30 ms·

That is, it seems like Apple really wanted to preserve "end-to-end" encryption,“ … except they still have not mentioned anything about E2E encryption… and they

That is, it seems like Apple really wanted to preserve "end-to-end" encryption,“ … except they still have not mentioned anything about E2E encryption… and they currently don’t encrypt icloud backups. You would think apple would get ahead of this story and mention … or maybe they don’t have any E2E plans at all.

hn_throwaway_99 5y ago
This blog post got a lot of commentary on HN a couple days ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28118350 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28118350. iMessages are already E2E encrypted, but you are correct, iCloud backups are decryptable with a warrant (and that was reportedly added at the FBI's request). But I agree with Ben Thompson's point in that blog post, that it's OK to not have strong, unbreakable encryption be the default, and that it's still possible to use an iPhone without iCloud and get full E2E. But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning.
- js2 5y ago
  > But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. As currently implemented, iOS will only scan photos to be uploaded to iCloud Photos. If iCloud Photos is not enabled, then Apple isn't scanning the phone.
  - hn_throwaway_99 5y ago
    Woops, you're right, thanks for the correction. I think the issue is that, as Ben Thompson pointed out, the only thing preventing them from scanning other stuff now is just policy, not capability, and now that Pandora's box is open it's going to be much more difficult to resist when a government comes to them and says "we want you to scan messages for subversive content".
    - js2 5y ago
      Yes, of course that is true. I use iCloud Photos and find this terribly creepy. If Apple must scan my photos, I'd rather they do it on their servers. I could maybe understand the new implementation if Apple had announced they'd also be enabling E2E encryption of everything in iCloud, and explained it as "this is the only way we can prevent CSAM from being stored on our servers."
      - AnthonyMouse 5y ago
        > "this is the only way we can prevent CSAM from being stored on our servers." Why is that supposed to be their responsibility? Given the scale of their business, there is effectively a certainty that people are transmitting CSAM via Comcast's network. That's no excuse for them to ban end to end encryption or start pushing out code to scan client devices. When you hail a taxi, they don't search you for drugs before letting you inside. Because they're not the police. It isn't their role to enforce the law.
        emodendroket 5y ago
        If you become known as a hub for this stuff Congress probably won't see it that way.
        alwillis 5y ago
        Why is that supposed to be their responsibility? They (and Google, Microsoft, Facebook, etc.) are essentially mandated reporters; if CSAM is on their servers, they're required to report it. It's like how a doctor is a mandated reporter regarding physical abuse and other issues. Because they're not the police. It isn't their role to enforce the law. They're not enforcing the law; if the CSAM reaches a certain threshold, they check it out and if it's the real deal, they report to National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC); they get law enforcement involved if necessary.
        kelnos 5y ago
        > They (and Google, Microsoft, Facebook, etc.) are essentially mandated reporters; if CSAM is on their servers, they're required to report it. I don't think that's correct. My understanding is that if they find CSAM, they're obligated to report it (just like anyone is). I don't believe they are legally obligated to proactively look for it. (It would be a PR nightmare for them to have an unchecked CSAM problem on their services, so they do look for it and report it.) Consider that Apple likely does have CSAM on their servers, because they apparently don't scan iCloud backups right now. I don't believe they're breaking any laws, at least until and unless they find any of it and (hypothetically) don't report it
  - callmeal 5y ago
    >As currently implemented, iOS will only scan photos to be uploaded to iCloud Photos. If iCloud Photos is not enabled, then Apple isn't scanning the phone. Except for the "oops, due to an unexpected bug in our code, every image, document, and message on your device was being continuously scanned" mea culpa we will see a few months after this goes live.
    - resfirestar 5y ago
      The potential for this is overblown and I think a lot of people haven’t taken the time to understand how the system is set up. iOS is not scanning for hash matches and phoning home every time it sees one, it’s attaching a cryptographic voucher to every photo uploaded to iCloud that, if some number of photos represent hash matches (the fact of the match is not revealed until the threshold number is reached), then allow Apple to decrypt the photos that match. This is not something where “oops bug got non-iCloud photos too” or “court told us to flip the switch to scan the other photos” would make any sense, some significant modification would be required. Which I agree is a risk especially with governments like China/EU that like to set conditions for market access, just not a very immediate one.
      - spsful 5y ago
