10 ms·

Doomed Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Boeing Sold as Extras

86 points by edward 8y ago

PaulHoule 8y ago
If it is a 737, the airline isn't buying any extras for comfort, even though they might give it a fancy paint job. (e.g. it's like putting a padded seat on a torture rack)
- lm28469 8y ago
  s/comfort/safety
  - Kuraj 8y ago
    Please write your comments in a manner understood by everyone
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
    - stordoff 8y ago
      s/x/y is common syntax: > A related habit uses editor commands to signify corrections to previous text. This custom faded in email as more mailers got good editing capabilities, only to take on new life on IRCs and other line-based chat systems. [...] The s/Erik/Eric/ says “change Erik to Eric in the preceding”. This syntax is borrowed from the Unix editing tools ed and sed, but is widely recognized by non-Unix hackers as well. http://catb.org/jargon/html/writing-style.html http://catb.org/jargon/html/writing-style.html
    - cdelsolar 8y ago
      Everyone on this forum understands sed, otherwise they wouldn't be on "Hacker News".
- tyingq 8y ago
  Not sure what you mean here. There are airlines with business class in a 737, and there's also the BBJ. Aircraft owners are free to choose how crowded the seats are on any aircraft.
  - PaulHoule 8y ago
    You aren't going to be all that comfortable in business class if the airplane has a circular fuselage that squeezes you in the vertical direction. The 737 is a classic story of undercompetition and underinvestment. The design goes back to the 1958 era 707, and it feels tiny on the outside even though it is big on the inside. The Embraer 195 is much smaller than the 737 but it feels more like the 767 inside because it is designed with the human physique in mind. Boeing was shocked by what it cost to develop the 787, but had it given the same treatment to the 737 it would have been able to recoup the costs more quickly because so many 737s get made. Also since the 737 is so common in the sky anyone who is concerned about climate change, noise, or any other environmental effects of air travel would see the 737 as a priority. Ten years ago you could take a widebody from NYC to LAX. Today if you fly, you wind up on a 737 or an A320 which is basically the same thing. For me it is a reason to stay home, drive, or take the bus.
    - tyingq 8y ago
      I think that's a reasonable point for the 737/A320 coach window seat. That egg shape of the Embraer hull does afford more room. It seems negligible for 737 business class though, since the seat is quite wide.
cube00 8y ago
Scary parallels with the way Tesla is selling software updates to enable features. Let's hope consumers don't have to choose which safety features they can afford in the future.
- Yver 8y ago
  For a long time, ABS and airbags were as extras as well. The difference is that a consumer shopping for a car can decide how much safety they want to pay for, while air travelers have no idea how safe the plane they are going to board is.
  - heavenlyblue 8y ago
    Look: ABS and airbags cost a considerable percentage of the car's total price. An AOA difference indicator price is negligible compared to the total cost of an aircraft.
    - blakesterz 8y ago
      I don't disagree with you on the point here, but how much do the breaks and bags cost? I did a quick search and it seems like the total for all the parts that make up a car is about just over 1/2 of the cost of buying a car. I know replacing an airbag is super expensive. Do the manufacturers pay that much for a new one when they're building the vehicles? I'm more curious than anything.
      - VLM 8y ago
        Air bags are extremely cheap, like the cost of a (typical, not extreme) car stereo. The designers generally don't care what happens to the rest of the car after deployment, so expect a broken windshield, various broken dashboard components, destroyed steering wheel components, HVAC system cracked (ducts, freon lines, vacuum lines, and water lines), broken wires of various kinds... Even if the air conditioner evaporator coil wasn't cracked, for example, the sheer labor cost of having to disassemble and inspect the entire interior of the car is very expensive for labor. Technically yes you can replace an airbag in about an hour, then you discover there's no turn signals and at next inspection/registration you discover there's no working horn, etc etc it adds up.
stanski 8y ago
To be fair, I don't think the "disagree" light would've helped those pilots any. Knowing that the AoA sensors disagreed isn't going to help them troubleshoot a system they are not aware exists. It's just one more warning to troubleshoot while fighting the aircraft. If anything, it's MCAS that needs to be heeding the AoA readings disagreement. Instead it's more than happy to only rely on the reading of one of the sensors.
- lallysingh 8y ago
  Or, you know, train the pilots. Boeing is trying to get the blame off their backs. It can go to the airlines now.
  - Someone1234 8y ago
    MCAS wasn't in the training materials provided to airlines. Even some US pilots have complained that they had no knowledge of it before the Lion Air crash.
    - lallysingh 8y ago
      I didn't know that the materials weren't provided. How do they add a new system and not provide training materials?!?!
      - deleted 8y ago
        [deleted]
      - danso 8y ago
        Because part of the advertised appeal of the MAX was that it would not require new training, despite a different aerodynamic profile: > Since MCAS was supposed to activate only in extreme circumstances far outside the normal flight envelope, Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system — and indeed that they didn’t even need to know about it. It was not mentioned in their flight manuals. > That stance allowed the new jet to earn a common “type rating” with existing 737 models, allowing airlines to minimize training of pilots moving to the MAX. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
VBprogrammer 8y ago
An angle of attack sensor is loosely equivalent to a G-meter in a car. Calling it a safety device is a bit of tabloid reporting. That said, given the sensors are used directly as input having a disagree light is a reasonable thing to expect.
- tyingq 8y ago
