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Rethinking OpenBSD Security
- h2odragon 7y agoGood writeup, fairly made points. It'd be easy to laugh at OpenBSD finding SMTPD vulnerabilities even now (I did); but as TFA points out it's complicated and often hard to see these things. And that's in OpenBSD which has had the honest effort and passion of scary geeks with no sense of proportion for how many years? Compare that to the security posture inherent in projects that install with sudo bash <(curl -sL someurl.wtf/thatredirectsanyway ) "Secure" computing today is just not going to happen. Not saying its a bad goal, or a waste of time; just that its a metaphysical pursuit of perfection doomed to beautiful failure.
- tinus_hn 7y agoSudo curl is terrible but is it really that much worse than downloading a dvd image and installing it? The main difference is how casually people give away the keys to the kingdom.
- jacobush 7y agoTo be fair there often is a key chain in place nowadays, for booting a PC. It's a little bit better even though I don't like how basically Microsoft controls the keys.
- Hitton 7y agoIt is worse. Notice that h2odragon didn't include "https" on purpose because of how many these install instructions do the same.
- jagged-chisel 7y agoDVDs also don’t implement https, and DVD images can download over http.
- zeveb 7y agoBut at least with a DVD you have the actual physical copy of what was installed, and you can examine it forensically after the fact, and you may even be able to use it as evidence of wrongdoing. You can't do that with some random file that you downloaded at some point in time (this, incidentally, is why in-browser crypto is hopelessly and forever broken).
- clarry 7y agoI can download DVD images over insecure transport and then check their signature. Not so if I'm piping code straight to shell from a http server.
- steerablesafe 7y agoI never saw a curl | bash install instruction without https.
- Hitton 7y agoYou are lucky. Last time I saw it here on HN less than week ago. When I called an author out about this I was called rude and ignorant and apparently doing so is "nasty" "especially since this is a well-known point of disagreement—not to mention well-trodden, therefore generic, therefore predictable, therefore tedious, and therefore mostly off-topic". The software in question was https://github.com/txthinking/nami https://github.com/txthinking/nami
- clarry 7y agoThe thread in question: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22701891 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22701891 Dang disappoints me again.
- irishsultan 7y agoOne issue with sudo curl is that it may end up your system in an unusuable (or unknown) state, even if the script you're fetching is not malicious, because your connection can be interrupted and bash will start executing even before the script is fully downloaded.
- vbezhenar 7y agoIt won't happen for properly written script.
- Someone 7y agoIt is a lot less likely, but it can happen when you first download and then execute a script, too. Disk read errors may prevent running the entire script or the script may run out of memory, disk space, or other resource limit such as the maximum number of open files or the maximum length of a file path.
- pjmlp 7y agoIt will happen, slowly but it will, liability law suits and media exposure just need to increase, then more companies will start paying attention to security.
- jstimpfle 7y agoI think some people just need to step up instead of only evangelizing, and actually build something that is useful and "secure" Oh wait... There are actually tons of such projects. Why did they not take off? (I'm trying hard not to sound cynical because I don't really know that there is absolutely no way that they could, but also I do feel cynical)
- wyager 7y ago> There are actually tons of such projects. Why did they not take off? Secure computing requires a relatively low time preference to be economical. Or, more precisely, marginal demand for secure computing increases with a marginal decrease in time preference. Most companies have (artificially inflated) high time preferences, so it's not economical for them to adopt what we consider secure computing. This is, I believe, to the net detriment of human society as a whole (at least, at my personal time preference). I'm not going to get too much into why time preferences are so (artificially) high on here, but I encourage people to look into it themselves. A lot of it has to do with government economic intervention, especially around monetary policy.
- marcosdumay 7y ago> A lot of it has to do with government economic intervention, especially around monetary policy. Don't single it out. Fiscal policy is as much guilty as monetary one. Even civil and criminal legislation help here.
- wbl 7y agoRates are low, which signals willingness to invest long term. Are you sure you got the monetary policy right?
- odkamkfn 7y agoOpenSMTPD has only been going for 7 years and it's gone through a bunch of changes almost every OpenBSD release.
- cat199 7y ago> laugh at OpenBSD finding SMTPD vulnerabilities even now OpenSMTPD is a relative newcomer - Sendmail: 1983 Exim: 1995 Postfix: 1998 OpenSMTPD: 2008 (2013 as active MTA in OpenBSD)
- JdeBP 7y agoThe counterpoint to that is that there is a lot of prior art, and prior mistakes to learn from, for something begun in 2008. So the assumption that it will take the same length of time, and the same learning and development process, to reach parity with other softwares has a flaw.
- nine_k 7y agoI suppose you don't do the `curl | bash` thing on your server fleet? I see how desktops (laptops) are more or less screwed because of the need to run ad-hoc things. But servers, which are much more controlled ad limited environments, could be more secure. A lot of orgs follow rather sane software security policies; if the software itself were less vulnerable, it would help. For a lot of end users that would make a significant difference, because they run most of their critical software in the browser anyway.
- ainar-g 7y agoHonest question. Why not just completely outlaw code like: exec("/bin/sh", "-c", "..."); And its friends? It feels like it does way more harm than it does good.
