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Making the hard problem of consciousness easier
- bobmaxup 5y agoWhy is it always the same people who expound the "hard problem" of conciousness. It is tiring to see authors like koch on everything.
- martingoodson 5y agoI agree. This quasi-mystical framing seems unlikely to bear scientific fruits. Is consciousnesses a clearly defined term?
- TheOtherHobbes 5y agoWho or what is asking that question?
- martingoodson 5y agoWell I typed it, obviously. But my existence doesn’t say anything about whether a ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is a useful way to think about the human mind.
- nsomaru 5y agoIs it that obvious? Who is this “I” you speak of?
- martingoodson 5y agoThe history of Western philosophy has amply demonstrated that investigating the grammar of language is not a useful way to find out how the world works.
- mooseburger 5y agoThat isn't about grammar. Presumably, this "I" is real. Can you find it in the world? If you say it's the brain, there's only elementary particles there, same as everything else. We see no such "I" there. So where is this "I"?
- tsimionescu 5y agoBy the same logic, you could claim that a computer that is calculating Pi is not actually calculating Pi: Presumably, this computation is real, but where is it in the world? If you claim that it's in the micro processor, there's only elementary particles there, same as everything else. There's no computation there. So where is the computation? Of course, the rebuttal is very simple: the computation is actually in the microprocessor; and consciousness is actually in the brain. They are of course made of particles (or strings or fields or whatever the ultimate building block may be) just as everything else is, or are one interpretation/structure of those particles. And note that the fact that interpretation entails an interpreter does not make my argument circular: just as you can write a computation that detects computation in a microprocessor, you can have one consciousness interpreting the same sort of thing as another consciousness. Similarly to how the von Neuman numeral 2 is an interpretation of the set {{}, {{}}} and vice versa (that is, the physical process would be isomorphic to consciousness).
- namero999 5y agoI don't think that's the point parent was making. Of course in a processor there are only particles, and we can easily detect computation by analyzing how registers and in turn potentials change. The point being made is that this description of computation does not leave behind anything else to be described. In other words, my analysis of the process fully describe the process. I can even simulate my description and obtain the same result (say, 1+1=2 obtained by running a program on silicon or by shifting registers with pen and paper). With consciousness is not so trivial. I can fully describe the neural correlates of you experiencing joy, or recalling a memory, or whatever, and there would be still plenty not captured by my description, which is the endogenous phenomenal experience of it. This is why it's hard. There is no epistemic bridge to cross (or burn).
- mellosouls 5y agoThis "quasi-mystical framing" by Chalmers was a major contributor to recharging and refocusing the contemporary philosophical and scientific attack on the problem of consciousness.
- martingoodson 5y agoGreat. Could you tell us what scientific fruits have resulted?
- mellosouls 5y agoI just have.
- gizajob 5y agoPhilosophy isn't science.
- martingoodson 5y agoThe article we are both commenting on is in a scientific journal and is concerned with scientific research into consciousness. I think it’s appropriate to talk about scientific results here.
- ganzuul 5y agoFine, but this is all I got: f(a,a) f(a,b) It's called 'hard' for a reason. :p
- hliyan 5y agoThe problem of consciousness (or the quality of something being able to experience itself and things around it), may never be solved. Even if the reductionist approach reveals some fundamental field or particle that gives rise to consciousness (which is very unlikely), it just shifts the problem from the brain's neural network and into that phenomenon. An old Julian Jaynes analogy comes to mind: if you're a flashlight, you will never be able to understand light, because wherever you look, light will be there. By definition you're unable to look at something that is dark. You perceive the world as being bathed in perpetual light. The closest we might get may be a hand-wavy form of panpsychism, with some probable connection to quantum fluctuations.
- thanatos519 5y agoThe less hand-wavy form of panpsychism is called IIT: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory
- hliyan 5y agoInteresting! So basically: the basic unit of consciousness (whatever you may call it) is an intrinsic property of matter (or energy or particles?) and the more complex information systems matter forms, a more detailed model of the physical world emerges with that system, and the system experiences said model? I only did a quick reading so I may be misinterpreting the theory.
