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FireEye Shares Details of Recent Cyber Attack
- jacksonpollock 6y agowild!
- david_shaw 6y agoThis demonstrates two major points that many people not familiar with security may not understand: The first is that anyone -- really, anyone -- can get hacked. I often joke with our CIO that security would be a lot easier if he just powered down our production infrastructure. Security is a game played in layers (often called "defense in depth"), but at the end of the day, it's almost impossible to prevent a breach with any high degree of certainty. The second is that bad actors (of wildly varying skill) are very active on the Internet. The threat of hackers used to be curious teenagers trying to learn more about computer systems; it didn't take long for that to devolve into criminal activity and "hacktivism." Now, the intelligence services of major nations regularly attack public and private organizations across the Internet. It's the job of contemporary security teams to defend against any and all threats -- but many (if not all) private organizations are ill equipped to defend against a well-organized intelligence agency in an attack such as this. I didn't see any what the attack vector used against FireEye might have been, but those same attackers are now very well "armed" with FireEye's red team arsenal. It's going to be an interesting future for security teams as we learn what and whom these adversaries will attack next.
- Veserv 6y agoYou missed the third major point that most people do not know which is that these attacks are not just possible, they are easy. Every single one of these articles always mentions "nation-state actors" to imply that only a nation-state with billions of dollars and thousands of people can pull off such a "sophisticated" "novel" attack. That is unequivocal garbage. I have never had a CISO (or any other high-level security executive) of a multi-billion dollar company ever answer the question: "How much would it cost to critically compromise your systems and do an unrecoverable amount of damage?" with a number higher than $1,000,000. $1,000,000 is a rounding error to these companies. $1,000,000 is a rounding error in a rounding error to a sizable nation-state. These systems are not just insecure against nation-state attackers, they are insecure against organizations with the staggering weight of 3-10 people. Or, to use a quote from the recent Project Zero blogpost on the iOS exploit said: "one person, working alone in their bedroom, was able to build a capability which would allow them to seriously compromise iPhone users they'd come into close contact with." That is a far cry from being secure against credible threats to a multi-billion dollar business by any stretch of the imagination. Are systems more secure now than they were in the past? Maybe. A targeted attack against an arbitrary target would generally take a few 10 to 100s of thousands of dollars. This is probably orders of magnitude more than the past of teenagers hacking for giggles. But, there are like 6-8 orders of magnitude between teenagers hacking for giggles and a "nation-state actor" and about 3 orders of magnitude between a random company/organization and a nation-state. The best systems deployed systems are about as close to adequate as a house is to a skyscraper.
- wglb 6y ago>Every single one of these articles always mentions "nation-state actors" to imply that only a nation-state with billions of dollars and thousands of people can pull off such a "sophisticated" "novel" attack. While this is true for e.g., Equifax (see https://ciexinc.com/blog/quick-assessment-of-a-companys-security-posture/ https://ciexinc.com/blog/quick-assessment-of-a-companys-secu...), if FireEye (aka Mandiant) says it, I tend to believe it to be quite true. I would expect that hacking them would be far from easy.
- acdha 6y agoOne of the big questions I'd have is exactly how these tools were leaked. Red team tools are by nature more exposed since they're using them with their clients, presumably on a large scale, and I would hope that there's a very large difference in the number of people who have access to those tools and the number of people who have access to their production infrastructure, code-signing, or software update mechanism.
