21 ms·

Just an anecdote, but I'm a traveling consultant for a pretty big tech company, and the manager of the consulting group told us when the 737 Max issue started (

Just an anecdote, but I'm a traveling consultant for a pretty big tech company, and the manager of the consulting group told us when the 737 Max issue started (but before it was grounded) that we did not have to fly on that plane and if we were put on that plane we could change flights and bill the change fee back to the company without any complaints. There's been no further guidance so far on what we'll do when the 737 Max is back in service, but the message was clear: the safety and comfort of the employee is worth a $200 change fee, compared to being forced onto a plane that the employee feels is unsafe. I've never heard that mentioned for any other plane. As much as air travel has sucked this summer with cancelations and delays caused by the grounding of this plane, I don't foresee that model having much luck if/when it's put into full service.

pcurve 7y ago
There have been plenty of design flaws in commercial jetliners and in most cases, reputation is recovered. But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. but none quite like this one.
- chx 7y ago
  Especially one that the FAA tried to pooh pooh as long as it could. It was amazing to watch the goodwill and trust accumulated over decades crumble to nothing in a few hours as the European countries one by one banned the airline from their airspace but did not ground them. It was the EASA telling the FAA to do the right thing. They didn't and then finally the EASA did ground the plane. I really can't remember any other time when the EASA and the FAA disagreed especially this big. https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/ https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/
  - FabHK 7y ago
    My perception is different. It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. It was also arguably appropriate for the FAA not to ground the fleet immediately after the second crash, but then after some time when it became apparent that the failure mode was sufficiently similar (as they did). However, what has emerged since then certainly damaged the reputation of the FAA. But it was not a matter of a few hours, it was a matter of careful investigation and evaluation over months.
    - markdown 7y ago
      > It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. Safety first. They ought to have grounded the plane immediately after the first crash and TBH it's my belief that they would have done so if it had been a US plane with US passengers. The fact that it happened to brown people on the other side of the world made it easy to ignore. Don't forget that the FAA had all the details of the plane showing that it had implemented the new MCAS system which in theory could have caused the crash.
      - briandear 7y ago
        The FAA doesn’t control the worldwide skies. Indonesia didn’t ground the plane, nor did Ethiopia. Europe also didn’t ground it after the first crash either. The FAA’s jurisdiction is the United States: other countries could have grounded the plane quickly but didn’t.
        bdhess 7y ago
        As the United States is the country of origin, an airworthiness directive issued by the FAA is valid in all ICAO member states.
      - georgeplusplus 7y ago
        Your safety first rhetoric doesn’t hold up against any sort of practicality. Should the 777 have been grounded immediately when Asiana crashed? What about the 777 after Malaysia or its second which we still don’t know the cause of? the right thing was done after the second crash (and eventually by the FAA after it’s arm was twisted enough) but to say it should’ve been immediately grounded is missing the picture entirely.
        akie 7y ago
        > and eventually by the FAA after it’s arm was twisted enough There's a big part of the problem.
        markdown 7y ago
  - ulfw 7y ago
    It was the Chinese Authorities who moved first and the we-outsource-our-job-to-Boeing FAA last.
    - dmix 7y ago
      China has recently produced some competing planes and has more of an authoritarian hold on the industry. About 20% of the Max stock was across a few of Chinese airlines which wasn’t a huge number. The last one also happened in SEA and had some initial duelling finger pointing so it worked well as a PR gambit to be the first to block it. Especially in the middle of a trade war involving product quality issues and Boeing is the closest thing to a US state run aircraft manufacturer. It’s always been a beacon of American protectionism well before the recent administration. So basically there was a ton of political will potentially involved here.
- nexuist 7y ago
