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Lock the doors: Remembering Columbia's final homecoming (2020)
- dpifke 5y agoFor anyone interested in NASA or the Columbia tragedy, I recommend the book Bringing Columbia Home (ISBN 978-1948924610). It's about the recovery effort for the accident debris, which is the largest ground search operation in US history.
- mrtksn 5y agoSomething I wonder: How far we are from having sensor density somewhat similar to the humans skin sensory? Would it be possible to have an autonomous sensor on each termal tile that reports its integrity and the heat/pressure instead of relaying on inspections? Feeling pain is obviously very useful to us, it's pretty much the primary mechanism of detecting issues, the limits and taking care of our bodies. I suspect, maybe it can be possible to have a wireless sensors that function by RF(a nearby source that powers the sensors) or being powered by something like the heat gradient/MEMS that charges and stores energy from the movements.
- mark-r 5y agoI'm glad you put the 2020 in the title, but I don't think it's necessary - this kind of story is timeless. Mark your calendar, next year will be the 20th anniversary of this tragedy.
- chrisseaton 5y ago> ordered flight controllers not to leave the building If NASA employees are civilians, do they have any authority to do this? Was there special legislation used or something?
- toomuchtodo 5y agoProfessionals respecting their responsibility.
- chrisseaton 5y agoSo why the need to lock them in?
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- na85 5y agoIt's to keep press out.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- emptybottle 5y agoNot sure why this is downvoted. I think one of the (many) reasons to lock the doors is absolutely to keep unauthorized persons out of the room.
- ggm 5y agoPress ideates as "mask the truth" where unauthorised covers all contingencies including nutcase pizzagate conspiracy hunters, Walter Mitty types and "cleaner unplugged the data rack power" fuckups. It isn't driven to keep the press out. If any benefit its a side benefit and I observe a metric French tonne of press is locked inside the room(s) at that point.
- xoa 5y agoFor those who haven't seen it, Ars had a fascinating incredibly in-depth "What If" article years ago exploring what might have happened if the damage to Columbia had been noticed in time and it had been determined that reentry was non-survivable so a rescue had to be attempted, "The audacious rescue plan that might have saved space shuttle Columbia": https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/ https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue... It would have been barely on the brink of possible, but with huge risks of its own. Going through the exercise though reveals a lot of details of the shuttle, being in orbit, and our capabilities at the time. It's been discussed a few times over the years on HN, the biggest one being 8 years ago when it was first published [0], but seems timely along with this article. I'm very glad though going forward that entire class of failure modes is gone for good and that particular possibility for heroics will not be needed. Side mounting the shuttle was always one of the worst design choices amongst many, many bad decisions that went into the STS. Also created one of the worst launch abort profiles of any system ever. Nobody will do that again though. ---- 0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224
- WalterBright 5y ago"Contrary to popular belief, the heat a spacecraft faces on reentry isn't generated by simple friction but rather by ram pressure—the fast-moving shuttle compresses the air in front of it, forming a massive shock zone in which air molecules ionize and break apart." Finally! Even Arthur C Clarke wrote in one of his novels that it was friction. I'm also amazed that the shuttle could not be landed by remote control because of a couple switches.
- mlyle 5y ago> I'm also amazed that the shuttle could not be landed by remote control because of a couple switches. A deliberate, but dubious decision. Deploying the gear before it's time is guaranteed catastrophe-- they decided it was important to not leave this under software control.
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- mturmon 5y agoIf you have some time, and are interested in engineering, troubleshooting, investigation techniques, complex systems, or just general meticulous care, it’s worth reading the Columbia Accident Investigation Baord report (Volume 1). It’s a masterpiece and I have read it at least twice. https://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html https://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html
- WalterBright 5y agoAs an engineer, I'm very interested in details of the fixes that went into the Apollo capsule as a direct result of the tragic Apollo 1 fire. It was about a year of re-engineering of it, and the accounts I've seen only dedicate a few sentences to it. Mainly changing the hatch design and not using 100% oxygen anymore.