- Veserv 6y agoFirst, FireEye was one of the companies who worked to secure Equifax prior to the breach as mentioned by the CSO of Equifax on page 4 of this FireEye white paper from 2012 [1] that FireEye has since retracted [2][3]. Second, that is kind of a non-sequitur. I did not say that a nation-state did not pull off the attack, my gripe is that they are implying, like every other company that gets breached, that only a nation-state has the resources to pull off such an attack with their wording. These attacks are extremely cheap and easy, that is why we see governments running literally hundreds to thousands of such attacks/programs in parallel as evidenced by the CIA Vault 7 leaks. A single branch of the US government was literally developing hundreds of independent tools/programs that could successfully compromise anything they cared to target. Third, define "easy". I define easy as ~$1,000,000-$10,000,000 since almost any moderately-sized corporation, of which there are millions, could fund such an operation. To put it in perspective, $10,000,000 is only ~1% of FireEye's revenue. I define "only a nation-state" at 1,000x more at ~$1,000,000,000-~$10,000,000,000 since although it is still technically doable for a large multinational or organized crime, it is unlikely to be profitable outside of theoretical large-scale extortion attacks. Do you think a penetration test of 3 engineers working fulltime for a year would fail to materially breach FireEye's corporate systems? Almost every penetration test by a competent company takes a fraction of that effort even against well-funded security teams. And 3 engineers for one year is only 3 engineer-years which at $300k/engineer-year is ~$1,000,000, the bottom end of "easy" and 1,000x less than "only nation-states can pull it off". If engineer-years is too abstract, the Google ProjectZero case I mentioned earlier was a zero-click iOS RCE from zero starting understanding in 0.5 engineer-years. So, doing some sloppy extrapolation, is it easier to find 6 zero-click iOS RCEs or breach FireEye's corporate systems? Let's say we moved up an order of magnitude to 1% of FireEye's revenue at $10,000,000 which is the high end of "easy" and is 2 orders of magnitude less than the bottom end of "only nation-states can pull it off". That would be enough to fund 30 engineers working fulltime for a year or 10 engineers working fulltime for 3 years. Do you think FireEye could prevent a material breach? I have literally never heard of a single person in enterprise security who has ever dared to make such a remark on the record that was not instantly taken down for a fraction of that. I know of no competent engineers in that space who would support making such a statement to anybody who could and would test it. Just think if FireEye announced a $10,000,000 prize at DefCon to breach their systems by the end of the year, do you think they would even last the month? [1] http://www.cnmeonline.com/myresources/fireeye/fireeye-cso-less-secure-than-you-think.pdf http://www.cnmeonline.com/myresources/fireeye/fireeye-cso-le... [2] https://web.archive.org/web/20120610031926/https://www.fireeye.com/CSO_WP_LP.html https://web.archive.org/web/20120610031926/https://www.firee... [3] https://www.fireeye.com/CSO_WP_LP.html https://www.fireeye.com/CSO_WP_LP.html
- gnfargbl 6y agoThis part of the story is intriguing: > In the FireEye attack, the hackers went to extraordinary lengths to avoid being seen. They created several thousand internet protocol addresses — many inside the United States — that had never before been used in attacks. By using those addresses to stage their attack, it allowed the hackers to better conceal their whereabouts. What does it mean to "create an internet protocol address," in this context? Did they use VPNs? VMs on cloud services? Residential proxies, luminati-style? Something else?
- the_only_law 6y agoAlso how do you validate an address has never been used in an attack?
- quartz 6y agoYou only need to validate it to the depth that your target can validate it, which likely means via (among other sources) paid-for IP Reputation services.
- gnfargbl 6y agoI would guess that is a little bit of journalistic summarization, and what the author means is that the IPs used in the attack had a reasonable reputation. That's what made me wonder whether they were talking about residential proxies.
- andrewflnr 6y agoProbably just a journalist's summary of "not on existing IOC lists".
- troydavis 6y agoThat sounds like a reporter’s explanation of announcing space that had never been allocated by an RIR, or had been allocated but never previously announced. More: https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-08 https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-08, https://www.manrs.org/2020/12/whats-the-as0-roa-policy-and-what-should-i-know-as-a-network-operator/ https://www.manrs.org/2020/12/whats-the-as0-roa-policy-and-w..., https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/
- troydavis 6y agoFireEye's own blog post is up: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unautho... As is the GitHub repo with their red team tool countermeasures, which they admirably released immediately: https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/ https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/
- dang 6y ago(This comment was originally posted to https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25351349 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25351349 but we're merging the threads.)
- 1cvmask 6y agoThe problem with these articles is the cloak and dagger nature of these stories and the lack of healthy skepticism. While not necessarily the case here, every big tech company puts blame on an APT aka a nation state actor. In fact, the very same FireEye attributed the Sony Pictures hack to North Korea on extremely flimsy grounds. By those same measures one could have implicated East Palo Alto High School. You never regain your credibility for attribution and provenance once you have committed such a public blunder. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Pictures_hack#Doubts_about_accusations_against_North_Korea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Pictures_hack#Doubts_abou... It is the same as Crowdstrike going back on their wild claims while their CEO testified under oath. https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/05/13/hidden_over_2_years_dem_cyber-firms_sworn_testimony_it_had_no_proof_of_russian_hack_of_dnc_123596.html https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/05/13/... Is sworn testimony the only way we will get them to tell the truth?
