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“Worst cloud vulnerability you can imagine” discovered in Microsoft Azure
- runnerup 5y agoI always wonder if these types of vulnerabilities affect the most secret DoD contracts, or if those accounts are somehow sharded onto sufficiently separate systems/networks?
- jeffbee 5y agoDoD only has idiotic requirements like there has to be a fence around their private racks, not useful requirements like the global database isn’t open to the world.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- dharmab 5y agoAzure runs their Gov and China clouds as separate infrastructures with separate capabilities.
- reallydontask 5y agoI'd guess that the azure us gov cloud defaults to stuff not being open to the web, so if you spin up an azure function this is only available internally, but this is a guess
- nonameiguess 5y agoNope. Look here (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-government/compliance/azure-services-in-fedramp-auditscope#azure-government-services-by-audit-scope https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-government/comp...) and search for Cosmos and you'll see this service is only approved for DoD Impact Level II systems. That is the lowest impact level the DoD offers and includes only systems exposed to the public, like the websites for recruiting and career descriptions. Any system handling controlled unclassified information or PII would not have been allowed to use this service. And when you're talking about "most secret" contracts, those are all classified systems, which are on totally separate networks in totally separate private data centers located on military installations. Unless you've figured out how to break strong symmetric encryption using hardware-generated, hardware-loaded, pre-shared keys controlled in military arms rooms, that means you need physical access. It doesn't necessarily mean you need to break into a military installation. You can always try to break into a contractor SCIF instead, but that still isn't all that easy. My wife once saw some AT&T contractors digging too close to the wrong fiber line at her facility when she was working for the Navy at a contractor site and unmarked black SUVs were there to take those guys away to God knows where within two minutes. That said, I don't doubt people try. When I was at Raytheon working at a secure facility, a Chinese company bought the property across the street, built a hotel at exactly the same height with windows facing us, and it was conspicuously almost always empty. I don't think demand for hotel rooms was financing that place.
- csharptwdec19 5y ago> My wife once saw some AT&T contractors digging too close to the wrong fiber line at her facility when she was working for the Navy at a contractor site and unmarked black SUVs were there to take those guys away to God knows where within two minutes. I used to do design/permitting for fiber networks and going around DOD areas/Fiber was always fun. You wind up having to submit your routes, and get vague feedback as to what you need to move, but never how far away/etc. Usually your best bet is to just go to the other side of the road if possible.
- sneak 5y agoI think the worst vulnerability I can imagine is the USG having unfettered access to the entire db contents without a warrant, which is already the case with everything in Azure. This bug only seems to widen that vulnerability slightly, to those groups plus those with knowledge of this bug. Nothing in major US cloud providers can reasonably be expected to remain private, so I think this breathless headline is a little overblown.
- Angostura 5y agoSo this vulnerability is worse than the worst you could imagine
- hollerith 5y ago>the worst vulnerability I can imagine is the USG having unfettered access You cannot imagine any other party it would be worse to be vulnerable to?
- dennisblue 5y agoNo.
- indigochill 5y ago> Nothing in major US cloud providers can reasonably be expected to remain private I'd expand that to "Nothing in third-party cloud providers can reasonably be expected to remain private". If you don't have ultimate oversight of how the host of your data is managed, anything could be going on there, regardless what nationality of company is managing it or what promises their salespeople make.
- jb0x168 5y agoFurther amended: nothing connected to the internet can reasonably be expected to remain private. Unless you have some secret kung-fu that makes your on-prem infrastructure hack-proof. The issue with the cloud is scale.
- karmakaze 5y agoIt's bothersome that they keep saying 'primary key' in regards to what seems to be an 'access key' relating to a database. Disappointing to see that it's arstechnica.
- mikeryan 5y agoIt's the term that MS uses, agree unfortunate name but you can't blame Ars. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/secure-access-to-data?tabs=using-primary-key https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cosmos-db/secure-acce...
- nuker 5y agoYou guys open DBs to internet?
- oefrha 5y agoDupe: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28322550 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28322550
- wiredfool 5y agoWorst I can imagine would be this, but for active directory or IAM.
- arduinomancer 5y agoWhenever stuff like this happens I see people saying there should be legal consequences for leaking data. By that logic should there be legal consequences for a company if someone breaks into their office and steals paper records?
- geofft 5y agohttps://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/negligence https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/negligence
- inetknght 5y ago> By that logic should there be legal consequences for a company if someone breaks into their office and steals paper records? Comparing cloud storage and paper records is worse than comparing apples to oranges; it's comparing apples to celery. Sure they're both edible but they are vastly different organisms. And yes, there can be legal consequences for a company if someone breaks into their office and steals paper records.
- jereees 5y agoAn analogy of an analogy. Could somebody go one level deeper?
- Sanguinaire 5y agoComparing the original statement to the subsequent analogy is a bit like comparing an apple and an NFT of an apple...
- aranchelk 5y agoIt depends, in a regulated industry if you fail to do stuff like install a commercial firewall, keep facilities secured with proper door locks, etc. you may very well face fines or loss of a license to operate. I think when people talk about consequences, they’re not regarding these companies as victims of crimes, rather as negligent actors.
- vorpalhex 5y ago
- donmcronald 5y ago$40k? Lol. I’m poor and I’d have to think twice about disclosing it for that. How many government lists does having the ability to discover that type of exploit get you on? I bet Microsoft would claim damages of $1+ billion if someone used that type of exploit maliciously by damaging data and undermining customer confidence in Azure. What a joke. This should pay $1+ million.
