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This seems like a good thing, they should be testing with people who don’t know the answers. Though I can’t help but wonder if this is a very subtle re-framing
by dahart 7y ago
This seems like a good thing, they should be testing with people who don’t know the answers. Though I can’t help but wonder if this is a very subtle re-framing of the Max accidents to shift blame back towards pilots. This approach of a regulatory agency recommending “average pilot” testing makes both the agency and Boeing look good, and tends to downplay the fact that Boeing intentionally avoided training the pilots, and that the system was only recoverable if you had some extremely specific knowledge. This wasn’t an issue of the quality of the pilots, this was an issue of the quality of the training, which we know was kept from all pilots to attempt to save time and money.
- treis 7y ago>Though I can’t help but wonder if this is a very subtle re-framing of the Max accidents to shift blame back towards pilots. Blame is a loaded word. Boeing assumed that pilots could be relied upon to recover from a MCAS induced runaway trim. Practice has shown that they can't. Whether Boeing or the pilots is at fault is, from a safety perspective, irrelevant. The bottom line is that an assumption was made, it was wrong, and a couple planes crashed. Using average pilots instead of highly experienced test pilots is a sensible step to prevent a repeat.
- kayfox 7y agoTo be more precise, Boeing assumed that all pilots flying their aircraft would be up to the standards of the United States as opposed to the different standards around the world.
- jfim 7y agoHas there been a documented occurrence of a US pilot encountering an MCAS failure in the US and correctly dealing with it?
- pdonis 7y agoYes, there are many reported incidents from US pilots of stability trim incidents in the FAA's database which, in hindsight, were due to MCAS. The pilots couldn't identify them as such at the time because, of course, they didn't know MCAS existed. But they were able to figure out the corrective action in time to maintain safe flight. (The reports also criticize the flight manual for being inadequate.) https://www.google.com/search?client=ubuntu&channel=fs&q=us+pilots+mcas+incidents&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8 https://www.google.com/search?client=ubuntu&channel=fs&q=us+...
- kayfox 7y agoMost of those reports involved the autopilot or were while flaps were extended, which disables MCAS. The ones that did not were complaining about not being informed about MCAS and not about it actuating. There were even incidents reported as being MCAS that did not involve stabilizer trim or a 737 MAX.
- pdonis 7y agoReports like the one where the plane started descending when autopilot was engaged are still relevant because they indicate issues with the angle of attack sensor, which is also what MCAS relies on.
- davinic 7y agoAlso all of the US-based MAXs had the optional AoA Sensor Disagree indicator, which would instantly show the source of the issue. The international pilots were in the dark because Boeing turned a critical safety feature into a revenue stream.
- kayfox 7y agoAs far as anyone could tell, MCAS was not encountered before in the US.
- throw0101a 7y agoOr perhaps assumed that the pilots even knew that the MCAS existed and how to override it. Part of the debate is that Boeing told the FAA and everybody else that 'no special training' for the Max series was needed; just watch a couple-hour video or somesuch.
- JanSt 7y agoMy understanding is that the pilots had only about 40 seconds time to solve the problem and were trained for one hour with an iPad (not on the MCAS, but the whole 737 Max). I'm not sure whether this is a question of pilots' standards in the US vs around the world.
- kayfox 7y agoThe general idea was that pilots would correctly recognize large amounts of undesired and uncommanded trim being runaway trim and perform the checklist to resolve that issue that they are expected to know by memory, since there is a need to execute it fast, without paging through the Quick Reference Handbook. This is not a checklist that was introduced with the 737 MAX, but one that has existed since the introduction of the 737 in 1969. I haven't gone and checked but IIRC a similar checklist exists for all Boeing jetliners and I would expect Airbus as well. In any system failure there is a chain of events that leads up to the ultimate failure, concentrating solely on Boeing's mistakes in these crashes overlooks all the other points at which they could have been averted: 1. In the Lion Air crash, there were some significant maintenance issues that lead up to the replacement for a failing AoA sensor with a used part older than the aircraft failing as well. 2. There were some significant failings in Crew Resource Management in the accident flights. 3. There appear to be issues in the pilots abilities to deal with unexpected situations. This is why simulator training exists, so that pilots can encounter unexpected issues and deal with them correctly. 4. The failure that lead to MCAS being activated also caused a whole ton of warnings to be activated, which may have been a situation Boeing was not expecting, and therefore did not put into the minimum baseline training they create. 5. The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. 6. Boeing's designs reflect a US-centric expectation of pilots. In the US we expect pilots flying airliners to have spent at least 1500 hours flying before they can even sit in the co-pilot seat. In other parts of the world I have heard numbers as low as 240 hours, so pilot testing will need to reflect this going forward.