- 0_____0 5y agoIIRC they continued to use 100% oxygen in space. O2 N2 mix on the ground at above sea-level pressure, replaced with 100% at low pressure in space (5PSI). Thereby mitigating the need for N2 tanks and associated equipment, and also mitigating the fire risk on the ground when above ambient pressures were required in the spacecraft. After Apollo they moved away from 100% O2, I think the ISS has a similar composition and pressure to terrestrial atmosphere.
- kirrent 5y agoThe EVA suits continue to operate on only oxygen though, which makes sense given that internal suit pressure is a major challenge for manoeuvrability as was famously demonstrated by Alexei Leonov during the first spacewalk. This does mean that astronauts spacewalking from the ISS need to prebreath pure O2 to purge nitrogen for preventing the bends, a detail that was captured in the Netflix SciFi film Stowaway.
- Raidion 5y agoCan you elaborate on why the internal pressure is an issue? Is the resisting force something like trying to flex a balloon animal x 1000?
- grogenaut 5y agohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FKxM-zNZBk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FKxM-zNZBk adam savage talks a lot about it during this video, but yes, bending a baloon is a good example. A better one might be a fully inflated inner tube or filled camelback.
- tpmx 5y agoRelated: It will be interesting to see what happens when SpaceX has their first fatal incident involving e.g. NASA astronauts. I'm of the opinion that astronauts should be allowed to take reasonably informed risks. Are they reasonably informed? How do you make sure they are?
- ProAm 5y agoLet's hope FSD is not in control of Starship
- colechristensen 5y agoIf you’re an astronaut, it’s your responsibility to make sure you’re adequately informed, and you are sure to be able to do that, nobody needs to protect you.
- whatshisface 5y agoThat's just not possible - astronauts depend on thousands of engineers and testers to do their jobs right, they can't know everything.
- sokoloff 5y agoPeople who judge that they’d need to know everything in order to be adequately informed presumably aren’t the type to become astronauts.
- krisoft 5y agoBut it is. Of course the astronaut can’t check let’s say every possible screws are properly tightened, but no single human can. So what can an astronaut do who is concerned about screws comming loose do? They go to the engineers who designed the craft and ask them. The engineers show them the various calculations and work documents showing how they sized the screws and how they calculated the appropriate torque they should be tightened to and why they think they won’t come loose. The engineers would also tell the astronauts that they specified twist wire as an additional safety mechanism on top of all of that. And then the astronaut can head to the head mechanic who leads the assembly process and ask them how do they know that the screws are torqued right. They would show them the training the technicians receive, the tools they employ and the QA processes they have in place. After that the astronaut can spot check a few areas. Of course they won’t do all of this with all of the systems and processes, but they can do enough to satisfy themselves that the place has the right processes in place to their liking. If the engineers don’t care about the screws, if the chief of technicians can’t find the calibration paper of the torque wrenches and if they find a passed out drunk technician behind a panel and rattling screws then the astronaut knows they are in trouble.
- hangonhn 5y agoThe account is still very hard for me to read even so many years after the events. That was one of the few events that caused me to weep as an adult. Space exploration is a combination of curiosity, scientific venture, and boldness that, to me, represent the best of humanity. That day felt like a dream being crushed and watching our heroes die.
- Waterluvian 5y agoI kind of horribly want to know what it would have been like. Is it an instantaneous death? Do they realize something is going wrong?
- RyanShook 5y agoThe Commander Thinks Aloud https://youtu.be/J8AisTXgAGA https://youtu.be/J8AisTXgAGA
- 1123581321 5y ago"Still, your face is young, as we feel our weight return..." Incredible song. I stumbled across it when I decided to try The Long Winters after hearing John Roderick on a podcast. Even after several listens it's capable of producing chills and tears, when it lines up with my mood. John talked about making the song on Song Exploder as well; it is one of my favorite episodes. https://songexploder.net/the-long-winters https://songexploder.net/the-long-winters
- chrisjkoenig 5y agoYou beat me to it. A deeply moving song from the perspective of the crew. And please don't miss the lovely [Song Exploder episode](https://songexploder.net/the-long-winters https://songexploder.net/the-long-winters) about the song with John Roderick, it's really stuck with me.
