35 ms·

Deploying key transparency at WhatsApp

204 points by snowboarder63 3y ago

snowboarder63 3y ago
WhatsApp announced that they’re adding key transparency to enhance end-to-end encryption verification within their suite of apps. There’s a blog post going into details on the engineering blog including announcing that the core logic for managing an auditable key directory is being open-sourced on Github: https://github.com/facebook/akd https://github.com/facebook/akd
- rvnx 3y ago
  The problem is not technical, FB could write anything, the security of the system is as weak as its weakest link. The problem here is way way behind the computer. https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/ The weakest link here, is that Facebook has to respect US laws. They don't have a choice there. So, if US law permits or requests in some way interception of communications, or that operators have to report certain activities, then your right to secrecy is done. Of course, a random user won't have its dog food or gardening communications intercepted, but once you trigger certain patterns, welcome to the new "user trials / feature flags / beta". Not saying it specifically for WhatsApp, it's valid for any US-based app -> and broadly any app where the founders may eventually be arrested by the US (as the US has a lot of extra-jurisdiction power). (think about it, how easy it would be to decrypt Mega.nz file, for example in a real-life scenario. One push of code on one URL to send back the part about the # sign, and done, or to activate new trials in Google Chrome, or to push a Play Store update to single users, etc...). I'd be really surprised that Zuck takes responsibility and ends up in jail because he refuses to execute a legal request regarding imminent terrorism attack (risking penal risk and being charged as helping the criminals, well, there's a plus; that's more time to spend in the Metaverse). The most likely scenario, is that the US-gov is very powerful and capable to enforce laws in their own country and that you have to respect the laws if you want you company to continue. Same with China.
  - russell_h 3y ago
    You're describing exactly the problem that key transparency helps to solve. With this rolled out, the WhatsApp app itself will be able to detect, by default without any manual verification, if FB attempts to MITM the connection. While this doesn't make it technically impossible for Facebook to modify the app and servers, it does make it organizationally almost impossible to do so secretly. Such a move would require the involvement of numerous individuals across multiple teams and would be noticeable to security researchers through changes to the app. This approach is taking off in a bunch of similar problem spaces (web PKI, code signing, etc), so very exciting to see it applied here. Randomly, and somewhat weirdly, Facebook actually offered one of the first Certificate Transparency monitoring tools, which made it possible to monitor all certificates issued for your domain using a very similar approach: https://www.facebook.com/notes/3497286220327506/ https://www.facebook.com/notes/3497286220327506/
    - rvnx 3y ago
      Not really ? I don't see what prevents the app from pushing a decoded copy of the conversation ? Even a variant of Skype was caught doing such (we only know about it because they left the server which had the raw logs completely open). And still, Skype is very secure/encrypted/blablabla; which is true, but within the borders of local regulations. https://web.archive.org/web/20090210230204/http://www.informationweek.com/news/telecom/voip/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=210605439 https://web.archive.org/web/20090210230204/http://www.inform... The end comment/advice from the US part is even a bit funny: "travelers should assume that all communications are monitored."
      - dheera 3y ago
        Exactly, without Zuck opening the protocol and sanctioning the use of open-source clients it is not meaningful.
        rvnx 3y ago
        Somehow I think this is still possible. The engineers behind WhatsApp seem to be very talented, and they may be able to convince Zuck that an open client would increase trust in Meta's brands, and increase usage (which can then be used to promote other Meta's products). If they keep the server-side closed, it's totally fair I think.
- gouggoug 3y ago
  I can’t really put my finger on why, but this comment looks like it came straight from chatGPT. Did it?
  - imwillofficial 3y ago
    Cut this crap out. This type of questioning all the time will not be good for HN.
    - axus 3y ago
      Using chatGPT to make a comment isn't necessarily a bad thing. I'd say the curiosity about how the comment was written is a good thing, as long as it's not a criticism.
      - mardifoufs 3y ago
        Sure, but it's still pretty rude because it's usually baseless. And as you said, it doesn't even really matter. If the comment is bad, just downvote it. If it's good enough, why even bring it up?
        InCityDreams 3y ago
        "Don't ask rude questions", usually said by those with something to hide. Obviously there's a current novelty factor with cgpt answers, and i for one am happy people 'challenge' them. If the comment isn't what you like, ignore it?
        imwillofficial 3y ago
        This is starting witch hunts for ai generated comments, attempting to discredit the comment by its format, not its content. This violates the goodwill we all share in conversation on HN.
      - wkat4242 3y ago
        Why would someone even bother using a chatbot to write a comment? Just writing it would be a lot quicker. There isn't really anything to gain here with that either.
pmlnr 3y ago
I wonder if this can be used to replace the fairly broken GPG keyservers.
- thepangolino 3y ago
  GPG key management should have been built into vCard and CardDAV! It's such a missed opportunity!
- detourdog 3y ago
  I think this is interesting since Apple is also turning key management over to the Users. Identity Key management seems like the next step in the App Store dance.
  - dmix 3y ago
    > Identity Key management seems like the next step in the App Store dance. Can you expand on what you mean by this?
    - detourdog 3y ago
      Warning this is all my opinion and one should use their own judgement. Apple's whole identity system is basically kerberos+ldap. This is how Apple deals with identity and authentication. Apple has made recent announcements at handing this management to the user. This is how Apple will open up the App Store. There will be a status quo set-up and an open set-up. The status quo will be for those who could give a flying flip about all the freedom people claim they are missing out on. The open set-up will let the identity owner share their keys with anyone they one want. Apple can use all sorts of alerts and lock down all of data held by Apple and the user can create and share keys with whoever they want without providing unintended data access held by Apple. Facebook users will create keys to use with their iOS device and and that will be the point that FB can start to collect data. The only thing this is based on is my Sysadmining Macs since about 1989.
- upofadown 3y ago
  The OpenPGP SKS keyservers are broken because they are append only. So script kiddies can do stuff like signing a particular key zillions of times or swamping the servers with zillions of bogus OpenPGP identities. Afterwards there is no way to fix things. The system discussed in the article (Parakeet) is also append only. So it would be vulnerable to the same sort of attacks. The difference is that it can eventually expire old entries in a reasonable way to free up resources. So no help against signature attacks but possibly of help against the resource usage of bogus identities. The bogus identities would still exist though. I think there might be merit to the overall idea of having a semi-trusted entity in charge of the system and then making it so that others can judge that what that entity is doing is reasonable. Still a problem if the entity goes rogue and you have to replace it. I suppose that is a problem in the Whatsapp case as well.
sschueller 3y ago
Why not open source the client?
- anonym29 3y ago
  Parent company: Facebook
- colesantiago 3y ago
  This. Meta probably doesn't make any money from WhatsApp anyway it doesn't really hurt them to open source the WhatsApp mobile apps.
  - sdfghswe 3y ago
    It's about power. If they DON'T open source now, with very little effort they have the option to in the future. They don't make money now, but maybe circumstances change? No one knows the future, and we don't know their plans. But if they do open source it, then it will take a lot of hard work to revert it. In other words, it's a company and this is their asset.