- ClumsyPilot 7y ago> 5. 5. The flight computer system and MCAS was implemented problematically, relying on one input because the expected control authority was very low, and then when that was not changed the system was not re-architected. I like your approach: Pilot's failures caused the crash, and Boeing made an honest mistake. And you seem to think it would have been fine flying in the US. You do realise plane crashes and industrial accidents do happen in the US? A safe system assumes they are operated by humans who are not infallible, and should not go up in flames from minor issues. Otherwise we must conclude Chernobyl reactor was a perfectly fine design.
- chopin 7y agoFrom what I read, I'd assume that the US just got lucky.
- elbrian 7y ago> Boeing assumed that pilots could be relied upon to recover from a MCAS induced runaway trim. Practice has shown that they can't. Whether Boeing or the pilots is at fault is, from a safety perspective, irrelevant. From a practical perspective, however, Boeing making universal assumptions about pilot capabilities in life-or-death situations, utilizing new equipment that they were not trained on, is anything but irrelevant.
- treis 7y agoTheir logic was that pilots are trained to deal with runaway trim, a MCAS failure is runaway trim, ergo pilots are trained to deal with a MCAS failure. Obviously that logic turned out to be faulty but it's not like Boeing made some outlandish leap here.
- erikpukinskis 7y agoDo you really think that’s an appropriate level of analysis for the manufacturer of a brand new MCAS? “Any failure of this new thing we’re shipping is just a trim failure, pilots can handle it”?
- treis 7y agoWith the benefit of hindsight it looks obviously wrong, but without that the reasoning looks sound to me. IMHO, the failure lies in validating the analysis with realistic test conditions. They should be testing their assumptions against the worst pilots, not the best.
- makomk 7y agoThe problem with their testing wasn't just that they tested against the best pilots. They simulated MCAS failure as just the stabilizer trim running away, which of course their test pilots caught. Real-world MCAS failures were accompanied by a bunch of warnings about loss of accurate airspeed and altitude (because those also used the angle-of-attack sensor), which meant that in reality pilots were occupied trying to sort through that and figure out if any of the conflicting airspeed and altitude readings could be trusted. That is, as I understand it, hard enough to deal with and demanding enough on its own that even well-trained Western pilots screw it up, occasionally with tragic results. Then whilst all that's happening they're meant to notice that the trim wheel is moving in an uncommanded and unwanted fashion, turn electric trim off, and manually wrestle the trim wheel back into the correct position (whatever that even is). Boeing didn't simulate any of those added complications according to the NTSB.
- dahart 7y agoI appreciate the attempt to be diplomatic, and I agree that using average pilots is sensible. But, with respect, I could not disagree more with the rest of that. > Blame is a loaded word. Boeing’s response to the accidents was to blame the pilots, there is precedent for this word in this situation. https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/23/business/american-airlines-boeing-pilots-union/index.html https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/23/business/american-airlines-bo... > Boeing assumed that pilots could be relied upon No, Boeing intentionally hid information from pilots. This is well known. https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-withheld-information-on-737-model-according-to-safety-experts-and-others-1542082575 https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-withheld-information-on-... > Whether Boeing or the pilots is at fault is, from a safety perspective, irrelevant No. If you want to fix the problem, you must know what the problem is. The cause may be irrelevant to the people who are dead, but it is absolutely relevant to solving the problem in the future especially from a safety perspective.
- totally 7y agoIt sounds like you're advocating for blame-ful post mortems. Is that the case and what's your reasoning?
- aeonsky 7y agoYes, when 400 people die for a company to save money, you must assign blame and put people in jail.
