49 ms·
That's a lot of work, but the instant it's in a rootkit everybody will be able to do it. 113 bytes is extracting an AES key from memory in about a minute. It'
by jandrese 7y ago
That's a lot of work, but the instant it's in a rootkit everybody will be able to do it. 113 bytes is extracting an AES key from memory in about a minute.
It's only really hard and messy for the first guy who implements it, after that it is much easier, albeit still fairly messy. I'm not saying we need to panic, but it's more than a "non-issue".
- scandinavian 7y ago>but the instant it's in a rootkit everybody will be able to do it. This makes no sense. If you have the privileges to install a rootkit, there is no need to use any speculative execution exploit.
- jandrese 7y agoThe first feature of a rootkit is to get root access. A userspace kernel-information leak utility would be very useful for this step.
- scandinavian 7y agoOkay, we have differing definitions of what a rootkit is it seems.
- foota 7y agoThey mean in the implementation of a rootkit.
- jnordwick 7y agowe have yet to even find Specter in a kit, this will never see the light of day, especially since it is so easy to avoid (turn TSX off). You also, don't get to extract constantly. You only get a shot when the data is in the LFB, so the program needs to be actively reading or writing it to keep it moving back and forth from L1 and L2, at least that is the way I read the paper.
- userbinator 7y ago113 bytes is extracting an AES key from memory in about a minute. How do you know where the key is, and how are you guaranteed to be able to read enough of it before the "shifting sands" that is timing unpredictability and general noise in the system make you read something else? That's what really irritates me about all these side-channels that have been found ever since the first Spectre/Meltdown --- they all demonstrate something flashy like "we read a key/password/secret/something important from memory in a few minutes" while conveniently ignoring to mention the countless hours spent aligning everything just right so they could show off the one "magic trick". In a lot of the cases there's barely even any control over where it reads. Every time something like this comes up, I feel compelled to post some bytes from somewhere random in the memory of a random process on my machine to show just how much I care; here you go: E8 7F 00 00 00 A1 64 30 40 00 89 45 D8 8D 45 D8 C4 20 00 00-CE 20 00 00-D8 20 00 00-E2 20 00 00 F8 20 00 00-00 21 00 00-0E 21 00 00-16 21 00 00 26 21 00 00-36 21 00 00-42 21 00 00-56 21 00 00 66 21 00 00-76 21 00 00-84 21 00 00-96 21 00 00 AA 21 00 00-00 00 00 00-FF FF FF FF-B4 16 40 00 C8 16 40 00-7C 20 00 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 EC 20 00 00-00 20 00 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 Of course if you are being targeted then the concern may go up, but I still think that attackers would have lower-hanging-fruit than this, seeing as setting up one of these reads to get one secret would itself require such intimate knowledge of your machine's configuration and state that they probably already know what they want.
- slovenlyrobot 7y ago> How do you know where the key is, and how are you guaranteed to be able to read enough of it before the "shifting sands" that is timing unpredictability and general noise in the system make you read something else? I don't mean to understate the difficulty of the task, but I've also seen probably tens of repros by now that use intimate knowledge of e.g. the kernel page allocator and known post-boot state of e.g. a firmware image flashed on millions of devices to drastically cut down the search space
- zelon88 7y agoWhat is it that programmers do? They automate complex tasks that take humans considerable effort. If a university can accomplish this task with their funding and no urgent incentive, what is the nation state actor doing with their enormous budget?