- FDSGSG 6y agoMaybe you should try to gain a basic understanding of what you're talking about before posting this /pol/ conspiracy theory stuff? There exists very little doubt that NK was behind the Sony hack, there's even a federal indictment. >It is the same as Crowdstrike going back on their wild claims while their CEO testified under oath. This is a complete fabrication by you, utterly unsupported by the link you shared which only contains meaningless bickering regarding forensic traces of data exfiltration.
- 1cvmask 6y agoHere is the congressional sworn testimony of Shawn Henry, the CEO of Crowdstrike, specifically saying that there is no concrete evidence of Russian hacking of the DNC. https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sh21.pdf https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sh21.pdf You can peruse the whole pdf or jump straight to the money quote on page 32. As for federal indictment on North Korea, that means nothing on the merits or dubiousness of the North Koreans hacking Sony. In fact, there was a smoking gun to a disgruntled ex employee. On a side note Sony and Sony entities were publicly hacked over 18 times prior to this as “revenge” for the PS lawsuit against the hacker who exposed encryption keys of the Playstation. https://www.wired.com/2014/12/evidence-of-north-korea-hack-is-thin/ https://www.wired.com/2014/12/evidence-of-north-korea-hack-i... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Pictures_hack#Doubts_about_accusations_against_North_Korea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Pictures_hack#Doubts_abou... https://www.wired.com/2014/12/evidence-of-north-korea-hack-is-thin/ https://www.wired.com/2014/12/evidence-of-north-korea-hack-i...
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- NikolaeVarius 6y agohttps://sec.report/Document/0001370880-20-000037/ https://sec.report/Document/0001370880-20-000037/ I hope to see these tools on Github soon.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- excalibur 6y agoI can't imagine Microsoft being especially hospitable to them.
- neodymiumphish 6y agoWhy not? Everyone else's tools make their way onto Gitzhub eventually.
- Aaronstotle 6y agoXi, Putin, or Kim?
- Daho0n 6y agoYou forgot the biggest bully.
- yabones 6y agoThey linked their Snort rules, in case anybody else is interested: https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/all-snort.rules https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blo... It'll be interesting to see if these get any hits from scanners in the next couple weeks...
- sillysaurusx 6y agoI found an XSS on FireEye's website when I was a pentester. Good times.. It took all night, too. Was worried it'd be the first gig I wasn't able to get a medium severity on. I'm not sure anything can protect against a targeted attack from a nation-state. It's tempting to think that you can. But the warfare is asymmetric; they have all the time in the world to become certain that they can breach your outer defenses. One slip up, one old server version, is all it takes. I've seen it. In this case, it's a security company, so I'm sure the irony seems a bit thick. But it's helpful to recall that security companies are companies. And no one is immune to security threats.
- forgotmypw17 6y ago>I'm not sure anything can protect against a targeted attack from a nation-state. hardware airgap can go a long way
- ciarannolan 6y agoDidn't help Iran: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet
- mike_d 6y agoAirgaps protect against low to medium level attackers. Nation state tools for bypassing airgaps are a dime a dozen. One of the most common is interdiction of computers in shipping and installation of hardware implants.
- lawnchair_larry 6y agoThis is not accurate at all.
- smithza 6y agoAirgaps are certainly intended to protect against every skill level hacker. The ideal strategy is the multi-layered, Swiss cheese approach. A slice for RBAC (LDAP, AD, MFA, etc.); a slice for email phishing filters and user awareness training; another for network segmentation and isolation (Firewalls, proxies); another for network filters (ping DDOS attacks, etc.); and on and on. The APT attack strategy uses every tool in the arsenal and hunts for a path through the cheese layers, hopefully never finding one to the real prize behind.
- deft 6y agoWill there be any public proof or evidence this is a state actor? The blog post has no details and the overuse of adjectives to describe the attacker as extremely competent sounds more like an excuse for their own weaknesses.
- Aaronstotle 6y agoAssuming it was a state actor, what type of proof could they release? Presumably the FBI wouldn't want to disclose how it came to this conclusion
- _wldu 6y agoSeems like they are seeking attention more than anything.
- enkid 6y agoThey are seeking attention by saying they got hacked, when their entire reason for existence is to defend networks?
