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Alexa and Google Home expose users to vishing and eavesdropping
- zik 7y agoTIL "vishing" is a word. If like me you were wondering what it meant: "Vishing is the telephone equivalent of phishing. It is described as the act of using the telephone in an attempt to scam the user into surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft."
- donio 7y agovishing is defined as using social engineering with the intention to get access to the user's vi session. The article is obviously using the term incorrectly.
- antod 7y agoI'm only now just wondering why (apparently - only looked at the first few search results) there isn't a vish shell....
- JetSpiegel 7y agoUnlike EMACS, (neo)vi(m) is a text editor, not an OS.
- BurningFrog 7y agoThis battle technique was perfected by the old Norse Vi Kings.
- asr 7y agoThis makes no sense. Phishing comes from phreak + fishing, but the "ph" in phreak is already from the word phone (phone + freak) -- so the ph in "phishing" already comes from the word phone! The telephone version of phishing should be... "phishing." But thanks for the explanation.
- chrisweekly 7y agoDisclaimer: I'm not a linguist, and this word was new to me. FWIW, I inferred something like "v for voice interface". IMHO the "ph" in "phishing", despite the etymology, has lost any meaningful semantic connection to "phone" per se. So this new term might seem redundant or circular in its derivation, while still being a valid / useful addition to the lexicon. (shrug)
- TheSpiceIsLife 7y agoIt is sometimes referred to as 'vishing - a portmanteau of "voice" and phishing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_phishing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_phishing
- kayhi 7y agoDo these devices record all the time or only after the trigger word (they would need to be always listening for the trigger word) until the end of the statement?
- javagram 7y agoThey record only after the trigger word. It's the same as Android phones and iPhones that have "OK Google" or "Hey Siri" enabled. In practice we know that trigger words for all these devices occasionally misfire (There was also an issue with one type of google home device a while ago which was shipped with a faulty physical button that caused it to be turned on at intervals as if the user had pressed the physical button to start speaking).
- jMyles 7y agoThe more important question is: how do we know whether these devices (or a particular subset of them) record all the time or only after the trigger word?
- jka 7y ago... while also considering the possibility of faulty software updates, bugs, and network attackers -- in an environment where hardware, network protocols, and APIs are proprietary and inscrutable. And would we know if they had been recording unnecessarily?
- cactus2093 7y agoWell they don't have big hard drives, so you can be confident they're not recording everything to disk that then could be unintentionally accessed or sent out later. And you can look at network traffic (e.g. from wifi router stats) to be pretty confident they're not constantly live-streaming audio up to the cloud. Of course most people will not actually do this monitoring themselves, but there are enough of these devices out there that if a significant number started recording constantly somebody would notice pretty quickly. And that would be terrible PR for the company involved, so I think google and amazon and apple have a pretty strong incentive not to do this.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- AtomicOrbital 7y agoAll hardware with a microphone (or speaker since it too can be used as a mic) needs a hardware switch to disable ... Which will only land once open hardware Linux mobiles take off in next year or two ... Until then I just assume nothing is private
- nightfly 7y agoYou don't need linux support to put a switch on a microphone
- jacquesm 7y agoTrue, but none of the players that be will add one voluntarily.
- marcan_42 7y agoThe Google Home mini and Google Home Max have physical sliding mic mute toggles. The original Google Home has a physical momentary mic mute switch (click to disable, click to enable). The Amazon Echo also has a similar mic mute switch.
- jimktrains2 7y ago> momentary mic mute switch (click to disable, click to enable). Momentary switches only activate when pushed and as son as their not pushed deäctivate. Was it a momentary switch or a normal one (push to activate, push to deäctivate)?
- marcan_42 7y agoMomentary, in that the actual mute function is software-controlled. However, on the Amazon device it does trigger a physical power-down of the microphones, which is hardware-tied to the LED, so you can be sure that when the LED says the mics are off they really are off. I'm not sure about the Google one. Edit: at least the physical slide switch on the Home Mini is a hardware cut-off; I assume the same is true of the Home Max.
- cookie_monsta 7y ago> Amazon or Google review the security of the voice app before it is published. We change the functionality after this review, which does not prompt a second round review How is this not a massive red flag?
- jeremyjh 7y agoI don't know for sure about Google, but with Alexa skills are simply implemented as a web service. There is no way for Amazon to know that you've deployed new code on your web service. There are a lot of limits to what you can change though, the prompts / intents are specified in a manifest you have to upload. But what the device does for an existing intent, and the responses it sends, can be changed without their knowledge.
- cookie_monsta 7y agoI just can't believe that people actually pay to have these things in their houses. Or maybe, sadly, I can.