  Like a lot of tragedies, it's really hard to tell how much the side effects of something like this are attributed to the mistake itself and how much can be explained through modern communication networks (social media) amplifying everything. Is the Boeing mistake really that bad, or is it because this is the first such aviation design mistake to happen in our post-2010 everyone-is-online world? Remember that the tails on 737s used to just...fall off back in the '90s. For the record, I don't think the 737 MAX should have ever been cleared to fly with the current version of MCAS. But I can't help but believe that there had to be some boneheaded designs in the past that cost hundreds of lives that we just don't think about today. In any case, I hope Boeing has learned from this and revised its engineering processes to go back to its previous prestigious roots. I also hope against hope that we will finally see some executives go to prison for approving this.
  - ncmncm 7y ago
    Yes, it's really that bad. Not because of the flaw itself, but the culture that drove the flaw into the outside world. There have been plenty of others in the past that do not detract from the magnitude of this one.
  - rsynnott 7y ago
    It’s hard to be statistically sure given the small number of existing examples, but taken on face value, no recent large airliner has anything like this level of deaths per flight.
  - bcrosby95 7y ago
    Yes it is that bad. No it is not because of social media. Airline crashes have always been a huge deal. That's why airplanes are so safe
  - rootusrootus 7y ago
    The 737NG problems in the 90s were rudders deflecting suddenly and irrecoverably, tails did not fall off. Two crashes and a number of incidents before the problem was identified. Boeing also tried to squash that investigation, they actually swiped the servo from the first crashed plane so it could not be properly analyzed. Then the 737NG went on to have the best safety record of any plane ever. So while the MAX problem is pretty bad, and social media vastly complicates the PR angle, there is precedent for recovering from this. Certainly with as many MAXs as have been built there is enormous incentive to get it fixed. It's not realistic to expect them to scrap the planes.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
- OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
  Has software had its materials science moment? The pioneering DeHavilland Comet failed due to unexpected stress fractures. The aviation industry changed markedly because of it with years of testing preceding the introduction of any new material or process. Boeing took the lead, DeHavilland never recovered. My cynical view is that little will change in this era.
  - mrtksn 7y ago
    More like MBAs moment maybe? This issue doesn't seem to have anything to do with the difficulties or shortcomings of computer science but product management.
    - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
      I am no fan of MBAs but in this case I am talking about what I perceive as cultural difference between hardware and software engineering. I come from the experimental/hardware world and I believe there isn't the incremental patch and release mindset for deliverable items. The testing cycles for mission critical hardware is rather brutal. The MBA piece of it is why I'm cynical. "Ho-ho-hold on one second. This installation has a substantial dollar value attached to it." --- C.J. Burke "Aliens"
      - fiter 7y ago
        I think this is a systems engineering problem that may have been due to siloed hardware and software engineering teams. The hardware engineers knew they were making something inherently unstable that the software would have to compensate for. The software engineers believed they had working AoA hardware.
      - joe_the_user 7y ago
        But that isn't the situation, it's really not. The context is airbus has an advanced and fuel-economic model that was eating Boeing market share. Boeing decided to produce one more version of the 737 model - it fit the category and as a fuel-efficinet "drop-in replacement", it was very competitive but was rather aerodynamically unstable. So Boeing added a software system to compensate but didn't tell anyone, didn't make it dependent on redundant sensors and basically produced a plane where, once the facts were all out, it became obvious it could never fly again - not because it could never be made safe but because making safe would involve admitting how flagrantly you initially skirted safety. No one flies on the "once this was utterly unsafe but now we've fixed it" plane if they really have fixed it. Everything about the plane was super advanced but cheap-as-could-be, including the software. But by that token, none of this seems the fault of "software culture", indeed, there's been no implication that the software was at fault in the crashes, just the total shitshow design package, which was indeed the fault of finance and management pushing this approach through.