- _wldu 6y agoIt reads like a brochure written by a marketing department, "top-tier offensive capabilities... world-class... operated clandestinely... They used a novel combination of techniques not witnessed by us or our partners in the past... nation-state cyber-espionage". It's way over-the-top.
- enkid 6y agoI mean, it's only over the top of it isn't true. Those are all words people have used to describe intrusions in the past, like Stuxnet or Sandworm.
- frakkingcylons 6y agoOf course it was written by a marketing department. They're a $3B public company with 3,400 employees. And you're proposing they faked a security breach and lied to the FBI so they could get media attention? Please be joking.
- ethanolburner 6y agoAccording to Reuters, a Western security official claims similar companies have been affected in a similar way to FireEye [1]. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, and if true, this may be the first of many compromises to be revealed. [1] https://twitter.com/Bing_Chris/status/1336431664478687239 https://twitter.com/Bing_Chris/status/1336431664478687239
- therealx 6y agoI salivate at the potential of seeing the industry turned on it's head and these tools being leaked. I know there are great firms out there, but a lot are snake oil nonsense.
- akeck 6y agoI wonder if the attackers could use what they stole to impersonate FireEye. As in, some org thinks they're contracted/working with FireEye, but they're actually working with this nation state doing intelligence against the org.
- gist 6y agoWhy impersonate Fireeye even? Just start a legitimate company, gain customers and then use that as a basis to gather what you need. The employees wouldn't know this they'd think they are working for a legitimate company. The bad actors who set it up would just have access to whatever they needed to do what they needed to do. This would take years of work to pull off but could be done.
- walls 6y agoAn APT group was doing this up until ~2016 under the name 'Combi Security' https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/09/13/fin7-sysadmin-pleads-guilty-to-running-it-for-billion-dollar-crime-syndicate/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/09/13/fin7-sysadmin-pl...
- economyballoon 6y agowhat does "None of the tools contain zero-day exploits" exactly mean? Does the tools contain knows zero-days but not non public zero days?
- neodymiumphish 6y agoIt just means all the exploits are for vulnerabilities that have been published already.
- pizzeys 6y agoOr no exploits at all, ie. post exploitation frameworks, control channels etc. only. EDIT: Nevermind they added something to the countermeasures repo that goes against that.
- opheliate 6y agoI would have thought it would mean that any exploits which are used have widely available patches.
- excalibur 6y agoDoesn't being known preclude them from being zero days by definition?
- PeterisP 6y agoIn the 'zero-day' and related terminology the days start counting from the time when a fix is available. It refers to how much time a defender has had to fix their systems, a zero-day implying that even the most prudent defender could not have prevented the attack; and a day-1 (or day-x) attack implying that the defender might have closed the vulnerability if they had been sufficiently fast in monitoring for the existence of the problem and fixing their systems. So there certainly could be zero-day exploits for vulnerabilities that are known but not yet fixable, perhaps because the vulnerability did not seem easily exploitable and thus not urgent to the vendor.
- gist 6y agoHuge target on their back no matter what. Like those movies where the tough guy is tested when he gets to prison. This is where it does not pay to be a public company. If they weren't a public company they wouldn't have to disclose this or acknowledge it and there most likely would not be a credibility damaging story which is easy to find. Sure the story could have gotten out but it would not be easy findable and would not be broadcast widely. An event like this makes major papers and nightly news. Read that again. There is nothing that says you need to air your dirty laundry. That's not a business or legal principal (other than whatever the public company requirements might be and I am not even 100% certain this was needed but I don't know). Also as others have pointed out indicating that it was a state sponsored actor is to me (for lack of an elegant way to put it) is 'chicken shit'. Why say that? Why not just say you were attacked and going to try and determine why and make any changes. All it does it sound like an excuse and further to say 'well others are not attacked like this and we can protect against them fine' doesn't fly.
- lowdose 6y ago> Why say that? Why not just say you were attacked and going to try and determine why and make any changes Because they would be out of business tomorrow if they say they think it was a 13 year old from Ohio just fooling around on a Sunday. This is FireEye marketing itself for the F500 by selling fear of an invisible adversary with unlimited resources that already deliver innovative black hat capabilities.
