5 ms·

Boeing has "culture" problems like a mangy stray dog has a flea problem. The dog and Boeing also have in common that both are blissfully unaware of their proble

Boeing has "culture" problems like a mangy stray dog has a flea problem. The dog and Boeing also have in common that both are blissfully unaware of their problems. However unlike Boeing, the dog does not blame imaginary ghosts of the past for its fleas. There is a notion that Boeing is (was) a company with an insanely great engineering culture. Their engineers lived in an idyllic culture of building amazing products while always putting public safety first. This great culture suffered under the merger with McDonnell Douglas [1], [2], [3]. This narrative further says that McDonnell had a mercenary profits at all cost management culture which infected the management of the combined entity. However Boeing's engineers tried to preserve their engineering ethos while living under this oppressive regime and continued building great and safe products. This argument is frequently put forth by ex-Boeing engineers. This is a naked apologia for Boeing's behavior which killed 346 people and endangered the lives of 1000s more and destroyed jobs/wealth around the world. So strong is the apologists conviction in the purity of Boeing's engineering culture that they ignore the fact that thousands of engineers worked on the 737 Max. Not a single engineer raised issues with the engineering of the aircraft. Not a single engineer wrote a blistering memo calling out its failing or quit in protest. They were all held in thrall, paralyzed and forced to go against their ethics, professionalism, decency by the power of this unholy culture forced upon them by McDonnell Douglas! Eventually, all stellar organizations, public or private, become complacent (e.g. Israeli Intelligence Failure, 1973, NASA by the 1980s). Boeing made an unstable plane which it then stablized with a dangerous MCAS to get it to market fast. They then topped it off by making the MCAS rely on a single sensor. They then made the dual-sensor an upgrade. An undergraduate engineering student with a basic course on probability can see that this is tailor-made for disaster. Boeing made an essential safety feature an upgrade!! But wait there is more. They then proceeded to hide this monstrosity from every regulator and airline on the planet. They insisted that the plane was no different in every aspect of its flight behavior than its predecessor which was over 30 years old and did not require additional safety training. Boeing had become so criminally blatant that the head of airline training at Lion Air inquired about extra training for the 737 Max and Boeing's test engineers rebuffed him. After the Lion Air crash, Boeing proceeded to cast aspersion on the safety practices of Lion Air. Lion Air had a spotty safety record in the past. In this case it was Boeing that rebuffed their requests for additional training because it would set a precedent for other airlines in SE Asia. When that lack of training became a factor in the crash during the investigation, Boeing proceeded to blame Lion Air. Chutzpah! Transcripts of messages released during the investigation show how Boeing employees worked in unison to ensure no extra simulator training was required. Folks, this is not a great engineering culture obsessed with safety but rather an organization trying to get away with as much as it can and then indulging in a coverup. We need to start accepting that whatever stellar engineering culture existed at Boeing is dead. We as a society need to stop scapegoating imaginary forces in the past and giving Boeing engineers a pass. Strong regulation is necessary to ensure the safety of Boeing Products. [1] https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merger-led-to-the-737-max-crisis/ https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg... [2] https://fortune.com/longform/boeing-737-max-crisis-shareholder-first-culture/ https://fortune.com/longform/boeing-737-max-crisis-sharehold... [3] https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max