    - palata 3y ago
      I see your point, but Signal is out there and it does pretty much exactly what WhatsApp does. It's just that people are too lazy to switch, because they don't care about their client being open source.
      - sdfghswe 3y ago
        I support your point on open source. At the same time, it has to be said that Signal doesn't to "pretty much exactly" what WhatsApp does. On my Android it's quite sluggish, whereas WhatsApp is very smooth.
        palata 3y ago
        Works very well on my Android, on a not-very-powerful phone...
bsaul 3y ago
I've read the post and i don't understand exactly which scenario they're trying to solve. i think it's aimed at solving the problem of someone impersonating whatsapp server and responding with corrupted public keys ( but then this person could also impersonate the key repository server ?) it doesn't however protect users against whatsapp cooperating with states to introduce spying devices / intermediate in your conversation. Does it ?
- bubbleRefuge 3y ago
  I think in certain countries there are easier ways to clone numbers and also to generate links to switch a whatsapp account to another phone. Attackers will then hijack the account and send out SOS status updates and messages to contacts asking for money. Public Key verify can help 2 parties to authenticate manually so to speak.
  - bsaul 3y ago
    In the scenario you're describing, what would let whatsapp know it actually shouldn't register that new device in the public key repository ? Either whatsapp knows the phone is hacking the account to a new number / device, in which case it should simply disable it, or it doesn't and then it will treat it exactly like a normal one.
    - bubbleRefuge 3y ago
      Well the pubic key would refresh and the other side could see that. I think whatsapp already sends public key refreshes anyway.
  - abdullahkhalids 3y ago
    When I left Canada after my PhD, I stopped paying for my pre-paid phone plan for my Canadian number. A couple of months later, someone tried to scam my cousin in Pakistan, using Whatsapp. The scammer 1. Acquired my Canadian number. 2. Identified it as "my" account, and downloaded a picture of my social media to use as a Whatsapp display picture. 3. Somehow, identified my cousin as a potential target. Not sure how they did it. 4. Located where roughly my cousin lived. Perhaps via social media check-ins or some other way. 5. Asked my cousin to meet in a park not too far from his house, because I was in trouble and needed money. Thankfully, my cousin did not fall for the scam and contacted me via other means to verify.
H8crilA 3y ago
One thing I do not understand: how does web.whatsapp.com work even if my phone is turned off? The key must be somehow transported via Facebook servers to my PC.
- m348e912 3y ago
  Good question. Have you confirmed it works when your phone is off? I haven't tried.
- psychphysic 3y ago
  WhatsApp web generates a key which your phone signs and then sender's encrypt messages for all those keys. Presumably this means that the device knows how many devices it will be send to.
  - bjt2n3904 3y ago
    If the private subkey is stored on their servers, then that means their servers are one of the "ends" in "end to end encryption", and they can read all your messages. Like putting a screen door on a submarine.
    - aaomidi 3y ago
      It’s stored in a local session on your computer. You won’t be able to start a new session. So no, not their servers.
- emsixteen 3y ago
  Is this a thing now? Never used to work for me, always got an error about needing my phone to be on.
  - warp 3y ago
    Yes, this is part of their multi-device support, which was in beta at the end of 2021 and then rolled out to everyone some time later. https://www.makeuseof.com/use-whatsapp-multiple-devices/ https://www.makeuseof.com/use-whatsapp-multiple-devices/
cbeach 3y ago
Unfortunately this provides zero guarantees of privacy unless I trust Meta's deployed WhatsApp client to handle my E2E decrypted messages with care and privacy. Seems clear we cannot trust Meta, given they've been fined more than a billion Euros for lax data protection. Meta have set aside two billion Euros to cover potential fines in 2023.
- jve 3y ago
  Well, you have to establish chain of trust to use ANYTHING. By using whatsapp, you trust: 1. FB Won't push code that relays your messages somwhere 2. Google won't backdoor your Android 3. Some networking driver does its job 4. Broadband manufacturer hasn't introduced hardware backdoor 5. Hope GOV won't ask things to FB Sure there are tons of more points. But the good thing is, everything else out of this circle has a really hard time penetrating your privacy.
  - palata 3y ago
    I guess the point of the parent is that if the client was open source, one could audit it. But you're right, you need to trust something at some point (be it your hardware, at the lowest level).
WorldPeas 3y ago
A past thread that may be of interest: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25685446 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25685446
annadane 3y ago
But why would anyone use Whatsapp after the Onavo stuff?
- hakanderyal 3y ago
  Billions of people using it creates a strong network effect...
  - annadane 3y ago
    Sure, network effects are hard to overcome; my point is that Zuckerberg bought it as a competition killing move so they're not likely to put any quality control into it
    - palata 3y ago
      I guess you are entitled to your own opinion (which I disagree with, though I recommend using Signal because the clients are open source). IMO the answer to your original question is: lock-in effect. People are generally too lazy to move to an alternative, and on top of that, if they decide moving to one, they don't necessarily know which one to chose. And many privacy-advocates don't help by being (again IMO) too extreme: "Do NOT use Signal, you MUST use <choose your complicated ultra-secure alternative here>".
- dijit 3y ago
  Care to elaborate? All I can find is that Meta bought a VPN company under that name. Was it forced into Whatsapp somehow?
- JohnFen 3y ago
  I use WhatsApp to talk to friends in other nations who only use WhatsApp. I don't consider it to be a secure communications channel.
tgtweak 3y ago
The privacy policy alone on whatsapp is what is keeping everyone I know off of it. It's egregious. FB is 100% snooping on what is being discussed, and if they are now moving to fully client-to-client encrypted on ALL chats (not just the ones you explicitly choose) it's only because they're losing market share to alternatives that are more trustworthy.
- tapoxi 3y ago
  Whatsapp has been fully e2e for years, maybe since 2016? It uses the Signal protocol.
  - NayamAmarshe 3y ago
    > It uses the Signal protocol. Is there any evidence for this? Like any independent audits like Signal and Telegram have for their protocols?
    - tapoxi 3y ago
      It was done by Signal themselves: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/ https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/ The client is closed so it can't be independently verified outside of sniffing traffic or decompilation I assume.
- Armic 3y ago
  As someone unfamiliar with their privacy policy, can you explain what’s egregious about it?
  - tgtweak 3y ago
    Remember when they tried to force everyone to accept the new terms or they would disable access after a certain date? Then they walked it back after people started using alternative platforms. https://www.livemint.com/technology/apps/whatsapp-to-make-new-terms-of-service-optional-for-users-report-11630058592460.html https://www.livemint.com/technology/apps/whatsapp-to-make-ne...
rsaesha 3y ago
Yet SMS based authentication still is a thing. Like SIM duplication and fake bases weren't a thing. Yikes.
- filenox 3y ago
  That's why you can enable a two-step verification PIN. You're asked to provide this PIN after installing Whatsapp on a new device. https://faq.whatsapp.com/1095301557782068 https://faq.whatsapp.com/1095301557782068
  - jve 3y ago
    FYI It also asks PIN from time to time on the same device too. Just a small inconvenience.
    - pas 3y ago
      It's a reminder, right? Signal has the same feature.
- switch007 3y ago
  What do you suggest as an alternative, taking in to account their 2 billion users?
  - JohnFen 3y ago
    Using one of the standard authenticator apps would be much better, and at least as feasible as SMS.
    - UncleMeat 3y ago
      The authenticator apps are just as weak as SMS against phishing, which is a gazillion times more common than sim swaps. The authenticator apps cause loss of credentials more often because people don't back them up and then drop their phones in the toilet. The thing that makes SMS weak to sim swaps is also the thing that keeps a mountain of people from losing access to their accounts.
