11 ms·
One thing I've never understood is why Blue teams don't get as much funding. Cyber defense is much harder than cyber offense. I know there is a lot you can do b
by godelski 5y ago
One thing I've never understood is why Blue teams don't get as much funding. Cyber defense is much harder than cyber offense. I know there is a lot you can do by tracking citizens and a lot of information you can get, but if you're not blue teaming your country then an adversarial country can use exactly all those same tools you're excited about using on your adversaries. I feel the red teams get all the money and the blue teams get pushed off to the side. I do want to keep red teams, but I want to see NSA also doing bug bounties, increasing security in Android and iOS, strengthening the internet, etc. Why is this not happening? Why are we also not outraged about this?
- kevin_thibedeau 5y agoYou can't measure the true effectiveness of blue teams so in MBA terms they are a useless cost center. At best the sort of thing that should be outsourced to the lowest bidder. Exploit happens... See! Look how bad the blue team is.
- sandworm101 5y ago>> but if you're not blue teaming your country then an adversarial country can use exactly all those same tools you're excited about You miss the point of these tools. They are not being used to protect country A from country B. They are being used to protect those running country A from those living in country A. Country B and its people are not in the picture. You don't blue team the target because you don't want to make it more difficult to watch. If anything, you want to deny them strong security tools. Your red team can do that very well.
- corndoge 5y agoI agree with you but please, no more outrage. We have enough outrage. Be a proponent of something without being outraged about it. It's not doing any good to be outraged and it's exhausting.
- yuuu 5y agoThanks for protecting us, outrage police!
- 1121redblackgo 5y agoAnd does that make you the outrage police police?
- yuuu 5y agoI'm just your regular outrage citizen thanking our local outrage police, no sarcasm whatsoever! They have an important duty to protect us from outraged people on the internet, and they put their lives on the line every day.
- adolph 5y agoWhen we all have outrage, does that make it outrage-us?
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- FpUser 5y ago>"We have enough outrage" We who? I definitely do not feel that we have enough. If we did it would've percolated to some noticeable action.
- rocqua 5y agoOutrage is not conducive to well thought out action. Ourage builds and builds pressure until the subject reaches a tipping point and comes with a knee-jerk reaction meant to reduce the pressure. Such reactions are poorly planned, have no room for nuance or discussion of downsides, and are not aimed at solving the problem but at getting the outraged people of your back. Joining a mob of angry people is a way to affect change. But in many cases it is not the change we (should) want.
- FpUser 5y ago>"Outrage is not conducive to well thought out action." Tell it to politicians. They're outraged every other minute. >"But in many cases it is not the change we (should) want." Did I say we should be outraged in "every case"? Oh and thank you for telling me what (should) I want.
- adolph 5y agoOften outrage is all froth and no caffe.
- godelski 5y agoBy the outrage I more mean where people are spending time complaining and trying to fix the system. I want people to focus efforts into trying to get larger funding into defense (and not defense as in building weapons, but security, if that wasn't clear).
- hn8788 5y agoThey are doing stuff like that, but it doesn't make for sexy clickbait, so nobody posts it. For example, last week Microsoft released a patch for an exchange server exploit that NSA discovered and reported.
- rtkwe 5y agoThere's also the issue that there's no mechanism to force companies to keep servers up to date or face consequences so it's only possible to really do half the work. Blue teams could find every vulnerability out there but you'd still have companies running old versions or refusing to put out patches to their customers (and customers not updating devices deployed in their home).
- rocqua 5y agoThe mechanism has sort of revealed itself recently, and it is not a net positive: ransomware.
- rtkwe 5y agoTrue enough I guess, though it’s definitely not what I’d pick. Tangentially I wonder why ransomware hasn’t been a thing for longer. Was it an issue of how to do payments that crypto solved?
- rocqua 5y agoThe consensus seems to be that it is crypto making receiving the ransom easier, and Russia (and other jurisdictions) giving ransomware crews free reign. I think the second one might be more important, because it is generally known who the big crews are, and it is actually easy to screw up the opsec on crypto.
