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Your phone may soon replace many of your passwords
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- OttPeterR 5y agoWhile I would rather use a password manager myself to keep accounts separate and not reliant on a single big tech account, I’m sure your average user would love the convenience of this and its overall security benefit would be a positive
- pedro2 5y agoVoted for reasonability. Did you see Demolition Man? What do you think about the beginning?
- OttPeterR 5y agoI haven’t seen it but I skimmed the plot on Wikipedia and I don’t see exactly how it’s related – could you elaborate?
- pedro2 5y agoThe villain is locked in in a room which requires a retinal scan from the guard to leave. So he proceeds to stab the eye globe of the guard with a pen to be able to unlock the door. As such I tend to prefer cloneable credentials. Everything that is unique (cellphone, ...) would imply that access credentials could be stolen (as in, actually stolen, not copied), which could imply the threat of violence to succeed.
- filoleg 5y agoI would much rather someone attempt to steal my phone irl, as opposed to someone on the other side of the globe cloning my method of accessing my accounts without me even being aware until it's too late. To clarify, this wasn't meant as an attempt at a "tough guy" acting. If someone tries to coerce my phone out of me irl by threats of violence, they will get the phone. But this being done irl at least has much easier path to being able to trace the criminal, actually prosecute them, and to minimize the damage to my accounts. Not even mentioning that it is much more risky for them to attempt, given it would have to be done somewhere around a public place with other people and law enforcement around. Meanwhile, some guy from an eastern european country cloning my access credentials to compromise my accounts will almost certainly never be traced, and 100% won't get prosecuted (and that's on top of me not being able to be aware of that happening until after the fact).
- xeeeeeeeeeeenu 5y ago>on a single big tech account, And those big tech companies are free to lock you out from your account for no reason with no recourse.
- OttPeterR 5y agoYeah it’s definitely not for me, but for your average user who isn’t tech savvy and uses the same password for everything: this is an improvement
- BruiseLee 5y agoBeing locked out is an improvement?
- jlund-molfese 5y agoIt's much more likely for the average user to forget their password than have their account banned deliberately. This would, overall, reduce friction when logging in.
- tempodox 5y ago… and consumer protection regulation may never arrive, while the feudal digital fiefdoms gain ever more power.
- chlorion 5y agoAs far as I can tell this doesn't actually require a "big tech account". I am imagining this working like OTPs that are generated on phones. The actual standard will be open and the implementations do not require a specific platform or any kind of "account", but most people will run it on their phone with Android or IOS because it's handy for them. I also don't think it's going to require running on a phone, just like OTPs. I can generate OTPs for 2FA purposes on my desktop system running Linux and it works great! If it does end up working like that, I think it's a great idea.
- SturgeonsLaw 5y agoIt doesn't require one from a technical perspective as you've pointed out, but every business incentive is to lock people in to accounts. It makes it easy to collect data on the users, to enforce payment by locking accounts, etc. I too prefer offline-first tools, but the market doesn't, and people are trained to sign up with an email account and password so for the masses "this is just how it is". I don't want to be a pessimist, but examples of user respecting systems are mainly commonplace in certain corners of the highly technical FLOSS world, it's certainly not the experience of the average person. TOTP being a notable exception.
- pedro2 5y agoPlease don't. I saw Demolition Man. Just let Password Managers do their job easily.
- _fat_santa 5y agoThe problem isn't folks like us that use password managers. The problem is all the other folks that have the same 8 character password they reuse across all their services.
- signal11 5y agoRegular people also have their phones stolen, lost, damaged or bricked on a regular basis. I suspect passwords will remain as a backup mechanism for a while.
- Ekaros 5y agoAlso funnily enough most recovery mechanisms are tied to that same phone... And then what happens when they don't update their device every 2 years like good consumers and there is some massive vulnerability...
- Wowfunhappy 5y agoSo please stop bothering the people who did the right thing by setting up a password manager! There's an easy way to make passwords usable only by people with password managers: instead of letting the user set a password, generate it for them.
- notreallyserio 5y agoWhat about Demolition Man are you referring to?
- joshyeager 5y agoI understand that passwordless auth is better UX. But it seems like a step backwards in security from two factor authentication. Why are all these major players pushing passwordless auth but not allowing a password in conjunction with a FIDO2 token? I feel like I’m missing some important detail.
- aristus 5y agoOnce you use them as the gatekeeper for auth ans identity, it becomes that much harder to delete that Facebook or switch phone brands. Not to mention much deeper insight into your activity everywhere.
- frankharv 5y ago>> Not to mention much deeper insight into your activity everywhere. This is the worrisome part for me. I still use a flip phone and don't want apps. I want a phone only.
- fauigerzigerk 5y agoIn what sense is this passwordless?
- dymk 5y agoA password is something you can remember with just your memory, a hardware token is a physical object you need to have to use (and can be lost).
- fauigerzigerk 5y agoSo does this system not require that I set a password for my account? Everything I have read about this approach seems to imply that passwords are still used, only perhaps not as often. For instance, there's this quote from the article: "Bellovin and others say one potentially tricky scenario in this new passwordless authentication scheme is what happens when someone loses their mobile device, or their phone breaks and they can’t recall their iCloud password."
- marssaxman 5y agoThis is one of those ideas which is completely the opposite of the way I want to do things, but which will probably gain enough traction that I'll be forced to accommodate it after several years of frustration, grumbling, and workarounds.
- daenz 5y agoI can see that perspective, but I don't think that will happen. Companies jump at any chance to steal each others customers, so the necessity threshold has to be very high for something like this to be adopted across the board.
- marssaxman 5y agoTheir interests are not aligned with mine. Many industry standards end up being user-hostile.
- korginator 5y agoI feel this approach has the potential to increase the number of successful attacks. According to the article, users would merely need to unlock their phones to complete the sign-in process. Most people tend to automatically unlock their phones without a second thought.
- ninjin-carh 5y agoI love the convenience but this will lock people to either iOS or Android. Next year: EU government force big tech phone OS manufacturers to enable identity portability
- JustFinishedBSG 5y ago> I love the convenience but this will lock people to either iOS or Android. FIDO2 is an open standard, you can use security keys or TPMs or whatever you want.