londons_explore 3y ago
If I'm understanding correctly... This merkle tree should give clues as to how many users whatsapp has (unless they insert fake users - but either way, it gives a lower bound). It also allows me to see how often a user re-registers (ie. sets up a new phone). Currently, I can see that if I have a conversation with a user, but with this public log, I can see the same info for the whole world?
- rvnx 3y ago
  If we can guess when a key was added in relation to another, it may even be possible for us to deduce who has initiated a conversation with whom ?
londons_explore 3y ago
Can this public log be used outside whatsapp? Ie. could a third party app use it as a way for two people to verify each other's identity securely knowing only the other persons telephone number?
- Aachen 3y ago
  That would actually be a better application than what they're doing here. In your scenario, you're trusting that Facebook's and that third-party app's servers aren't compromised. What Facebook is publishing here is Facebook verifying that Facebook isn't compromised or compelled. Anyway this idea is out there and most typically done with PGP, using the standard tooling to sign whatever info (or key) you want people to be able to verify regardless of what platform you're on.
  - palata 3y ago
    > What Facebook is publishing here is Facebook verifying that Facebook isn't compromised or compelled. I don't think so. Anyone could run a third-party audit record, right? At least I thought that was the whole point of it... See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35555910 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35555910
    - Aachen 3y ago
      I think we're having the same argument in two places :). I would say let's centralize to here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35564592 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35564592 as I already replied there before seeing this reply.
londons_explore 3y ago
I occasionally verify my security barcode with friends, and so far have never found any MITM's. Has anyone ever found barcodes that mismatch, indicating a MITM? If my understanding is correct, then for this to happen, either someone must be impersonating whatsapps server (which involves faking an HTTPS cert), or whatsapp themselves must be running en evil server. Both of those are quite a high bar, even for a state sponsored attack.
- matthewdgreen 3y ago
  Some technical experts at GCHQ have publicly suggested using "ghost users" (a kind of server-forced MITM) as a way to wiretap encrypted messaging [0]. The proposal is slightly different from a traditional two-party MITM, since it involves adding additional users to group chats, but the basic idea is similar: legally compel messaging operators (e.g., WhatsApp) to participate in wiretapping. Presumably there are other clandestine agencies who might try to do something similar by illegally compromising service providers. Key transparency makes standard MITM much more detectable, and so it will significantly dissuade agencies and private actors from investing in those capabilities. It obviously doesn't solve all problems (governments will still be able to hack, and hypothetically even to mandate client changes that break the disable transparency) it removes a piece of low-hanging fruit and signals to governments that it isn't worth trying to exploit protocol weaknesses. [0] https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-more-informed-exceptional-access-debate https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-more-informed-excepti...
  - eganist 3y ago
    > Key transparency makes standard MITM much more detectable, and so it will significantly dissuade agencies and private actors from investing in those capabilities. Just the private actors. Agencies would just spend more on it, or investigate side channels that achieve the same ends.
    - palata 3y ago
      > Agencies would just spend more on it That's the whole point of security: you try to make it too costly for your opponent to do it. That's why you have a threat model: to decide how much is "too costly".
RjQoLCOSwiIKfpm 3y ago
Meanwhile WhatsApp likely still coaxes people into enabling cloud backup, e.g. to Google Drive - which completely bypasses end-to-end encryption by putting plaintext chat history into the hands of Google et al. (Not a WhatsApp user myself anymore, don't know, sorry, if someone can confirm this in the comments would be nice. But it had been nagging to enable cloud backup long after they have been advertising "encryption" already.)
- dcsommer 3y ago
  Why not use the builtin E2EE backups? https://faq.whatsapp.com/490592613091019 https://faq.whatsapp.com/490592613091019
baby 3y ago
Props to the whatsapp team for improving the machinery! One question I have is how the protocol handles forks, or in other word what prevents the centralized service from sharing different views to different users? To me the problem screams: you need a consensus protocol. Without a consensus protocol you’re just hopping that users might be able to detect malicious forks by gossiping. If there’s a non-cryptocurrency usecase for blockchains, this is it.
- palata 3y ago
  > If there’s a non-cryptocurrency usecase for blockchains, this is it. They just explain in their blog post how they solve it. There is no non-cryptocurrency use-case for blockchains, period.
  - Aachen 3y ago
    A distributed blockchain would actually prevent the malicious server issue. It would theoretically be better. The practical problem is that you don't want to consume a ton of battery juice so this just isn't really feasible on mobile. (PoS wouldn't help because you'd still have to keep up with two billion users doing key changes.) Keybase ran into the same issue, there's a Github ticket somewhere where this was discussed. There was some blockchain lite they were hoping to implement, but that never happened, not sure if it was just off their radar or has issues of its own. I don't remember what its properties would be / if that would genuinely have distributed the trust for key exchanges. (Keybase was already publishing merkle root hashes on a chain, but the client didn't verify anything so it didn't help anyone, just like here with WhatsApp publishing the keys on a second system but that's still their own server controlled by a single party.)
    - palata 3y ago
      > A distributed blockchain would actually prevent the malicious server issue. It would theoretically be better. No it would not: the third-party audit record is there to prevent the malicious server issue, while being infinitely more practical than blockchain. Blockchain enables crypto-currencies. For the rest, we have more practical solutions already.
vrglvrglvrgl 3y ago
[dead]
anon4982 3y ago
[dead]
jlnho 3y ago
Genuinely curious: how do I know Whatsapp isn't keeping a copy of my private key somewhere?
- UncleMeat 3y ago
  The same way you'd know that Signal isn't keeping a copy of your private key somewhere - people can inspect the clients. Yes, the app could use some sort of really sneaky way of leaking the key such that nobody ever finds it. It would also be possible for the developers to distribute a very specific version of the client that does this only for a very specific region and device combo to minimize the likelihood that this is caught. But it is the sort of thing that would both be unimaginably bad for PR and challenging to keep under wraps.
  - hammock 3y ago
    Is WhatsApp client open source?
    - jlnho 3y ago
      no
    - UncleMeat 3y ago
      No. But plenty of people are good at looking at decompiled code. I'm more experienced with Android reverse engineering, so somebody else would need to comment on ios. But dalvik bytecode isn't too far from what people are used to looking at and the decompilers up to java are quite good. The native libs are the only actual challenge and even then there are tons of people out there who have no problem throwing ghidra at a binary and understanding it effectively. Publishing the source online doesn't fundamentally change the way that interested parties can inspect the client. And the reversing process has the nice property of actually guaranteeing that the thing you are looking at is what runs on the device.
      - NayamAmarshe 3y ago
        Don't they obfuscate the code though? Decompiling APKs makes sense but they obfuscate it on purpose. Also, WhatsApp's T&C forbid you from doing it anyway.
EGreg 3y ago