- gist 6y ago> if they say they think it was a 13 year old from Ohio How could you read my comment and think that is what I thought they should say?? I said not to say anything. And why use hyperbole ie 'they would be out of business tomorrow'. And no it's not marketing anymore than if a Karate expert airs that he was beat up in an alley and then says 'but the person was 9 feet tall that's why!'. (But sure to your point if they said 'by a 13 year old' that would not be better but once again I didn't say that.)
- lowdose 6y ago
- samizdis 6y agoArs Technica commentary on this: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/12/security-firm-fireeye-says-nation-state-hackers-stole-potent-attack-tools/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/12/secur...
- nosmokewhereiam 6y agoIf you'd like to learn more about Advanced Persistent Threats check out Florian Roth on twitter: https://mobile.twitter.com/cyb3rops https://mobile.twitter.com/cyb3rops Edit: For the downvoter, this isn't spam. It's an insight from a former CTI analyst.
- 1970-01-01 6y ago"They used a novel combination of techniques not witnessed by us or our partners in the past." This is the scary part. FireEye and the others have been studying and watching APTXX nation-state teams for many years. They should have some idea by now. It is entirely possible that a new team is out there.
- kiproping 6y agoThey are probably trying to make it look like they got hit by a clever attack, rather than SQLi or a XSS.
- kerng 6y agoYeah, details please. This is PR talk. If it's something novel indeed, the entire industry would like to know please.
- Daho0n 6y agoSince FireEye worked for Equifax before it was breached one could hope they have learned a thing or two, yes.
- kryogen1c 6y ago> During our investigation to date, we have found that the attacker targeted and accessed did their best to bury the lede. they say they were targeted multiple times, but dont say they were breached until the fourth paragraph, something like 40% of the way through - even then the admission is intentionally mentioned vice announced. i understand fireeye is a security company, but pussyfooting is pussyfooting and weasel words are weasel words. idk, politics is part of the game at the highest level. maybe im not destined for the c-suite.
- PradeetPatel 6y agoAs someone who has done some work in the PR sector, it was established that it's crucial to ensure the correct narrative is delivered. There can be times when the "factually accurate" narrative conflicts with the correct one, there's a reason why most corporations have dedicated resources for engaging with the public. What one normally consider to be "weasel words" are often carefully chosen to polish the truth while alleviating harm to key stakeholders.
- enkid 6y agoEveryone knows they are being targeted. They would have no reason to even put a press release together if they weren't breached. The first three paragraphs are basically "we are under attack" then "it's an advance attack" then "we're investigating the attack." No one implies that how successful the attack was until the first sentence. This doesn't seem like they are minimizing or attempting to cover up the damage.
- afrcnc 6y agoGlorius. One of the government's biggest contractors got pwned. And a security firm, no less.
- enkid 6y agoIs anyone getting the sense that there are a lot of weird comments in this thread? Why are there so many comments doubting the idea that FireEye could have been hacked by a nation state actor? It's just really weird that so many people are saying similar things without directly contributing. Not to be paranoid, bit it's the type of behaviour I would expect from a nation state trying to place doubt in the narrative that they were hacking commercial companies...
- SAI_Peregrinus 6y agoMost of the comments seem to be doubting that the attack was as advanced as FireEye claim. IE not that they got hacked, but rather that it wouldn't necessarily have taken a nation-state to do it. And therefore that just about any nation-state who did want to could have.
- tru3_power 6y agoNot sure if you work in the security industry or not, but often times people that work in the industry learn to understand it’s just not that hard to pop a majority of enterprise systems. Not sure if this due to knowing where all the bodies are buried or what.
- ryanlol 6y agoIt’s a widespread talking point among the QAnon crowd. See for example: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/pompeo-says-trumps-debunked-ukraine-conspiracy-theory-is-worth-looking-into/2019/11/26/66394e98-106e-11ea-9cd7-a1becbc82f5e_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/pompeo-says... https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/24/crowdstrike-trump-impeachment-trial-conspiracy-theories/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/24/crowdstrike-trump-impea... Russian government doesn’t do any hacking, it’s all a fabrication by the Democrats :)
- bigbob2 6y agoIt does seem paranoid to think that someone viewing something like this with scepticism makes them a state actor. I think there have been too many incidents of companies crying wolf for people to think otherwise. This is a forum for discussion and to accuse people with alternative views of being state actors probably just adds fuel to the fire.