        I hear you, 100%, but as a longtime Apple and iCloud user I have been through the absolute ringer when it comes to iCloud and have little faith in it operating correctly. 1. About 3 years ago, there were empty files taking up storage on my iCloud account, and they weren't visible on the website so I couldn't delete them. All it showed was that an excessive amount of storage was taken up. Apple advisors had no idea what was going on and my entire account had to be sent to iCloud engineers to resolve the issue. They never followed up, but it took months for these random ghost files to stop taking up my iCloud storage. 2. Sometimes flipping them on and off a lot causes delays in the OS and then you have to kill the Settings app and re open it to see if they're actually enabled. Back when ATT was just being implemented, I noticed it was grayed out on my phone every time I was signed in to iCloud, but was completely operational when I was signed out. Many others had this issue and there was literally no setting to change within iCloud; it was a bug that engineering literally acknowledged to me in an email (they acknowledged that it happened for some users and fixed it in a software update). Screwups happen in an increasingly complex OS and I just feel that there will be a day when this type of bug surfaces in addition to everything that already happens to us end users.
  - whoisjuan 5y ago
    That’s wrong. They are also enabling on-device detection for Messages.
    - js2 5y ago
      Communication safety in Messages is a different feature than CSAM detection in iCloud Photos. The two features are not the same and do not use the same technology. In addition: Communication safety in Messages is only available for accounts set up as families in iCloud. Parent/guardian accounts must opt in to turn on the feature for their family group. Parental notifications can only be enabled by parents/guardians for child accounts age 12 or younger. https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Frequently_Asked_Questions.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_...
      - b0tzzzzzzman 5y ago
        Yeah, for now this is what is stated. It should be alarming how much they pivoted and changed with out any background statment. Something more is at play.
        m4rtink 5y ago
        Thats the thing - with an unauditable black box like iOS you have to trust the vendor that it actually does what they say. If they suddenly start to break you trust - who knows what they will push to that black box next time ? You have no way to tell or prevent that, other than leaving the whole platform altogether.
  - browningstreet 5y ago
    For now, in v1.
  - tremon 5y ago
    > As currently implemented We don't actually know what is implemented. We only know what Apple's PR machine is saying about it, or do we have the source code somewhere?
- dmix 5y ago
  iMessage isnt true E2E encryption. Apple could easily decode messages for a 3rd party if they wanted to. This has been widely discussed on HN previously. All they have to do is insert an additional private key in the two party chat, as the connection is ultimately handled centrally. There's a very good reason Signal (and previously Whatsapp) were recommended over iMessage. Not to mention the inability to swap iMessage off for SMS which has made it a favourite exploit target for hacking firms like NSO.
  - jakemauer 5y ago
    You can turn off iMessages and force the phone to use SMS, however you can't do it on a per-contact or per-conversation basis.
  - alwillis 5y ago
    Apple could easily decode messages for a 3rd party if they wanted to. They don't have the keys, so how exactly would they decrypt these messages?
    - dmix 5y ago
      They would be able to decrypt messages after the point of interception, not retroactively.
- prophesi 5y ago
  > But I agree with Ben Thompson's point in that blog post, that it's OK to not have strong, unbreakable encryption be the default, and that it's still possible to use an iPhone without iCloud and get full E2E. I disagree completely on this. For one, users aren't aware that using iCloud means that Apple has your decryption key and can thereby read and share all of your phone's data. And two, opt-out is a dark pattern. Particularly if you surround it with other hurdles, like long click-wrap and confusing UI, it's no longer a fair choice, but psychological manipulation to have users concede and accept. Third, as it's hinted, smarter criminals, the ones the FBI should actually worry about, will know to opt-out. So instead the vast majority of innocent users have their privacy violated in order to help authorities catch "dumb" criminals who could have very well been caught through countless other avenues. disclaimer: I just read Bruce Schneier's "Click Here To Kill Everybody" after the pipeline ransomware attack, and these points come straight from it.
  - cheschire 5y ago
    I dunno, when I read the choices in iTunes about backups, I didn’t feel particularly manipulated. It seemed straight forward. Trade offs were clear to me. I guess some people just see dark patterns where I don’t.
    - ElFitz 5y ago
      The least of the biases at play, here, is the change aversion bias. Making things "opt-out", without even making it hard, dramatically increases the number of people who opt-in. It can be used for many reasons. For example, the UK switched it’s organ donation laws from opt-in to opt-out. Another example, my government has decided that them selling their citizen's personal information to garages, insurance companies, etc, when we buy cars, should also be opt-out. So they freely sell the car make, acquisition date, buyer's name,… [1][2] Unless it has changed with GDPR. I’ve never bought a car. While we're on the topic of GDPR, that is exactly why it insists on making cookies, tracking, and the "sharing of information with partners" opt-in. And that is without hiding what you’re doing, making it unclear or confusing, or requiring multiple actions to change it. (Links in French, sorry) [1]: https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Repertoire-des-informations-publiques/La-reutilisation-des-donnees-du-systeme-d-immatriculation-des-vehicules https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Repertoire-des-informations... [2]: https://www.carte-grise.org/actus/2014/05-12-L-Etat-vends-les-donnees-des-cartes-grises.php https://www.carte-grise.org/actus/2014/05-12-L-Etat-vends-le...