This is silly. You’re just taking their word for it: ”When they do match this confirms a secure, end-to-end encrypted conversation.” - Says Meta. This doesn’t matter. Why would we trust the word of a giant corporation that has lied to us repeatedly and abused every single loophole they can, to safeguard our private chats? Lies and deceit just in the last few years: WhatsApp messages: https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-reads-whatsapp-messages-encryption-2021-9?amp https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-reads-whatsapp-mess... Audio: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-13/facebook-paid-hundreds-of-contractors-to-transcribe-users-audio https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-13/facebook-... Video: https://medium.com/macoclock/apples-ios-14-catches-facebook-spying-on-millions-through-the-camera-be7853a3b39d https://medium.com/macoclock/apples-ios-14-catches-facebook-... Metadata: https://www.propublica.org/article/how-facebook-undermines-privacy-protections-for-its-2-billion-whatsapp-users https://www.propublica.org/article/how-facebook-undermines-p... They could easily ship any version of a client to anyone at any time. The answer is just to opt out of Big Tech and communicate without using clients and infrastructure of giant centralized corporations! Use open source alternatives. Capitalism and the profit motive will always be pitting them against their own users, trying to extract value from the data for their shareholders.
- palata 3y ago
  You have to trust their clients, since they are not open source. I agree with that. Still this project in particular seems nice. Why couldn't Signal deploy a similar thing, for instance?
  - Aachen 3y ago
    Because it's a very marginal improvement. It's Facebook verifying that Facebook's other server is providing you the right key; I'm not holding my breath for Signal to start doing the same. I'd honestly hope they'd instead focus on usernames, message editing, markdown, or any of the other features it's still missing compared to Wire or Element. (In Signal's defense, it's the most stable of the three so that's why I've got my family using Signal, but I wish for Wire's, or even better, Telegram's feature set on a daily basis.)
timwis 3y ago
Something I've often pondered: what about push notifications? Aren't their contents floating around in your phone in plain text? I've thought about it since I used to use https://www.pushbullet.com/ https://www.pushbullet.com/ (a great app, by the way) to show my mobile push notifications on my desktop. Really convenient, but a bit worrisome that an app can read these notifications in the first place! I'm aware that you can change the notifications to not show their contents, which may resolve this issue, but (a) I imagine they're still being _transmitted_ in full, and (b) most users don't do that, of course. Anyone know the answer to this?
- TobTobXX 3y ago
  This is usually done by sending a push message with no content, that just prompts the app to fetch messages whenever new ones are available. Of course, if the App then proceeds to post the message contents to a notification in plaintext, well then... But you can adjust the settings for what to display in the notif and of course just disable the notifications, so no other app will be able to listen.
  - psnehanshu 3y ago
    For that the app must be in foreground. How does WhatsApp manage to be always on the foreground? My app always gets killed by Android.
    - pas 3y ago
      by having a permanent/persistent notification. for example KeePass2Android does it pretty well. (usually when the battery saver kicks in it kills these semi-foreground things.) when the phone starts the user has to first start the app though (and I found this to be true for Signal, Skype and probably for WhatsApp too)
      - psnehanshu 3y ago
        WhatsApp doesn't have a persistent notification though. > when the phone starts the user has to first start the app though Just tested this and this is not the case with WhatsApp. I am on a Samsung and I am not sure if WhatsApp get's any special treatment.
ot 3y ago
This thread by Matthew Green explains a bit better why this is significant: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/1646516798840516609 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/16465167988405166...
- palata 3y ago
  Also works on nitter: https://nitter.net/matthew_d_green/status/1646516798840516609 https://nitter.net/matthew_d_green/status/164651679884051660... And Mastodon: https://ioc.exchange/@matthew_d_green/110192257970175203 https://ioc.exchange/@matthew_d_green/110192257970175203
hairofadog 3y ago
WhatsApp claims to be private and secure, but they insist on slurping up your entire address book before they'll let you use the app (or to be more specific, you can't do things like name a contact or start a group chat without allowing them to upload your entire address book). Is that data encrypted in such a way that Meta can't sell or make the data available to third-parties who might use it in nefarious ways? Or do they deposit that data directly into their bank account? I'm in the US, but the owner of the company I work for lives in Europe and refuses to use anything other than WhatsApp to communicate, so it's a tremendous pain in the ass. I wish Apple had the concept of multiple address books so I could choose a limited or even fake dataset to hand over in cases like this.
- codethief 3y ago
  > I'm in the US, but the owner of the company I work for lives in Europe and refuses to use anything other than WhatsApp to communicate I feel your pain. It doesn't even make that much sense anymore: So many people in Europe have Signal these days…
  - kibwen 3y ago
    If a company wants to dictate the software that its employees use, then it's the company's moral responsibility to provide hardware to run that software on. Not a chance in hell that I'm installing random spyware on my personal machines just to send an IM to my boss.
- sgjohnson 3y ago
  No. It’s because the metadata is enough for the 3 letter agencies. They are pefectly happy knowing who’s in your contacts, who and when are you texting, and who’s in the contact book of your counterparty without knowing exactly what are you talking about.
- cl3misch 3y ago
  I also feel your pain. In your specific case, you could not allow Whatsapp access to your contacts, and still use it with your employer? Of course, that does not prevent your colleagues from uploading their contacts...
xony 3y ago
[dead]
NoImmatureAdHom 3y ago
Their promises are worthless unless all client-side software is open-source and available for inspection with reproducible builds. It is unfortunate that WhatsApp managed to get significant network effects so fast (especially in Europe), meaning that many people feel the "have to" use it. If you "have to" use it: 0: encourage people to switch to Signal, Session, Briar, Matrix, etc. 1: you can use matrix bridges and similar things so you don't have to have Facebook's spyware on your phone. Examples: -beeper.com (pulls together many messaging platforms, WhatsApp Twitter Slack IRC Instagram Telegram...) (can self-host) -element.io operates another matrix-bridge-for-hire (can self-host) -texts.com does something similar, but I don't know the details -probably more I don't know about :-)
upofadown 3y ago
It wasn't clear to me from reading the article what the specific usability improvement is here. So you still have to compare the ridiculously long number once? With each and every device that anyone you want to message with owns? What does it mean if you don't? It used to be relatively clear that you had to verify everyone and maintain that verification. This seems potentially more complicated...
- palata 3y ago
  My understanding is that with this, your client can verify the key automatically. If you don't trust that verification, then you have to do the manual check.
foolinaround 3y ago
Does this in any way enhance protection of a citizen from government or other powerful actors?
throwaway292939 3y ago
Is the weakest link here iCloud backups? Afaik, the backups are encrypted but Apple has the key and is the one doing this encryption.
alexisaaaag 3y ago
So... How can we access the private certificates on our devices? Without direct access to those this has no partial privacy safeguard. Furthermore, Facebook issued the private keys to us for every contact, therefore they have the private and public key to every contact pair we've ever made.. and can therefore decrypt every message we've ever made. What proof do we have that this is not the case?
- alexisaaaag 3y ago
  It's likely not end-to-end encryption if you need to trust somebody. There should be a zero-trust policy in place.
ThePowerOfFuet 3y ago
This looks like a response to Apple: https://www.macrumors.com/2022/12/07/new-imessage-apple-id-security-features/ https://www.macrumors.com/2022/12/07/new-imessage-apple-id-s...