- Kalium 5y agoIt's also worth bearing in mind that the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, and Treasury all have efforts to this effect. And as you say, nobody writes articles about how the Department of Energy helped a solar operator figure out a patching strategy. It's boring. Energy effort here: https://www.energy.gov/national-security-safety/cybersecurity https://www.energy.gov/national-security-safety/cybersecurit...
- aemreunal 5y agoAlso, recently, FBI "hacked" in to Exchange servers that were vulnerable (with court authorization) to patch them [1], so it does happen. But I agree with your sentiment that it doesn't happen as often as it should. The public perception seems to be that the US doesn't spend enough resources to harden its and its people's defenses than it does to surveil people. [1]: https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/13/fbi-launches-operation-to-remotely-remove-microsoft-exchange-server-backdoors/ https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/13/fbi-launches-operation-to-...
- Veserv 5y agoBlue teams do get lots of funding (edit: I am speaking in general, not on government spending). It is just that their strategies are so so unbelievably bad no amount of money can produce an adequate system. Blue teams with a $1 Billion/year budget can not prevent total compromise by red teams with a $1 Million/year budget. If you must outspend you attackers by 1000x you are doomed. For instance, in 2015 Microsoft committed to spending $1 Billion/year in security research and development to securing their cloud, the second largest cloud in the world [1]. What is the result of such spending? A little over a month ago the default management agent they ship for managing Linux on Azure had a security defect that allowed local privilege escalation by sending an empty password [2]. Their processes are so bad that despite spending $1 Billion/year they can not detect and prevent themselves from releasing security 101 defects in default installs of widely deployed products. This is indicative of a grossly inadequate process in much the same way that a car factory delivering cars with no brake lines would indicate that factory and manufacturing process needs to be completely redesigned from the ground up and the entire team overseeing it replaced. The outrageous part is not that security is not being funded, it is that organizations and systems displaying such fundamental errors continue to get vast sums of money poured into them. [1] https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2015/11/17/enterprise-security-for-our-mobile-first-cloud-first-world/ https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2015/11/17/enterprise-secur... [2] https://www.wiz.io/blog/secret-agent-exposes-azure-customers-to-unauthorized-code-execution https://www.wiz.io/blog/secret-agent-exposes-azure-customers...
- alisonkisk 5y agoWhy hire a red team if you can't afford to fix the problems they find?
- nixpulvis 5y agoSo what do we do? Just admit that it's all doomed forever? Perhaps the only question left at that point would be exactly what even needs to be blue and red team'd. In other words what is worth using at the risk of being abused. If you also assume infinite extent, then nothing is worth it because everything can cause harm. Otherwise, we actually do learn ways to converge towards more generally secure systems. Safer programming languages and safer hardware will lead the way, but it seems much slower this round than the stories we hear about the origins of everything.
- dane-pgp 5y agoThe government's strategy is probably a result of it being easier to maintain an advantage by keeping weapons secret than by distributing defences to only the good guys. It would be interesting to speculate how close we are to replacing all networked services with provably secure implementations (like the work of Project Everest[0]). Of course there's no such thing as perfect security (or perfect proofs), but I think we are close to reaching the point where attacking implementation flaws is less fruitful than attacking the software supply chain. In fact, we may already have reached that point, so I think that efforts to secure the supply chain (like sigstore[1]) and potential government efforts to attack it (like recent changes to iOS and Android[2]) deserve more focus. [0] https://project-everest.github.io/ https://project-everest.github.io/ [1] https://security.googleblog.com/2021/03/introducing-sigstore-easy-code-signing.html https://security.googleblog.com/2021/03/introducing-sigstore... [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27176690 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27176690
- godelski 5y agoThe US gov can easily maintain an offensive advantage while doing massive amounts of patching. Red teaming is much easier. The problem here is that we're essentially building glass cannons. Yeah, we can hit hard but you can't win a fight that way. Eventually you're going to get punched in the face.