- QuantumSeed 5y agoWonder what these means for those folks who find smartphones too confusing and difficult to use. I have a couple of friends in their late 70's who simply can't use them; I fear they will be left behind.
- sokoloff 5y agoTo some extent, they are probably already being left behind; it’s just that it’s a more gradual thing than if smartphone becomes a hard blocker to a something that’s essential in life.
- Bilal_io 5y agoWhen I first heard about FICO, I thought I'd be a standard that a password manager can take advantage of, where they can identify me using my phone, then autofill my credentials. Maybe not very practical. But when I learned that the purpose of FICO was to replace passwords and rely on a tech giant to allow/deny me access to my online accounts, I was disappointed. No thank you.
- teeray 5y agoThis is an awfully complicated way to force people to stop using the same crappy password on every website.
- r_klancer 5y agoI'd be a bit worried about this from a digital hygiene standpoint: the default device for storing your passkey will be your phone, and every unlock is temptation to get sucked into the world of notifications and social apps. Fortunately it looks like security keys such as https://cloud.google.com/titan-security-key https://cloud.google.com/titan-security-key can be used instead.
- boplicity 5y agoIt's really, really bad digital hygeine to use social media apps – anything with "doom scrolling" – on the phone at all. I don't think most people agree with that, but if you eliminate all such things on your phone, it can be no problem to open a phone and use it. I don't check email on my phone, unless I absolutely have to. I don't have any social media on it except for signal. I don't open the web browser. My phone is mostly used for maps, reading books, and video chatting. I look forward to a world where people genuinely view social apps and related addictive software the way we do harmful drugs. Something to be avoided, and if you can't avoid them, there should be pressure to seek help.
- _fat_santa 5y agoI would hope that this is not made to be the only login option. More and more it seems that you can't go through life without a smartphone.
- ghaff 5y agoOf course, you already are if you use a password manager. (ADDED: As noted elsewhere, password managers can also be accessed from other devices so not the same.) I agree with your basic point though. Smartphones are the default for doing more and more things. And when traveling, I try to have reasonably backups for maps, itineraries, etc. But I'm hardly religious about it and my phone breaking or getting lost/stolen when traveling would be a major hassle.
- Jimmy 5y agoI simply won’t use any service that requires a phone and doesn’t allow other options. I am opposed to a future in which phones are a necessity of life rather than merely a convenience. And to the people who say “but desktops/laptops are already a necessity of life” - yes, and that’s a problem. We need to be actively thinking of ways to roll things back, rather than allowing technology to become more and more integrated into life.
- tjr225 5y agoWhat if I lose my phone or forget it at home? Can I no longer do my personal banking on my laptop or workstation?
- ghaff 5y agoThat's true today if you use a password manager, no? And it's true of any site that uses 2FA (unless the site supports multiple authenticators and you have a backup token).
- xyzzy_plugh 5y agoMy password manager is accessible on my other computers, so no it's not true today.
- bartchamdo 5y agoThe better analogy if your driver’s license/ID it passport. If you leave these, you likely can’t travel or be admitted into specific establishments, etc.
- ghaff 5y agoEver since I somehow managed to lose my driver's license between the private car that dropped me off at the airport and the door to the airport, I always use another government ID I don't actually need for anything (Global Entry) while going through security. I also usually carry my passport as a backup though that probably won't work if I need to rent car--and on that particular trip it was a last minute overnighter so I didn't throw in my backup documents and cards folder. It took me about half an hour to convince the hotel to let me check in. In general, I hate traveling with things that you really can't afford to lose and can only mitigate against loss to some degree.
- vbezhenar 5y agoI don't understand why so many websites insist on using valid email/phone and password at the same time. Just implement login via email/sms and that's about it. Now when it comes to this "phone" authentication, I'm not sure that I like this idea. I have good control over my phone number. I have good control over my domain and email (that's not true for most users, but they have the option). But making all my digital life depending on Apple or Google: that I don't like.
- alpinemeadow 5y agoI am really concerned about people with disabilities with this approach, if it becomes the main way to log in, and the options are there but super painful to set. In fact, all the minorities that for some reason or another can’t or it’s too hard to use a touchscreen smartphone.
- password4321 5y agoLike the acquired/abandoned https://github.com/kryptco/kr https://github.com/kryptco/kr with iOS and Android apps all under an "All Rights Reserved"-source license? > SSH auth + Git commit/tag signing using a key stored [on your device] > turns your [...] device into a WebAuthn/U2F Authenticator
- bertman 5y agoI quite like the "phone as hardware token" via Webauthn as 2FA. However, I've never used "Sign in with Google" and the likes because I don't want all the sites I'm using to get my "real" email address. So I really hope Google et. al. will offer some kind of email address cloaking like Apple do with their private relay stuff. Knowing Google, they sure as heck won't, though.
- matja 5y agoIt's depends on the site that uses OpenID Connect federated sign-in if they ask for your email address from the identity provider. An application/site can optionally request the "email" scope during OpenID Connect sign-in, but if it is not requested (only the "openid" scope instead) then the provider must not return an email address in the ID token, or an OAuth access token which is authorized for an API method which returns the user's email address (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.4 - "Requesting Claims using Scope Values"). Google implement this (https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/openid-connect#an-id-tokens-payload https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/open...), by returning only a unique numeric user ID in the returned id_token. I haven't checked other OpenID Connect providers.
- bertman 5y agoThanks! This is great info. I didn't know the details about different scopes and had always assumed the sites would obtain at least the name and email address, because all I ever saw was the prompt "To continue, Google will share your name, email address, language preference, and profile picture with <site>."
- autoexec 5y agoCell phones cannot be secured or trusted. You have no access to secure them either. Using them for anything private is already a terrible idea. This is just one more way for companies to take more of your data and insert themselves as a middleman in another aspect of your life that they can then control. A "feature" like this will only put your security at greater risk.
- kaba0 5y agoMobile phones are orders of magnitudes safer than any desktop OS available currently, that’s a fact.
- autoexec 5y agoNot true. Depending on your OS (sorry Windows users) your OS isn't collecting your personal data at every opportunity, and hopefully doesn't allow 3rd parties to push code to your devices without notice to you about what's been changed, and without any option for you to opt out of those changes. You must have zero trust in a device where 3rd parties have full access to change whatever they want at any time and for any reason without your knowledge or consent. That's not happening for the linux server in my closet. It's probably happening for the windows 10 system in the living room, and it's absolutely the case for the phone next to me.