204 points by snowboarder63 3y ago

WhatsApp announced that they’re adding key transparency to enhance end-to-end encryption verification within their suite of apps. There’s a blog post going into details on the engineering blog including announcing that the core logic for managing an auditable key directory is being open-sourced on Github: https://github.com/facebook/akd https://github.com/facebook/akd

rvnx 3y ago
The problem is not technical, FB could write anything, the security of the system is as weak as its weakest link. The problem here is way way behind the computer. https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/ The weakest link here, is that Facebook has to respect US laws. They don't have a choice there. So, if US law permits or requests in some way interception of communications, or that operators have to report certain activities, then your right to secrecy is done. Of course, a random user won't have its dog food or gardening communications intercepted, but once you trigger certain patterns, welcome to the new "user trials / feature flags / beta". Not saying it specifically for WhatsApp, it's valid for any US-based app -> and broadly any app where the founders may eventually be arrested by the US (as the US has a lot of extra-jurisdiction power). (think about it, how easy it would be to decrypt Mega.nz file, for example in a real-life scenario. One push of code on one URL to send back the part about the # sign, and done, or to activate new trials in Google Chrome, or to push a Play Store update to single users, etc...). I'd be really surprised that Zuck takes responsibility and ends up in jail because he refuses to execute a legal request regarding imminent terrorism attack (risking penal risk and being charged as helping the criminals, well, there's a plus; that's more time to spend in the Metaverse). The most likely scenario, is that the US-gov is very powerful and capable to enforce laws in their own country and that you have to respect the laws if you want you company to continue. Same with China.
- russell_h 3y ago
  You're describing exactly the problem that key transparency helps to solve. With this rolled out, the WhatsApp app itself will be able to detect, by default without any manual verification, if FB attempts to MITM the connection. While this doesn't make it technically impossible for Facebook to modify the app and servers, it does make it organizationally almost impossible to do so secretly. Such a move would require the involvement of numerous individuals across multiple teams and would be noticeable to security researchers through changes to the app. This approach is taking off in a bunch of similar problem spaces (web PKI, code signing, etc), so very exciting to see it applied here. Randomly, and somewhat weirdly, Facebook actually offered one of the first Certificate Transparency monitoring tools, which made it possible to monitor all certificates issued for your domain using a very similar approach: https://www.facebook.com/notes/3497286220327506/ https://www.facebook.com/notes/3497286220327506/
  - rvnx 3y ago
    Not really ? I don't see what prevents the app from pushing a decoded copy of the conversation ? Even a variant of Skype was caught doing such (we only know about it because they left the server which had the raw logs completely open). And still, Skype is very secure/encrypted/blablabla; which is true, but within the borders of local regulations. https://web.archive.org/web/20090210230204/http://www.informationweek.com/news/telecom/voip/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=210605439 https://web.archive.org/web/20090210230204/http://www.inform... The end comment/advice from the US part is even a bit funny: "travelers should assume that all communications are monitored."
    - dheera 3y ago
      Exactly, without Zuck opening the protocol and sanctioning the use of open-source clients it is not meaningful.
      - rvnx 3y ago
        Somehow I think this is still possible. The engineers behind WhatsApp seem to be very talented, and they may be able to convince Zuck that an open client would increase trust in Meta's brands, and increase usage (which can then be used to promote other Meta's products). If they keep the server-side closed, it's totally fair I think.
gouggoug 3y ago
I can’t really put my finger on why, but this comment looks like it came straight from chatGPT. Did it?
- imwillofficial 3y ago
  Cut this crap out. This type of questioning all the time will not be good for HN.
  - axus 3y ago
    Using chatGPT to make a comment isn't necessarily a bad thing. I'd say the curiosity about how the comment was written is a good thing, as long as it's not a criticism.
    - mardifoufs 3y ago
      Sure, but it's still pretty rude because it's usually baseless. And as you said, it doesn't even really matter. If the comment is bad, just downvote it. If it's good enough, why even bring it up?
      - InCityDreams 3y ago
        "Don't ask rude questions", usually said by those with something to hide. Obviously there's a current novelty factor with cgpt answers, and i for one am happy people 'challenge' them. If the comment isn't what you like, ignore it?
        imwillofficial 3y ago
        This is starting witch hunts for ai generated comments, attempting to discredit the comment by its format, not its content. This violates the goodwill we all share in conversation on HN.
    - wkat4242 3y ago
      Why would someone even bother using a chatbot to write a comment? Just writing it would be a lot quicker. There isn't really anything to gain here with that either.

pmlnr 3y ago

I wonder if this can be used to replace the fairly broken GPG keyservers.

thepangolino 3y ago
GPG key management should have been built into vCard and CardDAV! It's such a missed opportunity!
detourdog 3y ago
I think this is interesting since Apple is also turning key management over to the Users. Identity Key management seems like the next step in the App Store dance.
- dmix 3y ago
  > Identity Key management seems like the next step in the App Store dance. Can you expand on what you mean by this?
  - detourdog 3y ago
    Warning this is all my opinion and one should use their own judgement. Apple's whole identity system is basically kerberos+ldap. This is how Apple deals with identity and authentication. Apple has made recent announcements at handing this management to the user. This is how Apple will open up the App Store. There will be a status quo set-up and an open set-up. The status quo will be for those who could give a flying flip about all the freedom people claim they are missing out on. The open set-up will let the identity owner share their keys with anyone they one want. Apple can use all sorts of alerts and lock down all of data held by Apple and the user can create and share keys with whoever they want without providing unintended data access held by Apple. Facebook users will create keys to use with their iOS device and and that will be the point that FB can start to collect data. The only thing this is based on is my Sysadmining Macs since about 1989.
upofadown 3y ago
The OpenPGP SKS keyservers are broken because they are append only. So script kiddies can do stuff like signing a particular key zillions of times or swamping the servers with zillions of bogus OpenPGP identities. Afterwards there is no way to fix things. The system discussed in the article (Parakeet) is also append only. So it would be vulnerable to the same sort of attacks. The difference is that it can eventually expire old entries in a reasonable way to free up resources. So no help against signature attacks but possibly of help against the resource usage of bogus identities. The bogus identities would still exist though. I think there might be merit to the overall idea of having a semi-trusted entity in charge of the system and then making it so that others can judge that what that entity is doing is reasonable. Still a problem if the entity goes rogue and you have to replace it. I suppose that is a problem in the Whatsapp case as well.

sschueller 3y ago

Why not open source the client?

anonym29 3y ago
Parent company: Facebook
colesantiago 3y ago
This. Meta probably doesn't make any money from WhatsApp anyway it doesn't really hurt them to open source the WhatsApp mobile apps.
- sdfghswe 3y ago
  It's about power. If they DON'T open source now, with very little effort they have the option to in the future. They don't make money now, but maybe circumstances change? No one knows the future, and we don't know their plans. But if they do open source it, then it will take a lot of hard work to revert it. In other words, it's a company and this is their asset.
  - palata 3y ago
    I see your point, but Signal is out there and it does pretty much exactly what WhatsApp does. It's just that people are too lazy to switch, because they don't care about their client being open source.
    - sdfghswe 3y ago
      I support your point on open source. At the same time, it has to be said that Signal doesn't to "pretty much exactly" what WhatsApp does. On my Android it's quite sluggish, whereas WhatsApp is very smooth.
      - palata 3y ago
        Works very well on my Android, on a not-very-powerful phone...