marshmallow_12 6y ago
They did not hide it from the FAA
- redis_mlc 6y ago
  The MCAS certification documents filed with the FAA were inaccurate regarding MCAS behavior. Also, since the software was outsourced, I doubt if any documentation on that is believable.
glaucon 6y ago
I may have misunderstood you but your post seems to be saying "People say Boeing had a great engineering culture until the McDonnell Douglas merge but Boeing built the 737 Max and look how bad that is ?". The McDonnell Douglas merger occurred in 1997, the 737 Max programme wasn't started until 2011. So if people say that the merger caused a decline in engineering standards that would seem to be consistent with 737 Max being badly executed ?
- haltingproblem 6y ago
  Do you see the problem with that argument that "the McDonnell merger was the root of all evil in the current Boeing"? - First there is no way to falsify that assertion. It is completely unfalsifiable and unscientific. - Second, there is no one from McDonnell here to defend them. This assertion is at best innuendo and at worst defamatory and tars McDonnell unfairly. - Let's say that the merger was the cause of all the evil. So what? Really, so what. The shareholders and employees of the combined entity have reaped the benefit of the merger for two decades. I don't care if they merged with McDonnell or McDonald or McSorely's. The current Boeing inflicted this disaster on us. Lets hold them accountable and dispense with the fantastical stories of some company they merged with 20 years ago which did them in.
  - salawat 6y ago
    >"the McDonnell merger was the root of all evil in the current Boeing"...and more arguments on its irrelevance The problem with doing as you say is ypu're cutting out the factors that led to the problem. Companies do not fail in a day except in the most spectacular circumstances. Culture death is a death of many cuts, just as a successful corporate culture is the outcome of concerted, consistent effort. People in the presence of a good corporate culture don't generally make downright negligent, dangerous decisions. You need a dysfunctional culture to elevate those dangerous decisions to the "new, desirable status quo". Just look at investment banking or finance for examples of those by the boatload. Quality culture requires Quality upkeep. If you set the incentives wrong, everything quickly goes downhill from there. I see it everywhere I go. Maintaining a quality first mindset is not natural at all. It is Hard. It requires accountability, it requires everyone chipping in and doing at times their own job, plus someone elses enough to cover those bad days. It requires vigilance, egolessness, and a drive to stop the whole bloody show rather than deliver a sub-par, unworkable product. It requires as close as you'll ever get to unity and clarity of purpose from top to bottom. Throw out any of that, and effort invested to desirable output ratio just balloons from there. You had a Boeing competitor with a clear history of decision making that caused issues like MAX (DC-10, MD-11). You had an unprecedented period of aerospace consolidation. You saw a turning over of the guard in a shining star of the space where the very people who worked there and still had family there calling out that the culture had changed for the worse. >The relentless message: Shareholders would henceforth come first at Boeing. The important thing was not to get “overly focused on the box,” Hopkins said in a 2000 interview with Bloomberg. “The box”—the plane itself—“is obviously important, but customers are assuming the box is of great quality.” This was heresy to engineers, to whom the box was everything. The strike that year was formally over wages and benefits, but workers described it as a referendum on management.[1] The engineering powerhouse, famous for building "the box" stopped caring about the building "the box". They pivoted to growth and financial performance at all costs. >12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from sheer numbers to quality.[2] >12b. Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineering of their right to pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of the annual or merit rating and of management by objective.[2] They did everything they could to union bust, damping the spirits and pride that workers brought to the job. >End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.[2] They outsourced without regard for Quality of product or building loyalty and trust with suppliers. >Boeing began putting more junior employees into the roles, and some employees believed that was because they’d be more willing to listen to managers and less likely to dig in their heels, Dickson says. “How long do you want to keep polishing that apple?” was a phrase managers often used with engineers who wanted to keep testing, he says.[1] They skimped on training, and did everything possible to wring leniency out of their regulator. They penalized anyone who pointed out a Quality problem. These are not the hallmarks of a company that people point to as an example of quality culture, and the tipping point and timeframe from shift of incentives to long-term production of lackluster results is just about right. These are not unscientific observations. They are clear as day. You had means, management swapout/changing of incentives, culture degradation; opportunity (merger); and motive (hello stock options)! You don't do any of the aforementioned and come out smelling like roses, let alone all at the same time. The finance first school of corporate management, is not, in fact, the same culture that blazed the path for ever safer skies. Even once an Engineer (Mullenberg) got bumped up to CEO eventually, he inherited a dysfunctional organization, stripped of it's safeguards by the severity of the cultural transformation that had already taken place, and that he was a part and parcel of. To be honest, I feel bad for the guy. If anything went wrong, it was that he didn't disrupt the place enough on turn over to see where the mold had started to grow. [1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-09/former-boeing-engineers-say-relentless-cost-cutting-sacrificed-safety https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-09/former-bo... [2]https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points/ https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points/ It isn't about blaming ghosts. It's about acknowledging that as human beings, the institutions we establish are as much in a transient state of being, development, and growth as we ourselves are. The are the being, to which we were the cells and organelles. Therefore, you have to take into account the devil in the details to ensure the same degradation or slipping is recognized for what it is and remediated the moment it rears its ugly head. To do anything else; to blind oneself to the way change propagates through human systems, is to doom the lot of us to making the same mistakes again. You do you. However, as someone who dug into every detail of those investigations I could get my hands on at the time, down to running the math, looking up regulations, designs, blueprints, etc.? I saw enough of the warning signs to recognize the processes at work. Culture went down the tubes. It doesn't exonerate anyone involved necessarily, and yeah, more people should have spoke out. Maybe they'd have risked it if there was more competition in the sector? Maybe not. But we at least know a pattern to look for.

marshmallow_12 6y ago

They did not hide it from the FAA

redis_mlc 6y ago
The MCAS certification documents filed with the FAA were inaccurate regarding MCAS behavior. Also, since the software was outsourced, I doubt if any documentation on that is believable.

glaucon 6y ago

I may have misunderstood you but your post seems to be saying "People say Boeing had a great engineering culture until the McDonnell Douglas merge but Boeing built the 737 Max and look how bad that is ?". The McDonnell Douglas merger occurred in 1997, the 737 Max programme wasn't started until 2011. So if people say that the merger caused a decline in engineering standards that would seem to be consistent with 737 Max being badly executed ?

