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Signal's Cellebrite Hack Is Already Causing Grief for the Law
- monocasa 6y agoI mean, a motion was filled, but has that actually caused any real issues? Scattershot motions get filed constantly as the process of law unfolds. My understanding was these sorts of tools have case law around them that they're de facto trusted barring some proof that their defects actually impacted your case. It'd be like going in and saying that someone could reprogram the red light camera to superfluously give out tickets and record incorrect data. Almost certainly true (there's no way these systems are anywhere near secure), but try that argument in front of a judge and I believe you'll find it won't get you anywhere.
- bigiain 6y ago> It'd be like going in and saying that someone could reprogram the red light camera to superfluously give out tickets and record incorrect data. Over here a guy got a speeding camera fine thrown out because the authority running the cameras couldn't prove the MD5 hash they were using was adequate to verify the evidence. I can't quickly find a detailed explanation, but here's a reference: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/the_md5_defense.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/the_md5_defen... If my memory serves, the actual argument was that the MD5 hash was only covering the photograph, and that the speed/date/time stamps weren't included in the hashed data and therefore _could_ have been tampered with.
- thatguy0900 6y ago"brutally dunked on Cellebrite" why is this phrase showing up in so many news articles now? It's an old phrase, but I swear I've seen it on the titles of hacker news articles like 10 times last week. Such a annoying phrase, at that. It makes everything sound like it was just a witty comeback on twitter.
- Beaver117 6y agoOn a similar note, it seems a lot of media articles copy and paste the same dumb phrases. Search any trending news and half of them are quoting the same exact thing in the title, maybe only one or two bother to throw in a synonym.
- harry8 6y agoLargely unsubstantiated hypothesis: Did you see "The Last Dance?" Popular lockdown fare made the Michael Jordan hagiography more prominent that it would otherwise have been. Scotty Pippen v Patrick Ewing [1] suddenly became more prominent in the minds of many. We were lacking excitement and drama in our lives. Social media was full of this. Lazy writing follows the zeitgeist. Brutal, disrespectful dunking became more of a thing again... [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtOUpybXmzo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtOUpybXmzo
- murderfs 6y agoI think this one actually escaped from video games, specifically this video from 2011: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-fIOrUTIOQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-fIOrUTIOQ
- frombody 6y agoAfter a snickers commercial in 2009 the phrase became repeated and popularized by the general public https://youtube.com/watch?v=qarH-PTKulQ https://youtube.com/watch?v=qarH-PTKulQ
- harry8 6y agoYeah I'm sure that the jordan biopic wasn't the source. I am suggesting it's a reason why an agressive basketball metaphor has regained popularity of late. Could be very wrong, of course.
- austhrow743 6y agoMust have been a tough choice for the author between that and "slammed".
- 1cvmask 6y agoIn the physical world we take measures to ensure evidence is not tampered with like tamper “resistant” packaging etc... We don’t have any such measures at all for the digital “evidence.” And what exactly is digital evidence and how do we keep and maintain the integrity of it from beginning to end. We have trouble maintaining the security of mission critical systems. How are we gonna ensure there are no rogue elements in this process who conveniently can and will digitally frame us. They already use fake evidence in the physical world by planting stuff on us. Digital planting is so much easier. On a similar note, nation state hackers already have false flag tools in their arsenal, where they “plant” evidence of other nations doing an attack. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vault_7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vault_7
- gumby 6y agoThey could be extracting the data once into a Merkel tree and then peruse that. I've got to believe the reason they don't is that various intelligence agencies don't want them to.
- cryptonector 6y agoYou could reconstruct that any way you want to later.
- gumby 6y agoYes, you'd need to have separate storage for intermediate product (or at least periodic incremental hashes) to ensure against tampering. The meatspace chain of control rules would likely be adequate (at least to the current state of the legal art) to handle the two, were they stored separately.
- cryptonector 6y agoThis would require regulation of these devices, and they would have to have adequate hardware protection of the keys used to secure these Merkle hash trees.
- meepmorp 6y agoI wonder if/when we'll see an attack on Cellbrite's tools in the while. Getting a ransomware trojan onto an airgapped evidence computer would be a neat trick.
- WrtCdEvrydy 6y agoHonestly, we'll probably see a PoC against Autopsy any day... Budget Android phone containing basic payload against an open source ecosystem and boom... you got a research paper, baby!
