7 ms·

>Why would governments push back, when this hole which has already been used will _always_ be available? I'm not aware of a time when Apple pushed a software u

by dxf 4y ago

>Why would governments push back, when this hole which has already been used will _always_ be available? I'm not aware of a time when Apple pushed a software update (silently or otherwise) to defeat security for a user (or users). Can you provide a reference?

bboygravity 4y ago
The entire precondition for being able to do that is that you're not aware of it. Ever.
- jodrellblank 4y ago
  The parent comment said “hole which has already been used”, that’s a claim that Apple has actually done it, not only a speculation that they could. They are being asked to back up that claim.
- Melatonic 4y ago
  The thing that people always miss is that the damn SIM card is running its own little processor already. If the government really wants to read your shit they can probably just do some behind the scenes work with your mobile ISP and find a way to access your phones screen output or microphone data or something.
  - gumby 4y ago
    The baseband module has a processor too, and you don't have access to it per FCC regulation.
  - lilyball 4y ago
    iPhone 14 doesn't even have a SIM card anymore, it's strictly eSIM (and previous models could optionally use eSIM).
    - astrange 4y ago
      eSIM isn't any different here, it still runs the same applets. What makes it secure is the IOMMU preventing it from accessing main memory.
    - madars 4y ago
      If I really wanted a physical SIM and imported a European SKU which does have it (only North American variant is eSIM-only), would I expect seamless support in the US? E.g. would AppleCare just work?
- lghh 4y ago
  So there's no level of security that will ever be enough for anyone. The number of people who know the source for the current version of every piece of software, firmware, and hardware they use almost certainly approaches 0. I don't know what people expect. These moves are good things and everyone is whatabouting situations that there is 0 evidence has ever happened or would ever happen. It's unfalsifiable, impractical, and honestly just annoying.
- eduction 4y ago
  With Apple's current lack of encryption on iCloud backups, we are very aware of government access because those files end up as evidence in court cases after being obtained by police and prosecutors. If government were to compromise end to end encryption in the manner described above, it would either be visible when used to prosecute people, or invisible because it would never be used to prosecute people (but presumably for intelligence purposes). Even if it were used for intelligence purposes through the method above, which I don't think is at all established, it would still be a significant improvement over having data in a form that is actively used to prosecute people.
  - alldayeveryday 4y ago
    > Even if it were used for intelligence purposes through the method above, which I don't think is at all established, The snowden revelations were precisely about information gathering for intelligence purposes. The vast majority of intel gathering is not for prosecutionary purposes.
    - eduction 4y ago
      I didn’t say it’s good that intelligence agencies hypothetically could spy on this data by having Apple push malicious software. What is absolutely good is that they have e2ee now, and the only way they could even hypothetically open a back door would be one that was completely secret, for the government, which definitionally closes off a whole class of government use of the data, for example in domestic prosecutions of citizens. This may not be perfect (it’s not open source etc) but it’s a vast improvement over non encrypted data that was openly routinely given to the government.
      - alldayeveryday 4y ago
        I think we are talking cross purposes. I agree with your evaluation that this is an improvement over current state. I did not cite whether you think it is good or bad that intelligence agents could spy on this data. I was referring to the fact that most secret surveillance is expressly for the purposes of intelligence rather than prosecution. Surveillance methods that are secretive are, by their very nature of being secretive, typically not used for prosecutionary evidence gathering due to the fact that such use would reduce the method's secrecy. Until Apple can provide some verifiable proof that my keys cannot be handed off to governmental parties wishing to decrypt my data, I will not feel comfortable using their cloud service for my personal data (not that my family vacation photos and pictures of our dog will be that interpreting to anyone).
- tshaddox 4y ago
  "You can't prove that they don't already do X, because X is by definition a secret action" is a pretty useless epistemology though. Every electronic device you've ever used could secretly have a cellular modem that can secretly download over-the-air firmware updates that alter its behavior to be maximally evil. You by definition can't prove that your coffee machine doesn't secretly have the ability to change its behavior to start connecting to the internet and DDOSing charities or something.
amelius 4y ago
It doesn't matter. You are missing the entire point about E2EE.
szundi 4y ago
US can always pass a bill or have one that enables them to covertly force apple to comply otherwise Tim goes to jail. Easy
- tinus_hn 4y ago
  Last time they tried that Apple caused a lot of hoopla and made the case go away. Not easy.
  - supertrope 4y ago
    Are you referring to the Pensacola encryption bypass demand or PRISM?
- acdha 4y ago
  You make this sound easy but look at how that worked for NSLs. They got a ton of pushback for that and there’s no way to keep that a secret for very long – especially since things either end up in court or involve foreign governments who won’t share the desire to keep things secret.
- acchow 4y ago
  In the US, this is not easy.
- bee_rider 4y ago
  What do you mean, “can pass a bill?” On some level the US could also pass a law that says every iPhone user will be summarily executed. That’s how sovereignty works. Is it a realistic concern? Probably not.
parineum 4y ago
That's not the point. The point is that Apple hasn't closed the government out of Apple user's phones. The point of E2EE is to remove the power of the middleman to read the data but that middleman also has complete control over the device and the software running on it with remote root access. Apple's ecosystem is, by default, design and necessity, insecure to Apple. Keys stored on an Apple device are insecure. One can easily make a similar argument for Android/Google, however, a security conscious user could still take control over their device and install a more secure OS.
smoldesu 4y ago
When they migrated Chinese iCloud data to domestic servers.
- ghostpepper 4y ago
  You're saying there was a silent update pushed to Chinese iphones? Can you provide more details or a source on that?
  - smoldesu 4y ago
    It certainly wasn't silent, but that wasn't a condition for the parent's question. It was a well-documented (and much derided) decision though: https://mashable.com/article/china-government-apple-icloud-data https://mashable.com/article/china-government-apple-icloud-d...
    - astrange 4y ago
      You want them to break Chinese laws? Don't think they have popular support for that.
    - sbuk 4y ago
      Seeing as context is conspicuously missing, all cloud services offered by foreign business in China a required to be hosted and controlled by state owned providers. For instance, China has a separate Microsoft 365/Azure region hosted and controlled by 21Vianet. Apple still controls the encryption keys and there is no evidence that they have handed them over to the CCP, but it is largely assumed. Federighi has said that Apple will offer EE2E in China.
- shuckles 4y ago
  Why is data residency law cool and progressive when the EU does it and Big Tech complies, but Bad and Dystopian when China does the same? Tim Cook has said on the record that iCloud is the same regardless of data center.
  - 4y ago