bsaul 3y ago

I've read the post and i don't understand exactly which scenario they're trying to solve. i think it's aimed at solving the problem of someone impersonating whatsapp server and responding with corrupted public keys ( but then this person could also impersonate the key repository server ?) it doesn't however protect users against whatsapp cooperating with states to introduce spying devices / intermediate in your conversation. Does it ?

bubbleRefuge 3y ago
I think in certain countries there are easier ways to clone numbers and also to generate links to switch a whatsapp account to another phone. Attackers will then hijack the account and send out SOS status updates and messages to contacts asking for money. Public Key verify can help 2 parties to authenticate manually so to speak.
- bsaul 3y ago
  In the scenario you're describing, what would let whatsapp know it actually shouldn't register that new device in the public key repository ? Either whatsapp knows the phone is hacking the account to a new number / device, in which case it should simply disable it, or it doesn't and then it will treat it exactly like a normal one.
  - bubbleRefuge 3y ago
    Well the pubic key would refresh and the other side could see that. I think whatsapp already sends public key refreshes anyway.
- abdullahkhalids 3y ago
  When I left Canada after my PhD, I stopped paying for my pre-paid phone plan for my Canadian number. A couple of months later, someone tried to scam my cousin in Pakistan, using Whatsapp. The scammer 1. Acquired my Canadian number. 2. Identified it as "my" account, and downloaded a picture of my social media to use as a Whatsapp display picture. 3. Somehow, identified my cousin as a potential target. Not sure how they did it. 4. Located where roughly my cousin lived. Perhaps via social media check-ins or some other way. 5. Asked my cousin to meet in a park not too far from his house, because I was in trouble and needed money. Thankfully, my cousin did not fall for the scam and contacted me via other means to verify.

H8crilA 3y ago

One thing I do not understand: how does web.whatsapp.com work even if my phone is turned off? The key must be somehow transported via Facebook servers to my PC.

m348e912 3y ago
Good question. Have you confirmed it works when your phone is off? I haven't tried.
psychphysic 3y ago
WhatsApp web generates a key which your phone signs and then sender's encrypt messages for all those keys. Presumably this means that the device knows how many devices it will be send to.
- bjt2n3904 3y ago
  If the private subkey is stored on their servers, then that means their servers are one of the "ends" in "end to end encryption", and they can read all your messages. Like putting a screen door on a submarine.
  - aaomidi 3y ago
    It’s stored in a local session on your computer. You won’t be able to start a new session. So no, not their servers.
emsixteen 3y ago
Is this a thing now? Never used to work for me, always got an error about needing my phone to be on.
- warp 3y ago
  Yes, this is part of their multi-device support, which was in beta at the end of 2021 and then rolled out to everyone some time later. https://www.makeuseof.com/use-whatsapp-multiple-devices/ https://www.makeuseof.com/use-whatsapp-multiple-devices/

cbeach 3y ago

Unfortunately this provides zero guarantees of privacy unless I trust Meta's deployed WhatsApp client to handle my E2E decrypted messages with care and privacy. Seems clear we cannot trust Meta, given they've been fined more than a billion Euros for lax data protection. Meta have set aside two billion Euros to cover potential fines in 2023.

jve 3y ago
Well, you have to establish chain of trust to use ANYTHING. By using whatsapp, you trust: 1. FB Won't push code that relays your messages somwhere 2. Google won't backdoor your Android 3. Some networking driver does its job 4. Broadband manufacturer hasn't introduced hardware backdoor 5. Hope GOV won't ask things to FB Sure there are tons of more points. But the good thing is, everything else out of this circle has a really hard time penetrating your privacy.
- palata 3y ago
  I guess the point of the parent is that if the client was open source, one could audit it. But you're right, you need to trust something at some point (be it your hardware, at the lowest level).

WorldPeas 3y ago

A past thread that may be of interest: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25685446 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25685446

annadane 3y ago

But why would anyone use Whatsapp after the Onavo stuff?

hakanderyal 3y ago
Billions of people using it creates a strong network effect...
- annadane 3y ago
  Sure, network effects are hard to overcome; my point is that Zuckerberg bought it as a competition killing move so they're not likely to put any quality control into it
  - palata 3y ago
    I guess you are entitled to your own opinion (which I disagree with, though I recommend using Signal because the clients are open source). IMO the answer to your original question is: lock-in effect. People are generally too lazy to move to an alternative, and on top of that, if they decide moving to one, they don't necessarily know which one to chose. And many privacy-advocates don't help by being (again IMO) too extreme: "Do NOT use Signal, you MUST use <choose your complicated ultra-secure alternative here>".
dijit 3y ago
Care to elaborate? All I can find is that Meta bought a VPN company under that name. Was it forced into Whatsapp somehow?
JohnFen 3y ago
I use WhatsApp to talk to friends in other nations who only use WhatsApp. I don't consider it to be a secure communications channel.

tgtweak 3y ago

The privacy policy alone on whatsapp is what is keeping everyone I know off of it. It's egregious. FB is 100% snooping on what is being discussed, and if they are now moving to fully client-to-client encrypted on ALL chats (not just the ones you explicitly choose) it's only because they're losing market share to alternatives that are more trustworthy.

tapoxi 3y ago
Whatsapp has been fully e2e for years, maybe since 2016? It uses the Signal protocol.
- NayamAmarshe 3y ago
  > It uses the Signal protocol. Is there any evidence for this? Like any independent audits like Signal and Telegram have for their protocols?
  - tapoxi 3y ago
    It was done by Signal themselves: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/ https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/ The client is closed so it can't be independently verified outside of sniffing traffic or decompilation I assume.
Armic 3y ago
As someone unfamiliar with their privacy policy, can you explain what’s egregious about it?
- tgtweak 3y ago
  Remember when they tried to force everyone to accept the new terms or they would disable access after a certain date? Then they walked it back after people started using alternative platforms. https://www.livemint.com/technology/apps/whatsapp-to-make-new-terms-of-service-optional-for-users-report-11630058592460.html https://www.livemint.com/technology/apps/whatsapp-to-make-ne...

rsaesha 3y ago

Yet SMS based authentication still is a thing. Like SIM duplication and fake bases weren't a thing. Yikes.

filenox 3y ago
That's why you can enable a two-step verification PIN. You're asked to provide this PIN after installing Whatsapp on a new device. https://faq.whatsapp.com/1095301557782068 https://faq.whatsapp.com/1095301557782068
- jve 3y ago
  FYI It also asks PIN from time to time on the same device too. Just a small inconvenience.
  - pas 3y ago
    It's a reminder, right? Signal has the same feature.
switch007 3y ago
What do you suggest as an alternative, taking in to account their 2 billion users?
- JohnFen 3y ago
  Using one of the standard authenticator apps would be much better, and at least as feasible as SMS.
  - UncleMeat 3y ago
    The authenticator apps are just as weak as SMS against phishing, which is a gazillion times more common than sim swaps. The authenticator apps cause loss of credentials more often because people don't back them up and then drop their phones in the toilet. The thing that makes SMS weak to sim swaps is also the thing that keeps a mountain of people from losing access to their accounts.

londons_explore 3y ago

If I'm understanding correctly... This merkle tree should give clues as to how many users whatsapp has (unless they insert fake users - but either way, it gives a lower bound). It also allows me to see how often a user re-registers (ie. sets up a new phone). Currently, I can see that if I have a conversation with a user, but with this public log, I can see the same info for the whole world?

rvnx 3y ago
If we can guess when a key was added in relation to another, it may even be possible for us to deduce who has initiated a conversation with whom ?

londons_explore 3y ago

Can this public log be used outside whatsapp? Ie. could a third party app use it as a way for two people to verify each other's identity securely knowing only the other persons telephone number?