- Teknoman117 5y agoThey probably didn't suffer much. The investigation after the disaster found that none of the astronauts had sealed their helmets on re-entry and some weren't wearing their gloves. They would have passed out in seconds when the shuttle lost pressure. The launch and re-entry suits for the space shuttle crews were derived from the pressure suits the SR-71 and U-2 pilots wore. One pilot actually managed to survive the breakup of an SR-71 traveling at Mach 3 at 85,000 ft, although the suit was shredded when the pilot regained consciousness. The shuttle was traveling at Mach 18 at 200,000 ft when it broke up, so surviving the breakup would have been next to impossible anyhow. I think being on Challenger would have probably been worse. When the crew cabin was found, some of the emergency air tanks that have to be activated manually were found activated. It's possible the shock of the explosion activated them, but it's also equally possible that at least some of the astronauts remained conscious through the breakup and didn't die until the cabin hit the water...
- bhartzer 5y agoI will never forget that day. It was Saturday morning, around 8:00am CST, and my wife and I were laying in bed, I was barely awake. We were living in East Texas at the time. It was the loudest 'boom' I've ever heard, and it shook the house a bit.
- blunte 5y agoSame, from Fort Worth. We had no idea what it was until a few hours later. Hearing people die is just not something we who live outside of war zones are accustomed to.
- supernova87a 5y agoI was always curious to know about the org/cultural evolution aspect of this problem at NASA, and I was also reminded of it when the 737 MAX issue happened. As an organization starts to drift from its engineering origins and management gets populated with people who -- either because of increasing emphasis on management versus technical knowledge skills, and/or requirements to spend time on communicating versus building -- are making judgement calls far from the "detail level", is this problem bound to arise? How does an organization incentivize its people and structure to keep on making the "right" calls? *What I'm pointing out here is the terrible realization afterwards that the managers of the program were told about the potential damage to the orbiter, but actively denied requests from the engineering org to get help to image/diagnose/potentially repair the damage or come up with mitigations.
- zaphod12 5y agoThough a lot of what say is reasonable, it's of interesting note that NASA has had this issue basically since day 1. Many of these causes boil down to the same issues that caused the devastating Apollo 1 fire.
- pdonis 5y agoAnd the loss of the Challenger.
- pfdietz 5y agoThe underlying problem was that the Shuttle made no sense, and the agency twisted itself into a pretzel trying to pretend it did.
- ncmncm 5y agoAnd, it still goes on, now about SLS. E.g., inventing a space station in a weird orbit around the moon, completely useless as a staging point to land, just because it is a place SLS would be able to get to. And, continuing development after it is obvious it will be obsoleted by Superheavy/Starship. And even in promoting Mars colonization at SpaceX, where people insist that apparatus at Mars would plausibly have some useful role as a staging point for trips beyond Mars.
- jleyank 5y agoIt’s really bizarre to me that the conversation devolved into arguing over whether people could lock the doors when a program and 7 people literally went up in smoke. As others have said, why or even how would this have even come up? The screening process would have weeded non-committed people out long before. And the men and women in that room were as gung ho as the people strapping the rocket on.
- avazhi 5y agoPeople do weird things during a genuine crisis. I think I’m this case it was just about ensuring that everything that needed to be preserved for a complete investigation would be preserved without the possibility that data was omitted or destroyed, either intentionally or inadvertently.
- rdtsc 5y agoIt’s a procedure they probably rehearsed but not one they had to execute in real life. And their colleagues just died, so tremendous stress, shock, and having to execute this exceptional checklist.
- jleyank 5y agoWell, I'm sure it's more than "been practiced". They lost two shuttles as I recall, one Apollo on the pad and it might have occurred during Apollo 13 until they had a handle on things. Risky business lighting candles...
- rdtsc 5y agoWell Challenger was in 1986 and that's 17 years prior. I don't think I can recall the training materials from 5 years ago, but after 17 years things would definitely get fuzzy, especially during that kind of event.
- kevin_thibedeau 5y agoSkylab-3 had a fueling issue and there was a rescue Apollo module with two extra seats ready if needed.
- ncmncm 5y agoThe account completely omits that people were calling, while it was still in orbit, for the NSA to point one of its telescopes to get a shot of the bottom so they could inspect it. And, it omits the refusal to allow this to be done, for reasons never revealed.