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>> the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing's engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing's management, and gr
by phkahler 6y ago
>> the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing's engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing's management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA.
That is being very kind to Boeing management. Its blaming the engineers and the FAA but the management was just not transparent? Boeing fought hard for their autonomy and ability to self certify, so I guess the FAA failed by allowing that. But that doesnt exempt the management at Boeing who was supposed to create an organisation with processes in place to design and build safe airplanes. They had such an organisation but failed to maintain it as such. That's more than a lack of transparency.
- raxxorrax 6y agoAnyone working in engineering knows that any form of resistance would have been futile. I bet the engineers of MCAS didn't even have a view on the overall system and their solution probably fits the risk- and requirements analysis. You should be able check that, that is why we focus on documentation in security relevant branches. Responsibility is for the stupid, certainly not for management.
- moeris 6y ago> I bet the engineers of MCAS didn't even have a view on the overall system By system so your mean the MCAS, the airplane, it Boeing. I don't think you're correct if your mean the MCAS or how it integrated with the airplane. You don't think they had any sort of integration tests established? Also, one one the failings was that the system only relied on input from a single sensor, so that failing should have been extremely obvious. Unless by system you mean Boeing as a whole. I'm sure that as a part of the requirements process they were told that the system can be deactivated (which it could be), and I'm sure they were probably unaware that pilots were not being trained in disabling the MCAS. That makes those technical failures still obvious, but nonetheless understandable and maybe even acceptable in that context.
- jcims 6y agoDepends how the engineering teams are partitioned really. MCAS could be built as a closed system with a set of interface specs that the avionics teams would then have to integrate and test. That said, someone definitely should be doing integration tests.
- raxxorrax 6y agoNo, with system I meant the aircraft as a whole. I meant to say that few things are that obvious if they aren't specified. There should be a point in the risk analysis that handles sensory errors, possible consequences and risk mitigation and if it wasn't specified there, it would have been an error. Go up the chain from there. I doubt that software engineers necessarily know much about the reliability of sensors. You mostly learn that from experience. That is why you should include as much experience in the analysis process as possible. A pilot or the air techs would probably have mentioned the tendency of sensors freezing or having some form of malfunction. Only then can the softies develop a fault tolerant system. After a failure it is always obvious to everyone, but as you said, perhaps they just thought the pilots would notice the error and override the system. Also an obvious assumption that should be documented as mitigation to reduce risk. No risk analysis is perfect, but after the accidents we can expect some diligence and discipline in my opinion and hopefully this accident leads to a review on these processes instead of finding some fall guys. A thorough integration test would probably also have detected the issue at some point and maybe here are faults as well.
- HappySweeney 6y agoOne of the main selling points of the plane was the lack of need to retrain pilots. So, Boeing was acutely aware of the lack of training regarding MCAS.
- pbhjpbhj 6y agoThe need for training was there. The selling point was certification saying there was a lack of need. In part that's also a fault of each purchasing airline that didn't give extra training. Regardless of whether Boeing were willing to certify the system as not being training, those responsible for pilot competence at the purchasing commands should still have ensured pilots were trained before using the system. If a garage sells you a roadworthiness/MOT certificate when a vehicle isn't roadworthy, and you know it isn't, then we're both at fault.
- phkahler 6y ago>> Anyone working in engineering knows that any form of resistance would have been futile. That's a management failure right there. But fine, if managers want to take a "shut up and do as I say" attitude, then they need to be responsible for the results of what they said to do. Also, the thing they were least transparent about was probably hiding the differences between the Max and the regular 737. They hid those differences so that they could be certified as the same type and not require additional pilot training. That's not a lack of transparency, it's deception.
- dylan604 6y ago> then they need to be responsible for the results of what they said to do. "You clearly misunderstood what I said. I never said to design MCAS. I wanted you to build MCAAS. The extra A implies the redundancy the system requires. Sheeesh." Phew, now I'm no longer responsible for this mess.
- HelloNurse 6y agoIf there are "the engineers of MCAS", with a narrow mandate to build the MCAS, there must also be other engineers who don't delve into MCAS details but understand the overall system and therefore understand that the MCAS is dangerous. If not, how was that thing allowed to fly?