- kaba0 5y agoSafety != privacy at all.
- autoexec 5y agoThe same things that make your privacy vulnerable make your devices vulnerable. It's currently impossible to secure a consumer cell phone. They were explicitly designed to collect and leak your data. When 3rd parties have access to all your data you can't secure it. When 3rd parties can push code to your device without any notice to you, at some point a bad actor will do the same. If you aren't allowed to see what your device is doing you can't see when it's being used by an attacker. If you don't even have permissions to the most important parts of your own hardware/software you can't do anything about it once you are compromised. Cell phones are not private and they aren't secure and that makes them the worst kind of device you could insist on people using to replace their passwords.
- sgc 5y agoI have literally had financial institutions reject my password for being "too long" or containing "wrong special characters". Quite recently, my bank site was having a fit and I couldn't log in, with only cryptic errors. The first line of help didn't understand a thing and wrote back to IT to find out more. Apparently if you don't hand type / PW manager autotype your password, you are a hacker now; they are actively hostile towards PW managers. Great yet incomprehensible way to push people towards bad passwords. This was at a small bank that uses third party software, also used at another small bank I use. So it will have propagated to who knows where overnight. Now we want to get rid of passwords altogether, so phishing is a simple as [remotely] watching someone distracted unlocking their phone in the coffee shop, and there is a good chance you can get them to swipe right when they should go left. Idiocracy.
- lifeisstillgood 5y agoI need to get past the press releases and read up, but is this using my phone to authenticate to an IDp (ie google) who then oks me with the relying party (example.com) or am I directly signing up with example.com (ie my phone has a key pair in its secure enclave for google only, for for hundreds of sites I visit (from memory this will need much bigger storage in the secure enclaves - thousands of accounts is quite feasible)
- scott00 5y agoYou sign up directly with the relying party and are authenticating to a hardware device which then OKs you to the relying party. Each relying party gets a different public key. The corresponding private keys can be stored inside the secure enclave (this setup is called resident keys), or they can be stored in a "key handle" that the relying party stores and provides every time you attempt a login. The key handle would contain the service-specific private key encrypted with a key held inside the secure enclave.
- lifeisstillgood 5y agoI have not heard of this key handle before - is there any docs on it? Oh wait, example.com sends me a encrypted key, that I decrypt and then use? That sounds ... odd. I mean, why not just keep the same encrypted data on my local phone ? The attack surface seems much smaller.
- scott00 5y agoThe U2F spec https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-u2f-overview-v1.2-ps-20170411.html https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fid... has a clear description in the "Allowing for Inexpensive U2F Devices" section. For webauthn, they don't use key handle terminology anymore, but the same fuctionality is provided by the "Credential ID": https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#credential-id https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#credential-id
- LinuxBender 5y agoI can only speak for myself and my own personal preferences but I will not do business with anyone that requires this. I've been cutting ties with businesses that have intrusive practices. I have also been migrating to a bank that gave me the option to make everything online read-only. The only remaining business is Amazon but I have recently found a local business that will drive into a big city once a week to transport items from big box stores so maybe I can nix Amazon at some point. I am in a very remote area. My personal goal is to reach a point where I can power off my flip phone and leave it in a drawer for months at a time.
- uuee 5y agoIndividual migration is a very temporary solution. When the bank you just migrated to becomes a bit bigger -- it's the next target. Or some new law like digital ID's / one world currency make the migration irrelevant.
- LinuxBender 5y agoYou could be right but in my specific use case the bank I moved to will quite intentionally remain small. It serves a specific small community and has no intention to grow outside of this community. If that changes some day I will move again. Moving banks is simple. This community will not comply with digital currency laws and we would make our own mesh networks. The hardware and fiber is already in place to do so.
- rahidz 5y agoAt least in the US, the 5th amendment protects against revealing our passwords to the government (and we can always go with "I forgot what it was"). I don't believe the same is true for biometrics and such, is it?
- Riverheart 5y agoBiometrics and physical tokens are not protected
- Klasiaster 5y agoThe main problem I see (based on the screenshot in the article) is that it still allows the attacker to initiate the auth flow from the outside, and the clueless user would in doubt just unlock for them. I don't see how the proposed scheme would prevent this phishing attack. It seems to be worse than the SMS 2FA part where one would at least have to enter the SMS code into some suspicious website. My method of choice would rather have been what is established now for 2FA with time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). Here the attacker can't initiate the auth flow from the outside.
- scott00 5y agoI think that for the cases where you're authenticating on one device in order to allow access on another device, this is done by bluetooth communication between the devices, and as a result you have to be within bluetooth range of the auth device to initiate the auth flow.
- Klasiaster 5y agoThanks, if that's the case it's at least an improvement.
- Ekaros 5y agoI'm already in the auth approval hell working as consultant with multiple separate corporate customer and all the 2fa authentications needed in my daily activities. Including fun broken flows that mean I get notification that I don't even need, because I need to use different account... In the end this likely only leads to training people to automatically approve anything as every little piece of software on their machines needs approval once a day or more often at worst...
- eulers_secret 5y agoI hope there’s a FOSS way to manage my FIDO2 login tokens. As long as there’s a command-line app that I can use instead of my phone (which I will never do), I’m good with this! I’d be willing to help develop such an app.
- e2le 5y agoThere are a number of FOSS solutions. - https://github.com/google/OpenSK https://github.com/google/OpenSK <- DIY solution - https://solokeys.com/ https://solokeys.com/ - https://www.nitrokey.com/ https://www.nitrokey.com/ The issue with any FOSS solution is that FIDO requires an attestation private key, which must be shared between a batch of at least 100,000 security keys. Using a DIY or cli app solution (application running on the host) will likely mean you'll be generating that private key yourself, this makes you identifiable across registrations. Some sites (Cloudflare) may reject the use of attestation keys which are not found on the Fido Alliance Metadata Service. This precludes the use of any DIY solution. https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/ https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/ https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/4406889048077-FAQs-for-Cryptographic-Attestation-of-Personhood#h_16OGl1pu5javVk3m408rPU https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/44068890480...
