6 ms·
The researchers said that it’s capable of locating and leaking a Linux computer’s root password hash from physical memory in about 28 minutes when running the I
by userbinator 4y ago
The researchers said that it’s capable of locating and leaking a Linux computer’s root password hash from physical memory in about 28 minutes when running the Intel CPUs and in about 6 minutes for AMD CPUs.
Presumably under very ideal conditions? I've been indifferent to all these sidechannel attacks since the original Spectre/Meltdown and continue to maintain my opinion that this is really not of any significance to a single-user PC.
- api 4y agoIt's of most significance to cloud hosts and other shared hosting providers where there might be targets of sufficient value to motivate someone to spend a lot of time and effort cracking stuff.
- layer8 4y agoIt seems likely that if no mitigations were made available, actual attacks would eventually surface. That aside, other attack vectors are currently still much easier to target. The interesting thing about side-channel attacks, compared to other attack vectors, is that they can’t be addressed without impacting performance.
- itvision 4y agoNothing has surfaced for the past four years that all these vulnerabilities were revealed. Not a single piece of malware uses any of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerabilities https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulner...
- whizzter 4y agoThat we know of! Since timing attacks like this probably needs a bit of machine specific tuning it's probably not that much of an interest to regular mass-market attackers. But for APT groups that might need a wedge on particular machines it might be worthwhile, remember the length NSO group went with Pegasus.
- inetknght 4y ago> I've been indifferent to all these sidechannel attacks since the original Spectre/Meltdown and continue to maintain my opinion that this is really not of any significance to a single-user PC. The original attacks worked in javascript that could be delivered by a browser to your single-user PC. Being able to steal secrets -- passwords, bank account information, ephemeral encryption keys to other sites -- is absolutely very significant to single-user computers. Dismissing it without consideration for mitigations is malicious IMO.
- throw93232 4y agoIt seems disabling JIT on JS VM and only using slow interpreted mode is a good choice.
- codedokode 4y agoAlso in this case memory consumption will be lower because JIT'ed code takes space. I think that it is a good idea.
- azinman2 4y agoHas anyone produced meaningful benchmarks on real world websites? If I go to arstechnica, or NYTimes, or gmail — what will the difference be between JIT and non-JIT for page load and common operations?
- game-of-throws 4y agoEdge did some benchmarks with their "Super Duper Secure Mode" and found that disabling JIT improves performance more often than not: https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Secure-Mode/ https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Sec...
- Wowfunhappy 4y ago> and found that disabling JIT improves performance more often than not Well, kind of... >> We find that disabling the JIT does not always have negative impacts. Our tests that measured improvements in power showed 15% improvement on average and our regressions showed around 11% increase in power consumption. Memory is also a mixed story with negatively impacted tests showing a 2.3% regression, but a larger gain on the tests that showed improvements. Page Load times show the most severe decrease with tests that show regressions averaging around 17%. Startup times, however, have only a positive impact and no regressions. Most people are going to care about page load times more than anything else by far, and that's the one that quite clearly took a hit without JIT. It's great that no JIT makes Edge open faster, but how many times a day do you have to quit and restart your browser?
- causi 4y agoIndeed. I'm not going to hamstring my computer to guard against something that not only requires poor security practices on behalf of the user but is next to nonexistent in the wild.
- titzer 4y agoSo stop browsing the web I guess? A webpage can serve you up an ad with JS that attacks not just your other tabs, but your kernel, and steals your passwords? There's absolutely no excuse for the security boundaries that OSes have promised for decades, the foundation upon most everything we take for granted, should break down at a "mere" few hundred bytes a second.
- causi 4y agoThere's absolutely no excuse for the security boundaries that OSes have promised for decades I'm not saying there is. I'm saying running untrusted javascript on strange websites is not worth 15% of my CPU performance.
- foresto 4y ago> my opinion that this is really not of any significance to a single-user PC. Some single users care if web pages, OS containers, and virtual machines can access data that is (supposed to be) forbidden to them.
- staticassertion 4y ago> Presumably under very ideal conditions? Maybe? You could also assume that the attack will get faster in the future. Sidechannel attacks like this are situationally impactful. Most desktop users don't have to care about security much at all on Linux. Further, they probably don't have to care about any privescs. But some people have threat models that change that.
- userbinator 4y agoIronically, you could also assume the background noise will increase in the future, due to the increasing popularity of running software with built-in spyware aka "telemetry"... But some people have threat models that change that. Those people (a minority for sure) know who they are, but we shouldn't be crippling the performance of everyone else just for them.
- staticassertion 4y ago> Those people (a minority for sure) know who they are, I highly doubt that. Most developers, by far, could not tell you the threat model for these attacks. > but we shouldn't be crippling the performance of everyone else just for them. You can turn the mitigations off.
- hsbauauvhabzb 4y agoIt’s cheaper to not use them, for now. As attack cost of easier attacks increases, so will adversary sophistication