7 ms·

While I doubt this war will trigger the end of globalization, perhaps it will end blind globalization. I can imagine a lot of countries are now asking which cri

• belval 5y ago
  Indeed, it is possibly a best case scenario for the US, in the sense that now we are getting an example of what happens when a leader pushes through sanctions and it gives us a sense of just how catastrophic a Chinese invasion of a foreign neighbor would be. So far, it also shows that the theory that a strongly interconnected economy can prevent war is pretty moot. The EU and the US applied just about every economic sanctions (except imports of oil and gas in the case of EU) and Putin won't stop.
  • ledauphin 5y ago
    I've not really seen people discussing this, but it seems like one of the biggest 'results' of this invasion as far as long term geopolitics goes. Personally, I'd bought into the idea that heavily intertwined economies tended to prevent war. I'm much less convinced now, inasmuch as it seems fairly clear that autocrats with the power to wage war may yet do so on much more ideological grounds, economics be damned.
    • throwanem 5y ago
      > I'd bought into the idea that heavily intertwined economies tended to prevent war Hardly a novel error, at least: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion
    • munificent 5y ago
      Yes, I think the real takeaway is that people are not rational actors and people in positions of massive power even less so. I think there was an assumption baked into globalism that heads of state would behave in the best interest of their citizens, but that's only even approximately true when the country is a functioning democracy. In an authoritarian state, what's good for the leader may vary wildly from what's good for the people. One could argue that the entire point of autocratic power is for the leader to be able to do what their people don't want. And once you have someone with that level of power and no obligations to the masses, there should be no expectation that they will be have rationally or in the economic interests of the entire country. As long as it benefits their perverse psychology or isolated offshore bank accounts, it's on the table.
      • maxerickson 5y ago
        Pretty thin experiment to be making conclusions on though. There can be lots of scenarios where the last 70 years saw lots more war.
        • notriddle 5y ago
          Especially the "people in power are even less rational" part. The 99% might seem more predictable than the 1% only because the law of large numbers smooths out the random, unpredictable irrational acts.
        • munificent 5y ago
          That's a good point. It may simultaneously be true that globalism doesn't prevent irrational war to the degree that we had hoped, but it does still prevent it more than some other economic alternative. (Personally, I think the best way to prevent war is non-corrupt democracies with little autocratic power concentration and a strong fair press. Most people don't want to go to war and kill others, so when you give the entire populace agency over what the military does, you get a lot less irrational wars.)
    • syshum 5y ago
      I think given the speed of information today people have too high exceptions just how fast something like sanctions would take to work. it is not a "One Click, Buy now, next day delivery" Amazon Prime type of thing, we have come to expect INSTANT RESULTS, that is just not how Geo Politics works I also find it amusing when people say Gas price increases are due to Russia... Those are comming for sure, but no there has not been enough time for Russia's action to impact gas prices.. not yet.... But brace for it... Politicians love to Cease on current events to explain economic results that are actually months or years in the making
      • mannerheim 5y ago
        Prices change in anticipation of changes to supply and demand, even if those changes have not occurred yet. The stock market will swing down on the announcement of an interest rate hike, even if such a hike hasn't taken place yet. So it's entirely reasonable to attribute price increases to current events (although it is still worth pointing out that it's only a contributing factor, since inflation has been quite high for months).
        • syshum 5y ago
          You forget one critical thing, there is vast difference between stock and Commodity trading which is 100% speculation based vs Physical goods pricing which is not. The idea that business are adjusting their physical goods sold pricing based on news events is laughable, I know of ZERO businesses that do that.
          • mannerheim 5y ago
            The price of gasoline seems to follow extremely tightly with the price of crude oil. https://www.macrotrends.net/2501/crude-oil-vs-gasoline-prices-chart https://www.macrotrends.net/2501/crude-oil-vs-gasoline-price...