- crb002 6y agoFire sale on Fire Eye.
- dmix 6y agoWhy build hacking tools when you can steal them? Or at least get an idea of what tools your target company was red teamed with.
- kurthr 6y agoWhy spy on your own citizens when that makes them blackmail-able by foreign nation states? Seriously, the quickest, cheapest, easiest way to spy on someone (edit= everyone) in the US (or any 5 eyes) is through our own "security" agencies, but I'm going to go with stupidity rather than malice on the NSA's part.
- ardy42 6y ago> Seriously, the quickest, cheapest, easiest way to spy on someone in the US (or any 5 eyes) is through our own "security" agencies, but I'm going to go with stupidity rather than malice on the NSA's part. No. The quickest and easiest way is probably to send them a phishing message, the next easiest is probably figuring some of their password recovery answers using dossiers compiled by data brokers, maybe after that it's tapping into their phone line using SS7. Probably the hardest way is to first hack a security agency, which I'd imagine have some of the better intrusion detection out there.
- Dolores12 6y agoIntercepting an sms message for 2FA is also easy nowadays via sim cloning.
- Shared404 6y agoHad a customer with an ex who did this. Not fun.
- kurthr 6y agoYou can get a database of everyone's metadata communications by sending them a phishing message? Certainly, I don't keep even all my information on my computer, or even a single phone, and I think phishing _everyone_ is harder than you're making out. On the other hand it's all sitting right there at the NSA et al. Your other attacks are similarly focused on individuals, although the credit and health agencies are prime surfaces for data mining, you're not going to get the metadata/connectivity needed. I'm interested to know what you're proposing, but I suspect you simply misunderstood what I meant, and perhaps what your (and everyone else's) file at the TLAs looks like. It's a mighty plump target, and not comparably secure.
- PaulWaldman 6y agoDoes a story like this negativity impact FireEye's security credibility?
- dcormier 6y agoProbably. But it depends greatly on what happened and how they handle it.
- sillysaurusx 6y agoI've been out of the security game for years now, but I would say no. A security company is still a company. And companies are vulnerable to security threats from nation states. It probably depends whether (and how) they confirm it was a nation state, though.
- jcims 6y agoHow they handle it will impact their credibility more than anything. Honestly a company that gets popped and responds with urgency, gravity, transparency and integrity might even come out ahead.
- therealx 6y agoIt depends on how it happened, too. If it was a nation state deal and no more details come forth, I vote no. If this is a finphisher type hack and they get humiliated and db/source dumped, then yes.
- dx87 6y agoNot necessarily. Realistically, you can't stop a nation state attack if they want to get in. If it turns out that the breach was caused by default credentials being used on a public server, then it's a different story.
- Daho0n 6y agoFireEye worked for Equifax before Equifax was breached. I'm not sure their reputation can be harmed much when they are still here after that shitshow.
- seibelj 6y agoIf FireEye, ostensibly full of competent people, can be hacked, what hope does the government have for protecting access to legally mandated backdoors in encryption? The silver lining of these events is it shows how ridiculous mandating backdoors would be. It’s begging other nations to attack us.
- athms 6y ago>...what hope does the government have for protecting access to legally mandated backdoors in encryption? None. Both the CIA and NSA have been hacked too. The only entity that should hold private keys should be the person or organization using those keys.
- A4ET8a8uTh0 6y agoI genuinely hope your point is not lost on the decision makers. The steady push towards the 'ease' of accessing w/e you want as long as it is by 'good guys' ignores this argument and quickly pivots to cp, aml, and terrorism ( basically whatever currently works ). It is genuinely maddening.
- CawCawCaw 6y agoIt will be interesting to see if the tools are also published online en masse, similar to what happened with the NSA's hacking tools.
- therealx 6y agoI hope so. Between the cia, russia, nsa, and other private company dumps, it's been a fun time to be in the industry. I can't find these yet anywhere.
- arafsheikh 6y agoOfficial blog post (no info on how the attack was performed though): https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/fireeye-shares-details-of-recent-cyber-attack-actions-to-protect-community.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/f... They’ve also released signatures to detect the use of the compromised tools: https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures
- dang 6y ago(This comment was originally in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25354426 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25354426 but we're merging the threads.)