Aachen 3y ago
That would actually be a better application than what they're doing here. In your scenario, you're trusting that Facebook's and that third-party app's servers aren't compromised. What Facebook is publishing here is Facebook verifying that Facebook isn't compromised or compelled. Anyway this idea is out there and most typically done with PGP, using the standard tooling to sign whatever info (or key) you want people to be able to verify regardless of what platform you're on.
- palata 3y ago
  > What Facebook is publishing here is Facebook verifying that Facebook isn't compromised or compelled. I don't think so. Anyone could run a third-party audit record, right? At least I thought that was the whole point of it... See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35555910 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35555910
  - Aachen 3y ago
    I think we're having the same argument in two places :). I would say let's centralize to here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35564592 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35564592 as I already replied there before seeing this reply.

londons_explore 3y ago

I occasionally verify my security barcode with friends, and so far have never found any MITM's. Has anyone ever found barcodes that mismatch, indicating a MITM? If my understanding is correct, then for this to happen, either someone must be impersonating whatsapps server (which involves faking an HTTPS cert), or whatsapp themselves must be running en evil server. Both of those are quite a high bar, even for a state sponsored attack.

matthewdgreen 3y ago
Some technical experts at GCHQ have publicly suggested using "ghost users" (a kind of server-forced MITM) as a way to wiretap encrypted messaging [0]. The proposal is slightly different from a traditional two-party MITM, since it involves adding additional users to group chats, but the basic idea is similar: legally compel messaging operators (e.g., WhatsApp) to participate in wiretapping. Presumably there are other clandestine agencies who might try to do something similar by illegally compromising service providers. Key transparency makes standard MITM much more detectable, and so it will significantly dissuade agencies and private actors from investing in those capabilities. It obviously doesn't solve all problems (governments will still be able to hack, and hypothetically even to mandate client changes that break the disable transparency) it removes a piece of low-hanging fruit and signals to governments that it isn't worth trying to exploit protocol weaknesses. [0] https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-more-informed-exceptional-access-debate https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-more-informed-excepti...
- eganist 3y ago
  > Key transparency makes standard MITM much more detectable, and so it will significantly dissuade agencies and private actors from investing in those capabilities. Just the private actors. Agencies would just spend more on it, or investigate side channels that achieve the same ends.
  - palata 3y ago
    > Agencies would just spend more on it That's the whole point of security: you try to make it too costly for your opponent to do it. That's why you have a threat model: to decide how much is "too costly".

RjQoLCOSwiIKfpm 3y ago

Meanwhile WhatsApp likely still coaxes people into enabling cloud backup, e.g. to Google Drive - which completely bypasses end-to-end encryption by putting plaintext chat history into the hands of Google et al. (Not a WhatsApp user myself anymore, don't know, sorry, if someone can confirm this in the comments would be nice. But it had been nagging to enable cloud backup long after they have been advertising "encryption" already.)

dcsommer 3y ago
Why not use the builtin E2EE backups? https://faq.whatsapp.com/490592613091019 https://faq.whatsapp.com/490592613091019

baby 3y ago

Props to the whatsapp team for improving the machinery! One question I have is how the protocol handles forks, or in other word what prevents the centralized service from sharing different views to different users? To me the problem screams: you need a consensus protocol. Without a consensus protocol you’re just hopping that users might be able to detect malicious forks by gossiping. If there’s a non-cryptocurrency usecase for blockchains, this is it.

palata 3y ago
> If there’s a non-cryptocurrency usecase for blockchains, this is it. They just explain in their blog post how they solve it. There is no non-cryptocurrency use-case for blockchains, period.
- Aachen 3y ago
  A distributed blockchain would actually prevent the malicious server issue. It would theoretically be better. The practical problem is that you don't want to consume a ton of battery juice so this just isn't really feasible on mobile. (PoS wouldn't help because you'd still have to keep up with two billion users doing key changes.) Keybase ran into the same issue, there's a Github ticket somewhere where this was discussed. There was some blockchain lite they were hoping to implement, but that never happened, not sure if it was just off their radar or has issues of its own. I don't remember what its properties would be / if that would genuinely have distributed the trust for key exchanges. (Keybase was already publishing merkle root hashes on a chain, but the client didn't verify anything so it didn't help anyone, just like here with WhatsApp publishing the keys on a second system but that's still their own server controlled by a single party.)
  - palata 3y ago
    > A distributed blockchain would actually prevent the malicious server issue. It would theoretically be better. No it would not: the third-party audit record is there to prevent the malicious server issue, while being infinitely more practical than blockchain. Blockchain enables crypto-currencies. For the rest, we have more practical solutions already.

vrglvrglvrgl 3y ago

[dead]

anon4982 3y ago

[dead]

jlnho 3y ago

Genuinely curious: how do I know Whatsapp isn't keeping a copy of my private key somewhere?

UncleMeat 3y ago
The same way you'd know that Signal isn't keeping a copy of your private key somewhere - people can inspect the clients. Yes, the app could use some sort of really sneaky way of leaking the key such that nobody ever finds it. It would also be possible for the developers to distribute a very specific version of the client that does this only for a very specific region and device combo to minimize the likelihood that this is caught. But it is the sort of thing that would both be unimaginably bad for PR and challenging to keep under wraps.
- hammock 3y ago
  Is WhatsApp client open source?
  - jlnho 3y ago
    no
  - UncleMeat 3y ago
    No. But plenty of people are good at looking at decompiled code. I'm more experienced with Android reverse engineering, so somebody else would need to comment on ios. But dalvik bytecode isn't too far from what people are used to looking at and the decompilers up to java are quite good. The native libs are the only actual challenge and even then there are tons of people out there who have no problem throwing ghidra at a binary and understanding it effectively. Publishing the source online doesn't fundamentally change the way that interested parties can inspect the client. And the reversing process has the nice property of actually guaranteeing that the thing you are looking at is what runs on the device.
    - NayamAmarshe 3y ago
      Don't they obfuscate the code though? Decompiling APKs makes sense but they obfuscate it on purpose. Also, WhatsApp's T&C forbid you from doing it anyway.