- Zamicol 5y agoThat's so dirty. Of course the centralized control is hidden in the details. Thanks for pointing that out.
- aestetix 5y agoIs there an option for those of us who do not have a mobile phone?
- raspyberr 5y agoDoes anyone else think it's crazy that in order to participate in modern life you have to have an account with one of two massive American companies - Google or Apple.
- theamk 5y agoNo, because this is simply not true. I am not sure what "participate in modern life" means for you, but I have no personal Apple devices, so no Apple account for me; and I use Fastmail as my primary email. Granted, there are some groups which use Google Docs or such to coordinate, so I still have to have a Google account, but this is somewhat optional. And Google Play is pretty nice if you have a cellphone -- but on the older Android tablets I keep them account-less and use F-droid/random APKs from the web instead. A much concerning thing IMHO is a Facebook requirement -- I am missing a number of events when I tell people I don't use Facebook. Hopefully it will change one day, but I am not holding my breath. (And re the original article, you only need Google/Apple account if you want to use cloud sync. I am not quite sure how the system will work, but I suspect that with Android, you might either have alternative clouds (like Samsung's cloud), or may be able to use your own service, or sync via wired cable to PC)
- uuee 5y ago>I am not sure what "participate in modern life" means for you... Probably things like needing a (google/apple) smartphone for mandated vaccine passports / coming digital ID's, digital currency etc.
- notacoward 5y agoAll these claims about how FIDO prevents phishing seem very suspect to me. AFAICT the phishing protection is specific to U2F, which is only one of many interrelated (and IMO very poorly described) FIDO specs. Absent U2F, it seems like most forms of phishing are still entirely possible. Am I missing something? Is the operative definition of "phishing" much more limited than how a normal person would interpret it?
- tialaramex 5y agoI mean, FIDO itself doesn't care about the web, and so doesn't care about phishing. But, in the context of the web you'd use WebAuthn, which replaced U2F (because it's an actual W3C standard with multiple implementations) and yes that's protected from phishing. Specifically, FIDO binds credentials to a "Relying Party ID". For WebAuthn that's effectively the DNS name of your server, which is why it's protected from phishing. The W3C publishes the entire WebAuthn spec. so if you care you can read it and see how it works. If you're using FIDO in some other context (e.g. smartphone apps can do this via Android or iOS APIs) your RPID is based on that context, so e.g. the real Hacker News Android phone app (if such a thing existed) can't be impersonated by a dozen third party knock-off "Hack-a-News" and "News for Hackers" apps.
- andi999 5y agoIs this tied to the phone or to the phone number. This makes a difference if the phone dies or gets lost.
- saltcured 5y agoOne question I am unable to answer from all of these recent discussions: will I ever be able to use my phone as a cross-platform compatible FIDO/U2F hardware key? I don't want a vendor-specific or identity-provider specific integration like Google using Chrome and Android for MFA with Google accounts. I mean could my Android or iOS phone connect to a laptop via bluetooth or USB and act as a hardware key just as if I used a yubikey or titan key, and be visible to Firefox or any other software that knows how to talk to U2F or other smartcards to enroll with new websites and identity providers that have nothing to do with Google nor Apple accounts?
- idle_zealot 5y agoThere’s no technical reason why your phone couldn’t do what you describe. But the goal here isn’t to maximize security or privacy, it’s to maximize convenience for the sort of person who already uses the same weak password everywhere for the sake of convenience. Plugging in their phone with a wire is too much to ask.
- dwaite 5y agoThis is one of the main topics of the agreement discussed in the article - an agreement on how to use a phone as a cross-platform compatible authenticator and a commitment to do so. The mechanism is already available on chrome and android if you select the option to add an android phone - iPhones and iPads have a developer preview feature flag you can enable to work with this as well, and to have a Mac display a similar option when using the platform level support (aka Safari or certain native apps).
- saltcured 5y agoHmm, the closest thing I saw to this is the "caBLE" cloud-assisted bluetooth. Reading more on this, it does not sound exactly like what I am seeking. It seems completely tied to the platform vendors and interactions over the internet. I wish for a completely local mechanism where a phone with a hardware security module could act like a token via completely local communication with the browser, both for enrollment and later login with any relying parties. For general users, I do like the idea of being able to backup/restore the token seeds to allow replacement of hardware without manually re-enrolling redundant keys with all relying parties. But, I don't see why the cloud-assist should interpose between the user agent and the security device, nor why a cloud-assist should interpose between the user agent and the relying party. How is this cloud-assist different than the other vendors like Duo and Okta, interposed in enterprise client login attempts and organizing MFA options which can include authenticator apps on phones? I feel like platform vendor lock-in has been gratuitously introduced into this plan. Couldn't a token backup/restore service be offered to users without interposing anything new service between the phone-as-token, the user agent communicating with the token, and the relying party service? Or, couldn't the token standards be amended with some sort of web-of-trust concept to allow a token to announce additional peer/backup token keys during enrollment. so that one enrollment task can simultaneously enroll the present token and offline backup token(s) with the same relying party?
- amelius 5y agoWill the EU allow it?
- dataflow 5y agoWhat happens if my phone breaks/dies/runs out of battery/gets lost/...? What if it's my grandma's phone N thousand miles away?
- dwaite 5y agoYour first question is the primary topic of the article.
- dataflow 5y agoYes, where said article cays it's "it's tricky": > Bellovin and others say one potentially tricky scenario in this new passwordless authentication scheme is what happens when someone loses their mobile device, or their phone breaks and they can’t recall their iCloud password. and Google ignores the authentication question and just assumes a new, charged phone follows every human being wherever they go (and presumably the same goes without saying for backup codes): > Google says that even if you lose your phone, “your passkeys will securely sync to your new phone from cloud backup, allowing you to pick up right where your old device left off.”
