8 ms·
I shall repeat it like a mantra: voting beeing slow inefficient is a side effect of it’s transparency. You want a voting system were a average voting helper can
by atoav 8y ago
I shall repeat it like a mantra: voting beeing slow inefficient is a side effect of it’s transparency. You want a voting system were a average voting helper can look at it and say: “There was nothing fishy there, I saw it”. This is because it is about trust and not only about secrecy and security.
Your electronic voting system can be mathematically perfect, but if nobody average can say from the outside that everything is going by the rules and it makes sense, then it is worthless.
This is why paper works so well: it takes not much skill to count it, it has to have a physical place (harder to make it vanish) and everybody can have their eyeballs glued to it, and if something fishy is going on, it is harder to hide from the average voting helper.
Even I as a programmer with some crypto knowledge would never be able to fully gurantee for the integrity of a voting system, because who knows what software version is running out there in the wild, and whom I have to trust on that one.
Paper has no software version and errors in the process can (and are) catched more easily.
Electronic voting is good for decision were power is not involved, or where the outcome doesn’t really matter. I’d rather improve what we have instead of replacing it with a mathematical sound blackbox that everybody can with perfectly rational reasons distrust when the vote went into the wrong direction.
- sideshowb 8y agoEven a mathematically perfect voting system could be substituted in entirety. Replace the whole damn thing with your own one in an identical case running system.out.println("my favourite candidate wins! ");
- Strilanc 8y agoThe correctness of cryptographic voting systems is determined by their publicly observable behavior, not by their internal implementation. It's the protocol that's secure, not the specific hardware or software implementation. So the attack you're describing doesn't really apply.
- pauljurczak 8y ago"publicly observable behavior" is a bit of a misnomer - general public can indeed observe ElectionGuard in action, but it will not know what it sees. Fortunately, Microsoft advocates using paper ballots as a backup.
- sideshowb 8y agoCool, thanks for correcting me there
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- yorwba 8y agoHaving a cryptographically secure voting protocol doesn't protect you if the human-computer interface is compromised to alter the votes as they are being entered into the system. You get a code to verify that "your" vote was counted correctly, but because you're not supposed to be able to prove who you voted for to prevent vote-buying, you can't tell that the voting machine has slipped you the wrong code. It may not be an admissible attack in the model within which protocols are proven secure, but it's still an attack that could affect real-world systems.
- useerup 8y agoHomomorphic cryptography allows you to track your vote without revealing the vote content (who you votes for), but at the same time vote tallying is possible on the encrypted votes in a process that is verifiable. Of course the trust only comes with understanding of the mathematics.
- codedokode 8y agoBut you cannot observe it. You see that someone with a hash X has voted. How do you know whether it was a real person, a real person voting under boss supervision, a real person who actually didn't take part in elections, or just sysadmin inserting records into the database?
- couchand 8y agoThat question applies equally to a paper ballot.
- kazagistar 8y agoWatch person enter booth with fresh ballot, watch person leave booth with filled ballot, and check to see that person doesn't take pictures of their ballot. Seems pretty clear they voted and their vote can't be influenced.
- couchand 8y agoThough the article is light on details, it does seem to provide for an identical level of verification. I'm more than happy to be corrected if I'm missing something, but it sure sounds like they are proposing an effectively identical verification scheme.
- Faark 8y ago- You see the number of records aggregated, it should not exceed the amount of voters - You can somehow identify your own vote and thus verify it was properly counted - Everyone else can do the same, thus fraudsters would have to find a protocol weakness to add additional votes One attack vector might be whatever you use to identify your vote. Aka find a way to make two people think the same record is their own vote, then use the other yourself. This seems like a tricky problem, since everyone shouldn't just be able to see their own vote was included but also not not be able to show others how you voted. The article seems to indicate they solved this somehow, but I'm not familiar enough with the details / homomorphic encryption to understand that or even just trust that specific kind of encryption.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- YokoZar 8y agoThis isn't an electronic voting system. It's a system for verifiable receipts that attach to paper systems. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.
- jakeogh 8y agoIt's digital tabulation, AKA electronic voting. This is the most common type of attempt to subvert paper voting. The paper becomes the "recount" which is often challenged in court. See? The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count.
- YokoZar 8y ago>The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count. The whole point of this scheme is to provide strong evidence for when the numbers won't match. This is an advantage over existing optical scan systems, where a recount requires watching every single paper ballot go into the reader.