    • stjohnswarts 5y ago
      Yeah I think it takes only one madman at the rudder to grind global trade and diplomacy to a halt.
  • InitialLastName 5y ago
    > The EU and the US applied just about every economic sanctions (except imports of oil and gas in the case of EU) and Putin won't stop. To some extent, sanctions work more as a threat than a punishment, but threats only work if they are credible. The goal of these sanctions might not be so much to stop Putin (he clearly won't be stopping in the near term, for a number of political, psychological, and sociological reasons) but to a) damage the Russian economy and reduce their capacity to execute this war in the medium term, b) use that example as an object lesson for other countries who are considering expansionism, and c) lend credibility to future threats of sanctions.
  • cmurf 5y ago
    The gas+oil spigot is not completely turned off yet, even by sanctions adherent countries. The real difficulty comes if there's an end run around the sanctions by China and/or India. Imagine an exodus from that market. Imagine Apple having to exit China. And imagine all the services and trade with India. Those are very different spigots than oil and gas. Closing those is going to involve a lot of pain. Investing in those countries always involved tradeoffs. But the idea any country would help another in a blatantly illegal war of aggression to expand borders - it's so contrary to the U.N. charter and post-WW2 world that it's really quite surprising. China? As a founding member of the U.N. and permanent member of the Security Council helping Russia in any capacity? I am surprised. China may have lost upwards of 15 million in WW2. Have we forgotten everything?
    • belval 5y ago
      I am surprised by the direction China took here. This is a European war, not a US one, to me they had everything to gain by painting themselves as a supporter of Ukraine (getting preferable treatment from the EU) than as a neutral party. China being against US interest in general makes perfect sense to me, but against the EU it just does not make as much sense.
      • brabel 5y ago
        China is against the West (or anyone else) intruding on other nations issues (specially China's and its neighbours)... so, it's not suprising they won't wish to take sides on a fairly regional fight they have very little historical or economical interest in. Other distant, large but non-aligned countries like India and Brazil seem to have taken similar positions - not taking sides, just hoping for peace. The interested parties in this war are NATO countries and Russia, besides Ukraine, because the war is a consequence of decades of hostilities regarding the re-alignment of the ex-USSR territories East of Poland towards the West and against Russia.
        • cmurf 5y ago
          Members of the Security Council are obligated to intrude. That is the agreement they are a party to. If China cannot perform that duty, they need to withdraw as a permanent member of the Security Council. Russia has announced they have the right to expand their borders using aggression. They have committe the supreme international crime, as judged at Nuremberg. If countries aren't subscribing to that world view anymore, then we are lost. We are doomed to have a world war three. The entire fucking point of these institutions is to prevent another one. If nothing else China should be an institutionalist, preserving the international system of laws for its own long term interest. Maybe it's lost on people, but Poland told NATO in 1993 that if they weren't allowed to join, they were going to build their own nukes. Because they didn't trust Russia. They weren't the only one. If the U.N. Charter system dissolves, the NPT falls soon after that. And then it's an arms race.
  • ineptech 5y ago
    I take the opposite lesson - for the next generation, no one will think about invading a neighbor without remembering how devastating the sanctions were to Russia.
    • belval 5y ago
      How devastating were they really? The west is cutting off Russia, but China will be a good enough market for Russian resources for the next decade. Sure Russia will be poorer as a result, but their invasion of Ukraine is about as bad as it can gets (no believable motive, lots of sympathy for Ukraine, very publicised destruction in videos and pictures from Russia) so they got the worst possible sanctions we could impose and yet Russia is still bombing Kyiv, they didn't sue for peace in exchange of lesser sanctions.
      • ineptech 5y ago
        > How devastating were they really? Well, we don't know, and won't for years perhaps, I should've clarified that I'm guessing about what will happen in the long-term, not asserting that Putin will say, "Oh gosh, look at the stock market, I'd better withdraw" in the next few days. But it does seem like the sanctions will have the effect of impoverishing and weakening Russia for decades.