by dxf 4y ago

bboygravity 4y ago

The entire precondition for being able to do that is that you're not aware of it. Ever.

jodrellblank 4y ago
The parent comment said “hole which has already been used”, that’s a claim that Apple has actually done it, not only a speculation that they could. They are being asked to back up that claim.
Melatonic 4y ago
The thing that people always miss is that the damn SIM card is running its own little processor already. If the government really wants to read your shit they can probably just do some behind the scenes work with your mobile ISP and find a way to access your phones screen output or microphone data or something.
- gumby 4y ago
  The baseband module has a processor too, and you don't have access to it per FCC regulation.
- lilyball 4y ago
  iPhone 14 doesn't even have a SIM card anymore, it's strictly eSIM (and previous models could optionally use eSIM).
  - astrange 4y ago
    eSIM isn't any different here, it still runs the same applets. What makes it secure is the IOMMU preventing it from accessing main memory.
  - madars 4y ago
    If I really wanted a physical SIM and imported a European SKU which does have it (only North American variant is eSIM-only), would I expect seamless support in the US? E.g. would AppleCare just work?
lghh 4y ago
So there's no level of security that will ever be enough for anyone. The number of people who know the source for the current version of every piece of software, firmware, and hardware they use almost certainly approaches 0. I don't know what people expect. These moves are good things and everyone is whatabouting situations that there is 0 evidence has ever happened or would ever happen. It's unfalsifiable, impractical, and honestly just annoying.
eduction 4y ago
With Apple's current lack of encryption on iCloud backups, we are very aware of government access because those files end up as evidence in court cases after being obtained by police and prosecutors. If government were to compromise end to end encryption in the manner described above, it would either be visible when used to prosecute people, or invisible because it would never be used to prosecute people (but presumably for intelligence purposes). Even if it were used for intelligence purposes through the method above, which I don't think is at all established, it would still be a significant improvement over having data in a form that is actively used to prosecute people.
- alldayeveryday 4y ago
  > Even if it were used for intelligence purposes through the method above, which I don't think is at all established, The snowden revelations were precisely about information gathering for intelligence purposes. The vast majority of intel gathering is not for prosecutionary purposes.
  - eduction 4y ago
    I didn’t say it’s good that intelligence agencies hypothetically could spy on this data by having Apple push malicious software. What is absolutely good is that they have e2ee now, and the only way they could even hypothetically open a back door would be one that was completely secret, for the government, which definitionally closes off a whole class of government use of the data, for example in domestic prosecutions of citizens. This may not be perfect (it’s not open source etc) but it’s a vast improvement over non encrypted data that was openly routinely given to the government.
    - alldayeveryday 4y ago
      I think we are talking cross purposes. I agree with your evaluation that this is an improvement over current state. I did not cite whether you think it is good or bad that intelligence agents could spy on this data. I was referring to the fact that most secret surveillance is expressly for the purposes of intelligence rather than prosecution. Surveillance methods that are secretive are, by their very nature of being secretive, typically not used for prosecutionary evidence gathering due to the fact that such use would reduce the method's secrecy. Until Apple can provide some verifiable proof that my keys cannot be handed off to governmental parties wishing to decrypt my data, I will not feel comfortable using their cloud service for my personal data (not that my family vacation photos and pictures of our dog will be that interpreting to anyone).
tshaddox 4y ago
"You can't prove that they don't already do X, because X is by definition a secret action" is a pretty useless epistemology though. Every electronic device you've ever used could secretly have a cellular modem that can secretly download over-the-air firmware updates that alter its behavior to be maximally evil. You by definition can't prove that your coffee machine doesn't secretly have the ability to change its behavior to start connecting to the internet and DDOSing charities or something.

