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Was there a piece of repealed regulation that would have prevented SVB's collapse? Or is this just generic airing out of all of SVB's dirty laundry now that the
by gruez 4y ago
Was there a piece of repealed regulation that would have prevented SVB's collapse? Or is this just generic airing out of all of SVB's dirty laundry now that they're pariahs?
- comte7092 4y agoThis regulation would have required that they undergo more rigorous stress testing by the fed. Would it have prevented a bank run by a bunch of spooked VCs? We’ll never know, but one would imagine it would have put them in a better financial position.
- JumpCrisscross 4y ago> have prevented a bank run by a bunch of spooked VCs Yes. If SVB weren’t insolvent, they could have borrowed at the Fed’s discount window to settle liabilities.
- threeseed 4y agoThe Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act [1] which was introduced in 2018 "increase the asset threshold at which certain enhanced prudential standards shall apply, from $50 billion to $250 billion". Apparently SVB had assets of ~$220 billion in 2022 [2]. [1] https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2155 https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/215... [2] https://fortune.com/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-svb-ceo-greg-becker-dodd-frank-trump-rollback-systemically-important-fdic/ https://fortune.com/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-svb-ceo-g...
- jjoonathan 4y ago[flagged]
- gruez 4y agoWould "enhanced prudential standards" have caught the interest rate risk that SVB was exposed to? I dug into this a bit, and it looks like the stress tests[1] that they prescribe seems to be around loan losses, not interest rate risk. [1] https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-II/subchapter-A/part-252#p-252.15(a) https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-II/subchapter-...
- lejohnq 4y agoI think it would cover interest rate risk because an increase in rates causes bond value to decrease, implying the bonds SVB held lose value and they would not be able to cover capital. And if they have to value it appropriately every quarter, the issue likely would have been seen earlier and maybe they could have changed their positions as the rates were rising instead of being in a hole and trying to do it all at once. At least I think that’s how the regulations might have worked here.
- zinekeller 4y agoLook at Basel III and their liquidity tests. TLDR: government bonds (Treasuries for SVB) that matures in 5+ years are considered illiquid, and banks which are subject to Basel III (which SVB would be under old rules) must have at least 100% liquidity coverage ratio (which based on SVB's client base would require SVB to hold ~30% in short-term bonds). Edit: this FT opine summarize the sillyness: https://www.ft.com/content/c95e7708-b903-405d-a017-963844eb3dc3 https://www.ft.com/content/c95e7708-b903-405d-a017-963844eb3... (paywall bypass: http://archive.today/2023.03.11-083455/https://www.ft.com/content/c95e7708-b903-405d-a017-963844eb3dc3 http://archive.today/2023.03.11-083455/https://www.ft.com/co...)
- lxm 4y agoThe requirement to mark-to-market and undergo liquidity tests I think would’ve flagged the interest rate exposure back when SVB started on this path. > Calculating the amount of a highly liquid asset. In calculating the amount of a highly liquid asset included in the liquidity buffer, the bank holding company must discount the fair market value of the asset to reflect any credit risk and market price volatility of the asset.
- gruez 4y agoThe part you quoted seems to be for "liquidity buffer" (ie. cash on hand for withdraws), not for the overall balance sheet. >A bank holding company subject to this subpart must maintain a liquidity buffer that is sufficient to meet the projected net stressed cash-flow need over the 30-day planning horizon of a liquidity stress test conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section under each scenario set forth in paragraph (a)(3)(i) through (iii) of this section.
- tome 4y agoStep-change regulations really are a bad idea. Everything should be tapered.
- fwlr 4y agoThe latter. Arguably, being exempt from Dodd-Frank may well have allowed SVB to be more resilient than otherwise. The general thrust of Dodd-Frank was to push banks away from high-risk investments. The Volcker Rule that’s at the heart of Dodd-Frank is most explicit about this, it expressly forbids certain types of investment for being too high-risk. Treasury bonds are considered to be some of the lowest-risk investments possible, with correspondingly low returns (in fact, in researching this I discovered, horrifyingly, that it’s not uncommon for Treasury bonds to be described as literally risk-free). The Volcker Rule has a specific exemption to explicitly allow trading in U.S. Government securities, in recognition of their perceived low risk. SVB held a lot of Treasury bonds, percentage-wise more than most other banks. This is because they had a lot of startups depositing a lot of venture capital funding, they needed somewhere to invest it, and Treasury bonds were one of the few investment options that were in regulatory compliance and available in large amounts. When the Federal Reserve started rapidly increasing interest rates, this tanked the value of Treasury bonds. And “tanked” is no exaggeration; there are grim charts from the beginning of this year like https://www.usbancorpassetmanagement.com/index/our-insights/quick-insights-blog/TheImpactofRisingRatesontheBankingSystem/_jcr_content/root/responsivegrid/image.coreimg.png/1672927656284/screen-shot-2023-01-05-at-9.07.23-am.png https://www.usbancorpassetmanagement.com/index/our-insights/... and back in November 2022 we had the Chairman of the FDIC warning that these unrealized losses could very quickly become actual losses for a bank that needed to increase liquidity. Which is precisely what happened to SVB, down to the letter. The argument that “Dodd-Frank exemption is good actually” goes like so: if the regulations were applied more stringently to SVB, they would have bought even more safe-bet Treasury bonds (and offered lower interest rates to depositors), and thus they would have been even more blown out by Federal Reserve increasing rates.