- jen_h 7y agoYou could do the same thing with almost any type of app where you run your own web service; it's kind of a black box to the app market's test group...you could change everything but the domain name and security certificate (and most app stores don't pin the cert as they expire and you wouldn't want to recertify at every cert switch). One thing Amazon or Google could do here for voice apps, though, that Apple and Google (Android) can't for standard phone apps, is audit voice responses for anomalies or user input that matches a suspicous pattern and flag apps that trigger it. They can do this because every utterance a user sends a voice assistant passes through Amazon or Google systems. If an app has access to user PII, they could add some automation to flag suspicious user responses or anomalous activity that differs from x days previous and pass it up the chain for review. One thing I do like about Alexa development is that if you, as a developer, are privacy-minded (and don't need nor want user data for anything), you can protect your users by configuring your apps not to collect any of your users' info . As a developer, you don't even get IP addresses as everything goes User > Amazon > Developer > Amazon > User. You always get session and Amazon-assigned user id, but they're typically pretty anonymous unless the user says "I am Jane Doe" -- which, I guess we should be honest, probably does happen more than it should, and this is what the OP researchers are exploiting.
- adrianmonk 7y ago> It is possible to ask for sensitive data such as the user’s password from any voice app. Newsflash: computing device with the capability for user interaction can request information that you might not want to give it. In other words, how is this situation different from any software running on any other type of computing device?
- imglorp 7y agoIt's not, just another channel with its own inherent rate of success, maybe around non-technical users who might mistakenly trust the speaker but not a person on the phone. Back in 1966, the makers of the Eliza AI chatbot program were shocked to learn people inherently trusted the program and told it things they didn't want other people to hear. So I propose vishing capitalizes on this phenomena. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA
- jka 7y agoA decent chunk of computer security work seems to be around finding these same exploits in new devices, since we haven't convinced ourselves to stop reinventing and selling new connectivity devices :) i.e. - it's not a new technique, but a new instance of the problem, and that makes it worthwhile (especially for something widely used in private environments) to explore and expose. It'd be nice if we could reach some kind of device/phone capability plateau and reduce consumption of new equipment. And ideally settle on a small set of software to use on those, which could be hardened and made reliable over time. Until then, ...
- jen_h 7y agoIt's not really any different -- changing server behavior after app review is possible for any server-based app. The one thing they exploited that is unique, though, is that when a user talks to a smart device, they generally don't know at any given time if their commands are going to Google/Amazon or are being passed to Google/Amazon and the third-party developer. As far as many users are concerned, they're talking to Alexa. The third party app is Alexa, too. And because of the opaque single-dimensional nature of voice interfaces, even a savvy user doesn't know who's really receiving their intent -- there are enough glitches where you think you're sending to the active skill, but you're back in Alexa's lobby again, so the inverse case the researchers are playing with is a good vector. I think they could solve some of this because Amazon/Google are gatekeepers -- they get user input no matter where it goes -- they could easily automate detecting anomalous user input and flag for review (that would of course miss the first victims, but it's better than nothing). I think the "Who's listening?" part is a little harder to solve. Maybe by forcing the third party app to always announce itself as itself? But that does add some friction to the "experience" they want to provide...however, a little friction is better if it means protecting your users.
- eth0up 7y agoIf Amazon's Ring is partnering with LE[1], and from what I understand, in some circumstances providing access to customer-produced data even when customers refuse requests, it doesn't seem too unreasonable to have suspicions. 1. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/43kga3/amazon-is-coaching-cops-on-how-to-obtain-surveillance-footage-without-a-warrant?xyz https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/43kga3/amazon-is-coaching... 2. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/five-concerns-about-amazon-rings-deals-police https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/five-concerns-about-am... Edit to append link and quote: Quote: However, he noted, there is a workaround if a resident happens to reject a police request. If the community member doesn’t want to supply a Ring video that seems vital to a local law enforcement investigation, police can contact Amazon, which will then essentially “subpoena” the video. Link: https://www.govtech.com/security/Amazons-Ring-Video-Camera-Alarms-Privacy-Advocates.html https://www.govtech.com/security/Amazons-Ring-Video-Camera-A...
- ineedasername 7y agoThat seems like a strange workaround. Wouldn't the burden of proof to subpoena to Amazon be the same as a warrant to the user?
- koolba 7y agoAmazon owns the video, not the user, so you only need a warrant if they demand one. They’re also free to not require one.
- ineedasername 7y agoThat makes sense, although it's not a subpoena in that case. It's just Amazon voluntarily cooperating. However, I'm not a fan of such voluntary cooperation. I think a company's default response should be, "We'll help you in every way possible once there is a warrant." I mean, something like this should be viewed in the context of comparable IRL vendors. If I rent a 3rd-party storage unit from U-Haul or similar, a warrant is generally required. (one exception I found was a case where police, on-site, witnessed a drug deal. They then used the defendant's key to open their unit without a warrant. It was judged lawful, that finding drugs and keycard on the defendant was sufficient probably cause. That makes sense, given that if police witness you in front of your house, or car, etc selling drugs, that would be sufficient as well to search.) [0] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_14-cr-00696/pdf/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_14-cr-00696-0.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_14-cr-00...
- sucrose 7y agoGoogle allows you to change an app after Play Store approval without a second review? If so, well that's your problem right there.
- seansta 7y agoIm not a fan of devices actively listening and sending snippets (if not all the info) back to home base. My simple solution is to not use these kind of devices.