- midjji 5y agoIs it hard though? Or is the hard part ethics i.e. personhood, and because the terms are conflated that makes consciousness hard, since it means you cannot accept what consciousness is without needing to also define ethics. Drop the idea that consciousness is sufficient or required for personhood in favor for something more behaviourally consistent like cuteness or power, and things become clearer. There is a part of you which simulates social interaction by learning models of various other agents it has inferred the existence of. As can be expected from something which is looking for agents based on indirect clues, we know this part does struggle with accidentally assigning agency to things which clearly lack consciousness i.e that damned sharp rock you stepped on twice. This part of you is capable of simulating a finite number of simultaneous such agents at a time, meaning it will focus on, as a whole, being able to predict the actions of the agents most often observed. It is also why we would expect it to replace groups of people you only interact with as a group as a "them". It is also very common that the most significant agent to simulate would be you. Hence one of the models being simulated is you. This is what generates the perception of consciousness, why it is you yet separate. It predicts the cognitive bias of the mind body duality, yet maintains the perception of consciousness. A part of you is constantly trying to explain your own actions, but critically, while we would expect it to be good at providing a socially acceptable explanation, we do not expect it to be all that good at predicting what you will actually do, or even explaining why you did something. See Split brain examples, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfYbgdo8e-8&ab_channel=CGPGrey https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfYbgdo8e-8&ab_channel=CGPGr.... It also makes the prediction that it should be possible to damage this part of the brain and lose the sensation of consciousness yet retain primary function as a human. Which raises no ethical problems as the person still remains cute. Further, when predicting/explaining the actions of the modelled this social simulator is fairly robust, but it can have chaotic points, i.e. points where imperceptibly tiny differences in the inputs result in drastically different outcomes, specifically, the model/language has a name for these. When the social simulator concludes that such a point exists, we call these points choices, we do so regardless of our awareness that the agent is a machine or not, as in deep blue chose to move his knight instead of the queen, or you chose to accept/disbelieve this. Specifically we call these points choices, or once made decisions, when the model expects its there. This is the reason why one person will call what they did a choice others may or may not. It is why one person can know that person X will do y and be right, while person X thinks they are choosing between y,z and chose y. You may not be the best predictor of your own actions, and if you have/had kids you know this. In our case, the social simulator is strongly connected to language, and it will use language to perform simulations, providing predictions and explanations, and social manipulations. However, our ability to simulate the actions of animals shows that consciousness is not limited by language. Remember whenever we reason using language, we generally get far worse results compared to when we do not restrict ourselves to reason using language. If you have ever experienced the Zone when programming or doing math, or anything really, then you know the deeply disturbing feeling of the social simulator suddenly starting to chatter and try to weigh in to problems it has jack shit ability in and in practice going from smart and non conscious/ego dissolution (mostly ignoring the output of the social simulator/putting it in a sleep mode if you will) to conscious and retarded. Programming and math highlights this, because you cant argue with a compiler. This model of consciousness and free will isn't perfect by any means, but its the best one I know, mostly because it does not try to add magic into things while explaining the perceptions of it, and most of the contradictions between perception and physical reality as we know it. It predicts the cognitive bias towards mind body duality, and the cognitive bias towards free will. We needed words to communicate these. It resolves the paradoxes around free will in their entirety, while predicting the perception of free will, notably including the "thinking I will do x" then doing y problem. It predicts that it might be the case that we have "decided" on something before we are consciously aware of the decision, consciousness only being a weak input to choices, not the decision maker after all. And as if another's model of you does not put you in a chaotic point, then that does not mean your model of you, i.e. your consciousness wasn't. It predicts that we would be constantly simulating ourselves, yet can be surprisingly bad at predicting our own actions, and even worse that trying to subvocally reason yourself into changing behaviour by thinking " I will do this instead" would be utterly useless. The social simulator is expected to provide the outcome of actions in social context, decisions are then taken based on them. But when you are having hypothetical discussions that does not make a prediction it will use, that's just practice. Meaning, if you want to convince yourself not to have another slice of pizza, thinking i chose to be on a diet is useless, but imagining meeting a nice girl flirting then looking disgusted at your waistline might be strong enough to want to hurl. In short it predicts how to strengthen the influence of what you perceive as conscious will. It makes it possible that the output from the social simulator could be severed and that we could create people who live in the Zone, while being socially oblivious. (Not autism) It predicts that if you want to build a consciousness from scratch what you need is a system designed to infer the existence of and predict the interactions with other agents and having a very limited output bandwidth and whose input is direct environment observation and time delayed/ no feedback on the agents internal state. Trained on the feedback signal of some other system/agent using its predictions to optimize some score in an environment with multiple agents not all of whom are interacting. The consciousness so made wont feel like a person deserving of rights, but that isn't necessary, as we didnt tie ethical personhood to consciousness.