- alwillis 5y ago
  But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. Sure it is—just don't use iCloud Photos. They've been quite clear about this.
- mtgx 5y ago
  > iMessages are already E2E encrypted Well, actually...I don't know if this post or another, but I remember something about Apple being able to invisibly add "someone else" to the E2E conversion if they really wanted to. But at the very least, this post mentions that most "E2E iMessages" are auto-backed up to the iCloud, which is NOT E2E. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/26/can-apple-read-your-imessages/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/26/can-appl...
- raxxorrax 5y ago
  They are not E2E encrypted if they are decryptable. We should use the correct terminology here, especially to not subject users to false security.
- sneak 5y ago
  iCloud Backup is a backdoor in the iMessage e2e, and Apple can decrypt all the iMessages. No warrant is required for Apple to do so. Even with iCloud off, the other endpoint (the phones you're iMessaging with) will be leaking your conversations to Apple because they will still have iCloud Backup defaulted to on. iMessage is no longer an e2e messenger, and Apple intentionally preserves this backdoor for the FBI and IC. They access 30,000+ users' data per year without warrants.
- sillysaurusx 5y ago
  > But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. This is mistaken. If you turn off iCloud sync, Apple isn't continuously scanning your phone.
- shbooms 5y ago
  >iMessages are already E2E encrypted, but you are correct, iCloud backups are decryptable with a warrant (and that was reportedly added at the FBI's request). Not to be nit-picky but IIRC, this isn't exactly how it went down. icloud backups have always been decryptable and Apple had announced they were planning on changing this and making them fully encrypted but when pressured by the FBI, they scraped those plans and left them the way they are.
- trauco 5y ago
  "iMessages are already E2E encrypted," Unless you use iCloud Backup for iMessage, in which case Apple holds the keys to decrypt them.
- websites2023 5y ago
  > But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning This is not accurate. Scanning doesn’t happen without iCloud photos enabled.
- pyuser583 5y ago
  iPhones are already continuously scanning your photos. Every notice how it recognizes faces and organizes your photos by them? You can’t turn that off!! There’s no way to tell the iPhone, “stop with the AI recognition on my photos.” Since Apple has decided it’s going to categorize all your photos based on AI, it was just a matter of time before they started categorizing some bad stuff.
chrisfinazzo 5y ago
CSAM scanning is probably the easiest thing they could do to satisfy this demand, and if you don't use iCloud Photos, you're not affected by it at all. As far as encrypted backups go, it's an open question whether they want to deal with the legal and support headaches that such a change would bring. If they continued to do nothing, Congress might force their hand by legislatively outlawing stronger encryption - they had to shit or get off the pot. For users, if you enable this feature, but then lose your password, you are entirely screwed and Apple can't help you. Encrypting "In-transit" as a middle ground is likely good enough for most people, until researchers manage to come up with a better solution.
- mapgrep 5y ago
  > For users, if you enable this feature, but then lose your password, you are entirely screwed and Apple can't help you. Exactly the same with the phone if you forget your PIN/passcode. So they already do this.
  - raxxorrax 5y ago
    Especially on Apple devices. You cannot just reset the device if it was ever associated with an account and you don't know the password anymore. You must contact Apple support. Some people still want to employ Apple devices in a business environment. The amount of money that is spend on their devices is just insane.
  - chrisfinazzo 5y ago
    First, while the "Erase after X unsuccessful attempts" feature exists, I've never used it and really don't recommend anyone else do so unless you are exceptionally careful. Second, my comment was meant in the context of iCloud - if you don't enable the feature as described, Apple may be able to decrypt and recover something, but if you do go all the way to the logical end, yes, you're out of options.
    - mapgrep 5y ago
      My point is, Apple has already crossed the rubicon of allowing users to lock themselves out of their data. On an iPhone, regardless of auto-erase settings, if you lock yourself out, Apple cannot help you.
nicce 5y ago
Well, iCloud Photos are now ”kinda” E2E encrypted. iOS 15 beta has new recovery option by secret (which is useful only on E2EE?) And Child Safety was released most likely because the leaks. Motive of the leaks is unknown. They might be waiting for September now.
deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
gidam 5y ago
what best way to "to preserve end-to-end encryption" than shipping a technology that can bypass it anytime?

hn_throwaway_99 5y ago

This blog post got a lot of commentary on HN a couple days ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28118350 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28118350. iMessages are already E2E encrypted, but you are correct, iCloud backups are decryptable with a warrant (and that was reportedly added at the FBI's request). But I agree with Ben Thompson's point in that blog post, that it's OK to not have strong, unbreakable encryption be the default, and that it's still possible to use an iPhone without iCloud and get full E2E. But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning.

js2 5y ago
> But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. As currently implemented, iOS will only scan photos to be uploaded to iCloud Photos. If iCloud Photos is not enabled, then Apple isn't scanning the phone.
- hn_throwaway_99 5y ago
  Woops, you're right, thanks for the correction. I think the issue is that, as Ben Thompson pointed out, the only thing preventing them from scanning other stuff now is just policy, not capability, and now that Pandora's box is open it's going to be much more difficult to resist when a government comes to them and says "we want you to scan messages for subversive content".
  - js2 5y ago
    Yes, of course that is true. I use iCloud Photos and find this terribly creepy. If Apple must scan my photos, I'd rather they do it on their servers. I could maybe understand the new implementation if Apple had announced they'd also be enabling E2E encryption of everything in iCloud, and explained it as "this is the only way we can prevent CSAM from being stored on our servers."
    - AnthonyMouse 5y ago
      > "this is the only way we can prevent CSAM from being stored on our servers." Why is that supposed to be their responsibility? Given the scale of their business, there is effectively a certainty that people are transmitting CSAM via Comcast's network. That's no excuse for them to ban end to end encryption or start pushing out code to scan client devices. When you hail a taxi, they don't search you for drugs before letting you inside. Because they're not the police. It isn't their role to enforce the law.
      - emodendroket 5y ago
        If you become known as a hub for this stuff Congress probably won't see it that way.
      - alwillis 5y ago
        Why is that supposed to be their responsibility? They (and Google, Microsoft, Facebook, etc.) are essentially mandated reporters; if CSAM is on their servers, they're required to report it. It's like how a doctor is a mandated reporter regarding physical abuse and other issues. Because they're not the police. It isn't their role to enforce the law. They're not enforcing the law; if the CSAM reaches a certain threshold, they check it out and if it's the real deal, they report to National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC); they get law enforcement involved if necessary.
        kelnos 5y ago
        > They (and Google, Microsoft, Facebook, etc.) are essentially mandated reporters; if CSAM is on their servers, they're required to report it. I don't think that's correct. My understanding is that if they find CSAM, they're obligated to report it (just like anyone is). I don't believe they are legally obligated to proactively look for it. (It would be a PR nightmare for them to have an unchecked CSAM problem on their services, so they do look for it and report it.) Consider that Apple likely does have CSAM on their servers, because they apparently don't scan iCloud backups right now. I don't believe they're breaking any laws, at least until and unless they find any of it and (hypothetically) don't report it
- callmeal 5y ago
  >As currently implemented, iOS will only scan photos to be uploaded to iCloud Photos. If iCloud Photos is not enabled, then Apple isn't scanning the phone. Except for the "oops, due to an unexpected bug in our code, every image, document, and message on your device was being continuously scanned" mea culpa we will see a few months after this goes live.
  - resfirestar 5y ago
    The potential for this is overblown and I think a lot of people haven’t taken the time to understand how the system is set up. iOS is not scanning for hash matches and phoning home every time it sees one, it’s attaching a cryptographic voucher to every photo uploaded to iCloud that, if some number of photos represent hash matches (the fact of the match is not revealed until the threshold number is reached), then allow Apple to decrypt the photos that match. This is not something where “oops bug got non-iCloud photos too” or “court told us to flip the switch to scan the other photos” would make any sense, some significant modification would be required. Which I agree is a risk especially with governments like China/EU that like to set conditions for market access, just not a very immediate one.