- cagenut 5y agoThe context you're missing here is the company/research-team that found this are ex-MS employees who started a company (Wiz.io) to help other companies secure their cloud hosting/environments. This is some of the most pure-gold viral content marketing they can dream of, they don't care about the $40k at all, its just to acknowledge this is non-trivial.
- doliveira 5y agoThat sounds like paying artists with "exposure".
- ufmace 5y agoThere is kind of a 2-sided argument here: 1. Small time cheap skate business owners sometimes try to cheat professional artists by "paying with exposure", when they have no meaningful audience or influence and therefore no meaningful exposure to give. 2. Sources that do genuinely have very large audiences and influence can infact give an artist so much exposure that it's worth far more than any reasonable direct payment This situation seems a lot more like 2 than 1. The company is in the business of helping companies secure their cloud environments, and these articles going around the tech press are being read by hundreds of thousands of people who are generally more interested in cloud security than a random person. They could spend many times the amounts discussed here on advertising and still not get their name in front of that many of the right people in a good context.
- doliveira 5y ago
- muststopmyths 5y agoI'm curious if Microsoft is suffering from a massive loss of generational expertise. At least right after XP we had to go through a security standdown where all code was reviewed and audited throughout the company. Subsequent features and services had to go through a pretty thorough security review at design time as well. Over the past few years the number of security fiascos has been increasing. Is the internal Security team (forget what the org was called) dead now ? I'm sure lack of dedicated testing is also a major factor, but do launches no longer have to satisfy a security review ? Maybe in the name of agile development ?
- foepys 5y agoI'm wondering about this, too. There are so many things being redone from scratch that I'm scratching my head about the why. Maybe Microsoft lost so many engineers from the 90s that they don't have the people anymore that understand the old code.
- ta988 5y agoThe problem here is due to a lack of basic security practices. There is nothing related to old code, it is brand new code and infrastructure that was deployed without audit.
- pmlnr 5y agoUnderstanding old code rarely gets one promotions.
- welkie 5y agoSomehow, it's gotten me promotions and raises. I feel like I'm lucky and should stick around.
- stingraycharles 5y agoAt the time of XP, Microsoft had a fierce monopoly in the world and was absolutely dominating. I wouldn’t be surprised if they started embracing the “ship fast” mentality with the cloud a bit more over the past years, in order to corner the market more quickly (which they did). Additionally, I can also imagine that the release processes for cloud are fundamentally different than something like an OS. With the cloud, there’s a much larger mentality of releasing often, and it may be difficult to translate rigorous security audits to this workflow.
- varispeed 5y agoI am the only one who thinks these bounties are ridiculously low? They should at least add a couple of zeroes to that one. Just wow.
- jobigoud 5y agoIf you add two zeroes you run the risk of rogue employees planting vulns themselves.
- mirekrusin 5y agoWhat kind of private key is it, and can it be called _private_ key if it exists remotely?
- oaiey 5y agoIt's private in the tenant. A SSL certificate encrypted web server also has the private key in the remote machine. Potentially hosting millions of other pages.
- tialaramex 5y agoI don't see the phrase "private key" in this article. The only mention of the word "private" is in a mention of how the problem was reported to Microsoft. I don't believe private keys were in use here, instead I expect these are secrets and the thing about secrets is, as Bono sang, "A secret is something you tell one other person" which means now there's another party that can lose it. This is a reason to avoid using shared secret schemes and instead prefer private keys, because if access to Cosmos DB required a private key you as the only one with the key know if you gave that to Jupyter, if you didn't then it can't very well have given copies to anybody else. Unfortunately this is also why systems often don't use such an approach, enabling Jupyter across Azure likely earned somebody a promotion.
- rixed 5y agoFrom the article: > A privilege escalation vulnerability allowed anyone with a Cosmos DB account to filch the private key for any other Cosmos DB account, by way of the Jupyter notebook functionality. Could we not be served the same article?
- tialaramex 5y agoAha, it's the blurb for an image in the carousel for the article and not in the body text. So the good news is you aren't seeing things, that is what the Ars article said. The bad news is that Ars are wrong and these are clearly not private keys but shared secrets. Other people have linked Microsoft's documentation, the control panel for Cosmos DB lets you ask for new keys and warns you they may take minutes to be ready, so that means it's a shared secret, as a private key would be something you pick and don't reveal to Microsoft.
- doliveira 5y agoIt's even hard to imagine how this might have happened. Is the service a shared Jupyter server (or group thereof) that somehow has access to everything and it's within this service that the access/authorization is implemented? I wouldn't expect IAM to work this way in a cloud service I don't know how these security boundaries are usually implemented, but I would expect this bug to be way less plausible. Isn't this an architectural smell?
- m0zg 5y agoMicrosoft isn't helped by the fact that there are also FB and Google in town, and they pay at least 20% more and have better engineers to work with as well, which makes work far less aggravating. So MS gets FB/Google rejects at this point, and there's a constant brain drain on top of that. But their internal culture has always been, "if we pay managers well enough things will work out". This breaks down when you actually have to do something hard (rather than rearrange buttons on Office app toolbars), as managers aren't the ones who do the actual work.
- srigi 5y agoI remember how one of the local Azure advocates blogged how there are two specialised security teams in Azure: 1. constantly improving security by patching products 2. acting like hacker(s) are already in the system and looking for them I believe a 3rd group should be founded - our programmers did something stupid, looking for that.