- specialist 5y agoI've been waiting +25 years for this. But I don't want my phone to serve as my "root" authority. I'd rather have a separate pair of fobs used to seed all my other devices. Then put one of those fobs somewhere safe. When the USA finally gets smart and implements postal banking, I'd love for the USPS to offer safe boxes. Maybe even other fob related services. Kinda like a notary public, but for credentials. -- Late 90s, shortly after W3C's P3 failed to catch on, a buddy and me cobbled together a SSO POC for browsers. Our catchy name was "Credendity", a failed portnameau evoking credentials and identity. One of our core motivators was "faceted identity", negotiated per account, to only share partial PII, to thwart data aggregators. So naive; big data deanon always wins. Our POC was just turrible. Embarrassing. Ditto every SSO implementations I've used since, whether standards-based, vendor, or bespoke. In hindsight, it's too bad our sense of integrity and esthetics prompted us to abandon our effort.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- _8j50 5y agoThere needs to be a law that forbids mandating cellphones and creditcards for ordinary business transactions. My apartment started requiring an app to enter the premises and use another app so wash and dry your cloth and then required an app to enter the place you wash your cloth. I came home one day after a series of missed and delayed flights, tired and sleepy at 3am after waiting eons for uber at the airport when my phone finally died and at 3am I could not enter my own apartment because my phone was dead and there is no one else at that time to open the hate for me. In these cases, technology is creating not solving problems. Ask yourself this: As great as smartphones are, do you want a future where everyone is required to purchase one, an a cell plan to exist in society, to engage in commerce, enjoy shelter, health care and security? I would even go so far as to say cash and physical paper should be supported by any business and government department.
- spyder 5y agoDon't worry they will fix the cellphone requirement by installing face- / voice- / iris- recognition cameras. /s :-|
- JumpCrisscross 5y ago> do you want a future where everyone is required to purchase one, an a cell plan to exist in society, to engage in commerce, enjoy shelter, health care and security? This seems like a slippery slope argument. Almost everyone purchasing these products has a phone and service. Cash is expensive to accept. (And makes zero sense for online-only services, which a cash-mandating law incentivises.)
- daenz 5y agoEveryone having a phone already is orthogonal to whether or not it is a good idea to require phones to function in society. I don't see it as a slippery slope argument because almost everything will eventually move to being online-based, and if "having a phone" becomes the standard for authN, then someone without a phone is excluded from participating in all of those things.
- 0des 5y ago
- TheRealNGenius 5y agono thanks, my nonexistent phone can't replace my existent passwords
- fimdomeio 5y agoI know this is far from the main discussion, and that it's something that happens all the time, but I can't help feeling offended that this is called FIDO which nameclashes with a part of pre-internet history, FidoNet.
- lloydatkinson 5y agoNope. 2FA is already terrible enough and does not provide any meaningful security that can’t be provided conventionally. Making it become “only FA” eg password-less is an unimaginably disastrous idea.
- daenz 5y agoJust say you wish everyone was required to be chipped at birth with a NFC private key, Big Tech. I'm only being half sarcastic. There's a lot of outlandish conspiracies around this idea, but I think we all know it's heading in that direction, unless we continually reject it.
- theamk 5y agoDon't see this direction at all, given you can do all this stuff using $20 Android phone with no plan you got from ebay.
- daenz 5y agoMany of the replies here are "but what if I lose my phone|my battery dies|my phone is destroyed?" and they are all valid concerns. The next logical improvement to this is an authN device that cannot be lost, forgotten, or easily destroyed. One that is even more secure than biometrics.
- teddyh 5y agoLet him that hath understanding count the number of the beast.
- Ekaros 5y agoI really hate that we truly think and market smartphones as some sort of secure device. To me the whole thing looks like creating massive single point of failure. A single device have big enough vulnerability and essentially everything is lost. Including all the usual recovery options from email, phone calls to SMS messages. As security person I prefer much more old school options, like that I can still use single use passwords with my bank. But I fear that this will go away one day...
- azinman2 5y agoThe alternative right now is people using the same pot password everywhere, and/or writing it down on post it noted next to their computer. We need far better solutions for the majority.
- Ekaros 5y agoPost it notes at home aren't so bad. It is not like you couldn't steal a phone if you have physical access. Maybe finger print is bit hard, but learning pass code or using face unlock when person is sleeping...
- Too 5y agoPost its at home can be stolen, or photographed, while I'm out of the house. My phone plus my face? Without me noticing either? Not as easy. I still keep printed one-time recovery codes locked up and hidden to not be completely surrendered to my phone, but i don't really like them since they can be copied without notice, only comfort is that usage of them will trigger notification, yubikeys feel like a better middle ground.
- jml7c5 5y agoI dearly wish that security keys (Yubikey etc) were cheaper. The average person needs two keys so that they can store one as a backup. The average person needs keys that support NFC (or similar) so that they can easily use one across multiple devices. But the average person is not going to pay $50 for a pair of keys, regardless of the security or convenience benefit. It's not until you hit the $5/key range that people will use them without being strongly deterred by the cost.
- akomtu 5y agoSo a remotely controlled device built primarily for surveillance of the end user is going to have access to all your passwords. Wonderful idea.
- throwawaymanbot 5y ago[dead]
- aeturnum 5y agoI mean, I do understand the appeal of using strong crypto over using passwords. I also understand why one would roll this out on phones first (even though phones are obviously less secure than many other ways of doing this). At its core, a model of identity would be to create a keypair for each account and require that key sign each login request. That said, I agree with everyone's fears and frustrations with the actual real world circumstances around phones. I do not trust my phone and I don't really trust the most popular projects to make phones more secure. I suppose you could keep a separate device whose only exposure to networks is to verify access over a limited protocol - but ofc due to the baseband and other requirements you would still be vulnerable. Very frustrating.
- dwaite 5y ago> I also understand why one would roll this out on phones first This is Web Authentication/FIDO 2. We've had security keys like Yubikeys to do this for years. This is about committing to have computing devices also have the functionality of these security keys built in, to synchronize those credentials within a platform ecosystem, and to support cross-platform usage such as an android phone letting you into a site on a windows desktop browser. The hope is that much higher user availability will cause much higher site adoption. > At its core, a model of identity would be to create a keypair for each account and require that key sign each login request. That is exactly how it works. Web Authentication declares a javascript API for site access, and the request and signed authentication response formats/processing. > That said, I agree with everyone's fears and frustrations with the actual real world circumstances around phones. I do not trust my phone and I don't really trust the most popular projects to make phones more secure. There is about eight years of hardware in the market you can use rather than your phone. In addition to security-opinionated end-users, it is expected that some portion of enterprises and governments will require a separate hardware key for employee/contractor access - and may even require specifically the one that their IT hands to the person.