- peterwwillis 7y agoBecause arbitrary "Thou Shalts" do not prevent security holes. Make a restriction, and hackers will find the cracks around it. The only way to stop them is to fill the cracks, and the only way to find the cracks is to look for them. Now, certainly if there was an exec() replacement that was more secure, you should use that; but banning exec() entirely is doing more harm to functionality than good to security. Particularly, the exec() bug here is one of misunderstanding the security guarantees of interfaces; particularly, that there are none. Not validating inputs is the single most universally known security practice, and yet it wasn't done here. On top of that, not using typed objects further increases potential for attacks. This was just shit security design. exec() had about as much to do with the bug as your brakes have to do with you locking up your wheels when traveling too fast in rain/snow/ice. (that you should have been going slower, not that the brakes are defective)
- ainar-g 7y agoI haven't proposed to ban exec entirely. I've proposed to ban exec uses that just sends data into a shell.
- loeg 7y agoWhen a user runs 'sh -c "foo"' on the command line, how do you think that is executed? Taking a step back, Unix's programming model is heavily influenced by the design requirements of interactive bourne shell. It's hard to outlaw shell-like things without breaking shells.
- hedora 7y agoSometimes you need to tell something to programmatically spawn a shell: watch bash -c “ps | grep argname” and similar.
- smitty1e 7y ago> Privilege separation is a key component of OpenBSD security, and interprocess communication is at the heart of it. More focus on what can go wrong with corrupted processes would help. Secure browsers are evolving longer and longer kill chains. smtpd in particular is supposed to be secure against memory corruption in the network processes, but the ease with which it can control the parent is pretty alarming. This invites the sincere, honest technical inquiry as to why OpenBSD doesn't have an SELinux-style Mandatory Access Control (MAC) facility, but is OK with the traditional Discretionary Access Control (DAC).
- GeorgeWBasic 7y agoThey have pledge(2) and unveil(2) instead.
- smitty1e 7y agoExcellent. Thank you.
- beefhash 7y agoI feel like I should add a bit that pledge(2) and unveil(2) take the "opposite" approach of SELinux. Instead of caging an application in hopes that the cage is correctly set up, the responsibility for pledge(2) and unveil(2) is intended to be with the application developer, who minimizes system calls as much as possible and only keeps paths unveiled that they actually require. As far as I know, the idea here is that the developer knows best. People seem to have been experimenting with applying these restrictions from the outside, but it's generally hard to guess how a large program from ports will behave.
- st3fan 7y agoAFAIK (correct me if I am wrong) OpenBSD does not have a single unit test. No unit tests. There is so much code that parses text input and yet I can’t find a single test that actually shows that the code works and that it properly deals with malicious input. How do OpenBSD developers test? How do they make sure changes do not regress things. Why is unit testing just not a thing? (Same for many other C based projects)
- clarry 7y agoWhich one of these bugs would have been prevented by unit tests? Probably none, because you'd have to know about the bug in order to craft a test that exploits it.
- sildur 7y agoUnit tests could prevent reintroducing old bugs.
- st3fan 7y agoSometimes that is definitely true. But very often when you spend time to write unit tests you discover limitations and bugs in your code while you come up with test scenarios. The only thing that the FTP bug needed was a "test_redirect_responses()" test. The SMTPd bug was all about parsing user input. Ideal candidate for unit testing and probably even some fuzzing.
- api 7y agoThere's a factor with OpenBSD that isn't mentioned here at all: it has very few developers. A single developer can hold much or all of the state and important security considerations in their head. A small team can communicate well and can hold to a single style, and members of a small team can ask each other things easily. Single developers or small teams can write secure code in unsafe languages. The problem is that this doesn't scale. Add a large number of developers and it becomes increasingly difficult to police security in an unsafe language. Safe languages, unit tests, and fuzzing help a lot more here by making large classes of errors difficult or impossible to manifest or catching them automatically. Linux is a bit special here: it has a lot of developers but a small number who are responsible for approving things, and it's so massively important and popular that it has a lot of eyeballs on it and gets a lot of automated testing. Security issues still creep in though.
- pjmlp 7y agoCreep it enough, that Google created the Kernel Self Protection Project. https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Pr... One of their first activities was to clean the kernel from all usage of C's VLA.
- chasil 7y agoYou might claim that the security design of OpenBSD does not scale, and the observations of the parent article do cast some reasonable doubt on code security. However, a number of projects from OpenBSD have been widely adopted and are successful in their own right, for example: C:\>ssh -V OpenSSH_for_Windows_7.6p1, LibreSSL 2.6.4 The two projects above, OpenSSH and LibreSSL, have been even more strongly adopted by Apple, as I understand it. OpenSSH is adopted by just about everybody. Google Android's "bionic" C library is also based on OpenBSD, and I would imagine that the coding concerns for libc will trickle down. OpenBSD is not the sum of its parts, as so much of it is used in other environments.
- loeg 7y agoBionic took pieces from OpenBSD, as well as other places[1]. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)#Components https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)#Components
- jancsika 7y agoHi Ted, Please change your page design so that the content is centered horizontally. Otherwise we have to swivel ourselves toward the left side of the screen to read the article. Sincerely, My Eyes
- patrec 7y ago> OpenBSD aims to be a secure operating system Pretty idiotic aim if you're writing it in C.