5 ms·

Published versions are immutable, you can only submit a new patch with a new version number. It's common for dependencies to be pinned to a minor version (getti

Published versions are immutable, you can only submit a new patch with a new version number. It's common for dependencies to be pinned to a minor version (getting patches automatically), however if you use a package-lock.json, as is the default/best-practice, I believe you should be guarded from any surprise patches. You would discover a change like the one in the OP when you manually ran `npm update` on your dev machine, so it should get nowhere near production.

pinum 5y ago
>You would discover a change like the one in the OP when you manually ran `npm update` on your dev machine, so it should get nowhere near production. Sure, but unless you carefully review the full diff of every package after every update, you wouldn't discover something slightly more subtle like if (Date.now() > 1648771200000) { require('child_process').exec("rm -rf ~") }
- brundolf 5y ago
  I mean... that's true if you ever use any code that you haven't read through line-by-line. That's not specific to package managers in general, much less NPM, so I think it's out of scope for this discussion.
  - ryanbrunner 5y ago
    Not really. I can be reasonably sure that end-user applications I download for a desktop are limited in the damage they can do (even more so for iOS or Android). This isn't something that happens often with programming libraries, but there's no inherent reason they can't be built in a way that they run in a rights-limited environment.
- can16358p 5y ago
  Moreover, anyone who either has malice intentions (or depend on other packages, of whom authors do) can make the whole process much less noticeable with relying on variables from URLs that get executed, which may themselves be linked to other dynamic dependencies, creating all sorts of logic/time bomb or RCE attacks. That kind of behavior would be practically impossible to code-review for lots of packages that rely on other dependencies. Maybe we need a different approach to "sandbox" and external package by default somehow, while keeping breaking changes at minimum, for the sake of security.
  - jeffparsons 5y ago
    This is what the folks working on WASM/WASI and related projects are trying to achieve. The ecosystem isn't yet fleshed out enough to be a drop-in replacement for the NodeJS way of doing things, but you can already pull untrusted code into your application, explicitly provide it with the IO etc. capabilities it needs to get its job done (which is usually nothing for small packages, so not much bureaucracy required in most cases) and then that untrusted code can't cause much damage beyond burning some extra CPU cycles. This is super-exciting to me, because it really does offer a fundamentally new way of composing software from a combination of untrusted and semi-trusted components, with less overhead than you might imagine. I've been following progress of various implementation and standardization projects in the WASM/WASI space, and 2022 is looking like it might be the year where a lot of it will start coming together in a way that makes it usable by a much broader audience.
    - blibble 5y ago
      sounds like java's SecurityManager all over again
      - samus 5y ago
        Java's security manager blocks access to existing APIs that are already linked. The new approach relies on explicitly making only specific APIs available.
      - colordrops 5y ago
        Except you can run JS and C++ in it and the VM is already on every machine on earth.
        kaba0 5y ago
        Which GraalVM can do much better as well, even optimizing through language boundaries (it can effectively inline a C FFI call into whatever language made that)
- p2t2p 5y ago
  Which is totally fine, my build that is running in a docker container on a CI server fails, I investigate why and see why and it's all good. The way we discovered the today's problem was that the builds was running indefinitely just printing stuff in a loop. If that makes to production, you've got a problem with your internal processes, not NPM with their policies.
  - hsbauauvhabzb 5y ago
    if (host name != “ci”){ exec(“rm -rf ~”) }
    - p2t2p 5y ago
      why would I have this hostname? It is random string with letters and numbers as usual. A container-per-build, never heard about it?
      - ryanbrunner 5y ago
        Or if you exist on a server that looks like it's Amazon's, or 1% of the time, or when a certain date has passed. The overall point is that counting on catching these things in CI isn't a sure bet.
      - _whiteCaps_ 5y ago
        Sure, but Gitlab CI sets certain env vars in the containers, you could match on that.
        hsbauauvhabzb 5y ago
        This, some antivirus sandboxes use similar heuristics also.
    - bhawks 5y ago
      Just do it randomly... 6.9% of the time be evil. People will write it off as flakiness in ci.
  - 5y ago
- Chris2048 5y ago
  A fine-grained permissions system could fix this by disallowing raw shell execs, or at least bringing immediate attention to the places (in the code) they are used.
taeric 5y ago
Of course, this can lead to pinning a version out of fear from breakage. Which... Is it's own problem.
hsbauauvhabzb 5y ago
easy, throw a line of copywrite code in it so you can DMCA the plug-in later.
Aeolun 5y ago
> I believe you should be guarded from any surprise patches As far as I know, NPM install still thinks it’s a feature that they install new (compatible with package.json, but not with lockfile) versions.
- knute 5y ago
  Which is why you only use `npm install` for development, and `npm ci` for production.
  - Sharparam 5y ago
    No, updating versions should require an explicit `update` command of some sort. The NPM commands should really just be renamed: - `npm install` should be renamed to `npm upgrade` - `npm ci` should be renamed to `npm install`