- aeturnum 5y ago> This is Web Authentication/FIDO 2. We've had security keys like Yubikeys to do this for years. Yes - doesn't the article suggest that this would use FIDO? "According to the FIDO Alliance, users will be able to sign in to websites through the same action that they take multiple times each day to unlock their devices" I was pointing out that this model - FIDO or some other version - does make sense. Even if the drawbacks of forcing people to use it on phones are obvious. > There is about eight years of hardware in the market you can use rather than your phone. If there are dedicated hardware solutions that's great! It seemed from the article like they were requiring phones - which was the source of my concern.
- charliea0 5y agoThis would have an interesting potential to cut down on password sharing for subscription services like Netflix, Amazon prime, etc. I think it would be more annoying to call a friend to confirm an authentication on their phone than it is to write down a text password.
- xeromal 5y agoOr an EX-friend or partner.
- coffeefirst 5y agoI've yet to see an answer to the elephant in the room: if your phone gets lost or bricked, what's the recovery path?
- ggm 5y agoIn the article. Cloud rsync of fido state, PKCS wrapped for the security concious. Our fallback on passphrase held off-line, for emergency use only.
- dwaite 5y agoTypically you set up many devices that can be used for authentication - your android phone and windows desktop, as well as a USB key in your safe for emergency access into bank accounts and the like. Account recovery is a pretty well-known space as well. If the person does not have any authentication mechanisms left, you can send an email link or go through identity proofing depending on your security requirements.
- nicolas_t 5y agoAnd then banks will decide that it's not secure having multiple devices and actively prevent you from doing that. Right now my bank requires my phone to get a 2fa code for anything important. I can only have a single device at a time, if I lose my phone, I can of course reset it if I'm in the country and go to a branch. Of course with Covid that was difficult when I last lost my phone, so I had to download a form sign it and fax it to be able to set up my 2fa on my new phone. It took 2 weeks before I could access my bank account.
- dwaite 5y ago> And then banks will decide that it's not secure having multiple devices and actively prevent you from doing that. IMHO based on current policies, it is more likely that they will have one device on your account, like a combined USB and NFC hardware authenticator, that you can request from them and becomes expected for higher security interactions like large money transfers.
- 5y ago
- thereare5lights 5y agoOh that's cool. Something that's super easy to steal and to coerce access to.
- gomjabbar 5y agoPersonally I think this is a huge breakthrough that brings huge phishing resistance to billions of people's accounts. While it's good to be suspicious of something so critical like authentication, particularly coming from a big tech alliance, what about the positives? Consider the number one issue for most people is still phishing, and under this system there's no password to be phished anymore. Also consider that this system is likely using Bluetooth for the PC to phone challenge/response, avoiding current issues with passwordless MFA apps (i.e. Microsoft's right now) where the user could be still be social engineered to confirm a logon by a remote attacker. The Google smart lock app works like this today using BT and FIDO, so we know it works. Plus the core tech is from what I can tell, just tried and tested asymmetric crypto, with the private key on your phone. The public key is on registered on every web service you want to use it on. Second factor is the phone PIN/Biometric. Sure, Apple will let you store the key in iCloud, but we aren't talking standard iCloud backup here, this is iCloud Keychain where it's protected by your device passwcode which Apple does not know. And if none of this is for you, just use a Yubikey, it's the same tech. And if you do choose to use it, while you are at it, add several Yubikeys as backups to every service, that's standard practice and how it works now.
- Eddy_Viscosity2 5y agoHow does this work for people who primarily use old-style desktop computers, and several of them at that?
- dwaite 5y agoYou can always use a hardware key like a Yubikey. The additional options discussed in this article are are to: 1. use a platform feature to have the TPM or Secure Enclave in the device itself work as an authenticator as an alternative to a hardware dongle. 2. synchronize across devices within an ecosystem (e.g. all Apple devices) using a mechanism on top of the platform account (aka AppleID + iCloud Keychain). 3. allow a phone to be used to authenticate to a desktop, even across ecosystems. The previous way would be to use a hardware key like a yubikey. If your platform supports #1, most sites _should_ support user management of a set of appropriate authentication mechanisms, and may even prompt on a windows desktop "would you like to use Windows Hello to sign in more quickly in the future?" A version of Windows has support for #2 might let you instead have that credential be added to every windows desktop or laptop on your account. Due to the variability of Linux, my suspicion is that each browser will fill some of the gaps there as well.
- Eddy_Viscosity2 5y agoThanks for the reply. I work both at home and at the office and I have separate workstations I keep sync'd. I also have a personal desktop computer and travel work laptop. A dongle sucks because I'd always having to be moving between computers and guaranteed I'll forget it one place, while I'm at another. The different computers run different OS, so I can do a universal sync like with apple. So I need to get creds on each computer in a way that its secure and can not be erased if I clear browser storage (unless I want that).
- techsin101 5y agoI have lost my phone 3 times and countless times I needed to login and my phone battery had just died. Also I don't want to safeguard my phone like my life depends on it. Imagine cops get your phone and boom 99% access to everything you have got online.
- fortran77 5y agoMy 89 year old mother can deal with a printed sheet of her passwords but can’t deal with the complications of a smartphone.
- paulbjensen 5y agoThis is potentially a bad idea, and I can explain an actual use case that happened a few weeks ago. My neighbour had dropped her phone in some water, it was a Samsung S21, and the screen was messed up. The moment you tried to activate the screen, lines would appear across it. It was unusable. Thankfully she had a spare phone available to use, but she needed to get a bunch of things setup on there (Google Mail, NHS for the Covid pass as she was travelling abroad). She ran into an issue authenticating her Google Mail account - the password. She didn't remember it, so we tried the "Forgot Password" user flow. For reasons unknown, the user flow insisted on sending a notification to her Samsung S21, even though we had swapped the SIM card from that phone into the new phone, and we had no way to swipe the notification on the S21 due to the screen being broke. Somehow, we managed to trigger sending a text message with a code, and thankfully she got access to her Gmail account and other items. But it was not a simple process, and there's no way your everyday person would have a clue how to deal with such cases (it confounded me and I'm a developer!), so I hope that someone with UX and QA chops is able to cater for scenarios like someone's phone screen being busted and knows how to provide alternative options that your everyday folk can get to grips with.