- t0mas88 6y agoRansomware on an evidence computer could be hilarious... Even more so if it doesn't lock immediately but first waits to connect to a network and spread. Also because you don't want to be standing there when it happens (would get you arrested for a new crime on the spot). You will need a very good lawyer to explain that you didn't hack them but they fucked up by trying to steal your data and "by accident" ran into a special file you had. Then make sure you cannot legally be compelled to give them the decryption key. But I guess you should aways be able to "forget" the key, can't be forced to remember something.
- meepmorp 6y agoThat's assuming the individual is even aware that they're the attack vector. Apps can easily write a suitable file to their private storage that will deliver a payload. And now I'm wondering - since the exploit only requires that the bad file be parsed, couldn't you put an appropriate exploit in place just by sending the file via email, sms, or airdrop? As long as it's someplace Cellbrite will see and process it, you're good.
- smitty1e 6y agoDeepFake technology seems like it makes "bearing false witness" into an arms race. Who does the better job of framing the opponent? Does X start off getting busted, as though framed by Y, only to have the truth be X framing Y to appear as though framing X?
- superkuh 6y agoDeepFake technology democratizes the ability to produce believable fakes. Before only countries and large institutions could do so.
- ganafagol 6y agoAnd that may not be a good thing. Now we won't just hear the occasional lying about WMD in far-away-country, which is bad, but if your government wants to trick you, they'll succeed nonetheless. Now it can easily be the idiot neighbor who fakes some nonsense about you and can damage your reputation for life with the right tools, until the general public has caught up and understands that a video can't be trusted anymore.
- bawolff 6y agoNot really. Experts can still detect if something is a deep fake, and the punishment for trying to pass one off as evidence is severe.
- dustyleary 6y agoYeah, if there's one thing the worldwide politics of the last several years has shown us, it is that punishment is swift and severe when governments knowingly lie to their citizens. /s
- emodendroket 6y agoWell they didn't need high tech means to do that, did they?
- 6y ago
- wolverine876 6y ago> The company claimed that the patches had “been released to address a recently identified security vulnerability. The security patch strengthens the protections of the solutions.” However, Vice also reports that the company did not “specifically say whether the addressed vulnerability is one and the same as the one disclosed by Marlinspike.” IIRC Marlinspike didn't disclose one vulnerability, but a massive class of them: Cellebrite must process media in every possible format and thus relies on components from outside sources, FFmpeg being just one example. Cellebrite inherits security vulnerabilities from all those components, and doesn't appear to be diligent in keeping them patched (not that a perfect record of patching would protect them - the attack surface is enormous and probably most component developers don't provide sufficient security). Integrating insecure code is likely a necessary decision for Cellebrite: Writing, maintaining, and updating their own code to process all types of media, and keep up-to-date with all changes to all those types of the media, seems impossible and certainly uneconomical. What could they do? Maybe they could sandbox each component but then they'd need a lot of horsepower in their device.
- kijin 6y ago> they'd need a lot of horsepower in their device. Googling "cellebrite forensic extraction device" shows a rugged laptop-like device in a case the size of a desktop PC. I'm not sure if that's the real thing or not, but in any case it doesn't look like space is a concern. There's plenty of room in that suitcase for a modern CPU, lots and lots RAM, and as much battery power as you need.
- masklinn 6y agoThe « rugged » part usually translates to thermal and reliability concerns, which are traded for raw performances.
- VRay 6y agoThe friggin device probably costs over $100,000 and comes with a full-time support contract. They could add an extra $500 worth of CPU and RAM to the device, assuming they can find a competent evil kernel dev to do the work
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 6y agoMr. "Marlinspike" could probably earn a few (edit: more) quid as an expert witness thanks to that blog post.
- gumby 6y agoIf you look him up you’ll see he already does.
- owenversteeg 6y ago>Previously, data extraction was primarily used in only certain types of cases—typically child pornography or, sometimes, drug offenses. Now, however, cops’ first move is typically to find some sort of incriminating evidence on a suspect’s cell phone, he said, regardless of what kind of case it is. ...What? Are cops frequently scanning people’s entire phones as a first move now? I had heard that this occasionally happened at borders or with serious crimes, but I had no idea it was this widespread.
- craftinator 6y agoI know multiple people, unconnected from each other except through me, who've encountered this. Time to live in NZ I guess.
- plantain 6y agoSome light reading: https://www.businessinsider.com.au/new-zealand-police-kim-dotcom-prism-nsa-2013-8 https://www.businessinsider.com.au/new-zealand-police-kim-do... https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/07/18/gcsb-j18.html https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/07/18/gcsb-j18.html
- staticassertion 6y agoNaively, I had always assumed this would be a first move from them.