- fennecfoxen 7y agoI have downvoted your comment, because I believe it does more to obscure understanding than to enlighten. > when 400 people die for a company to save money Let me take a step back and ask: Why? Is it because we're vindictive, and demand blood? Or is it because this actually does something to help keep people from dying in the future? If the latter is more important than the former -- which I hope is the case -- how can we trust that we're pursuing a course that improves the future of society while also using rhetoric to the effect of "when 400 people die for a company to save money"? Consider, for instance: Part of reason for the company "saving money" is that it results in lower costs for planes, and ultimately lower airfare for customers who pay airlines' capital expenses, potentially resulting in fewer miles driven and fewer accident. Is reducing this statistical danger more or less than the danger of the planes? Quite possibly, it's not -- but using this rhetoric certainly won't help us find out. More broadly the "omg greed" narrative, which -- to me, at least -- just doesn't make too much sense. If the corner-cutting that led to 737 Max problems is to be understood as a "greed" move, it's a pretty incompetent one, because Boeing is almost certainly out billions over the mess. People who seek to maximize profits for their own self-interest also seek to mitigate risk, for the same reason. I would suggest that a "hubris" narrative, or something similar, is probably more appropriate here. If this is so, the remedies are entirely different, and the assertion that we MUST jail people, because it fits our "greed" narrative and whatever cognitive bias we drag into the picture, ensures that we will not remedy the problem effectively. This means people may die.
- StreamBright 7y agoYou cannot really assume such thing in a situation like flying when the consequences of your assumption is loss of life potentially.
- ryacko 7y ago>Boeing assumed that pilots could be relied upon to recover from a MCAS induced runaway trim. The incidents of MCAS errors with US pilots who reported it to the FAA did result in recovery. But later cases did result in tragic accidents. https://static.seattletimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/LionAir-BlackBox-WEB-1020x680.jpg https://static.seattletimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/L... But when you make that statement, I don't think you're really imagining what it would be like to be on a plane like that. The above infographic shows what it is like. The plane was operating in an erratic manner. I don't design planes, but does Boeing at least have a system that detects whether or not pilots are resisting against the controls?
- salawat 7y agoThey did actually. Older 737 models have an "oh shit" trim override when the pilot pulls the yoke back. This was specifically removed from the MAX to accommodate MCAS.
- sterileopinions 7y ago>Whether Boeing or the pilots is at fault is, from a safety perspective, irrelevant. It's quite literally the most relevant talking point in this entire conversation.
- markdown 7y ago> Using average pilots instead of highly experienced test pilots is a sensible step to prevent a repeat. It wouldn't have made a difference without the training for this specific MCAS issue. Highly experienced test pilots would have been equally unable to recover had they been flying the planes that crashed. Normal runaway trim is easily handled, but the MCAS-induced runaway trip had the cockpit lighting up with all sorts of errors and warning lights and beeps. The only way to deal with this is to pick up checklists and start going through them... which you simply couldn't do because there was no time. So using pilots selected at random from various airlines is a great idea and should be implemented, but it would not have prevented this situation. Only training might have.
- smaddox 7y ago> Using average pilots instead of highly experienced test pilots is a sensible step to prevent a repeat. Or a good way to kill average pilots. How about using highly skilled pilots, but failing a plane when anything unusual happens?
- Zenst 7y agoWhat is average? Is the average of one countries pilots the same as another's - maybe, maybe not. Whilst I tend to agree, this does seem a bit of a blame-shift/deflection, it does raise the area of pilot plane certification. Maybe, that is the area that needs to be addressed so pilots are more knowledgeable about the plane they are flying at a level beyond what is allowed now. However this plays out, I'd say those who certify planes for use by pilots also need to do so on the basis of the "average" pilot and perhaps need to raise their standards more than pilots do. I would of assumed that had plane had difficulty - that they had a hotline to somebody who was very knowledgeable beyond forcing pilots in a panic situation to RTFM. Which is kinda what the situation is now.
- cptskippy 7y ago> Though I can’t help but wonder if this is a very subtle re-framing of the Max accidents to shift blame back towards pilots. How so? The assertion that average pilots must be use implies that average pilots were not being used and that because of this the testing is flawed. I think the point is that an average pilot would have failed tests and exposed a flaw in their training but because they used above average pilots any flaws in their systems were mitigated or avoided by the pilots. I think we'd all agree that if a pilot landed a fully functional plane, that they were certified to fly, without first deploying the landing gear then we'd question that pilot's abilities. The rationale for testing using average pilots is along the same lines. An average pilot can reasonably be expected to have a certain level of knowledge and ability, therefore all testing should be to expose the gaps between what they know and what's needed to pilot a new aircraft. Using a more experienced pilot closes or narrows those gaps.
