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People stopped paying attention to Searle when he was asked how he could tell his dog was conscious, and he replied "I can see it in his eyes".
by dekhn 6y ago
People stopped paying attention to Searle when he was asked how he could tell his dog was conscious, and he replied "I can see it in his eyes".
- baggy_trough 6y agoSearle is a wise man.
- jimbokun 6y agoDo you have a better answer?
- dekhn 6y agoWell, it seems to sort of kill his argument because he's saying you can detect consciousness via a visible tell, but a sufficiently advanced dog-robot with expressive eyes would trick him (there's a reason I work in machine learning)
- 6510 6y agono no, the sufficiently advanced dog would be conscious by his definition.
- dekhn 6y agoerr, no? The sufficiently advanced dog would be able to fool a human into thinking it was a real dog, but at least according to Searle: """The Chinese room argument holds that a digital computer executing a program cannot be shown to have a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness",[a] regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave""" He undermines his whole argument by implying he can tell his dog is conscious simply by visualizing its eyes.
- ifdefdebug 6y agoYour argument is based on the proposition that a dog machine able to fool him can be built. There is no proof for that yet, and having it for an axiom is quite far fetched.
- sjy 6y agoIsn’t Searle’s argument based on the equally far-fetched axiom that a program could be written which (a) passes the Turing test, and (b) could be executed by a human using pencil and paper, with sufficient speed to not fail the Turing test?
- ifdefdebug 6y agoNo, obviously not because that's just absurd. But one could ask if the fact of a human with pencil and paper being dead slow computing the output is enough to invalidate the whole argument. But anyway, I am not trying to defend Searle’s argument. I was just pointing out something what seemed to me like a flaw in that particular refutation.
- 6510 6y agoI started writing and didn't finish a chat bot one time that meats the criteria. (Actually 2 chat bots) The formula is this: 1) The 2 bots have a scripted conversation. 2) When a human tries to participate (read: interrupts) they have a conversation like "Bot1: who is this guy? Do you know him? Bot2: NO". Then they happily continue their chat completely ignoring the human unless he types their username. Then it goes "What do you want?" and "Could you please stop highlighting me" etc
- tripzilch 6y agoVery cool! :) I once made a chatbot that screams. http://gunshowcomic.com/513 http://gunshowcomic.com/513
- dekhn 6y agoI read Searle's argument as boiling down to: you cannot tell the difference between a "truly conscious" (in terms of experiencing the subjective experience of consciousness), and a machine that emulates behavior well enough to fool people into believing that it is conscious. Many people (like me) believe that in the process of making such a fake, it's entirely possible (and even likely) that a mind would emerge as a spontaneous outcome.
- lostlogin 6y agoThis is a really good counter. And for what it’s worth, looking into the eyes of an intelligent dog like a border collie gives an unnerving sensation that it’s calculated the next 20 moves and knows how to win.
- meowface 6y ago"I know it when I see it."
- hnracer 6y agoIt's not so absurd. How do we know solipsism isn't true? Because of two reasons, (1) the physiology of others is similar to our physiology, and (2) we can see evidence of inner state reflected in behaviour. For dogs we can make a similar argument using (1) and (2). It is slightly weaker than applying it to other humans but not by much. Searle's comment pertains to (2).
- gdy 6y agoWhich people?
- TaupeRanger 6y agoAnd they shouldn't have. That's a perfectly reasonable argument: an organism's behavior (movement of the eyes and facial gestures) give clues about its internal state and potential conscious experiences.