- jakeogh 8y agoOptical scan is electronic voting. Gaming optical scan machines was one of the first demonstrated hacks. Hand counted paper ballots.
- dunkelheit 8y agoRight, but I don't think we should glamorize old-style paper voting either. Yes, it is easier for an observer to spot that something fishy is going on, but it is also easy for authorities to dismiss it as insubstantial. Someone obstructed your view of the ballot box for a few seconds? Sorry, that was an accident. Police evicted you from the poll station? Better behave yourself next time. You saw a blatant incident of fraud and you have hard evidence? Well sure, local officials went a bit over the line, we'll cancel the results of that particular poll station. Our candidate still wins. My impression from fraud reports from Russian elections is that most fraud occured at the local level (where no one was able to precisely quantify it) and from the point the data was inserted into the centralized database everything was squeaky clean. So maybe some kind of a centralized panopticon surveillance system that the FAAMG are so fond of is just the right fit for elections.
- codedokode 8y ago> most fraud occured at the local level If it was something that was done at local level, not in conspiracy with central government, then why the investigations in cases of election fraud are so ineffective, and even if the case gets to the court, it typically ends with just a fine? If the central government didn't have relation to the fraud, they would prefer to punish local officials, yet they try to avoid doing it. Instead, they warn heads of regions that the results of election in their region might affect their evaluation. Regarding things you have described, they are possible with electronic voting as well. Hashes not matching? You probably made a mistake, verify again, our experts say that everything is correct. Also, for an average person, seeing a video recording with officials throwing a pack of ballots into the box is easier to understand than some difficult calculations with hashes.
- dunkelheit 8y ago> If it was something that was done at local level, not in conspiracy with central government, then why the investigations in cases of election fraud are so ineffective, and even if the case gets to the court, it typically ends with just a fine? If the central government didn't have relation to the fraud, they would prefer to punish local officials, yet they try to avoid doing it. Instead, they warn heads of regions that the results of election in their region might affect their evaluation. Maybe I misunderstood your phrasing but that's precisely what enables large-scale fraud. High-ranking officials can maintain plausible deniability by outsourcing fraud to the local level and doing nothing overt themselves. If low-level officials are caught, they suffer token punishment because some semblance of rule of law must be maintained (but punishment cannot be too strict because they were doing what they were supposed to do). > Regarding things you have described, they are possible with electronic voting as well. Hashes not matching? You probably made a mistake, verify again, our experts say that everything is correct. Right, but if you have evidence that say 10% of votes are tainted, it is something worth fighting for and going to the streets for. Whereas if all you have is a recording of a handful of ballots thrown into a box at some poll station in rural Yakutia, well who cares about a few 100s of ballots? You can try to string a few of these videos together to provoke an emotional reaction but it will subside quickly as public attention will be redirected to the next outrage du jour.
- openfuture 8y agoThis is why reproducible (even better; deterministic) builds matter.
- DSingularity 8y agoPaper ballots are vulnerable to systemic voter suppression of the kind that’s hard to eliminate. Voter ID laws. Complicated ballots. Overloaded polling stations. Worst, all these weaknesses are difficult to eliminate because they are both difficult to sincerely debate and difficult to generate the public interest necessary to generate enough activism. Electronic voting can reduce the friction enough to where we can address these issues with common-sense approaches.
- atoav 8y agoThese are mostly solved problems in all western nations (except for the US). E.g. I am Austrian living in Germany and I vote by mail since a decade. Mail voting has the downside that it invites the kind of problems where some guy tricks elderly people into giving them their vote etc. But all in all it works quite well.
- C1sc0cat 8y agoAKA Granny Farming - which is a downside to postal voting which should be limited to those that need it medical reasons troops aboard etc
- jonwachob91 8y ago>>> These are mostly solved problems in all western nations (except for the US). E.g. I am Austrian living in Germany and I vote by mail since a decade. The US has had vote-by-mail for as long as I can remember [0]... So what is an example of a "mostly solved problems in all western nations (except for the US)" other than an example that you posted that is inaccurate? I'm not arguing that we have solved all election problems, but it's unfair to say we haven't solved something and share a solution that your country has that our country has too. Maybe Austria does something different with their vote-by-mail system than what the US does, if so please share what that is. [0]https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/for-voters/voting/vote-by-mail/ https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/for-voters/voting/vote-b...