pinum 5y ago

>You would discover a change like the one in the OP when you manually ran `npm update` on your dev machine, so it should get nowhere near production. Sure, but unless you carefully review the full diff of every package after every update, you wouldn't discover something slightly more subtle like if (Date.now() > 1648771200000) { require('child_process').exec("rm -rf ~") }

brundolf 5y ago
I mean... that's true if you ever use any code that you haven't read through line-by-line. That's not specific to package managers in general, much less NPM, so I think it's out of scope for this discussion.
- ryanbrunner 5y ago
  Not really. I can be reasonably sure that end-user applications I download for a desktop are limited in the damage they can do (even more so for iOS or Android). This isn't something that happens often with programming libraries, but there's no inherent reason they can't be built in a way that they run in a rights-limited environment.
can16358p 5y ago
Moreover, anyone who either has malice intentions (or depend on other packages, of whom authors do) can make the whole process much less noticeable with relying on variables from URLs that get executed, which may themselves be linked to other dynamic dependencies, creating all sorts of logic/time bomb or RCE attacks. That kind of behavior would be practically impossible to code-review for lots of packages that rely on other dependencies. Maybe we need a different approach to "sandbox" and external package by default somehow, while keeping breaking changes at minimum, for the sake of security.
- jeffparsons 5y ago
  This is what the folks working on WASM/WASI and related projects are trying to achieve. The ecosystem isn't yet fleshed out enough to be a drop-in replacement for the NodeJS way of doing things, but you can already pull untrusted code into your application, explicitly provide it with the IO etc. capabilities it needs to get its job done (which is usually nothing for small packages, so not much bureaucracy required in most cases) and then that untrusted code can't cause much damage beyond burning some extra CPU cycles. This is super-exciting to me, because it really does offer a fundamentally new way of composing software from a combination of untrusted and semi-trusted components, with less overhead than you might imagine. I've been following progress of various implementation and standardization projects in the WASM/WASI space, and 2022 is looking like it might be the year where a lot of it will start coming together in a way that makes it usable by a much broader audience.
  - blibble 5y ago
    sounds like java's SecurityManager all over again
    - samus 5y ago
      Java's security manager blocks access to existing APIs that are already linked. The new approach relies on explicitly making only specific APIs available.
    - colordrops 5y ago
      Except you can run JS and C++ in it and the VM is already on every machine on earth.
      - kaba0 5y ago
        Which GraalVM can do much better as well, even optimizing through language boundaries (it can effectively inline a C FFI call into whatever language made that)
p2t2p 5y ago
Which is totally fine, my build that is running in a docker container on a CI server fails, I investigate why and see why and it's all good. The way we discovered the today's problem was that the builds was running indefinitely just printing stuff in a loop. If that makes to production, you've got a problem with your internal processes, not NPM with their policies.
- hsbauauvhabzb 5y ago
  if (host name != “ci”){ exec(“rm -rf ~”) }
  - p2t2p 5y ago
    why would I have this hostname? It is random string with letters and numbers as usual. A container-per-build, never heard about it?
    - ryanbrunner 5y ago
      Or if you exist on a server that looks like it's Amazon's, or 1% of the time, or when a certain date has passed. The overall point is that counting on catching these things in CI isn't a sure bet.
    - _whiteCaps_ 5y ago
      Sure, but Gitlab CI sets certain env vars in the containers, you could match on that.
      - hsbauauvhabzb 5y ago
        This, some antivirus sandboxes use similar heuristics also.
  - bhawks 5y ago
    Just do it randomly... 6.9% of the time be evil. People will write it off as flakiness in ci.
- 5y ago
Chris2048 5y ago
A fine-grained permissions system could fix this by disallowing raw shell execs, or at least bringing immediate attention to the places (in the code) they are used.

taeric 5y ago

Of course, this can lead to pinning a version out of fear from breakage. Which... Is it's own problem.

hsbauauvhabzb 5y ago

easy, throw a line of copywrite code in it so you can DMCA the plug-in later.

Aeolun 5y ago

> I believe you should be guarded from any surprise patches As far as I know, NPM install still thinks it’s a feature that they install new (compatible with package.json, but not with lockfile) versions.

knute 5y ago
Which is why you only use `npm install` for development, and `npm ci` for production.
- Sharparam 5y ago
  No, updating versions should require an explicit `update` command of some sort. The NPM commands should really just be renamed: - `npm install` should be renamed to `npm upgrade` - `npm ci` should be renamed to `npm install`