    - spsful 5y ago
      I hear you, 100%, but as a longtime Apple and iCloud user I have been through the absolute ringer when it comes to iCloud and have little faith in it operating correctly. 1. About 3 years ago, there were empty files taking up storage on my iCloud account, and they weren't visible on the website so I couldn't delete them. All it showed was that an excessive amount of storage was taken up. Apple advisors had no idea what was going on and my entire account had to be sent to iCloud engineers to resolve the issue. They never followed up, but it took months for these random ghost files to stop taking up my iCloud storage. 2. Sometimes flipping them on and off a lot causes delays in the OS and then you have to kill the Settings app and re open it to see if they're actually enabled. Back when ATT was just being implemented, I noticed it was grayed out on my phone every time I was signed in to iCloud, but was completely operational when I was signed out. Many others had this issue and there was literally no setting to change within iCloud; it was a bug that engineering literally acknowledged to me in an email (they acknowledged that it happened for some users and fixed it in a software update). Screwups happen in an increasingly complex OS and I just feel that there will be a day when this type of bug surfaces in addition to everything that already happens to us end users.
- whoisjuan 5y ago
  That’s wrong. They are also enabling on-device detection for Messages.
  - js2 5y ago
    Communication safety in Messages is a different feature than CSAM detection in iCloud Photos. The two features are not the same and do not use the same technology. In addition: Communication safety in Messages is only available for accounts set up as families in iCloud. Parent/guardian accounts must opt in to turn on the feature for their family group. Parental notifications can only be enabled by parents/guardians for child accounts age 12 or younger. https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Frequently_Asked_Questions.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_...
    - b0tzzzzzzman 5y ago
      Yeah, for now this is what is stated. It should be alarming how much they pivoted and changed with out any background statment. Something more is at play.
      - m4rtink 5y ago
        Thats the thing - with an unauditable black box like iOS you have to trust the vendor that it actually does what they say. If they suddenly start to break you trust - who knows what they will push to that black box next time ? You have no way to tell or prevent that, other than leaving the whole platform altogether.
- browningstreet 5y ago
  For now, in v1.
- tremon 5y ago
  > As currently implemented We don't actually know what is implemented. We only know what Apple's PR machine is saying about it, or do we have the source code somewhere?
dmix 5y ago
iMessage isnt true E2E encryption. Apple could easily decode messages for a 3rd party if they wanted to. This has been widely discussed on HN previously. All they have to do is insert an additional private key in the two party chat, as the connection is ultimately handled centrally. There's a very good reason Signal (and previously Whatsapp) were recommended over iMessage. Not to mention the inability to swap iMessage off for SMS which has made it a favourite exploit target for hacking firms like NSO.
- jakemauer 5y ago
  You can turn off iMessages and force the phone to use SMS, however you can't do it on a per-contact or per-conversation basis.
- alwillis 5y ago
  Apple could easily decode messages for a 3rd party if they wanted to. They don't have the keys, so how exactly would they decrypt these messages?
  - dmix 5y ago
    They would be able to decrypt messages after the point of interception, not retroactively.
prophesi 5y ago
> But I agree with Ben Thompson's point in that blog post, that it's OK to not have strong, unbreakable encryption be the default, and that it's still possible to use an iPhone without iCloud and get full E2E. I disagree completely on this. For one, users aren't aware that using iCloud means that Apple has your decryption key and can thereby read and share all of your phone's data. And two, opt-out is a dark pattern. Particularly if you surround it with other hurdles, like long click-wrap and confusing UI, it's no longer a fair choice, but psychological manipulation to have users concede and accept. Third, as it's hinted, smarter criminals, the ones the FBI should actually worry about, will know to opt-out. So instead the vast majority of innocent users have their privacy violated in order to help authorities catch "dumb" criminals who could have very well been caught through countless other avenues. disclaimer: I just read Bruce Schneier's "Click Here To Kill Everybody" after the pipeline ransomware attack, and these points come straight from it.