- mopsi 7y ago
  > But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. The DC-10 cargo door issue is probably the closest thing. Took two accidents, 346 fatalities and a House of Representatives investigation to get the flawed design fixed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_door_problem_and_other_major_accidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_...
  - lmm 7y ago
    Notably that was another case that was widely seen as the FAA treating an American company especially gently.
  - philjohn 7y ago
    Also the DeHaviland Comet ... first passenger jetliner, but due to poorly understood metal fatigue science had several high-profile explosive disintegrations during flight and along with the lives of those on board, the hopes of the UK being a major aviation player looked bleak until Airbus.
- briandear 7y ago
  The A330 in the crash of AF 447 certainly had a design flaw like that. Due to that flaw, they entered a high altitude stall and crashed into the ocean.
  - thombat 7y ago
    On AF447 all three of the airspeed probes iced up for 40 seconds, prompting the flight computers to disconnect autopilot and autothrottle and clearly announce to the crew that air data was unreliable and that the normal protection against stalling was suspended. The pilots immediately understood the problem, however for various reasons made a series of bad decisions which resulted in the crash. Tragically there was no need for the pilots to take any urgent action - by design the plane continued in stable flight when the air data was lost. On the 737MAX crashes the single angle of attack indicator being used as input to the MCAS malfunctioned and in response the system set about repeatedly forcing the plane into a dive with no clear indication of why this was happening. Compounding this was the utter lack of training on the MCAS system, which wasn't even mentioned in the pilot manual or IPad-based training that was also used by US airlines. There's a world of difference between these accidents.
- elliekelly 7y ago
  There’s also clearly a serious design flaw in FAA regulations and how the certification process works. Like most rules, I’m sure they meant well when it was implemented but as the regulations/process has iterated it’s created a perverse incentive where Boeing wasn’t optimizing for safety in order to pass the safety certification. Boeing bears a lot of responsibility but taking Boeing to task without taking a look at the system in which it operates seems short-sighted.
lucb1e 7y ago
A bit tangential but I'm curious: if you fly that much, does your company compensate the CO2? From their statement about changing flights being no problem, it sounds like there would easily be budget for such a thing, but I have no idea if companies are starting to do this yet.
- disordinary 7y ago
  You'd hope so, but I know from traveling for a large multinational that it was up to the individual to pay for their own offsetting and I think most are the same. I tend to just try and video conference with people to alleviate the exhaustion of traveling (I live in New Zealand, going to a workshop in Europe is a 30-40 hour endeavor) and the carbon that flying generates.
fred_is_fred 7y ago
I believe that several carriers (for sure United and I think others) will let you change for free on a Max. The issue for you is going to be the impact to your time, which is likely more valuable than the change fee to begin with. On the standard consultant route of Monday morning/Thursday afternoon there are many times not alternative flights for hours (or possibly days) later -- especially if a Max gets "subbed in" at the last minute and you cannot plan ahead. The change fee will be inconsequential compared to you not showing up on a client site for a day or at all.
petilon 7y ago
You may refuse to fly on 737 Max, but how do you feel about 737-8200? Boeing will likely not use the "Max" name when the plan is put back into service. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509
- xiphias2 7y ago
  People are not stupid. They will know the new name of the MAX whatever it will be.
  - ethiclub 7y ago
    Devil's advocate: Common, successful marketing: If a brand is poisoned, distance yourself from the name & rebrand. At its extreme, it is used alongside phoenix company tactics. It works, although a (likely minority) customer portion will keep their finger on the pulse.
- cloudwizard 7y ago
  The engines are visibly different. They are huge.
  - gizmo385 7y ago
    Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight?
    - mcny 7y ago
      > Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight? I am not an industry insider but my understanding is the vast majority of the flying public simply does not matter. We are flying on the cheapest possible ticket. The people who do matter imo are those who are flying on a corporate account or better yet those who control a corporate account. If wealthy people refuse to fly on this death trap, I think airlines will listen.
    - 7y ago
nrau 7y ago
An interesting part of the history of the 737 is that when it launched it originally had a serious rudder design flaw that contributed to several fatal crashes where a lot of folks lost their lives: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues However, Boeing did fix the problem, and the 737 went on to be one of the best selling airplanes in history. This MCAS issue is eerily similar in that it has also resulted in two fatal crashes. But if history is any guide, the problems will be fixed, and the memory of MCAS and MAX issues will likely fade from the public as well.
- TrueDuality 7y ago
  A part of me joins you in this pessimistic view, but the other side of me recognizes that the rudder issues took place in 1991 and most likely the vast majority of the public was never made aware of those issues. I had never heard of it, though that doesn't mean much as a statistical sample. I know a lot of people are now aware of this particular design flaw and I would put money on it being more generally known now then then.
  - orisho 7y ago
    I also believe most people hadn't heard of it. For one, news gets around much faster and easier nowadays with the advent of the internet. Anecdotally, it appears as if anyone who flies would've had the right exposure to Western media to hear about it.
  - georgeplusplus 7y ago
    You can’t really compare the two. The 80s and 90s were loaded with severe accidents where the NTSB was really giving the taxpayers their money’s worth since there would be a major accident almost every month and the agency had to create a new division to handle all the cases. Most weren’t design issues like the MCAS and the 91’ rudder issue but faulty 3rd party parts, poor maintenance, unknown stresses on aging fleets, pilot issues, and on and on. We are in an unprecedented age of aviation safety and the MCAS issue is a huge blow to that record, thus you’re hearing about it in this level because it is fresh in the news. Accidents were common place back then, so common that I’d wager the 91 crash wasn’t on peoples radars since they just accepted that aircraft crash frequently and to be honest the general public doesn’t know what a rudder is in the first place.
jubble 7y ago
Same thing for me in a megacorp. Group manager said “no requirement to travel on a 737 Max” without higher approval... he said he’d just eat the cancellation fees from his own budget.
laydn 7y ago
With the amount of planes already ordered and in the production pipeline, it will be near impossible to not fly with a 737 MAX within a few years, if you are a heavy flier. The alternative for a given route may be a train, bus, or another aircraft with a schedule that won't meet yours.
StreamBright 7y ago
This is exactly why this is pretty bad for companies operating these flights. The alternatives are often within reach of the customers.
jwr 7y ago
Having looked carefully into what Boeing has been doing with the 737 Max, I have no intention of flying on one ever again, even if it gets rammed through FAA again. Though I am absolutely certain that all the sleazy airlines (or perhaps Boeing) will soon begin a rebranding project, changing the name to something that people will not immediately recognize.
- retSava 7y ago
  Unless you boycott Boeing 737-max similar airplanes, you may fly with one without knowing it. The name is really badly burnt and the only plausible way out of it for Boeing is renaming it to something that doesn't ring the bell. IIRC I read that they've already done that for the airplanes that are being delivered since the grounding.
  - IAmEveryone 7y ago
    As far as I can tell, no planes have been delivered since the grounding. The airlines aren't willing to take delivery of a flawed product. It would just cost them money to park them, and may even have legal consequences, such as shifting the burden of proof in any legal disputes that may still arise.
    - alistairSH 7y ago
      You are correct about delivery. Boeing has parking lots full of new Max that are ready for delivery.[1] The OP is referring to several Max that had their paint changed to remove "737 MAX" and replace it with "737 8200" (see link to RyanAir example in sibling).[2] 1 - https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2&i=1406233054&w=780&fh=&fw=&ll=&pl=&sq=&r=2019-07-09T194009Z_12328_MRPRC18CF54C5E0_RTRMADP_0_BOEING-DELIVERIES https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2... 2 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-max-ordered-by-ryanair-undergoes-name-change https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
      - joezydeco 7y ago