- dmix 7y agoWhy would NTSB try to shift blame away from Boeing?
- deelowe 7y agoIt's not the NTSBs job to lay blame. They aren't litigators.
- mlyle 7y ago> and that the system was only recoverable if you had some extremely specific knowledge. This isn't true. If you follow the runaway trim procedure, you recover. Pilots in the US are required to demonstrate the runaway trim procedure as part of a type rating checkride. Aggravating factors are, IMO: 1) Even well-trained aircrews getting a runaway trim condition on takeoff are not guaranteed to show the same performance as on their checkride day. 2) Not all jurisdictions require this demonstration. 3) The MCAS could fail in a way that could be surprising and not seem exactly like normal runaway trim (intermittency). 4) This test of "can you handle runaway trim?" was much more frequent than the normal causes of a stuck switch or actuator. I think #3-4 is the big issue. While better trained crews could address the others, MCAS has the ability to fail in a way that it only does stuff when the crew isn't looking. There's nothing that can address this but system redundancy.
- tim333 7y ago> If you follow the runaway trim procedure, you recover. In the Ethiopian crash the crew followed the runaway trim check list but didn't recover. The issue seems have been that the aircraft was going to fast so they couldn't turn the manual trim adjuster. But that isn't mentioned on the runaway checklist (http://www.b737.org.uk/runawaystab.htm http://www.b737.org.uk/runawaystab.htm) OK a different crew might have figured that and slowed down but not crashing should not be that tricky really.
- mlyle 7y agoAs already discussed, the runaway trim procedure got them to a positive rate climb. Then they did A) re-enabled electric trim (and MCAS) B) while still low, C) touched the trim button for a second, and didn't adjust anywhere close to proper trim, and D) left electric trim/MCAS on. Not to mention, from your source, the FCTM says: > Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.
- cmurf 7y agoI see it as every certificated Airline Transport Pilot is a pilot who passed the certification requirements, and any of them should be able to recover from recoverable scenarios, rather than fragmenting this certification into elite or specialist test pilots. The notion that a specialized test pilot or airplane certification pilot can recover from a unusual scenario cannot be used to justify impunging the qualification of any qualified pilot. And that's basically the early Boeing rhetoric, and also from others like Langewiesche, talking about airmanship, the notion that some certified pilots really actually are incompetent they just so happen to be foreign pilots, etc. To whatever degree the average pilot is not getting the proper training, it's a call that the entire industry has an obligation to bring up the average pilot to the actual real world expected minimum level of competency, and stop this b.s. blaming of pilots as if there are different kinds of competencies for the same level of certification. I further note, upon MCAS existence becoming public, U.S. based pilots got rather distinctly pissed off about being kept in the dark. That is not a reaction consistent with, yeah it'll be just like runaway trim, we can handle that, no big deal.
- Obi_Juan_Kenobi 7y ago> the system was only recoverable if you had some extremely specific knowledge I don't think this is a fair characterization. The runaway trim condition is not arcane knowledge. It's a standard part of pilot training and easily something the vast majority of pilots are well prepared to handle. The issue with MCAS was that, while it was ultimately a runaway trim issue, it didn't look like it from the pilot's seat. The MCAS trim inputs were intermittent and came with no indication that the MCAS system was providing them. You also had throttle inputs and a whole slew of cabin warnings. The fact that the AoA disagree indicator was not standard shows just how little consideration was made to communicate to pilots. Even with improved pilot training, I think a major crash was inevitable due to the nature of how the malfunction presents itself. More training doesn't make up for the obscure operation of MCAS or the fact that this failure occurs with very little time to react. I'm in strong agreement that blaming the pilots is unconscionable. The pilots' action disabling the trim with the cutout switch, and then re-enabling it in a desperate bid to regain control of a badly-out-of-trim and overspeed aircraft speaks volumes. They were quickly put into a nearly-impossible situation and behaved reasonably, if ultimately incorrectly.
- m463 7y agoI am thinking of another question: The boeing model, apart from MCAS, has traditionally been "the pilot decides" Would this shift towards the airbus model (the plane decides)?