- cheschire 5y ago
  I dunno, when I read the choices in iTunes about backups, I didn’t feel particularly manipulated. It seemed straight forward. Trade offs were clear to me. I guess some people just see dark patterns where I don’t.
  - ElFitz 5y ago
    The least of the biases at play, here, is the change aversion bias. Making things "opt-out", without even making it hard, dramatically increases the number of people who opt-in. It can be used for many reasons. For example, the UK switched it’s organ donation laws from opt-in to opt-out. Another example, my government has decided that them selling their citizen's personal information to garages, insurance companies, etc, when we buy cars, should also be opt-out. So they freely sell the car make, acquisition date, buyer's name,… [1][2] Unless it has changed with GDPR. I’ve never bought a car. While we're on the topic of GDPR, that is exactly why it insists on making cookies, tracking, and the "sharing of information with partners" opt-in. And that is without hiding what you’re doing, making it unclear or confusing, or requiring multiple actions to change it. (Links in French, sorry) [1]: https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Repertoire-des-informations-publiques/La-reutilisation-des-donnees-du-systeme-d-immatriculation-des-vehicules https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Repertoire-des-informations... [2]: https://www.carte-grise.org/actus/2014/05-12-L-Etat-vends-les-donnees-des-cartes-grises.php https://www.carte-grise.org/actus/2014/05-12-L-Etat-vends-le...
alwillis 5y ago
But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. Sure it is—just don't use iCloud Photos. They've been quite clear about this.
mtgx 5y ago
> iMessages are already E2E encrypted Well, actually...I don't know if this post or another, but I remember something about Apple being able to invisibly add "someone else" to the E2E conversion if they really wanted to. But at the very least, this post mentions that most "E2E iMessages" are auto-backed up to the iCloud, which is NOT E2E. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/26/can-apple-read-your-imessages/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/26/can-appl...
raxxorrax 5y ago
They are not E2E encrypted if they are decryptable. We should use the correct terminology here, especially to not subject users to false security.
sneak 5y ago
iCloud Backup is a backdoor in the iMessage e2e, and Apple can decrypt all the iMessages. No warrant is required for Apple to do so. Even with iCloud off, the other endpoint (the phones you're iMessaging with) will be leaking your conversations to Apple because they will still have iCloud Backup defaulted to on. iMessage is no longer an e2e messenger, and Apple intentionally preserves this backdoor for the FBI and IC. They access 30,000+ users' data per year without warrants.
sillysaurusx 5y ago
> But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. This is mistaken. If you turn off iCloud sync, Apple isn't continuously scanning your phone.
shbooms 5y ago
>iMessages are already E2E encrypted, but you are correct, iCloud backups are decryptable with a warrant (and that was reportedly added at the FBI's request). Not to be nit-picky but IIRC, this isn't exactly how it went down. icloud backups have always been decryptable and Apple had announced they were planning on changing this and making them fully encrypted but when pressured by the FBI, they scraped those plans and left them the way they are.
trauco 5y ago
"iMessages are already E2E encrypted," Unless you use iCloud Backup for iMessage, in which case Apple holds the keys to decrypt them.
websites2023 5y ago
> But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning This is not accurate. Scanning doesn’t happen without iCloud photos enabled.
pyuser583 5y ago
iPhones are already continuously scanning your photos. Every notice how it recognizes faces and organizes your photos by them? You can’t turn that off!! There’s no way to tell the iPhone, “stop with the AI recognition on my photos.” Since Apple has decided it’s going to categorize all your photos based on AI, it was just a matter of time before they started categorizing some bad stuff.