- michael1999 5y agoPublicly, Poindexter and the rest of the criminals under Bush Jr. went all-offence and launched the Information Awareness Office [0] to pursue a strategy of Total Information Awareness [1]. They wanted to ramp up ECHELON to hoover the whole world, started hoarding 0-days, and eventually created a whole industry to shop exploits. Now that is a business, nobody is going to make director leading the blue team. Privately, I speculate that they also assessed the state of play and just gave up. Microsoft back then still believed that code-signing would fix their bug-of-the-week run. Industry security practices were so weak as to be non-existent. Hell - telnet was still common. The only nice thing I can say about it was they had an amazingly honest logo [2]. That is, until congress freaked out and made them hide it all behind a bit SECRET sign. And so we heard little more about except via a steady drip of whistleblowers like Mark Klein, Thomas Drake, William Binney, and Snowdon. [0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_Information_Awareness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_Information_Awareness [2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office#/media/File:IAO-logo.png https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office#/...
- alisonkisk 5y agoHow is a Blue Team different from regular IT and Compliance work?
- nonameiguess 5y agoThe NSA does perform that function for the government. They protect DoD and IC assets and critical civilian computing infrastructure. They created SELinux and sponsored many of the major cryptographic standards out there. They don't actively provide defense for iOS and Android because those are product owned by trillion dollar private companies who can pay for their own security, not expected publicly-funded agencies to do it for them. The Internet is an interesting case. Nobody owns it. It isn't even American. The fact that it was originally created by and for universities that all implicitly trusted each other has led to a whole lot of security flaws baked into the core assumptions of the most basic protocols. But the NSA does protect the hell out of military networks. Military and IC networks are absolutely nothing like the Internet. There is an inherent difficulty in bringing the same assurance to public networks, though, because nobody on a military network expects to be anonymous or to have any privacy. Users implicitly trust the network's central authority. They have to because they work for it. Security is a lot easier with a trusted central authority.
- spydum 5y agoI think the root of this is you cannot buy "security". It has to be part of the engineering ethos at all levels. This gets really hard to do at scale. Pouring money u to Blue teams is too late in the process.
- FpUser 5y agoThis. If you want something secure everything has to be created from scratch. The OS, languages, tooling, every software etc. etc. Nobody will ever do that. And even if they did something will fuck it up on higher level.
- adolph 5y agoMaybe there is a genius in the statement “640K is all the memory anybody would ever need on a computer” in that it would be harder to fuck up something much smaller and simpler. https://www.wired.com/1997/01/did-gates-really-say-640k-is-enough-for-anyone/ https://www.wired.com/1997/01/did-gates-really-say-640k-is-e...
- FpUser 5y agoI remember that time quite well. PC's of the regular not savvy users were full of viruses.
- PeterisP 5y agoNo, those smaller/simpler systems are much easier to fuck up. In order to have secure systems, you need to add a lot of complexity overhead that earlier systems simply could not afford. Proper process isolation is a good example - extra complexity, but absolutely necessary unless your chip limitations make it impractical. Permissions for memory pages eg. W^X policy. Stack canaries. Address space layout randomization. All things that add extra complexity and resource usage, but without which it's much easier to exploit systems and any single mistake means it's game over.
- LogonType10 5y agoIt seems like you think that red teaming and blue teaming works much like an RPG game where you can spend skill points on perks, but blue team perks (like tier 1 endpoint defense) cost more skill points than red team perks. I don't think this is an accurate mental model, and I'd rather frame it like this: exploits are secrets, and when you learn the secret, you can share it with others as well as develop the countermeasure to the exploit. If you spend a lot of money discovering a useful exploit it is by definition something nontrivial that is unlikely to be discovered by regular hackers unless it is leaked or discovered after careless usage. If you discover an exploit that an enemy will soon discover, it is to your advantage to publish the countermeasures to the exploit before your opponent discovers and weaponizes it.
- capableweb 5y ago> increasing security in Android and iOS This would make it more difficult to hack those OSes in other countries and within the borders too, why would they make their own job harder for them? Yeah, I know, their job shouldn't be to hack others, but that's how it is today.
- BobbyJo 5y agoSpeculating at a 10,000 foot view: It may just be the case that, in any real conflict, phones, the internet, etc. are doomed no matter what. It would be so easy to cripple digital infrastructure with physical means it probably doesn't make much sense investing in digital prevention. Physical safeguards are both easier to implement, easier to demonstrate when funding is decided, and generally the better investment considering most compromises of government digital infrastructure come from people with direct physical access (plugging in a dropped USB, spies, phishing, etc.).