- thetinguy 5y agoJust turn the phone off. That’s what Apple has you do when you need to turn off Find My iPhone but your phone is on and unable to be used. Even without the sim the device is still trusted, and as long as it’s connected to the internet it will try to authenticate with it. Also trusted contacts are also now a thing. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212515 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212515
- throwaquestion5 5y agoGotta love HN. OP talks about phone useflows that in "no way your everyday person would have a clue how to deal with such cases" on a Samsung phone. They get a reply about a hack about apple phones when unusable. You do notice the irony, right?
- FinnKuhn 5y ago
- anothernewdude 5y agoSo back to single-factor then?
- chemmail 5y agoWhat happens when you lose/break/get stolen, or app bugs out? You are SOL? There are utopian theories. And I've watched enough hunger games to know this will only end with someone breathing poison.
- betwixthewires 5y agoCan someone explain to me how this is a better approach than, say, a password manager and TOTP 2FA? I can think of a few downsides: 1) in the US at least, being compelled to provide biometric identification for all accounts, 2) single hardware device point of failure, on top of that being the most often lost, stolen or damaged hardware device. And all the benefits I can see with it are already served by password managers and TOTP, which the manufacturers can just ship by default if they want to, the tools are there already. And I can back it up in whatever way I choose, securely. So what's the upside?
- sebk 5y agoFIDO needs to improve their communications and marketing if they hope to gain adoption, if they can't even get to the HN crowd. TFA also gets passwordless wrong, see As ZDNet notes, Apple, Google and Microsoft already support these passwordless standards (e.g. “Sign in with Google”) But that is not passwordless as either FIDO or ZDNet describe it, it's simply OpenID Connect. The announcement is specifically about FIDO2 adding support for two additional things: 1) The ability to share FIDO credentials between multiple devices. Previously, it was implied and alluded to, but never stated outright, that credentials would be bound to an authenticator, like a MacBook's Secure Enclave, which FIDO calls a platform authentictor, or a Yubikey, which FIDO calls a roaming authenticator. Now there's explicit support for multi-device credentials. Apple recently added this feature in what it calls "Passkeys", a name that other vendors (but not FIDO) seem to be adopting too. This is net positive. Losing a device that was bound to a credential meant that the credential was lost forever. Now, as long as the credential resides in at least one device the user has access to, there's no recovery flow needed. Note that the vendor providing syncing services for these credentials does not have access to them. See https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-keychain-syncing-sec0a319b35f/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-keychain-syn... for an example implementation 2) Expanded ability and commitment from vendors to use a roaming authenticator over Bluetooth Low Energy (this is already in the standard). And in particular, the ability to use a phone's platform authenticator as a roaming authenticator in a different device. This does not mean, as TFA implies, that you'll need a phone to sign in to services. Rather, it means that for services that allow or require FIDO credentials to sign in, a phone is now an additional option to present those credentials. You can still use a Yubikey, TouchID or any other way you interact with your existing TPM. I understand that people are concerned about new authentication standards backed by big corporations who have a history of locking users out of their platforms and services, but the current state of secure login is dire. FIDO2 is an incredibly well designed set of protocols to prevent phishing, credential reuse, and several common causes for account compromise. It was clearly designed with that in mind, at the expense of usability. These are notable and incremental improvements to enhance the usability of a standard that is head and shoulders better than existing alternatives like passwords, but still has some ways to go in terms of functionality. Personally, I'm very excited about FIDO and WebAuthn, and some of the improvements I'd like to see in the coming months are: a) The ability to share passkeys across vendors, including the ability to implement a "sync fabric" as some folks in the WebAuthn working group have called it, so it's interoperable beyond the major vendors. b) For these vendors to strengthen their own log in experience. Apple only allows their own TOTP implementation and SMS fallback to authenticate to iCloud. I'd like to use WebAuthn exclusively here, so I could back up access to my now-precious Keychain that holds all my FIDO credentials with a YubiKey. c) A better story about backing up security keys. Implementing a) would give us that. Devices that can be initialized with a given seed like some common hardware crypto wallets would give us that, albeit not without introducing changes to the threat model -- you have to store the seed and input it somehow -- and https://www.yubico.com/blog/yubico-proposes-webauthn-protocol-extension-to-simplify-backup-security-keys/ https://www.yubico.com/blog/yubico-proposes-webauthn-protoco... would give us that as well. d) A better story for usernameless. The current methodology to have a user initiate a usernameless login and picking the right credential is a UX mess, and I don't believe I have actually seen it implemented in a production site. I'd love to be shown an example!
- Krisjohn 5y agoI had two phones fail in quick succession and I nearly lost all my MFA. This is not the way to move forward.
- account-5 5y agoI commented on another thread about this FIDO thing. I really don't get what benefit this has fir me. I use keepassxc, so I'm not reusing passwords. I'm currently forced to use less secure SMS OTPs for some sites because they won't allow me to use TOTP in keepassxc. Now I'm expected to tie everything to one device that could be easily lost, stolen, or damaged, and back up my secure key to some random cloud store just in case that happens?? Cloud storage in control of companies that at a whim could lock you out. I don't think so.
- Borealid 5y agoTo describe security benefits, we use threat modeling. If there's a threat that's prevented by system A but not by system B, and all threats prevented by B are covered by A, then A is colloquially "more secure" than B. Here are some threats that are prevented by FIDO and not by TOTP: - An attacker compromises DNS infrastructure and makes a web page that looks 100% identical to the one you're expecting, hosted on the same URL. They wait for you to log in and use the TOTP you send to authenticate to the real site's servers as you. FIDO prevents this threat (phishing via MITM) entirely, TOTP provides little protection. KeepassXC if you don't use your clipboard to paste TOTPs provides limited protection but the matching is DNS-based, not cryptographic like FIDO is. - A hacker compromises your computer while it's on and keepassxc is unlocked. With keepassxc TOTPs, they now have your TOTP secret and can impersonate you at any point in the future. With FIDO on a separate non-key-extractable token, they haven't gained anything. Sites can verify that the FIDO authenticator you're using disallows key extraction as part of the protocol, and can even blacklist known-compromised second factors without your intervention. - A hacker is able to guess exactly 1,000,000 passwords in one minute. They have stolen your password but don't have your TOTP secret. They guess the TOTP using their ability within 999,999 attempts, since that's all TOTP with its default six-digit generator provides. With FIDO, the secret is 128 bits, and they'd be guessing for thousands of years. I'm not saying FIDO/U2F is "better" than TOTP. They're just different. But you, as a security-conscious user, do get concrete advantages (in the form of protection against particular threats) using a FIDO credential over using TOTP. Additionally, FIDO doesn't requiring storing a secret key per site; TOTP does.