chrisfinazzo 5y ago

CSAM scanning is probably the easiest thing they could do to satisfy this demand, and if you don't use iCloud Photos, you're not affected by it at all. As far as encrypted backups go, it's an open question whether they want to deal with the legal and support headaches that such a change would bring. If they continued to do nothing, Congress might force their hand by legislatively outlawing stronger encryption - they had to shit or get off the pot. For users, if you enable this feature, but then lose your password, you are entirely screwed and Apple can't help you. Encrypting "In-transit" as a middle ground is likely good enough for most people, until researchers manage to come up with a better solution.

mapgrep 5y ago
> For users, if you enable this feature, but then lose your password, you are entirely screwed and Apple can't help you. Exactly the same with the phone if you forget your PIN/passcode. So they already do this.
- raxxorrax 5y ago
  Especially on Apple devices. You cannot just reset the device if it was ever associated with an account and you don't know the password anymore. You must contact Apple support. Some people still want to employ Apple devices in a business environment. The amount of money that is spend on their devices is just insane.
- chrisfinazzo 5y ago
  First, while the "Erase after X unsuccessful attempts" feature exists, I've never used it and really don't recommend anyone else do so unless you are exceptionally careful. Second, my comment was meant in the context of iCloud - if you don't enable the feature as described, Apple may be able to decrypt and recover something, but if you do go all the way to the logical end, yes, you're out of options.
  - mapgrep 5y ago
    My point is, Apple has already crossed the rubicon of allowing users to lock themselves out of their data. On an iPhone, regardless of auto-erase settings, if you lock yourself out, Apple cannot help you.

nicce 5y ago

Well, iCloud Photos are now ”kinda” E2E encrypted. iOS 15 beta has new recovery option by secret (which is useful only on E2EE?) And Child Safety was released most likely because the leaks. Motive of the leaks is unknown. They might be waiting for September now.

deleted 5y ago

[deleted]

gidam 5y ago

what best way to "to preserve end-to-end encryption" than shipping a technology that can bypass it anytime?