pcurve 7y ago

There have been plenty of design flaws in commercial jetliners and in most cases, reputation is recovered. But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. but none quite like this one.

chx 7y ago
Especially one that the FAA tried to pooh pooh as long as it could. It was amazing to watch the goodwill and trust accumulated over decades crumble to nothing in a few hours as the European countries one by one banned the airline from their airspace but did not ground them. It was the EASA telling the FAA to do the right thing. They didn't and then finally the EASA did ground the plane. I really can't remember any other time when the EASA and the FAA disagreed especially this big. https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/ https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/
- FabHK 7y ago
  My perception is different. It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. It was also arguably appropriate for the FAA not to ground the fleet immediately after the second crash, but then after some time when it became apparent that the failure mode was sufficiently similar (as they did). However, what has emerged since then certainly damaged the reputation of the FAA. But it was not a matter of a few hours, it was a matter of careful investigation and evaluation over months.
  - markdown 7y ago
    > It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. Safety first. They ought to have grounded the plane immediately after the first crash and TBH it's my belief that they would have done so if it had been a US plane with US passengers. The fact that it happened to brown people on the other side of the world made it easy to ignore. Don't forget that the FAA had all the details of the plane showing that it had implemented the new MCAS system which in theory could have caused the crash.
    - briandear 7y ago
      The FAA doesn’t control the worldwide skies. Indonesia didn’t ground the plane, nor did Ethiopia. Europe also didn’t ground it after the first crash either. The FAA’s jurisdiction is the United States: other countries could have grounded the plane quickly but didn’t.
      - bdhess 7y ago
        As the United States is the country of origin, an airworthiness directive issued by the FAA is valid in all ICAO member states.
    - georgeplusplus 7y ago
      Your safety first rhetoric doesn’t hold up against any sort of practicality. Should the 777 have been grounded immediately when Asiana crashed? What about the 777 after Malaysia or its second which we still don’t know the cause of? the right thing was done after the second crash (and eventually by the FAA after it’s arm was twisted enough) but to say it should’ve been immediately grounded is missing the picture entirely.
      - akie 7y ago
        > and eventually by the FAA after it’s arm was twisted enough There's a big part of the problem.
      - markdown 7y ago
- ulfw 7y ago
  It was the Chinese Authorities who moved first and the we-outsource-our-job-to-Boeing FAA last.
  - dmix 7y ago
    China has recently produced some competing planes and has more of an authoritarian hold on the industry. About 20% of the Max stock was across a few of Chinese airlines which wasn’t a huge number. The last one also happened in SEA and had some initial duelling finger pointing so it worked well as a PR gambit to be the first to block it. Especially in the middle of a trade war involving product quality issues and Boeing is the closest thing to a US state run aircraft manufacturer. It’s always been a beacon of American protectionism well before the recent administration. So basically there was a ton of political will potentially involved here.
nexuist 7y ago
Like a lot of tragedies, it's really hard to tell how much the side effects of something like this are attributed to the mistake itself and how much can be explained through modern communication networks (social media) amplifying everything. Is the Boeing mistake really that bad, or is it because this is the first such aviation design mistake to happen in our post-2010 everyone-is-online world? Remember that the tails on 737s used to just...fall off back in the '90s. For the record, I don't think the 737 MAX should have ever been cleared to fly with the current version of MCAS. But I can't help but believe that there had to be some boneheaded designs in the past that cost hundreds of lives that we just don't think about today. In any case, I hope Boeing has learned from this and revised its engineering processes to go back to its previous prestigious roots. I also hope against hope that we will finally see some executives go to prison for approving this.
- ncmncm 7y ago
  Yes, it's really that bad. Not because of the flaw itself, but the culture that drove the flaw into the outside world. There have been plenty of others in the past that do not detract from the magnitude of this one.
- rsynnott 7y ago
  It’s hard to be statistically sure given the small number of existing examples, but taken on face value, no recent large airliner has anything like this level of deaths per flight.
- bcrosby95 7y ago
  Yes it is that bad. No it is not because of social media. Airline crashes have always been a huge deal. That's why airplanes are so safe
- rootusrootus 7y ago