- bequanna 4y agoI think your explanation is missing one big thing: duration It isn’t that treasury bonds are inherently “risky”. The risk is that when you hold longer duration bonds at low interest rates like SVB did, even modest rate increases will have a large effect on value. Combine that with the bonehead investment in MBS which allegedly only yielded 1.5% at 10 year duration and you have massive losses.
- treis 4y agoI'm not sure if it's tied to a specific repeal, but letting them keep the MBS at face value on their books is an obvious mistake in hindsight. Also in retrospect they were likely insolvent or at best barely capitalized at the end of last year. Probably should have been pushed into receivership or forced to recapitalize then.
- smsm42 4y agoAs I understand, their problem wasn't capital as such, it was liquidity. I.e. they had the assets that were above their deposits, it's just that these assets were not liquid, so when the run happened, they predictably couldn't raise liquidity fast enough. If that's the case, adding more capital would help only if it'd be enough capital to cover all deposits participating in the run, but I'm not sure many banks have that amount of capital just laying around, if it's in billions. FDIC has billions though.
- shkkmo 4y agoThis framing is a bit weird. The bond assets are not worth enough to cover SVB's deposit liabilities. Thus in a very real sense SVB was insolvent. The fact that these were marked as "hold to maturity" for accounting purposes, means this insolvency was concealed until SVB faced a a liquidity crunch. The issue was never that these bonds can't be sold (are illiquid), but that their real value was much lower than how they were valued under the applicable accounting rules.
- smsm42 4y ago> The bond assets are not worth enough to cover SVB's deposit liabilities. I don't think this is actually true. Could you provide the source for that? I understood that the bond assets can not be converted to enough liquidity to cover withdrawal demands, but it's not the same thing. If you own a house worth $1M, and I ask you to give me $1M tomorrow, you couldn't do it - but that doesn't mean your house is worth less. It means it's an illiquid asset that can't be easily converted to cash. Even if you agreed to sell it for $100, you probably couldn't pull it off in one day. Maybe you could take a loan against the house - but even that is hard to do by tomorrow. > but that their real value was much lower What's "real value"? Is it the value of the income stream when held to maturity? Then I never encountered any mention that these bonds were bad (in fact, some of them were Treasuries which are as good as any bond can be) - could you provide a source for this claim? If you mean "fire sale" value then yes, of course the "fire sale" value was low - but that's not because the bonds were bad, you can not value an asset by it's "fire sale" value.
- machina_ex_deus 4y agoWhy do we even need regulations, isn't it in the shareholders best interests that the bank doesn't go bust? If these supposed regulations could have prevented shareholders from losing money, wouldn't they have done them voluntarily instead of needing regulations? It's not regulations that are the problem. They were obviously using this bank as a free margin account using customers money to leverage their debts. They did it because they have a lot of money to win when betting with other people's money and only 100% to lose. 10x margin and the government making your counterparty whole if you fail? Of course this degenerate bank used it in the most VC way. Don't make a single client of them whole. Those banking there probably had connections to the people making tons of money when the bets went their way. Those who recommended banking there need to lose their credibility. The risk they took was not a mistake. It was a feature. It was intended.
- MrMan 4y agoI mostly agree with this. these players should not be rewarded for using the deposits of the bank as a multiplier of their funds AUM, and the portfolio companies were pawns who willingly played along, or were ignorant and either way deserve to lose.
- fvdessen 4y agoYoud’t think people wouldn’t want to drive under the influence and risk dying in a car crash, but they do ! They also main innocent along the way. That’s why you need regulations.
- CPLX 4y agoYou need regulation because you have a better and more productive society when you have it than when you don’t. Having to pay a lot of attention to your bank to wonder what’s going on behind the scenes is work and requires expertise. There’s no reason to have everyone do it, we can create agencies full of experts to do it for us.
- machina_ex_deus 4y agoYou can't regulate away malicious intents from misaligned incentives. Regulations giving banks privileges is what caused this abuse to happen in the first place. You can't solve it with further regulations. Only thing that can stop this misalignment of incentives is to revoke the regulatory privileges of banks. Let everyone bank directly at the Fed. There's no reason these banks should get the privilege of holding other people's money. They dont hold the risk so they shouldn't hold the privilege.
- davidgerard 4y agoThis was indeed the specific regulation that would have stopped SVB's books from being allowed to get into its present state, yes. It was a Basel III requirement after the 2008 financial crisis.
- egberts1 4y agoExcept that SVB is considered a "nonbank" by Federal Reserve, no?
- davidgerard 4y agono? in what way?
- egberts1 4y agoThe earliest Federal Registry is this Federal Reserve Notice, dated March 14, 2014. "Finally, the Board has determined not to impose enhanced prudential standards on nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board through this final ($50B stress test) rule." Note the word "non-bank". And pre-dates any 2018 actions. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2014-03-27/html/2014-05699.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2014-03-27/html/2014-...