EGreg 3y ago

This is silly. You’re just taking their word for it: ”When they do match this confirms a secure, end-to-end encrypted conversation.” - Says Meta. This doesn’t matter. Why would we trust the word of a giant corporation that has lied to us repeatedly and abused every single loophole they can, to safeguard our private chats? Lies and deceit just in the last few years: WhatsApp messages: https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-reads-whatsapp-messages-encryption-2021-9?amp https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-reads-whatsapp-mess... Audio: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-13/facebook-paid-hundreds-of-contractors-to-transcribe-users-audio https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-13/facebook-... Video: https://medium.com/macoclock/apples-ios-14-catches-facebook-spying-on-millions-through-the-camera-be7853a3b39d https://medium.com/macoclock/apples-ios-14-catches-facebook-... Metadata: https://www.propublica.org/article/how-facebook-undermines-privacy-protections-for-its-2-billion-whatsapp-users https://www.propublica.org/article/how-facebook-undermines-p... They could easily ship any version of a client to anyone at any time. The answer is just to opt out of Big Tech and communicate without using clients and infrastructure of giant centralized corporations! Use open source alternatives. Capitalism and the profit motive will always be pitting them against their own users, trying to extract value from the data for their shareholders.

palata 3y ago
You have to trust their clients, since they are not open source. I agree with that. Still this project in particular seems nice. Why couldn't Signal deploy a similar thing, for instance?
- Aachen 3y ago
  Because it's a very marginal improvement. It's Facebook verifying that Facebook's other server is providing you the right key; I'm not holding my breath for Signal to start doing the same. I'd honestly hope they'd instead focus on usernames, message editing, markdown, or any of the other features it's still missing compared to Wire or Element. (In Signal's defense, it's the most stable of the three so that's why I've got my family using Signal, but I wish for Wire's, or even better, Telegram's feature set on a daily basis.)

timwis 3y ago

Something I've often pondered: what about push notifications? Aren't their contents floating around in your phone in plain text? I've thought about it since I used to use https://www.pushbullet.com/ https://www.pushbullet.com/ (a great app, by the way) to show my mobile push notifications on my desktop. Really convenient, but a bit worrisome that an app can read these notifications in the first place! I'm aware that you can change the notifications to not show their contents, which may resolve this issue, but (a) I imagine they're still being _transmitted_ in full, and (b) most users don't do that, of course. Anyone know the answer to this?

TobTobXX 3y ago
This is usually done by sending a push message with no content, that just prompts the app to fetch messages whenever new ones are available. Of course, if the App then proceeds to post the message contents to a notification in plaintext, well then... But you can adjust the settings for what to display in the notif and of course just disable the notifications, so no other app will be able to listen.
- psnehanshu 3y ago
  For that the app must be in foreground. How does WhatsApp manage to be always on the foreground? My app always gets killed by Android.
  - pas 3y ago
    by having a permanent/persistent notification. for example KeePass2Android does it pretty well. (usually when the battery saver kicks in it kills these semi-foreground things.) when the phone starts the user has to first start the app though (and I found this to be true for Signal, Skype and probably for WhatsApp too)
    - psnehanshu 3y ago
      WhatsApp doesn't have a persistent notification though. > when the phone starts the user has to first start the app though Just tested this and this is not the case with WhatsApp. I am on a Samsung and I am not sure if WhatsApp get's any special treatment.

ot 3y ago

This thread by Matthew Green explains a bit better why this is significant: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/1646516798840516609 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/16465167988405166...

palata 3y ago
Also works on nitter: https://nitter.net/matthew_d_green/status/1646516798840516609 https://nitter.net/matthew_d_green/status/164651679884051660... And Mastodon: https://ioc.exchange/@matthew_d_green/110192257970175203 https://ioc.exchange/@matthew_d_green/110192257970175203

hairofadog 3y ago

WhatsApp claims to be private and secure, but they insist on slurping up your entire address book before they'll let you use the app (or to be more specific, you can't do things like name a contact or start a group chat without allowing them to upload your entire address book). Is that data encrypted in such a way that Meta can't sell or make the data available to third-parties who might use it in nefarious ways? Or do they deposit that data directly into their bank account? I'm in the US, but the owner of the company I work for lives in Europe and refuses to use anything other than WhatsApp to communicate, so it's a tremendous pain in the ass. I wish Apple had the concept of multiple address books so I could choose a limited or even fake dataset to hand over in cases like this.

codethief 3y ago
> I'm in the US, but the owner of the company I work for lives in Europe and refuses to use anything other than WhatsApp to communicate I feel your pain. It doesn't even make that much sense anymore: So many people in Europe have Signal these days…
- kibwen 3y ago
  If a company wants to dictate the software that its employees use, then it's the company's moral responsibility to provide hardware to run that software on. Not a chance in hell that I'm installing random spyware on my personal machines just to send an IM to my boss.
sgjohnson 3y ago
No. It’s because the metadata is enough for the 3 letter agencies. They are pefectly happy knowing who’s in your contacts, who and when are you texting, and who’s in the contact book of your counterparty without knowing exactly what are you talking about.
cl3misch 3y ago
I also feel your pain. In your specific case, you could not allow Whatsapp access to your contacts, and still use it with your employer? Of course, that does not prevent your colleagues from uploading their contacts...

xony 3y ago

[dead]

NoImmatureAdHom 3y ago

Their promises are worthless unless all client-side software is open-source and available for inspection with reproducible builds. It is unfortunate that WhatsApp managed to get significant network effects so fast (especially in Europe), meaning that many people feel the "have to" use it. If you "have to" use it: 0: encourage people to switch to Signal, Session, Briar, Matrix, etc. 1: you can use matrix bridges and similar things so you don't have to have Facebook's spyware on your phone. Examples: -beeper.com (pulls together many messaging platforms, WhatsApp Twitter Slack IRC Instagram Telegram...) (can self-host) -element.io operates another matrix-bridge-for-hire (can self-host) -texts.com does something similar, but I don't know the details -probably more I don't know about :-)

upofadown 3y ago

It wasn't clear to me from reading the article what the specific usability improvement is here. So you still have to compare the ridiculously long number once? With each and every device that anyone you want to message with owns? What does it mean if you don't? It used to be relatively clear that you had to verify everyone and maintain that verification. This seems potentially more complicated...

palata 3y ago
My understanding is that with this, your client can verify the key automatically. If you don't trust that verification, then you have to do the manual check.

foolinaround 3y ago

Does this in any way enhance protection of a citizen from government or other powerful actors?

throwaway292939 3y ago

Is the weakest link here iCloud backups? Afaik, the backups are encrypted but Apple has the key and is the one doing this encryption.

alexisaaaag 3y ago

So... How can we access the private certificates on our devices? Without direct access to those this has no partial privacy safeguard. Furthermore, Facebook issued the private keys to us for every contact, therefore they have the private and public key to every contact pair we've ever made.. and can therefore decrypt every message we've ever made. What proof do we have that this is not the case?

alexisaaaag 3y ago
It's likely not end-to-end encryption if you need to trust somebody. There should be a zero-trust policy in place.

ThePowerOfFuet 3y ago

This looks like a response to Apple: https://www.macrumors.com/2022/12/07/new-imessage-apple-id-security-features/ https://www.macrumors.com/2022/12/07/new-imessage-apple-id-s...