  The 737NG problems in the 90s were rudders deflecting suddenly and irrecoverably, tails did not fall off. Two crashes and a number of incidents before the problem was identified. Boeing also tried to squash that investigation, they actually swiped the servo from the first crashed plane so it could not be properly analyzed. Then the 737NG went on to have the best safety record of any plane ever. So while the MAX problem is pretty bad, and social media vastly complicates the PR angle, there is precedent for recovering from this. Certainly with as many MAXs as have been built there is enormous incentive to get it fixed. It's not realistic to expect them to scrap the planes.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]
OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
Has software had its materials science moment? The pioneering DeHavilland Comet failed due to unexpected stress fractures. The aviation industry changed markedly because of it with years of testing preceding the introduction of any new material or process. Boeing took the lead, DeHavilland never recovered. My cynical view is that little will change in this era.
- mrtksn 7y ago
  More like MBAs moment maybe? This issue doesn't seem to have anything to do with the difficulties or shortcomings of computer science but product management.
  - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
    I am no fan of MBAs but in this case I am talking about what I perceive as cultural difference between hardware and software engineering. I come from the experimental/hardware world and I believe there isn't the incremental patch and release mindset for deliverable items. The testing cycles for mission critical hardware is rather brutal. The MBA piece of it is why I'm cynical. "Ho-ho-hold on one second. This installation has a substantial dollar value attached to it." --- C.J. Burke "Aliens"
    - fiter 7y ago
      I think this is a systems engineering problem that may have been due to siloed hardware and software engineering teams. The hardware engineers knew they were making something inherently unstable that the software would have to compensate for. The software engineers believed they had working AoA hardware.
    - joe_the_user 7y ago
      But that isn't the situation, it's really not. The context is airbus has an advanced and fuel-economic model that was eating Boeing market share. Boeing decided to produce one more version of the 737 model - it fit the category and as a fuel-efficinet "drop-in replacement", it was very competitive but was rather aerodynamically unstable. So Boeing added a software system to compensate but didn't tell anyone, didn't make it dependent on redundant sensors and basically produced a plane where, once the facts were all out, it became obvious it could never fly again - not because it could never be made safe but because making safe would involve admitting how flagrantly you initially skirted safety. No one flies on the "once this was utterly unsafe but now we've fixed it" plane if they really have fixed it. Everything about the plane was super advanced but cheap-as-could-be, including the software. But by that token, none of this seems the fault of "software culture", indeed, there's been no implication that the software was at fault in the crashes, just the total shitshow design package, which was indeed the fault of finance and management pushing this approach through.
mopsi 7y ago
> But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. The DC-10 cargo door issue is probably the closest thing. Took two accidents, 346 fatalities and a House of Representatives investigation to get the flawed design fixed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_door_problem_and_other_major_accidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_...
- lmm 7y ago
  Notably that was another case that was widely seen as the FAA treating an American company especially gently.
- philjohn 7y ago
  Also the DeHaviland Comet ... first passenger jetliner, but due to poorly understood metal fatigue science had several high-profile explosive disintegrations during flight and along with the lives of those on board, the hopes of the UK being a major aviation player looked bleak until Airbus.
briandear 7y ago
The A330 in the crash of AF 447 certainly had a design flaw like that. Due to that flaw, they entered a high altitude stall and crashed into the ocean.
- thombat 7y ago
  On AF447 all three of the airspeed probes iced up for 40 seconds, prompting the flight computers to disconnect autopilot and autothrottle and clearly announce to the crew that air data was unreliable and that the normal protection against stalling was suspended. The pilots immediately understood the problem, however for various reasons made a series of bad decisions which resulted in the crash. Tragically there was no need for the pilots to take any urgent action - by design the plane continued in stable flight when the air data was lost. On the 737MAX crashes the single angle of attack indicator being used as input to the MCAS malfunctioned and in response the system set about repeatedly forcing the plane into a dive with no clear indication of why this was happening. Compounding this was the utter lack of training on the MCAS system, which wasn't even mentioned in the pilot manual or IPad-based training that was also used by US airlines. There's a world of difference between these accidents.
elliekelly 7y ago
There’s also clearly a serious design flaw in FAA regulations and how the certification process works. Like most rules, I’m sure they meant well when it was implemented but as the regulations/process has iterated it’s created a perverse incentive where Boeing wasn’t optimizing for safety in order to pass the safety certification. Boeing bears a lot of responsibility but taking Boeing to task without taking a look at the system in which it operates seems short-sighted.