- 5y ago
- ddingus 5y agoA fan of this idea at all, because I am likely to end up with a phone used just as a physical key.
- godmode2019 5y agoMy government required everyone to carry a cell phone to enter any store. The app had both location and Bluetooth tracking, when they uploaded your Bluetooth data they do they download everything then do the filtering on the survey. Then can say your data is stored on your device, we only access it for a specific location, but they do the filtering on the server side.. The app had a QR code using a auth protocol called relating to the future of digital identity, I forget the name. DAT by memory. The token has your plain text name, DOB for anyone to see, ask for, require on entry. Last time I checked 60% of people still have it installed collecting Bluetooth data of other people with that app. The point is your phone is going to replace more than your passwords.
- FpUser 5y ago
- Taniwha 5y agooh great - part of what I do is RF design, I work in a faraday cage
- rmbyrro 5y agoThe israeli will enjoy it.
- skybrian 5y agoTo avoid lockout, you need multiple ways to get into your more important accounts. A phone is one way, and it's pretty good. A Yubikey is another good way. A third way is a printout of secure backup codes, kept with your important papers. At that point you're pretty safe. (Although, if your phone and Yubikey are both lost while traveling, you might not be able to get in until you get home.) Some services like Github and Google actually support this, but it's not that common yet. The other lockout risk is access denied due to a policy violation (which could be a false positive) and adding authentication schemes won't help there; you need backups. So it's great that this FIDO initiative lets people use their phones, but what's it going to take to make sure everyone has multiple, reasonably secure ways to get in?
- ljweglkajlk 5y ago[flagged]
- jlokier 5y agoI had a problem with a broken phone token recently. My phone screen broke (turned black), so I wasn't able to log in to my business bank account, not even through the web portal on my laptop. Web login on the laptop requires confirmation via the phone app, but with a black screen I couldn't figure out how to confirm. (It also needs the phone camera to read a QR code, so I guess it would have been a problem if the screen worked but the camera stopped working.) I phoned the bank and said, surely there must be another way to authenticate in these situations. Or perhaps I could just use bank services over the phone? Their answer was no, the only option to access any bank services was to purchase another smartphone, move my SIM over, call the bank to activate the new device, and then video myself reading some text. Then I would be able to use the new phone to login to my account on the web on my laptop. As a result I wasn't able to access the bank account for several days to make payments, until my new phone arrived. Then similar fault occurred on the new phone a few weeks later (identical model, bought used in a hurry, see above). This time I had just caught Covid so I wasn't going to rush out to local shops for a third phone. During all this, the original phone was acting as a Google 2FA token for a client Google work account (unrelated to the bank account). Logging in to that Google account required confirmation on the phone, and it had to do something Googley, it didn't accept third party 2FA apps. I never did figure out how to to transfer that token over, but that Google account isn't needed any more so I no longer care.
- segmondy 5y agoI feel happy sad, in 2017 I applied to YC with this idea, and got rejected. I even called it exactly what they are calling it, mutlipass. I solved the problem of losing your phone. I also had it where you can have multi factor if you wanted, so you can still use you password which makes sense for much secure sites. I experimented with NFC rings where you could have a ring and your phone so if someone takes your phone away from you, they won't be able to use your phone. All the big corps trying to do this want to lock you into their ecosystem, this is a problem that should be solved by an org that has no other products to sell but security.
- usrn 5y agoI'll move onto my boat before I buy another Goddamned smartphone.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- camkego 5y agoJUST WOW. "Passkeys" appears to be another name for FIDO Multi-Device. FIDO previously took the position that the private keys should never leave your hardware token (or phone). Because that's the most secure position. That position appears to be out the window. They provide a rather longish obscure FAQ entry explaining, yeah, we said your private key shouldn't leave your token (or phone), but times are a' changing. From the FIDO multi-device FAQ: https://fidoalliance.org/faqs/#multi-device-fido-credentials https://fidoalliance.org/faqs/#multi-device-fido-credentials From the FIDO Alliance website: "FIDO Alliance has previously stated that user authentication credentials never leave the device. Has that changed?" "FIDO Alliance’s mission is to help reduce the world’s over-reliance on passwords. It is true that some relying parties (and their users) get value out of hardware-bound credentials, and the FIDO standards still support this type of deployment. But for many relying parties, the fact that FIDO’s approach required users to enroll each new device presents some customer usability challenges, and also limits their ability to replace passwords (as passwords frequently serve as a means to verify new authenticator enrollment). As such, replacing the password with a challenge-response protocol based on asymmetric cryptography is a huge step forward in security, even if those cryptographic keys aren’t bound to hardware – as this helps RPs thwart the constant threats of phishing, credential stuffing and other remote attacks."
- bblb 5y agoHmm... Isn't that kind of against the whole "FIDO" thing that I've been personally trying to deploy company wide as much as possible. That you have in your person some actual physical object, what ever it is: YubiKey, SmartCard, a laptop with a TPM chip, a phone. And your personal private key inside that specific physical object is your "password" that only you can access by PIN or biometric identification. If you lose access to that physical object, you lose access to the services also. That's the whole point! You can replace it, but then you go through the whole "enrollment" process again. That's another very important point also. Sounds like a requirement from governments or LEOs. They need access to your private keys and it's much simpler if it's not bound to a physical object anymore. From now on it's just a plain text file on some server, when you backup your phone to the cloud.
- egberts1 5y agoNope. My phone number is no longer up grab. Grab something else.