        • reedjosh 5y ago
          Perhaps in a further destabilized future, Russia could emerge stronger and more independent. Russia may be forced to become more self reliant.
      • mannerheim 5y ago
        China as a monopsony buyer of Russian gas will be able to set the price, even one that does not recoup the capital costs. Even before the invasion, the Power of Siberia had been viewed as extremely unprofitable (it seems likely that corruption played a major role in driving up costs), and then there's the further issue that more work is necessary for it to send its total capacity, which is a fraction of what it sends to Europe. > Yet the project does not appear to be as grand a success as Moscow would have liked it to be. To begin with, the capacity of gas production on the Russian side of the border is open to doubt. The Chayanda gas field in Yakutia region, currently the only source of gas for the pipeline, can produce up to 25 bcm a year. > To deliver 38 bcm to China, Gazprom has to develop another large field, Kovykta in the Irkutsk region some 800km south of Chayanda, and connect it to the Power of Siberia with another pipeline, which has not been built yet. The completion of the infrastructure needed for pumping the required volume to China is probably going to take more than 10 years, according to Gazprom’s pre-feasibility study of the project. > ... > Currently Gazprom sends westwards about 200 bcm annually via a number of pipeline routes. The Power of Siberia project, however, has a limit of 38 bcm and it is unlikely that another major pipeline project would be launched any time soon. Thus, the Russian company would not be able to switch export flows as it pleases.
  • stevetodd 5y ago
    It’s still to early to see all the effects of the sanctions. That was something repeated several times.
  • toast0 5y ago
    > So far, it also shows that the theory that a strongly interconnected economy can prevent war is pretty moot. This sounds a little no true scottsman, but I'm not sure Russia was heavily interconnected. What necessary good(s) do they lose out on when/if the world refuses to export to them? They're fairly self-sufficient, as I understand it, which makes sanctions relatively weak.
• kube-system 5y ago
  And we've already been headed in that direction since the supply issues driven by COVID. China just locked down Shenzhen again this weekend.
• downrightmike 5y ago
  Oil and gas are used to make fertilizer, fertilizer is needed to create the massive crop yields we expect. Like for wheat, when the norhtern hemisphere harvests in the fall, they have six months of reserves on top of that to cover demand. For corn and soybeans, it is usually just 60 days, And the Sothern hemisphere is harvesting now. brazil and argentina both do soybeans really well, so there is always some production somewhere. We really don't have to worry about 2022 from a production standpoint, but a logistics one. Port of LA pre covid, 90% of ships were on time, now only 10% and there is a backlog. Which means bottle neck. So we can't move food where it needs to be, so that should increase reserves being held. 2023 will be a problem if we can't get enough fertilizer or have a very bad rainy season. But no one in exporting countries should have an issue getting food, other than it will be more expensive. Alternatives will be needed for sure in net importers, and likely in the exporters too, because they will always feed themselves first. And as an example, the USA companies have to get permission to sell large amounts of grain to foreign buyers. So that is a possible action too.
  • hinkley 5y ago
    > brazil and argentina both do soybeans really well Where is Brazil growing that soy? In their vast and ample prairies? (hint: the answer to the second question is 'no') > So we can't move food where it needs to be, so that should increase reserves being held. This parallels a problem we have in cluster management - if load increases and you spin up new servers as a response (increasing capacity), then depending on how those servers work they might actually increase load while trying to spool up. You then have to be careful you don't create a feedback loop where spinning up servers triggers spinning up more servers. If you can't get food into the ports, then stockpiling it means bringing more food in through those same ports. Which makes getting food (and other supplies) slower, which means you increase your stockpiles, which means more shipments having trouble getting into port... Often the right answer is to raise the low water mark, which means that the status quo is maintained until the next lull, when you hold on to some of your excess capacity instead of letting it go, and to refine your boundary conditions to react a little bit sooner, and/or a little less aggressively (ie, do less but do it sooner).