- shakna 6y ago> FireEye CEO Mandia wrote that none of the red team tools exploited so-called “zero-day vulnerabilities,” meaning the relevant flaws should already be public. Seems like a massive amount of energy to devote to stealing tools, that by and large, probably have public equivalents sitting around on GitHub.
- tptacek 6y agoIt is. It's equally likely that the direct goal of this attack was simply to harm FireEye.
- rndgermandude 6y agoI wouldn't discount a bored teenager yet. And yes, I am serious (as there is no info on how the attack took place yet).
- tptacek 6y agoYeah, no. People say this every time an attack is attributed to a state-level adversary, and while attribution is imperfect, it's not based on the idea that you have to be GRU to write an exploit. There's much more that goes into it; attribution specialists collect and catalog indicators of compromise, like the C&C servers and protocols people are using, many of which are not widely known.
- rndgermandude 6y agoBut nothing is known, we have to believe a company trying to master a PR shitshow right now, saying that the attackers were extremely sophisticated. Maybe it was, maybe they are "inflating" the sophistication of the attack to avoid looking bad. Besides that, I care little about "attribution specialists" and what they say (sorry if anybody is in the audience :p). Evidence can be faked, it's all bits and bytes in the end (and some server locations, usually rented boxes) and things have been misattributed constantly in the past and will be in the future. I think the most you can infer is the general sophistication of the attackers and their resources, but that doesn't require an "attribution specialist". Attributing it to some specific nation state is guess work at best based on mistakes they made in their camouflage (if those mistakes aren't a deliberate or accidental red herring; e.g. [1]). And such "It was China/Russia/North Korea/underpants gnomes" claims are made by people claiming to be "attribution specialists" all the time. It's extremely rare that there is compelling evidence to supporting such attributions. So if FireEye provided evidence or at least a reasonably detailed post mortem backing their claim of a sophisticated attack, then I'd probably believe them on that. If they made claims about a particular nation state (and so far they did not, as far as I can tell) then I would find that a dubious claim to make. [1] https://theintercept.com/2017/03/08/wikileaks-files-show-the-cia-repurposing-foreign-hacking-code-to-save-time-not-to-frame-russia/ https://theintercept.com/2017/03/08/wikileaks-files-show-the...
- xwdv 6y agoThese attacks are great for other cybersecurity companies. Feeds that paranoia that brings in customers and raises stock prices for shareholders.
- therealx 6y agoI don't think they would be publishing this if they didn't think that the tools will stay secret. They are getting ahead of it.
- arafsheikh 6y agoFrom their official blog post: > Based on my 25 years in cyber security and responding to incidents, I’ve concluded we are witnessing an attack by a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities. I wonder what nations possess “top-tier offensive capabilities” today. USA, China, Russia, Israel come to mind. Who else? Is there a list or metric to measure a nation’s cyber attack capabilities?
- andrewnicolalde 6y agoProbably anyone else in the Five Eyes, especially the UK.
- mike_d 6y agoVery few companies will publicly attribute attacks to a specific government - both because it is hard and because of potential political blowback. I would confidently say that the top 50 countries by GDP have a solid offensive capability. Some, like Japan, have very specific interests that don't align with what makes the news. At some point you start getting in to the territory of Hacking Team, NSO Group, Gamma, VASTech, etc. Effectively combining the resources of many smaller governments in to a for-hire enterprise that can provide near-nation-state capabilities. Here is a list of well known attributions of groups to get you started: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/1H9_xaxQHpWaa4O_Son4Gx0YOIzlcBWMsdvePFX68EKU/view#gid=1864660085 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/1H9_xaxQHpWaa4O_S...
- therealx 6y agoThanks. Any more info on the Japanese stuff you mention? I don't often hear about that (as you state)
- lupire 6y agoWhy would ant victim conclude anything else? You can't prove them wrong and this is what anyone trying to CYA would say.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- 0xy 6y ago>There is no evidence that FireEye’s hacking tools have been used or that client data was stolen Later in same article... >Beyond the tool theft, the hackers also appeared to be interested in a subset of FireEye customers: government agencies. ??? Which is it?
- BiosElement 6y agoInterest != Used or Stolen Client Data.
- rndgermandude 6y ago"no evidence" != "didn't happen", either, tho, especially if the attackers really were that capable as they claim,
- BiosElement 6y agoThat's entirely true. I'm not qualified to judge that, just that the statements didn't necessarily conflict like they might on first glance.
