5 ms·
Last time I checked, all the computers were growing powerful and crypto was relevant neither for latency nor for power consumption on any device capable of join
by marcosdumay 5y ago
Last time I checked, all the computers were growing powerful and crypto was relevant neither for latency nor for power consumption on any device capable of joining a network.
It helps that one of the largest factors on choosing crypto algorithms is speed on both general purpose and specialized hardware.
So, count me in the group of people that don't understand why the NIST is doing this. Will they trade any security guarantee for speed? If so, nobody should ever use one of those algorithms. If not, whatever algorithm wins here would also win a new round of general purpose crypto contest.
- wmf 5y agoCheck out the case of storage encryption in smartwatches and very cheap phones. The CPUs do not have AES instructions and doing software AES makes the watch noticeably sluggish. https://lwn.net/ml/linux-crypto/20180806223300.113891-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/ https://lwn.net/ml/linux-crypto/20180806223300.113891-1-ebig...
- marcosdumay 5y agoThe question is, are you ok with the encryption being breakable if it makes your watch faster? Personally, if I'm ok with the encryption being breakable, I'm also ok with not using any encryption at all. I can't imagine a scenario where I would want weak encryption. Anyway, the way to solve that problem is to get a CPU with AES instructions.
- wmf 5y agoThat tradeoff doesn't exist. No one is proposing weak or breakable encryption. Even the fastest "lightweight" finalists provide full 128-bit security.
- marcosdumay 5y agoIf they have 128-bit security, what is the difference between that and a normal contest?
- neodon 5y agoI think the difference is that the focus is on finding more efficient ways to provide the same level of security. Existing algorithms are "good enough" performance-wise for mainstream hardware, but there is much room for improvement without tradeoffs.
- tluyben2 5y agoFor instance, the devices we make are not powerful enough to use the standard crypto algorithms. So we are looking forward to the results. Security, for us, only has to be guaranteed for a limited time: if it cannot be cracked in a few minutes, it does not matter if it ever does. So we benefit from 'not as secure but secure enough'. Edit; by not powerful enough, we mean both: too high latency and too much energy drain.
- marcosdumay 5y agoIf you create an encryption schema designed to survive a few hours of attack, it will automatically be vulnerable to the attacker negotiating a discount with a CPU manufacturer.
- oleganza 5y agoWould you mind sharing what protocols you are working on that can benefit from a "lightweight cryptography"? My impression from learning cryptography in the last 8 years is that cryptographic protocols are either exponentially secure, or any tiny weaknesses can be amplified into a complete break. The only example of secure "intrapolynomial cryptography" [1] is Proof-of-Work, but it also requires work to be expended continuously. Not exactly a scheme for "underpowered devices". [1] https://nakamotoinstitute.org/intrapolynomial-cryptography/ https://nakamotoinstitute.org/intrapolynomial-cryptography/
- tluyben2 5y agoThat is why NIST is doing this; most IoT I am aware of, including ours, needs a very secure channel, but for a relative short(er) time. So if it takes 6 hours minimum to decrypt it without having the private key, that would be fine for us and most IoT (that I have seen anyway) but bad for most general purpose computing, where you want 'infinite time' security if you can get it. I think it is a different and undervalued market, resulting often in bad security practices because we have no alternatives. The MCUs we use cost cents and are measured in mhz speed and kbs memory. They do have cryptographic co units but those are not very fast either while generic crypto algos tend to demand more and more power to guarantee longer periods of being decrypted by bad actors. Edit: note that we are using RSA and, lately, Ed25519, but it takes 5-6s for the heaviest Ops and that is simply way too long. It is however secure and it works, so if that is it than that is it, it is just overkill mostly for what we need.
- Lifelarper 5y ago> all the computers Maybe those machines that don't even spin up a fan with 400 npm dependencies, but billions of of low end embedded devices pumped out annually. Call me a sceptic but I think the lightcrypto contest is actually something that will benefit society far more than the post-quantum simultaneously underway.
- marcosdumay 5y agoThe processing needs of a wifi connection (or any wireless protocol) are overwhelming on dealing with the problems of a radio connection. Unless you are connecting, sending a single package and disconnecting¹, encryption barely registers. For wired devices things changes a bit. Encryption can be dozens of times more expensive than moving your data around for processing. But if that's a problem, you need to accelerate your encryption in hardware², not to weaken the encryption. 1 - If you are, you are better with some protocol that keeps the encryption setup around between transmissions, not with weaker crypto. 2 - Just like you accelerate the "moving data around" part, because it doesn't go from the network into the main memory for free either.
- 0xdeadb00f 5y agoThe biggest use case for these algorithms is IoT, and other resource constrained embedded devices. Quite frankly, I'm surprised you didn't consider it seeing as insecure IoT devices have been in the news pretty much since they hit the market. Embedded devices, especially specialised ones arent poweful enough to operate sufficiently while also providing protection via the current "standard" crypto algorithms.
- loeg 5y agoA lot of the problems with IoT devices are things like hardcoded keys or passwords shared across all units. LWC doesn’t fix that kind of design problem. I agree LWC has value but I think most IoT products are less cpu-limited and more engineer-limited.
- mindslight 5y agoThe problem with Internet of Trash devices isn't a lack of cryptography - it's closed, poorly developed, throw-away software. In comparison to implementing a whole wifi stack, some dedicated hardware for AES is trivial. Given that NSA has been trying to get us to use "lightweight cryptography" for decades (eg 512 bit RSA), this seems quite uncompelling. Furthermore for even smaller devices without Wifi, the "Internet" of things (where Internet means communicating directly over the WAN rather than to a more-capable local device) won't be compelling until the software situation has been sorted out. For example the best practices for using current Wifi smart plugs is to stick them on their own VLAN with no Internet access, communicating only with a local Home Assistant or whatever. There's no reason they themselves need to be on the WAN.
- hannob 5y agoPretty much every IoT device uses Wifi, and that doesn't seem to be a problem right now. They all seem to be perfectly capable of speaking WPA2 with AES.
- JoachimS 5y agoOr BTE, ZigBee, LoRa. Esp for longer distances (things out in forests, industrial parks) Wifi is not the radio being used.
- 60Vhipx7b4JL 5y agoEvery thought about all the things besides personal computers and smartphones? Embedded applications, energy limited (battery, power harvesting) devices, IoT, other resource constrained devices? I also doubt that more processing = more security.