    • 5y ago
• cirgue 5y ago
  Safer for whom? A part of the security logic of neoliberal globalization, whatever it’s other flaws, is to force strategic interdependence between states specifically to make conflict an absolute last resort. Like I want Chinese dependence on foreign markets and I want EU dependence on Russian oil, because as soon as that economic codependency dries up, military intervention is now feasible as a response to crisis. The reason we’re not in a world war right now is because Europe must tread carefully and so must anyone who might align themselves with Russia for reasons that have nothing to do with the possibility of military force, which we all know is subject to uncertainty and an attractive prospect for leaders who like to gamble.
  • simulate-me 5y ago
    Interdependent trade was theorized to promote peace, but it was only ever a theory, and one that’s becoming increasingly outdated with each passing day that Russia remains in Ukraine. Certainly there are aspects of the concept that are true, but Germany’s dependence on Russian gas is now limiting its ability to respond to a crisis. They’ve handicapped themselves and can no longer promote peace and in fact are funding a war.
    • vimy 5y ago
      The same thing was assumed right before the first world war. Back then we also had globalization. It didn’t prevent the war and globalization didn’t return until after the second world war.
    • p_j_w 5y ago
      >it was only ever a theory, and one that’s becoming increasingly outdated with each passing day that Russia remains in Ukraine. This seems like a bit of a silly point, given that the war in Ukraine is, at least so far, nothing compared to the conflicts of the past. Do we wanna rush head first back into something that reliably produced worse conflicts than we see today simply because what we have going now isn't perfect? >Germany’s dependence on Russian gas is now limiting its ability to respond to a crisis. They’ve handicapped themselves and can no longer promote peace and in fact are funding a war. A bunch of western companies are pulling out of Russia over this and it looks like the whole thing is going worse for the aggressors here than they expected. I'll take this over Germany and Russia engaging directly in armed conflict.
• mc32 5y ago
  Russia, like the US/Canada, China, India, Australia and Brazil, maybe some others, have enough natural resources, manufacturing and skills that they could on-shore the great majority of things. Granted, probably none would have a best in class of much, but they could still be pretty independent. China has some mineral dependencies and India, Russia and Brazil might have some semiconductor dependencies, but they could come up with 1990 to 2000s versions of most semiconductors --and that's probably good enough. Japan, Britain, France, Germany, etc. probably either don't have enough consumer manufacturing or natural resources to survive independently.
• rich_sasha 5y ago
  I think globalisation as we saw it was the logical evolution of a world largely at peace for 30 years. No cold wars, no world wars (of course plenty of local ones with terrible human suffering). It was almost as if we thought humanity was past that; we were past the trenches of WWI, fascist craziness of WWII and entrenched rivalry of Cold War, and we’re building a stable, global world of tomorrow. Then it does make sense to source everything wherever it is cheapest; services in developed countries, resources in developing ones (for consumers in the former anyway). Except of course, it turns out that wasn’t right. China is raising the stakes and wants a seat in the superpower club, Russia clearly isn’t past WWII style politics. But I guess 4 years ago this wasn’t obvious to the average politician (who tend to be reactive anyway).
  • stjohnswarts 5y ago
    I personally think that it was the collapse of the Soviet Union, not anything to do with trade. We've always had trade for the past few centuries and it never stopped countries from attacking/invading others.
• lumost 5y ago
  Semiconductors, raw materials for manufacturing, capital, ownership stakes. Russia is now seeing viable businesses shut down in mass because their owners decide to exit the market. Europe can't sever Russia entirely due to energy dependence. Everyone is wondering what will happen when Russian companies go bankrupt, or the harvests from Ukraine and Russia don't materialize. Is the real question whether it's safe to have any large economic dependencies on a country that you may have a military conflict with in the future? I'm not sure you can easily segment "core" vs. non-core dependencies except by the fraction of the economy they represent.