- deelowe 6y agoThere are. It's an entire engineering discipline and a required one on aviation/military projects: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_engineering https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_engineering There absolutely would have been systems engineers in charge of the various budgets and margins baked into the design. Safety is always a top one in aviation. In fact, Id be surprised to find there wasn't a team of systems safety engineering on the max. We need to see their analysis to understand whether this was a fault of engineering or management. If the engineers had done a thorough systems safety analysis and quantified the risk, then the responsibility definitely does not fall on engineering.
- HelloNurse 6y agoCompetent systems engineers are in charge of high level decisions in theory. In practice, they might be less in charge than they should be (so that, more or less criminally, managers prioritize business objectives over safety and quality) or less able to do their job and less competent than they should be (probably because better processes and higher standards would mean spending money to cause "problems").
- deelowe 6y agoIt's never any engineer's job to make decisions/define constraints. That's on the business side whether it be management, marketing, analytics teams, etc... I seriously doubt any engineer decided this. The decision to go with a single non-redundant system and use software to improve safety margins seems like a cost cutting measure which definitely seems more like something that would have been mandated as one of the design goals. Maybe engineering presented various options or something like that, but I find it very hard to believe the risk decision laid anywhere else other than very senior management.
- stjohnswarts 6y agoThat's not true. In industries like medical and aerospace engineers have more power than they think. I've been there and done that. Safety is relevant still so you can't throw you hands up and do nothing. They don't have the same mentality as FANG companies, safety, redundancy, and being vigilant is part of the job. However, things will happen if everyone isn't vigilent. There are lots of companies out there doing it the right way, don't throw them all under the bus with Boeing.
- raxxorrax 6y agoNot intending to throw Boeing under the bus at all and I do think engineers take security seriously. But generally there is a R&D lead that makes the decision to implement it. There may be responsibility there, but the decision to design the plane this way was an economic one. Some reported internal pressure to develop quickly. By now, that is probably standard in the industry where any software is involved. So apart from an engineering position that could nearly crash or delay such a project... If the system reactivated wrongly, it is certainly a bug and I think they have already fixed that problem. But an error that is hard to identify and the system was basically just designed to conform to regulations defining flight characteristics to evade renewed certification and training. Of course there are still valid design criticisms possible if you take security real serious.
- mannykannot 6y agoFurthermore, I doubt that the lack of ‘transparency’ was entirely accidental. At least since Enron, the management of large enterprises has become adept at encouraging or subtly coercing its employees to do what it takes to get the desired results, while they remain nominally unaware of what is being done.
- Jgrubb 6y agoLike the mob.
- throwaway0a5e 6y agoThey're not stupid. What do you expect them to do? Being transparent clearly comes with risk and 2020 clearly increases risk. To not insulate against that would be to not do their jobs. You get what you incentivize.
- bumby 6y ago>What do you expect them to do? For starters, display good leadership traits like accountability, including to themselves. I'm worried the signal we're sending right now is that weak leadership traits are rewarded which incentivizes weak leaders.
- piptastic 6y ago"right now" has been going on for many, many years.
- bumby 6y agoTrue, I shouldn't have used such vague language
- throwaway0a5e 6y agoAnd what's their incentive to do that? These people's success is measured in dollars and little else so of course everything gets thrown under the bus if doing so will make more money.
- mtgx 6y agoSelf-certifications of any kind are such a scam.
- headmelted 6y agoThis. Also, I’m astonished that Boeing continues to talk about when it’ll deliver the 737 Max when no-one will ever willingly fly in one of those planes. Even their own staff have said in writing that they wouldn’t let their families fly in one of those planes. Boeing’s utter lack of awareness of the gravity of the situation continues to amaze as much as the absurdity of this statement.
- derwiki 6y agoNo one? There are a lot of people who fly but don’t follow the news and have missed all of this. And then others who will forget/not check every time they fly.
- sjm-lbm 6y agoI fly, follow the news, and assume I'll probably fly one one at some point because there's not enough alternative options. It's not what I want, but if they have a fix proven out by a lot of successful flight time and a MAX flight has the arrival time I need.. why not? Part of the reason Boeing is going to survive is the pure fact that Airbus can't make enough airplanes to cover the market.