- elliekelly 8y ago
- gfiorav 8y agoAlso prevent uninterested, lazy, people from voting out of spite. I know it's unpopular to say, but I don't think it's a bad thing that voting requires personal (strictly personal; no corporation should get in your way) effort.
- ccffph 8y agoI agree. I never understood the notion of same-day registration, nor the constant blasting of voting reminders for months before the midterms. Do we really want people who have to be extremely convinced to vote, to vote? Do we really want people who didn't care at all, got convinced by one team the day of, and decided to vote on a whim, to vote? Thus, are the votes from people who had to be reminded on twitter and google to vote, "real" votes? Or were they gamed?
- gfiorav 8y agoYeah... all the talk of emotion-driven-politics makes me dizzy. Politics should be boring (if everything is ok)
- kazagistar 8y agoBecause the amount of spare effort people have available is correlated to class, and thus adding more hoops to jump through is yet another way to favor the idle rich over the working poor. But I also don't see why the first sentence is inherently bad. Why is it good to police what type of people may vote? Why is it good to police the reason for voting?
- gfiorav 8y agoI just feel that spiteful voting is damaging and a recent abuse of the confidence in the voter to do what’s right for 4 years.
- jonathanstrange 8y agoElectronic voting is the classical solution to a nonexistent problem. Just so the results of voting can be displayed on TV a bit earlier, we are supposed to accept substantial risks to democracy posed by blatantly insecure endpoints, blatantly insecure company infrastructure, insecure network communications and devices (routers, etc.), private companies that often have a track record of insecure and sloppy programming, voting machines that have been shown to be hackable easily (people from CCC and similar groups do that routinely when they get hold of a machine), voting program code that has been improperly audited and/or cannot be verified by the public, flawed patching mechanisms, flawed and insecure operating systems of voting machines, and on and so forth. The list of flaws of electronic voting systems is nearly endless, and, what's worse, there is no mathematical proof that the encryption used in those systems cannot be broken. (There are lots of proofs in cryptography, but almost all of them are based on very strong idealizing assumptions. In the end, only OTPs are provably secure. We do not even have a proof that P!=NP yet.)
- reallydude 8y ago> Electronic voting is the classical solution to a nonexistent problem. That is incorrect. Voting is a feedback loop for the will of the voters. The slower the process is, the less representative it is. The fidelity of the loop is paramount, but the issue remains. EDIT: do the downvoters understand that there is setup involved in a paper process and getting results is not the end of the feedback loop (not race)? SMH
- arethuza 8y ago"The slower the process is, the less representative it is" If we are talking about months perhaps, but as long as a result is known within a day or two (at most) I'm not sure it really makes that much difference.
- gjm11 8y agoSurely the relevant feedback-loop time is the interval between elections, not how long it takes for votes to be counted.
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- 3xblah 8y agoWent to a conference in 1993 or thereabouts, put on by a now defunct organization called "CPSR" (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility). I rememeber Phil Zimmerman was a speaker. Anyway, one of the topics was the problem of electronic voting. About 10 years later... Underhanded V Contest http://graphics.stanford.edu/~danielrh/vote/vote.html http://graphics.stanford.edu/~danielrh/vote/vote.html (If I remember correctly, the "Underhanded C Contest" came later.) http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/soft/vote.c http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/soft/vote.c Now, a Microsoft SDK with a catchy name, "Defending Democracy". What next?
- alexandercrohde 8y agoHas anybody even read the article? Jesus. Your comment is a complete non-sequiter. There are two ENTIRELY UNRELATED questions. One question is "cryptographic verification." One is "Paper/electronic" You can have any combination. You can have a crypographical, verifiable, PAPER voting system, for example (and that's what this article is about).
- laughinghan 8y agoDid you read the comment you're replying to? Its whole point is that lay people don't understand sophisticated cryptography like homomorphic encryption, which makes it difficult to trust, whereas they do understand and trust paper. A cryptographic paper voting system that required advanced math to understand would have the same legitimacy problem as a cryptographic electronic voting system.
- PyroLagus 8y ago> A cryptographic paper voting system that required advanced math to understand would have the same legitimacy problem as a cryptographic electronic voting system. No, because it'll still be counted manually by humans. What the cryptographic layer allows you to do is verify that your vote was properly counted or allow a trusted third-party to verify that for you. It doesn't take anything away from the paper voting system but only adds to it. That said, you'd still have to trust the device that generates your tracker, but maybe they've found a way to deal with that.