- codeulike 5y agoadversarial collaboration rests on identifying the most diagnostic points of divergence between competing theories, reaching agreement on precisely what they predict, and then designing experiments that directly test those diverging predictions. omg why has no-one thought of doing this before
- codeflo 5y agoNot strictly related to the article, but I’ve yet to be convinced that most of the talk around this supposed “hard problem” is anything more than an attempt to reintroduce Cartesian dualism in more scientific sounding terms. “Quantum consciousness” and whatnot.
- nahuel0x 5y agobut Cartesian dualism (an the notion of souls) has its roots in the very real subjective experience. You feel, how do you probe others feels too? The hard problem is real.
- mabub24 5y agoA lot of philosophical work has been done explicitly against Cartesian Dualism. Wittgenstein's, extremely influential, "Philosophical Investigations" is probably the biggest example. The entire book is dedicated to dissolving the problem posed by dualism, and presents a conceptual approach that makes the "hard" problem of consciousness, or the problem of understanding someones feelings, effectively not really a problem at all. Much of the problem is more a result of conceptual confusion than anything else. The [Private Language Argument](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language) is probably the most famous. Its result can also be extended to pain, feelings, and vision. Fundamentally private subjectivity is largely a misconception. It's like trying to use a currency that has no purchasing power. Insistence on subjectivity and subjective experience is more productively understood as "personal" rather than as "private".
- benlivengood 5y agoThe hard part of consciousness is drawing the line left by the dissolution of Cartesian dualism. Some matter is not conscious, other matter is. How finely can we draw the boundaries between the two? Dualism drew a metaphysical line between matter and spirit but we have to draw a manifold around and through a physical brain to locate conscious experience.
- tgv 5y agoIt sounds premature to me. "Big" science (CERN, Human Genome, etc.) were only possible and sensible because the subject matter was well understood, and getting more and more information about it required apparatus and manual labor beyond the reach of a normal lab. The consciousness problem, however, is very poorly understood. The article contains some hand-waiving pointing at extremely large groups of neurons, jumping to irrelevant details such as its "anatomical footprint." But even the function of small groups of neurons is not understood, nor the interaction between them. How "big science" can get meaningful results then is not clear to me. > and change the sociology of scientific practice in general Right then.
- o_p 5y agoThe only hard thing about consciousness is that we dont have a good enough interface to experiment with, the question about "what is consciousness" is meaningless and not scientific, science progesses when we start asking "how" things work, modeling the dynamics of things is the thought shift that allowed science
- jdonaldson 5y agoIt's probably easier to think of consciousness as "learned". That is, we have these brains that can extract patterns from noisy or sparse inputs, and the notion of a "self" is just something it learned to recognize. The rest of the "common sense" that guides our course through the world is basically just adaptation and learnings of how to preserve that self in a given environment. It's interesting to think of situations where the self becomes subordinate... family, sex, certain types of anger, etc. There are some old and deep patterns in the brain that can override the control of "self"... and they roughly correspond to very primitive parts of the brain that govern simpler and essential fight or flight mechanisms.
- baxrob 5y agohttps://www.susanblackmore.uk/consciousness-an-introduction/ https://www.susanblackmore.uk/consciousness-an-introduction/
- callesgg 5y agoWhile arguably unfalsifiable. To me Joshua Bach’s explanation of consciousness covers all the bases. It is a logical explanation that explains consciousness without the need for magic. Whether or not it covers what you want from a consciousness explanation I can’t tell. That it is not more accepted seams strange, but it is fairly new and people in philosophy are famously slow when it comes to change. So I guess it makes sense.