haltingproblem 6y ago
Do you see the problem with that argument that "the McDonnell merger was the root of all evil in the current Boeing"? - First there is no way to falsify that assertion. It is completely unfalsifiable and unscientific. - Second, there is no one from McDonnell here to defend them. This assertion is at best innuendo and at worst defamatory and tars McDonnell unfairly. - Let's say that the merger was the cause of all the evil. So what? Really, so what. The shareholders and employees of the combined entity have reaped the benefit of the merger for two decades. I don't care if they merged with McDonnell or McDonald or McSorely's. The current Boeing inflicted this disaster on us. Lets hold them accountable and dispense with the fantastical stories of some company they merged with 20 years ago which did them in.
- salawat 6y ago
  >"the McDonnell merger was the root of all evil in the current Boeing"...and more arguments on its irrelevance The problem with doing as you say is ypu're cutting out the factors that led to the problem. Companies do not fail in a day except in the most spectacular circumstances. Culture death is a death of many cuts, just as a successful corporate culture is the outcome of concerted, consistent effort. People in the presence of a good corporate culture don't generally make downright negligent, dangerous decisions. You need a dysfunctional culture to elevate those dangerous decisions to the "new, desirable status quo". Just look at investment banking or finance for examples of those by the boatload. Quality culture requires Quality upkeep. If you set the incentives wrong, everything quickly goes downhill from there. I see it everywhere I go. Maintaining a quality first mindset is not natural at all. It is Hard. It requires accountability, it requires everyone chipping in and doing at times their own job, plus someone elses enough to cover those bad days. It requires vigilance, egolessness, and a drive to stop the whole bloody show rather than deliver a sub-par, unworkable product. It requires as close as you'll ever get to unity and clarity of purpose from top to bottom. Throw out any of that, and effort invested to desirable output ratio just balloons from there. You had a Boeing competitor with a clear history of decision making that caused issues like MAX (DC-10, MD-11). You had an unprecedented period of aerospace consolidation. You saw a turning over of the guard in a shining star of the space where the very people who worked there and still had family there calling out that the culture had changed for the worse. >The relentless message: Shareholders would henceforth come first at Boeing. The important thing was not to get “overly focused on the box,” Hopkins said in a 2000 interview with Bloomberg. “The box”—the plane itself—“is obviously important, but customers are assuming the box is of great quality.” This was heresy to engineers, to whom the box was everything. The strike that year was formally over wages and benefits, but workers described it as a referendum on management.[1] The engineering powerhouse, famous for building "the box" stopped caring about the building "the box". They pivoted to growth and financial performance at all costs. >12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from sheer numbers to quality.[2] >12b. Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineering of their right to pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of the annual or merit rating and of management by objective.[2] They did everything they could to union bust, damping the spirits and pride that workers brought to the job. >End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust.[2] They outsourced without regard for Quality of product or building loyalty and trust with suppliers. >Boeing began putting more junior employees into the roles, and some employees believed that was because they’d be more willing to listen to managers and less likely to dig in their heels, Dickson says. “How long do you want to keep polishing that apple?” was a phrase managers often used with engineers who wanted to keep testing, he says.[1] They skimped on training, and did everything possible to wring leniency out of their regulator. They penalized anyone who pointed out a Quality problem. These are not the hallmarks of a company that people point to as an example of quality culture, and the tipping point and timeframe from shift of incentives to long-term production of lackluster results is just about right. These are not unscientific observations. They are clear as day. You had means, management swapout/changing of incentives, culture degradation; opportunity (merger); and motive (hello stock options)! You don't do any of the aforementioned and come out smelling like roses, let alone all at the same time. The finance first school of corporate management, is not, in fact, the same culture that blazed the path for ever safer skies. Even once an Engineer (Mullenberg) got bumped up to CEO eventually, he inherited a dysfunctional organization, stripped of it's safeguards by the severity of the cultural transformation that had already taken place, and that he was a part and parcel of. To be honest, I feel bad for the guy. If anything went wrong, it was that he didn't disrupt the place enough on turn over to see where the mold had started to grow. [1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-09/former-boeing-engineers-say-relentless-cost-cutting-sacrificed-safety https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-09/former-bo... [2]https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points/ https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points/ It isn't about blaming ghosts. It's about acknowledging that as human beings, the institutions we establish are as much in a transient state of being, development, and growth as we ourselves are. The are the being, to which we were the cells and organelles. Therefore, you have to take into account the devil in the details to ensure the same degradation or slipping is recognized for what it is and remediated the moment it rears its ugly head. To do anything else; to blind oneself to the way change propagates through human systems, is to doom the lot of us to making the same mistakes again. You do you. However, as someone who dug into every detail of those investigations I could get my hands on at the time, down to running the math, looking up regulations, designs, blueprints, etc.? I saw enough of the warning signs to recognize the processes at work. Culture went down the tubes. It doesn't exonerate anyone involved necessarily, and yeah, more people should have spoke out. Maybe they'd have risked it if there was more competition in the sector? Maybe not. But we at least know a pattern to look for.