- pydry 6y agoChina and Airbus together probably can. China already has a 737 MAX competitor - the COMAC C919. People have been a bit wary of Chinese safety but Boeing kind of gifted them the benefit of the doubt on that front.
- dirtyid 6y agoCOMAC is nowhere near ready and will have to prove itself in the domestic market before international rollout. That said Chinese aviation safety is among the best after a very rough start, but the real issue is airplane sales involve geopolitics, and geopolitics is not looking favourable by the time COMAC is ready. >gifted them the benefit of the doubt on that front I haven't seen anyone discuss this, but China was responsible for (justifiably) grounding the MAX around the world and crippling Boeing short term. CAAC was the first to ground Chinese MAX fleet after Ethiopian crash, which inspired everyone else to despite FAA insisting MAX airworthiness. I'm sure US is going to remember that when COMAC is open for deliveries, not that the US will ever buy, but the smearing is going to be rough.
- CivBase 6y ago> the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing's engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing's management My experience in this industry is that many of the most important engineering decisions are made by management. Not to excuse their engineers, but on the topic of management getting of lightly, I wonder how many of those "faulty technical assumptions" should fall at the feet of Boeing's management.
- mywittyname 6y agoThe only engineers with real power are the ones that own the company. And even then, they can still be out-maneuvered by politically astute executives. Engineers are almost never to blame in these situations, even if they are the direct cause of an issue. There's usually so many of them that someone catches problems. But they are powerless to do much more than send a strongly worded email to their management. Until C-suites and board members are held personally liable for tragedies like this, I doubt much will ever change. There's no real incentive to fix problems, when it costs too much money because the worst thing that will happen is, a few years down the road, there might be a Congressional inquiry and a modest fine. Of course, any engineer whose malfeasance costs the company even 0.001% of that fine will find themselves in jail at the behest of company leadership, even if no lives were lost or any measurable damage was done to the company..
- bumby 6y ago>Engineers are almost never to blame in these situations I strongly disagree with this. Engineering is a profession of public trust, even if operating under an industrial exemption to circumnavigate licensure. We need to hold ourselves accountable to those standards or else it risks becoming a vocation devoid of responsibility and lacking accountability similar to the C-suite positions that people rail against in this thread. I don't think society would cut a doctor or lawyer slack for 'just doing as they're told' and I think engineers are in the same area of public trust. Good organizations should have dissenting opinion processes. The advantage is that it gives a way to hold management accountable (e.g., they must formally acknowledge that risk). Sure, using that process may come with professional risk, but that should come with the territory of a position of public trust.
- wyattpeak 6y ago> so I guess the FAA failed by allowing that Yes, but that failure is enormous. That a certifier should hand off certification duties to the entity being certified boggles the mind, and they should bear very substantial blame for that decision.
- lurker458 6y agoThey did so because politicians told them to, with the threat of withholding funding, due to lobbying by Boeing. Boeing management is the root cause.
- astockwell 6y agoWhen "management" are the ones testifying, of course their fingers point to... the engineers.
- bregma 6y agoManagement testifying to politicians. Like wolves testifying to foxes about the culpability of chickens who jump into their mouths.
- dheera 6y agoTo what extent should we be faulting the SEC for requiring quarterly earnings reports, which is a rather meaningless frequency for an aircraft company? How many companies have cut corners on safety due to earnings report requirements? To what extent should shareholders take some of the brunt for their fickle behavior and threatening to short Boeing stock if they don't sell sell sell earn earn earn, instead of holding long term for Boeing to resolve safety issues at the right pace, which in turn sets the behavior of internal managers at Boeing?
- csours 6y agoI think about this every time I take my corporate CYA training - the courses you have to take every year to ensure you follow security protocols, don't break the law, don't harass people, etc. Since there's a record that I took the classes, the company can blame any problems on me. Blame in an engineering context is rarely if ever productive. But, if you have to blame, you really need to check if the issue was raised to management before you blame. In this case I'm pretty sure the issue was raised, so it's not really on the engineers.