amelius 4y ago

It doesn't matter. You are missing the entire point about E2EE.

szundi 4y ago

US can always pass a bill or have one that enables them to covertly force apple to comply otherwise Tim goes to jail. Easy

tinus_hn 4y ago
Last time they tried that Apple caused a lot of hoopla and made the case go away. Not easy.
- supertrope 4y ago
  Are you referring to the Pensacola encryption bypass demand or PRISM?
acdha 4y ago
You make this sound easy but look at how that worked for NSLs. They got a ton of pushback for that and there’s no way to keep that a secret for very long – especially since things either end up in court or involve foreign governments who won’t share the desire to keep things secret.
acchow 4y ago
In the US, this is not easy.
bee_rider 4y ago
What do you mean, “can pass a bill?” On some level the US could also pass a law that says every iPhone user will be summarily executed. That’s how sovereignty works. Is it a realistic concern? Probably not.

parineum 4y ago

That's not the point. The point is that Apple hasn't closed the government out of Apple user's phones. The point of E2EE is to remove the power of the middleman to read the data but that middleman also has complete control over the device and the software running on it with remote root access. Apple's ecosystem is, by default, design and necessity, insecure to Apple. Keys stored on an Apple device are insecure. One can easily make a similar argument for Android/Google, however, a security conscious user could still take control over their device and install a more secure OS.

smoldesu 4y ago

When they migrated Chinese iCloud data to domestic servers.

ghostpepper 4y ago
You're saying there was a silent update pushed to Chinese iphones? Can you provide more details or a source on that?
- smoldesu 4y ago
  It certainly wasn't silent, but that wasn't a condition for the parent's question. It was a well-documented (and much derided) decision though: https://mashable.com/article/china-government-apple-icloud-data https://mashable.com/article/china-government-apple-icloud-d...
  - astrange 4y ago
    You want them to break Chinese laws? Don't think they have popular support for that.
  - sbuk 4y ago
    Seeing as context is conspicuously missing, all cloud services offered by foreign business in China a required to be hosted and controlled by state owned providers. For instance, China has a separate Microsoft 365/Azure region hosted and controlled by 21Vianet. Apple still controls the encryption keys and there is no evidence that they have handed them over to the CCP, but it is largely assumed. Federighi has said that Apple will offer EE2E in China.
shuckles 4y ago
Why is data residency law cool and progressive when the EU does it and Big Tech complies, but Bad and Dystopian when China does the same? Tim Cook has said on the record that iCloud is the same regardless of data center.
- 4y ago