- dx87 6y agoThey could have seen evidence in logs that the hackers were searching for files that likely were associated with the government, but they didn't find any.
- Ansil849 6y ago> Consistent with a nation-state cyber-espionage effort, the attacker primarily sought information related to certain government customers. If this was the primary objective of the attackers, why is it buried in the seventh paragraph of FireEye's blogpost, after a lengthy discussion of the attackers targeting -- though apparently not primarily targeting -- FireEye's internal tooling?
- marcinzm 6y agoBecause the tooling getting out impacts everyone and thus warrants a public post. Some government information being stolen only impact those customers and only warrants notifying those customers.
- Ansil849 6y agoInformation pertaining to government customers invariably impacts civilians under that governance (and potentially civilians outside of it).
- marcinzm 6y agoWhich would be the responsibility of the government customer to disclose to those impacted. FireEye is likely under many contracts that prohibit it from giving out any details on what client data was stolen. Without those details the information is essentially worthless to the public. Who knows if they got the pin number to the VA men's bathroom or all your social security records.
- mike_d 6y agoAs a red teamer I want to clear up why we build "hacking tools" and why FireEye did nothing wrong here. For example take the tool mimikatz [1], which is publicly available and well known. It can dump stored passwords out of Windows memory. But if you download mimikatz and try to run it every single antivirus/endpoint protection solution will light up like a christmas tree. However, the underlying technique isn't being blocked - just the specific implementation. This is why we build our own tools: to demonstrate to defenders that while they are blocking a specific implementation they have not addressed the underlying vulnerability. I do want to call out FireEye for doing an amazing job recovering from this situation. They did the responsible thing and released fingerprints [2] that could be used to detect every single one of their tools. They effectively burned their entire catalog and put them in to the class of "public" tools that are easily identified. I've browsed over the list of signatures and didn't see anything that popped out as giving a malicious attacker any advantage other than saving them work of building it themselves (of course I don't have access to look at the actual tools so YMMV). Also, everyone gets hacked. No matter how good you are or how many cyber security engineers you have on staff... there is still Matthew in accounting that will open that invoice attachment so he can pay it. 1. https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz 2. https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/tree/master/rules https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/tre... Edit: To be clear I do work on an internal red team - we hack ourselves. I don't work for FireEye or a competitor. Edit 2: Don't pick on Matthew. :)
- supercucumber 6y ago> Matthew in accounting that will open that invoice attachment so he can pay it. This is painfully accurate. A chain is really only as strong as its weakest link :/
- sjg007 6y agoThe invoice should be a PDF interpreted by pdf.js inside a sandboxed browser. Even better is that the company should have its own internal ordering system.
- mmaunder 6y agoIf only hacked companies were as good at defense as they claim to be at attribution.
- caeril 6y agoYou don't need to be good at attribution when you're on the same side as the press. You can build a case on the flimsiest of IOCs, and anyone who questions you gets smeared as a foreign agent or cutout, without a shred of evidence. Really, quite neat.
- pabs3 6y agoIs FireEye the kind of company that has a cache of 0days?
- smithza 6y agoThis is something I doubt. Zero-day exploits are the kind that software vendors have no awareness of and therefore have no fixes in place (think mimikatz). FireEye is the sort of company who, upon discovering one in the wild, would disclose it to the software vendor to protect their clients. NSA on the other hand has been proven to hoard zero-days--even from US companies.
- EE84M3i 6y agoI didn't realize mimikatz ever used an 0-day. I'd be interested to learn more about the vuln
- dang 6y agoOther articles that were posted on this: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fireeye-cyber/u-s-cybersecurity-firm-fireeye-discloses-breach-theft-of-hacking-tools-idUSKBN28I31E https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fireeye-cyber/u-s-cyberse... https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/technology/fireeye-hacked-russians.html https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/technology/fireeye-hacked... (via https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25354426 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25354426 and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25351349 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25351349, but we've merged the comments hither)
- 300 6y agoMore and more companies get compromised by a "highly sophisticated" actors. And somehow, these companies immediately "know" that it was a nation-state actor. Same case here. There are only claims, but no facts, no evidence. And lately, it's always "the russians" :) I'm just noticing the pattern. Lastly, what I really can't understand is - how in the world these "highly sophisticated attackers" are so bad at covering their tracks. :)