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The power to prevent mergers is based on access to markets. EU is the worlds biggest single market, if they don't accept the merger it won't go trough. Nvidia a
by nabla9 6y ago
The power to prevent mergers is based on access to markets. EU is the worlds biggest single market, if they don't accept the merger it won't go trough. Nvidia and Amd and their customers want to sell to EU.
Big single markets like EU or US can take action against any merger between two international companies even if neither of them is based on the EU.
I don't think there is any reason for EU to take action in this case.
- reader_mode 6y agoEU is going to ban ARM chips ? Or impose sanctions/tariffs ? What do you think those will be transformed to ? Higher mobile prices for EU citizens for no apparent reason and no reasonable alternatives. And to what end ? EU has no players in this space. There is nothing EU can or should do here, no matter how you feel about the move.
- creato 6y agoWho are ARM's actual customers? Most people don't buy anything from ARM directly, they buy from a company that builds a product with an ARM product in it. I'm sure there are companies like that in the EU, but how many compared to the US and Asia? And would that matter in terms of market access to the EU?
- nabla9 6y agoMore like who are ARM + Nvidia's customers.
- adventured 6y ago> EU is the worlds biggest single market The US is the world's biggest single market, by a considerable margin over the EU now. It was larger than the EU before Brexit, now it's that much bigger. US GDP for 2019 was around $21.5 trillion. EU GDP for 2019 minus the UK is $16 trillion ($18.7 trillion with the UK). That giant $5.5 trillion gap is big enough to fit the world's #3 economy (Japan) into. It's larger than France + Italy ($4.7t), or Germany + Spain ($5.2t). Given the major economies of the EU haven't seen any net economic growth since 2006-2007, it's unlikely the EU will match up to the US economically in the coming decades. Over the coming 10-20 years it will persistently fall away, an increasing distant third behind the two superpowers of the US and China. And that's the good scenario and assuming there are no more exits from the EU. The US will become more aggressive about its trade imbalance with the EU, with the EU heavily dependent on exports and in a position of weakness with the US accordingly; and China will seek to compete with and replace the high value manufacturing they import from the EU (with most of the focus in both cases on Germany, their future is stagnation if they don't figure out how to move to a modern tech economy and fast). Germany will go through a very painful deindustrialization that they've largely been able to avoid thus far, as China goes after their high-end manufacturing and then exports those competing goods to the rest of the world far cheaper than Germany can. France GDP: 2008, $2.9 trillion | 2019, $2.7 trillion Germany GDP: 2008, $3.8 trillion | 2019, $3.8 trillion Italy GDP: 2008, $2.4 trillion | 2019, $2 trillion Spain GDP: 2008, $1.6 trillion | 2019, $1.4 trillion Netherlands GDP: 2008, $948 billion | 2019, $902 billion And that's of course pre-pandemic. Those are the five largest economies of the EU, accounting for 73% of the EU economy. They're going to see a likely net zero (or negative) economic growth for 20 years or more (inflation adjusted it's going to be brutal).
- matthewmacleod 6y agoYour point is valid of course, but it’s interesting that the US is in some ways less of a single market than the EU is…
- perardi 6y agoSorry, going to need you to expand on that. Individual states in the States have far less regulatory power than nation-states in the EU.
- staticman2 6y agoExtrapolating based on the last 17 years doesn't make any sense. 17 years ago you would have made a very different prediction based on the 17 years before that.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- dbspin 6y agoYou're making lots of questionable assumptions here. Primarily one being that the US (and indeed the EU) continue to exist in their current form on a 20 year timeline. Given the political climate in both, that seems unlikely. Given that the US is reindustrialising [https://doc-research.org/2018/06/reindustrialisation-us-deglobalisation-china/ https://doc-research.org/2018/06/reindustrialisation-us-degl...] right now, it's extremely unlikely we'll see a decline in German manufacturing - even if that means an increase in european protectionism. There's no way Germany (who hold vastly outsized power within the European Commission, especially in a post Brexit world) would willingly allow that strategic and economic advantage to wilt. Especially given the economic decline and social disintegration that the move to a service economy wrought on France and the UK. Chinese economic might is almost entirely based on exports, in an era of increasing protectionism and at a time when their manufacturing base is moving to places like Vietnam and to a lesser extent India. The US's failure to invest in infrastructure (everything from broadband to roads to dams) has left it in need of massive capital investment. And of course massive internal investment (arguably unsustainable and fraudulent) in construction. I'm not suggesting these are paper tigers, but neither are assured of 'superpower' status. Moreover - the enormous material costs we're starting to see from climate change will accelerate. We can estimate some impacts, such as enormously larger migrant crises and water wars. But the second order effects of this are extremely unpredictable.
- dogma1138 6y agoThe point you are missing is how EU antitrust works, in the EU there is essentially a split between the Commission specifically the Directorate General for Competition and the competent authorities (aka the regulators) in each EU member state. The DG COMP investigations are usually triggered via complaints raised by member states however they can also decide to investigate it own their own, once they done if any action needs to be taken they would authorize the regulators in each member state to take that action they do not enforce actions themselves. However there still needs to be a violation of either Article 101 or 102 for them to investigate, this is quite different from the Chinese case where NXP and Qualcomm had to seek permission from the Antitrust regulator, in this case if NVIDIA requires one it would only be from the UK regulator and there is currently no freaking way that Brussels would interject in the midst of Brexit. A year, 5, 10 down the line they might decide to open an antitrust case if they believe that NVIDIA's practices warrant an investigation, but currently there is no way for them to block the sale.
- nabla9 6y agoThat's not how it works. Nvidia/Arm merge is large enough to require the commission be notified prior to its implementation. The time between notification, clearing or final decision is just few months. https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html Merger cases by date - Last 3 months https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_merger_by_date https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuse...