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Beautiful. That's how you do it. I actually believe that law enforcement has the legal right to subpoena information, with a judge's consent, while investigati
by 2OEH8eoCRo0 5y ago
Beautiful. That's how you do it.
I actually believe that law enforcement has the legal right to subpoena information, with a judge's consent, while investigating criminal activity. This is exactly the solution to that problem. These platforms should want to know as little about you as possible.
- teawrecks 5y agoIf neuralink/related tech ever gets to the point of mind-to-mind communication, without a doubt our law enforcement will claim they have the right to subpoena a person's thoughts. We may be setting a precedent now that is more important that we could ever think (pun intended).
- Marsymars 5y agoThat kind of technology would make the issue more obvious, but I already operate under the understanding that people's personal computing devices are effectively extensions of their minds. I read a good short story on the subject recently, "The Truth of Fact, the Truth of Feeling": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Truth_of_Fact,_the_Truth_of_Feeling https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Truth_of_Fact,_the_Truth_o...
- iammisc 5y agoNo the solution is functioning government. Government can tomorrow make encryption illegal. Why does everyone think the solution is technical when it's a cultural problem? The government has big guns and will use them to enforce the law.
- savant_penguin 5y agoAgreed, except when the government gets to make that subpoena a state secret
- ARandomerDude 5y agoWith very limited use, even secret subpoenas can be a good thing, for example in a counterintelligence situation where you don't want to tip your hand to a foreign intelligence service. The problem is abuse of that system.
- post_below 5y agoAbuse of that system being a when, not if, scenario.
- throwoutway 5y agoMore like “how often”, or have we forgotten how much Obama tried to bury Snowden’s leaks?
- akiselev 5y agoI'd postulate that given the scale of a nation state, abuse of any system becomes a when, not if, scenario.
- salawat 5y ago...or to your own citizens, who you may be looking at as a domestic threat. Let's be clear There is no reason to assume that this type of thing is constrained to "just the type" the government can have their arm forced into admitting to.
- webmobdev 5y agoThat seems to be recent thing (over the last decade or 2) with the US. The Supreme Court of India recently made these observations when the government refused to share certain information with it under the bogey of "national security": > "... In a democratic country governed by the rule of law, indiscriminate spying on individuals cannot be allowed except with sufficient statutory safeguards, by following the procedure established by law under the Constitution ... > We had made it clear to the learned Solicitor General on many occasions that we would not push the Respondent-Union of India to provide any information that may affect the national security concerns of the country. However, despite the repeated assurances and opportunities given, ultimately the Respondent-Union of India has placed on record what they call a "limited affidavit", which does not shed any light on their stand or provide any clarity as to the facts of the matter at hand. > However, this does not mean that the State gets a free pass every time the spectre of "national security" is raised. National security cannot be the bugbear that the judiciary shies away from, by virtue of its mere mentioning. Although this Court should be circumspect in encroaching the domain of national security, no omnibus prohibition can be called for against judicial review. > The Respondent-Union of India must necessarily plead and prove the facts which indicate that the information sought must be kept secret as their divulgence would affect national security concerns. They must justify the stand that they take before a Court. The mere invocation of national security by the State does not render the Court a mute spectator" > ... We are not interested in knowing matters related to security or defence. We are only concerned to know whether Govt has used any method other than admissible under law ..." Source: Supreme Court Constitutes Independent Expert Committee To Probe Pegasus Snooping Allegations - https://web.archive.org/web/20211029130706/https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-security-cheque-dishonour-138-negotiable-instrument-act-184598 https://web.archive.org/web/20211029130706/https://www.livel...
- onetimeusename 5y agoYes, although the way around this for law enforcement is to pressure Apple and Google to remove Signal from the App Store/Play respectively (to protect children!) and work on operating system level bypasses of Signal. I am fearing this scenario.
- tyingq 5y agoI wonder how far they could go in compelling Signal to push a change that let more info leak for a specific user. I know there have been somewhat similar cases where companies were compelled to add new functionality, logs, etc, to capture info for a specific user.
- BrandoElFollito 5y agoEvery time I see similar questions, I just wonder why companies such as Signal do not put in place a mechanism to veto changes across countrie. If they had developers in, say, France, who would need to accept changes made somewhere else then a single country could not force such secret modifications. Of course an app is actually a binary, so there must be a way to verify that code + compilation = the published binary.