lucb1e 7y ago

A bit tangential but I'm curious: if you fly that much, does your company compensate the CO2? From their statement about changing flights being no problem, it sounds like there would easily be budget for such a thing, but I have no idea if companies are starting to do this yet.

disordinary 7y ago
You'd hope so, but I know from traveling for a large multinational that it was up to the individual to pay for their own offsetting and I think most are the same. I tend to just try and video conference with people to alleviate the exhaustion of traveling (I live in New Zealand, going to a workshop in Europe is a 30-40 hour endeavor) and the carbon that flying generates.

fred_is_fred 7y ago

I believe that several carriers (for sure United and I think others) will let you change for free on a Max. The issue for you is going to be the impact to your time, which is likely more valuable than the change fee to begin with. On the standard consultant route of Monday morning/Thursday afternoon there are many times not alternative flights for hours (or possibly days) later -- especially if a Max gets "subbed in" at the last minute and you cannot plan ahead. The change fee will be inconsequential compared to you not showing up on a client site for a day or at all.

petilon 7y ago

You may refuse to fly on 737 Max, but how do you feel about 737-8200? Boeing will likely not use the "Max" name when the plan is put back into service. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509

xiphias2 7y ago
People are not stupid. They will know the new name of the MAX whatever it will be.
- ethiclub 7y ago
  Devil's advocate: Common, successful marketing: If a brand is poisoned, distance yourself from the name & rebrand. At its extreme, it is used alongside phoenix company tactics. It works, although a (likely minority) customer portion will keep their finger on the pulse.
cloudwizard 7y ago
The engines are visibly different. They are huge.
- gizmo385 7y ago
  Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight?
  - mcny 7y ago
    > Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight? I am not an industry insider but my understanding is the vast majority of the flying public simply does not matter. We are flying on the cheapest possible ticket. The people who do matter imo are those who are flying on a corporate account or better yet those who control a corporate account. If wealthy people refuse to fly on this death trap, I think airlines will listen.
  - 7y ago

nrau 7y ago

An interesting part of the history of the 737 is that when it launched it originally had a serious rudder design flaw that contributed to several fatal crashes where a lot of folks lost their lives: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues However, Boeing did fix the problem, and the 737 went on to be one of the best selling airplanes in history. This MCAS issue is eerily similar in that it has also resulted in two fatal crashes. But if history is any guide, the problems will be fixed, and the memory of MCAS and MAX issues will likely fade from the public as well.

TrueDuality 7y ago
A part of me joins you in this pessimistic view, but the other side of me recognizes that the rudder issues took place in 1991 and most likely the vast majority of the public was never made aware of those issues. I had never heard of it, though that doesn't mean much as a statistical sample. I know a lot of people are now aware of this particular design flaw and I would put money on it being more generally known now then then.
- orisho 7y ago
  I also believe most people hadn't heard of it. For one, news gets around much faster and easier nowadays with the advent of the internet. Anecdotally, it appears as if anyone who flies would've had the right exposure to Western media to hear about it.
- georgeplusplus 7y ago
  You can’t really compare the two. The 80s and 90s were loaded with severe accidents where the NTSB was really giving the taxpayers their money’s worth since there would be a major accident almost every month and the agency had to create a new division to handle all the cases. Most weren’t design issues like the MCAS and the 91’ rudder issue but faulty 3rd party parts, poor maintenance, unknown stresses on aging fleets, pilot issues, and on and on. We are in an unprecedented age of aviation safety and the MCAS issue is a huge blow to that record, thus you’re hearing about it in this level because it is fresh in the news. Accidents were common place back then, so common that I’d wager the 91 crash wasn’t on peoples radars since they just accepted that aircraft crash frequently and to be honest the general public doesn’t know what a rudder is in the first place.

jubble 7y ago

Same thing for me in a megacorp. Group manager said “no requirement to travel on a 737 Max” without higher approval... he said he’d just eat the cancellation fees from his own budget.

laydn 7y ago

With the amount of planes already ordered and in the production pipeline, it will be near impossible to not fly with a 737 MAX within a few years, if you are a heavy flier. The alternative for a given route may be a train, bus, or another aircraft with a schedule that won't meet yours.

StreamBright 7y ago

This is exactly why this is pretty bad for companies operating these flights. The alternatives are often within reach of the customers.

jwr 7y ago

Having looked carefully into what Boeing has been doing with the 737 Max, I have no intention of flying on one ever again, even if it gets rammed through FAA again. Though I am absolutely certain that all the sleazy airlines (or perhaps Boeing) will soon begin a rebranding project, changing the name to something that people will not immediately recognize.

retSava 7y ago
Unless you boycott Boeing 737-max similar airplanes, you may fly with one without knowing it. The name is really badly burnt and the only plausible way out of it for Boeing is renaming it to something that doesn't ring the bell. IIRC I read that they've already done that for the airplanes that are being delivered since the grounding.
- IAmEveryone 7y ago
  As far as I can tell, no planes have been delivered since the grounding. The airlines aren't willing to take delivery of a flawed product. It would just cost them money to park them, and may even have legal consequences, such as shifting the burden of proof in any legal disputes that may still arise.
  - alistairSH 7y ago
    You are correct about delivery. Boeing has parking lots full of new Max that are ready for delivery.[1] The OP is referring to several Max that had their paint changed to remove "737 MAX" and replace it with "737 8200" (see link to RyanAir example in sibling).[2] 1 - https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2&i=1406233054&w=780&fh=&fw=&ll=&pl=&sq=&r=2019-07-09T194009Z_12328_MRPRC18CF54C5E0_RTRMADP_0_BOEING-DELIVERIES https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2... 2 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-max-ordered-by-ryanair-undergoes-name-change https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
    - joezydeco 7y ago