- archibaldJ 5y agoThe problem I have with these definitions (and the accompanying theories) is that they are not practical. At best fun abstractions to wrap your head around with, at worst pretentious and misguided. To advance the field of consciousness, I believe at the current stage we should always treat consciousness as a blackbox, and ask questions around it with practical engineering implications. Perhaps two categories of questions: Category 1: qualia/perception These would be human-centric questions related to experimenations with altered states of mind. Here is one for example: Why is it that under the effect of THC, certain stimuli and actions [1] can reliably slow down the perception of time, while certain stimuli (e.g. the soft humming of the aircon) tend to normalize time perception for some individual? [1]: e.g. start the stopwatch app, have the phone at arm's length, stare at the millisecond digit and slowly moving your phone closer to you. What can we say about the neural activations (and subsequently, oscillations) of individuals who are able to alter the time perception more easily (even at the presence of normalizing-stimuli) and how can this ability be learnt or unlearnt? Understanding of the above phenomenon could be used to design the calibration phrase of a BCI device so preprocessing, signal processing, etc, can be customized to deliver a smoother user experience. Category 2: data/computation One of the key charactistics of biological systems that invoke consciousness appears to be a cybernetics-oriented ability that involves orchestrating (often-function-specific) modules (e.g. in human brains) to accomplish (often-highly-abstracted(?)) tasks. Perhaps we can take inspirations from mindful practises (and other consciousness-centric activities) and study the brain and how its modules work together to come up with architectures, models, etc, that (going one step above spiking neural network?) mimic the cybernetic nature of consciousness for the integration of loosely-coupled things e.g. in transfer learning, etc, as well as systems that involve a lot of feedback loops. Perchance such biomimetics would help us to get a better idea how type (and category)-theoretical aspects of things can be introduced to engineer highly fault-torelent and energy-efficient systems that employ millions of pretrained models like GPT3 at the lower level and are constantly self-learning for general purpose tasks.
- qualudeheart 5y agoI never quite understood what Qualia are.
- 2snakes 5y agoConsciousness has multiple levels. At a quantal level it is referred to as the nonphysical 3rd form of reality besides mass and energy, in relationship volumetrically based on the normalization of the electron characteristics. Neurologically Psychologically Higher Consciousness. Consciousness is that which draws distinctions to distinguish reality and is aware of itself. There is that which is Distinguished, that From which it is distinguished, and the Consciousness that distinguishes. This is Perceptual, Conceptual, and Existential, and uses the variables of Intent (Atomic stability, organic life and conscious awareness), Content(Mass of subatomic/atomic/universe, Energy (photonic electric magnetic) and Consciousness (Individual Group and Cosmic) and Extent (Space Time and Consciousness-awareness) There is ebook called Reality Begins with Consciousness from brainvoyage.com by authors Ed Close and Vernon Neppe that is interesting. Here is a shorter introduction: https://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Primary-Perspectives-Advancement-Postmaterialist-ebook/dp/B07SLJFLBY/ https://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Primary-Perspectives-Ad...
- wildermuthn 5y agoThe “hard problem of consciousness” is not essentially about consciousness. It’s just the most obvious form of the problem to conscious beings. The “hard problem of applesauce” is the same essential problem. While it is true that we will one day fully understand the molecular, atomic, and quantum composition of applesauce, and thus be able to create artificial applesauce without a single apple, we still won’t be able to explain the existence of existence. Consciousness, applesauce, electrons, and existence itself have no reason to exist, and yet they do. That’s the hard problem. Consciousness is simply the closest we get to that mystery, insofar as we only get close to anything through consciousness itself.
- gremlinsinc 5y agoDonald Hoffman, theorizes we're in a simulation and has math backing it, but that's not the point I'm trying to make... He mentions a mathematical concept that the more theorems you solve, the more there are. As in - you never really grasp the end of math. In his sim theory, we're perceiving life in a VR, there's the ego, the many receptors like visual that detect colors, etc and understanding everything we take in, each of those is a "unit"... the gist of what I'm getting at, the physics we perceive are natural ONLY to our sim, or our VR headset, outside it could be totally different, but MATH is constant in all the universe, something that doesn't change, but that we're also always going to have new discoveries for. Consciousness could be the same, once we discover how to take the VR headset off (without death), we then discover a new reality, with new physics, etc... and a new VR headset to take off, maybe ad infinitum... It's like how there's the big bang, many think that there was nothing now there's something, when in reality there was always something just a much more compact something... miles across, a few light years? who knows how big, but it began expanding super fast for unknown reasons... It wasn't just nothingness, or one particle that exploded into everything else... I think the closest we'll ever get is finding ways to create consciousness inside simulations of our own, unfortunately that itself will prove (99%) that we're likely not base reality.