- thereare5lights 6y agoGiven what we know about how law enforcement really acts, it's not naive.
- pjc50 6y agoA disappointingly large amount of policing is picking a "suspect" and then trying to find a crime.
- junon 6y ago
- DyslexicAtheist 6y agoNaively assuming ffmpeg and others aren't too happy that their hard work gets used in questionable military or LE operations. Perhaps a more restrictive license[1] can help fight companies like NSO Group, Cellebrite & Co (and continue the momentum Signal created). Best case it would make it illegal for them to use the software and worst make the possibility to use public patches much harder. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14864197 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14864197 (from the top comment): > Linked below is an example to restrict military use. Note though, it's so broad reaching that it might scare away even non-military organizations for using your software. And it still doesn't address how you enforce such license. So there's lots of questions about the applicable of this example license. http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/license2.pdf http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/license2.pdf -------------------------- EDIT: Such a license would probably no longer be fully open source (afaik). Perhaps it's time to create a new breed of license that allows people to build systems where they know their work isn't going to be used to guide a missile or get someone killed for their sexual, political or religious believes.
- Hamuko 6y agoWasn't Cellebrite already violating Apple's copyright?
- DyslexicAtheist 6y agoallegedly afaik. the Signal post pointed out a dll that looked like it belonged to Apple and it was unclear if they had permission from Apple if so.
- Hamuko 6y agoThen they probably don't give a shit about what the ffmpeg license says.
- dmak 6y agoI don't think a license is going to stop them from adopting the software. Their current FFMpeg is 9 years out of date! That should illustrate the diligence already.
- MightyOwl13 6y agoIn a previous role I worked, law enforcement would send over requests for information from time to time. Once my scripts became better at gathering information requests turned from providing highly specific information (ex: details about this individual, on this date and time doing this particular action) to blanket statements (we think this person is called X or Y - can we get all info covering these two years). General security/crime prevention concerns were being provided as reasons for these searches. I had voiced my concern to my managers but they said as long as we had a paper trail which clearly tied each request to the info provided, they didn't really care. I left the place shortly afterwards, but it highlights, I think, how quickly these things spiral out of control. How specific turns general, how true belief turns into mere suspicion or blanket statements (ex - everyone in THAT area is a criminal so we need all the info).
- 02020202 6y ago"everyone in THAT area is a criminal so we need all the info" = patriot act. same crap stasi, kgb or any other former european secret police pulled on the people. those who do not read the history are deemed to repeat it.
- etripe 6y agoIt also highlights the bias in law enforcement/intelligence that "stopping bad things from happening" is a good enough rationalisation to justify a lot of morally grey behaviour, at best. As a colleague once told me before starting on a support ticket for the federal police: "be careful, because they're trained to look for a suspect, not a root cause or solution". What approximate time did you work there? Did you perhaps get to experience the difference between the situation before and after the Patriot Act, or before and after the emergence of ISIS? Or was this just the usual scope creep? I'm old enough to have witnessed 9/11 live on TV and as I see it, there has been a downward spiral in the areas of privacy, the barrier for probable cause and the presumption of innocence - particularly in the US but almost equally egregiously here in Europe. Honestly, COVID isn't helping either, because it's just enough of a threat to be considered a security concern.
- MightyOwl13 6y ago
- georgeplusplus 6y agoThe article states "that corrupted apps on a targeted phone could basically overwrite any data extracted by Cellebrite’s tools" Traditionally a non volatile memory chip is forensically read by being removed from the board and read out directly. Each sector is read from its memory registers. This is a robust forensic method since 1) its passive 2) its repeatable 3) you can fit the chip into another surrogate device and obtain the same results or use a different piece of software to obtain the results If what cellebrite is doing is altering the memory when it interrogates it, this breaks the chain of custody. The process cannot be repeated.
- PeterisP 6y agoThe described cellebrite tool is not used to read chips removed from the board, it attaches to an unopened, unmodified phone over a standard external interface and extracts data over that.
- polar 6y agoCellebrite's "Physical Analyzer" can parse imported data, including disk images and chip images.
- PeterisP 6y agoIn that case it can't alter any evidence in an undetectable way - it can't alter the disk or chip itself; and it can't alter the image without changing the (already recorded offline) image hashes.
- sitkack 6y agoHow do you know that? If the imported data pops the host process, it could take over the host and mount the phone read/write.
