4 ms·
Whenever you have sharing, you usually have side channels. We're going to see more and more of this until we have much better hardware isolation. This is a kin
by musicale 7y ago
Whenever you have sharing, you usually have side channels. We're going to see more and more of this until we have much better hardware isolation.
This is a kind of obvious variant of Rowhammer, which hasn't generally been fixed AFAIK.
Hardware in the late 2010s seems a bit like Windows in the late 1990s - a house of cards waiting to collapse, but the dominant vendors know that very few customers are willing to pay more for security and reliability vs. performance/features/new and shiny.
(So if we're lucky then we'll end up with a "more secure" version of hardware that is analogous to... Windows Vista.)
- colechristensen 7y agoReal-world side channels are going to start getting more attention as the technology and techniques for extracting information from EM radiation from circuits (not radios) leaking state improve.
- dahfizz 7y agoIs that possible without special hardware to detect EM radiation?
- Dylan16807 7y agoYou usually need an antenna, yes. Does that matter?
- chii 7y agoit matters because if the hardware is difficult and expensive to obtain, an attack can be costly, and hence, won't affect the common man. Industrial espionage or state level espionage hardly changes for the common man, and since most of the hardware in use is by the common man, it's unlikely to get a real fix.
- colechristensen 7y agoThere are demos of things being done with RTL-SDR dongles which cost less than a good lunch.
- ac29 7y agoEffective antennas are reasonably easy to build from scratch (depending on the frequency band), and are commercially available in an insane number of variations. Either way is very cheap - as little as a few dollars. Software defined radios can be had for as little as $10-20 for simple receive only types, up to several hundred for substantially nicer transceivers. They can also be $1000+ for special applications or R&D.
- dahfizz 7y agoIt makes attacks much more limited. You need physical access to whatever machine you're attacking, versus being able to distribute code to millions of machines at once over the internet. That matters a ton.
- colechristensen 7y agoWell "special hardware to detect EM radiation" is most often software-defined radios like HackRF or BladeRF among others down to TV reception dongles you can get for a few dollars (search for RTL-SDR)
- mycall 7y agoI look forward to the day when SDRs are inside smartphones.
- colechristensen 7y agoThey probably already are just hidden behind closed source firmware
- h2odragon 7y ago>technology and techniques for extracting information from EM radiation Whats known to the public, you mean. I suspect even the nuttier conspiracy theorists don't have a solid grasp of just what capabilities might exist among well funded secret institutions.
- colechristensen 7y agoThere have been many demos at security conferences of doing these kinds of things, "simple" things like key logging from a laptop with only a nearby radio.
- nyolfen 7y agohow about extracting pgp keys with a smart phone microphone from 6 feet away? https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf
- mrmuagi 7y ago> Figure 4. A mobile phone (Samsung Note II) is placed 30 cm from a target laptop. Less impressive than 6 feet, but still impressive.
- msds 7y agoI was unaware that there were high-speed digital circuits that weren't also radios.
- colechristensen 7y agoJust ones that people have particularly strong feelings about being radios
- jiveturkey 7y ago> This is a kind of obvious variant of Rowhammer, which hasn't generally been fixed AFAIK. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer#Mitigation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer#Mitigation
- Dylan16807 7y ago"optional hardware support" "some manufacturers" I think "hasn't generally been fixed" is a fair assessment. TRR is so cheap to implement and should have been made mandatory, with generous safety margins.
- mrmondo 7y ago“RAMBleed has been demonstrated on devices with DDR3 memory chips, and Rowhammer's bit flipping on DDR4 components. DDR4 supports a defensive technique called Targeted Row Refresh, but its efficacy is uncertain. "Given the closed-source nature by which TRR is implemented, it is difficult for the security community to evaluate its effectiveness," said Kwong. "While bit flips have been demonstrated on TRR before, the extent to which TRR mitigates RAMBleed remains an open question." https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/06/11/rambleed_rowhammer_attack/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/06/11/rambleed_rowhammer_...
- Dylan16807 7y ago> While bit flips have been demonstrated on TRR before Yeah but when I chase down references all I can find is one saying that rowhammer was possible on a Pixel phone, in turn referencing a paper that doesn't have the word 'pixel' in it. No study about how TRR effects the difficulty, or whether TRR was set up correctly. I want a chart showing bit flip difficulty vs. TRR aggressiveness. Because you can set TRR to be very aggressive with almost no performance impact on non-malicious workloads.
- bumblebritches5 7y agoIntel hardware, not AMD.