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IMHO, expiration dates on certificates are and have always been the Wrong Thing. The Right Thing is to have the certificate contain a time stamp of when it was
by lisper 7y ago
IMHO, expiration dates on certificates are and have always been the Wrong Thing. The Right Thing is to have the certificate contain a time stamp of when it was issued. The client should decide whether the certificate is still trustworthy. The cert can contain a recommended expiration date, but the dispositive information should be the issue date.
- thefounder 7y agoAnd how are the CAs supposed to squeeze you of money?
- gruez 7y ago> The client should decide whether the certificate is still trustworthy. Great, now you need to constantly go to some site like caniuse.com to see what % of browsers thinks your certificate is valid.
- derefr 7y agoI mean, in a world with more than an oligopoly of browser makers, that'd already be true given that browsers each ship with their own trusted CA store. In the original conception of X.509, it was supposed to be an enterprise's system administrator (e.g. a university's IT department) that would define the set of root CAs that the enterprise's computers would trust. So there'd be literally no way to know whether a given user device would trust your certificate. That was supposed to be a choice that is up to them, not something you can pre-guarantee by making deals with third parties.
- e12e 7y agoYou have to do that anyway to check if the certificate is revoked. Or, we'll, you should. I'm not sure sure if there are any production tls stacks that actually handle revocation well.
- abdullahkhalids 7y agoCan someone chime in with the original intended purpose of the expiration date? The one that I can imagine (without research) is that the issuer knows the quality of their own security practices, and if they says that a certificate will expire by X date, they are saying that they can't guarantee that they will still be the only person with the secret key after that point. Any other explanation?
- tmpz22 7y agoMillions of dollars in IT consultation work. Target in 2014, 2019 (it was a 5 year certificate), Microsoft Teams 2020, etc.
- marcosdumay 7y agoWell, it's the one that works in practice. The issuer is the one that known when he will renew the certificate. If every client decided for himself, half of the internet would be broken at each time.
- FireBeyond 7y ago1. As an analogue for password expiration (with all the commentary that entails). 2. Recurring revenue models for CAs.
- wool_gather 7y ago> the issuer [...] are saying that they can't guarantee that they will still be the only person with the secret key after that point. It's not quite clear what you mean here. The issuer should never have the private key for the end-entity cert (the one representing the domain or whatever). Only the owner should have the private key. EDIT: Hmm, according to another comment here, some CAs will offer to generate both halves of the keypair for the end user. Yikes. If you are talking about the CA's own private key...if that ever leaks, then no certificates signed by it should ever be trusted again; expiration date has no relevance here.
- tgv 7y agoThe latter did already happen: Diginotar, in 2011. The Dutch government tried to restrain browser makers from revoking Diginotar's certificates, since many of their websites and services used them. It's a good thing certificates don't have an eternal life span.
- tialaramex 7y ago> EDIT: Hmm, according to another comment here, some CAs will offer to generate both halves of the keypair for the end user. Yikes. I wasn't able to find this comment, but perhaps I didn't look hard enough? EDIT: Wait, I think I found it. I will reply there. In the Web PKI this is prohibited but there are or at least were resellers who'd offer this service to their customers. You should not use this service of course, and some CAs have pledged to tell their resellers not to offer it. In S/MIME it's more common because often the end user is both technically unsophisticated and not given real control over their client in order to mint their own keys anyway. But S/MIME is... probably not important, certainly it isn't what Apple's change is about.
- hannob 7y agoThat is... a very absurd idea. You really don't want a situation where webpages may work or not work based on some completely unclear criteria.
- wool_gather 7y agoIt's basically what has been announced here, though, no? There's no technical impediment to a CA continuing to hand out 2+ year certs. The only reason they would not do so is that webpages will start breaking if they're accessed from Safari.
- tambre 7y agoThe criteria are very clear: - Safari - max 398 days
- luckylion 7y ago> The criteria are very clear: today. Tomorrow they may change to be 397 days, or 39.8 days, or "until the next iPhone is released".
- chrisandchris 7y agoIsn‘t that a bit like arguing about the 825 days? The CA/B could change that aby day they want and there‘s nothing you can do. Others will follow Apple and the CA/B will follow too, like they should have in 2017, IMHO. The 398 days isn‘t something they came up right before they presented it. It‘s already 3 years old...
- labawi 7y agoNope. Today, tomorrow and for 6 more months is 825 days. As of September 1, 2020, it will be 398 days - a change people knew was coming for a long time.
- luckylion 7y ago
- Someone 7y ago”The client should decide whether the certificate is still trustworthy” That’s what is happening now. Except for common sense, nothing stops a browser from trusting a certificate with an expiration date in the past. The expiration date more is a statement from the issuer “I wouldn’t trust this after this timestamp”. Having said that, I think Apple should say “our OSes will stop trusting certificates issued over two years ago” instead of ”our OSes will stop trusting certificates that expire in over two years” If they did that, one could still use certificates with longer expiration periods, allowing other parties to cache them for longer periods. Now they force everybody to follow them, so that, if this change breaks sites on iOS, it also breaks sites everywhere else.
- richardwhiuk 7y agoEveryone would just issue certificates for two years longer. This is designed to fix the fact that revocation is utterly broken.
- zaat 7y ago> The Right Thing is to have the certificate contain a time stamp of when it was issued Well of course they should, that's why it is right there, called "not before" > The client should decide whether the certificate is still trustworthy. The cert can contain a recommended expiration date, but the dispositive information should be the issue date. Well, that exaclty is the case. Most clients decided to honor the recommended expiration date, and Apple just announced they won't.