- JTbane 5y agoMight go full idiotic like the Australian government and mandate backdoors
- Thorentis 5y agoI'm surprised the FBI has tried to get a custom keyboard into the Play Store yet, or asked Google to add a key logger to the stock one. Sure, the legality is blury at the moment, but it's just a matter of changing some laws and then that becomes legal.
- monocasa 5y agoI assume Google's reports back already. They need that for ML training.
- MuffinFlavored 5y ago> This is exactly the solution to that problem. I could be wrong but I was under the impression that the way end-to-end encryption worked (like what Signal claims, I thought) was it was physically impossible for them to decrypt (handover decrypted data (aka your messages) to a court of law) because the public/private keys are impossible to crack and also not known by Signal. It sounds like this isn't the case whatsoever. I don't really understand modern chat apps that talk about encryption. By no means am I a pro on the subject so I apologize in advance but... if you really don't want ANYBODY EVER snooping on your data network wise (unless they are holding one of the devices and reading the screen after it has been unlocked via passcode/biometric, etc.), can't you just tell your friend a key and exchange it offline and then communicate freely with no middleman? Or even, with a middleman... that is just transporting your data and doesn't know your agreed upon shared secret or keys. How could a subpoena ever work against this kind of data?
- aidenn0 5y agoIt takes extra effort to design a system with this little amount of data. Note that we only have Signal's word for some of this; they could in fact log every single time that you login, which would make the amount of data sent to the FBI much larger (and could be of importance to the case, for example, if the defendant had a dedicated Signal account for the crime that they only logged into at certain times). Then there's IPs. If you log IPs along with when someone connects, then an IP can often be tracked to a WiFi router, which then pins your location. Most E2EE communication protocols will see (and thus potentially log) the time and destination of every message you send. If two people have been accused of conspiring to commit a crime, this could be material in forming the case. They may also store your contact list, but a sufficiently long list of messages sent will practically determine your contact list anyways. Even just the time of messages could be important; if someone interviewed claimed to be in the shower at a certain time, but there were logs of a message being sent at that time, that's probably enough for an obstruction of justice charge to stick.
- tialaramex 5y ago> they could in fact log every single time that you login, which would make the amount of data sent to the FBI much larger I guess you mean each time you connected to their server to retrieve messages? There is no "login" step, Signal doesn't have a log in process. Presumably a typical Signal client calls several times per day. The record they provided says connection date and despite being supplied in milliseconds since the epoch the value appears to indeed represent a whole day not a specific time. So you're correct Signal could be lying and actually store the exact moment you last connected, for whatever that's worth, and we could not prove they don't have that info. > Most E2EE communication protocols will see (and thus potentially log) the time and destination of every message you send Signal doesn't know who sent messages among close friends, and optionally not anybody who sent messages to a sensitive account. Let's take the example of a message I sent to my friend Chris. I know Chris, I've sent messages to him previously and he knows me, so I'm in his contacts list. As a result by default my Signal client keeps some "Sealed Sender" tokens for Chris. When I send a message to Chris, my client uses a token it learned from a previous conversation with Chris, but Signal doesn't know who I am, just that I have a valid token for sending messages to Chris. So it stores the message, and gives it to Chris. Chris's client can determine that this is a message from me, tialaramex, but the Signal service never knew who sent the message. If one day Chris hates me and blocks me from sending messages, his client invalidates all Sealed Sender tokens, and begins issuing new ones to his other friends so they can continue to contact him.
- bertil 5y agoIt’s a very small thing, but ~I suspect that~ “Unix timestamp” means they actually send the epoch number, without even bothering to do the conversion to Gregorian data format. PS: I didn’t notice the attachement. Yup, that’s _exactly_ what they send. Curious whether the suspect could recognise their creation date and know that they are being investigated that way--and whether that exposes Signal.
- raxxorrax 5y agoExactly, but I fear that government is a step away to ask for ID for any online service. Median age in politics is pretty old and regarding security and experience from the last 20 years suggest they are also easily scared. While you might forgive someone working for interior ministries, this is an automatism towards fearful stupidity. Benefits don't play are role here, it is exclusively about any potential security benefit, doesn't matter how small. Sadly signal is based on phone numbers which I dislike, but other messengers should take note here.