- georgeplusplus 6y agoI understand that. My intent was to point out the difference between traditional digital forensics and what cellibrite does.
- londons_explore 6y agoIt still seems doubtful this kind of defence is going to hold up in court... > So what you're claiming, Mr Defendant, is that these Signal messages found on your phone were not in fact written by you, but were placed there by a virus that someone else had put onto police equipment when they were previously arrested? And this virus also knew your exact writing style and knew to place incriminating messages to your childhood schoolfriends? And you didn't mention this possibility at your original trial?
- mikojan 6y agoNot police equipment. The device itself. Furthermore, the attacker would _want_ to mimic the suspect's exact writing style. The real problem I would assume is: The software used to produce the incriminating material has been alleged to produce incriminating material out of thin air at will. This certainly should change your perception of the material produced by this software (even if in this case you find it does not change your conclusions).
- martin8412 6y agoIf I could install an app on my phone that would destroy the machine being used for Cellebrite, I would do that in a second.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- drdec 6y agoBruce Schneier reports that Signal will do exactly that (sometimes): https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/04/security-vulnerabilities-in-cellebrite.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/04/security-vuln...
- caf 6y agoRemember though that in that situation they don't have to convince the judge that that actually happened - they only have to convince the judge that they should have been able to raise the possibility with the jury.
- KingOfCoders 6y ago"Now, however, cops’ first move is typically to find some sort of incriminating evidence on a suspect’s cell phone, he said, regardless of what kind of case it is."
- t0mas88 6y agoBut for now, not if the suspect has an iPhone: https://www.google.com/amp/s/9to5mac.com/2021/04/27/cellebrite-physical-analyzer-iphone/amp/ https://www.google.com/amp/s/9to5mac.com/2021/04/27/cellebri... Cellebrite has told all customers to stop using the physical device on iPhones. Could be related to the stolen Apple DLLs in their product. Any competent legal department would tell them to remove those immediately, because you don't want to get in a lawsuit with Apple over such a clear case.
- asix66 6y agoThe data extraction piece is bad enough. I find the problems of integrity in that data to be worse. Tying right into that narrative is "Coded Bias", a documentary investigating the bias in facial recognition algorithms [0]. Available on Netflix [1]. [0] https://www.codedbias.com/about https://www.codedbias.com/about [1] https://www.netflix.com/title/81328723 https://www.netflix.com/title/81328723
- upofadown 6y agoThe headline might be accurate if the lawyer actually gets a new trial for their client. At this point there has been demonstrated zero grief for the law.
- jl2718 6y agoThink of the absurdity of this situation. We all get together and vote to pay one group of people to keep us safe from another group of people, and then cheer for the ability to evade the people we hired. It sure seems like the overwhelming majority of law-abiding citizens with an opinion disagree with the extent of electronic surveillance (maybe it’s just this echo chamber). So, is democracy working? Are we all grossly misinformed about the terrible things that this prevents? How can democracy work if we are so uninformed? People talk about abolishing police, and I wonder what would come of that. I believe that the popular will toward some form of community protective services is so strong that it would materialize out of necessity. But in what form? Even the cartels deliver world-class public safety for their territories, but only if you tolerate their own atrocities. The justification of electronic surveillance is mostly stated in terms of physical crime prevention. This suggests that the forces on the ground are basically incompetent. Any sort of real-world crime that would require large-scale electronic communication, involves a lot of people, and leaves a lot of physical evidence. It just can’t go on within a community that trusts and invites law enforcement. Likewise in the electronic world, certain levels of surveillance are welcomed. Most people would probably rather use a platform that recovered funds from hacks and scams. But this doesn’t seem to be its purpose. Actually we have no idea what is being watched or why, and the only thing we observe from officials is political shoe-banging against whatever group of citizens are the objects of today’s moral outrage. So it’s pretty easy to become extremely paranoid, and reject all forms of surveillance in favor of accepting the risk of all those terrible things that it may or may not have prevented. So if this is the wrong idea, it seems pretty easy to fix with transparency. What do we really gain by operating in the shadows? I see this as somewhat similar to the comparison between proprietary and open source models. The Britannica is dead. Transparency allows trust and collaboration from sources that never would have been able to contribute. And what if criminals knew what evidence is being collected on them? My best guess is that 99% of criminals would give up at the first sign of trouble. Transparency is the ultimate force multiplier. The greatest victory is to win without a fight. We forget this. It feels good to fight and win and get a medal at the award ceremony. Transparent power is boring, safe, democratic.