  It's standard equipment on new Cessna 172's and marketed as "Safe Flight", specifically called out as a way to avoid a stall, etc. When the industry says it's a safety thing, it's hard to blame a reporter.
  - VBprogrammer 8y ago
    Yeah, marketers aren't any better. If I was buying a new 172 I'd probably be more interested in a BRS (whole airframe parachute) than an AoA sensor. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/general-aviation/2016-12-30/cessna-adds-safe-flight-aoa-new-skyhawks%3Famp&ved=2ahUKEwil3Pvvo5PhAhUr2OAKHT7rDygQFjAAegQIAhAB&usg=AOvVaw2KnayYMbyI7efq78lKx9EK&ampcf=1 https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/general-aviation/201... Since these are twin engine aircraft, you could make many arguments about blue line speeds and balanced runway lengths but I'll take your point.
- Someone1234 8y ago
  > Calling it a safety device is a bit of tabloid reporting. It become a safety critical sensor as soon as flight inputs are directed as a result of its data. For example, bad data has now resulted in 346 deaths, if that isn't safety critical I don't know what the criterion would be.
  - VBprogrammer 8y ago
    To be blunt, hitting the ground at 300kts is what caused 346 deaths. There hasn't even been a preliminary report on the Ethiopian crash so we can't say with any certainty that the failure was the same. It is quite likely that the pilots were overwhelmed with warnings (e.g. stick shaker activation) and conflicting data. It's not clear that presenting yet more conflicting data would have averted the disasters. Limiting the authority of the MCAS system is likely to be the real fix.
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]
OliverJones 8y ago
Well, they tried to fix an airframe stability problem (caused by fitting larger/heavier engines to an existing airframe platform) with a fly-by-wire solution. Kinda like if you or I could rent an 18-wheeler truck with a promise that it "drives just like a car." One wonders: Did outside air temperature or weight-and-balance issues figure in to these crashes? Hotter=less lift. Weight too far aft=nose up tendency.
- VLM 8y ago
  An accurate analogy, although a better HN automobile analogy in the sense of more accessible to the general public would be trying to drive SUVs like cars results in rollover accidents. Its an error of regulation to permit a ridiculously safety critical real world physical system to digitally emulate a historical virtual system to save training money. Its a perfectly good aircraft on its own; it just has intentionally hacked and modified controllers to fake being another plane, and those hacked and modified controls unfortunately kill hundreds of people. Given the merger of government and aerospace its going to be a huge dysfunctional fight where neither side can back down and admit they need to change things. My guess is for purely political reasons both sides will admit guilt, although its obviously completely a government failure. On the other hand, as per the recent VW Diesel situation, if the government implements stupid regulations that are followed to the letter resulting in predictably dumb outcomes, the government accepted no blame and the company was attacked. There are strong indications going both directions which will make this interesting to watch.
  - treis 8y ago
    >An accurate analogy, although a better HN automobile analogy in the sense of more accessible to the general public would be trying to drive SUVs like cars results in rollover accidents. That analogy implies that the pilots were trying to fly the plane in a way that it couldn't handle. A better analogy would be a safety mechanism on the SUV that prevents drivers from turning too sharply and rolling over. The crashes are caused by that system incorrectly measuring the turn rate, forcing the car to drive straight, and have it run off the road. Really, there's nothing wrong with the MCAS system in theory. Plenty of planes require computer controlled inputs to fly safely. The problem is in the execution. The base model lacks redundancy and pilots weren't trained well enough to handle the system malfunctioning. And in the case of the Lion Air crash a poor safety culture. Honestly, the problem is probably already solved at this point. Correcting the issue that caused the crashes is simply flipping a switch. The issue is identifying what's causing the control issues to know which switch to flip. Every pilot should be hyper aware of the potential issue and they'll be able to easily diagnose and fix in flight issues.
ocdtrekkie 8y ago
It's comforting knowing the airline I usually fly on bought both options. I wonder if we could mandate these options being public and who ordered what, so that airlines are more hesitant to leave them out? Reminds me so much of the car market though. Adding a $3 thermistor is "automatic temperature control" and requires a trim level that costs $1,400 more.
nyeormex 8y ago
In the software update that Boeing says is coming soon, MCAS will be modified to take readings from both sensors. If there is a meaningful disagreement between the readings, MCAS will be disabled. How was MCAS rolled out and certified flight-ready when it did not rely on readings from both sensors? This breaks a cardinal law of airplane safety -- always have redundancy.
- Someone1234 8y ago
  Because MCAS wasn't originally proposed as having enough authority to make dangerous flight inputs. It was allowed by that standard. Then Boeing increased how much authority the system had to pass a different part of certification without telling the FAA. > “The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.” [...] > The discrepancy over this number is magnified by another element in the System Safety Analysis: The limit of the system’s authority to move the tail applies each time MCAS is triggered. And it can be triggered multiple times, as it was on the Lion Air flight. I'd suggest reading the full article/context: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
  - nyeormex 8y ago
    Interesting, thanks for this.
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
DailyHN 8y ago
> A United spokesman said the airline does not include the features because its pilots use other data to fly the plane.
ajnin 8y ago
> Boeing charges extra, for example, for a backup fire extinguisher in the cargo hold. Past incidents have shown that a single extinguishing system may not be enough to put out flames that spread rapidly through the plane. Well that's something that is not comforting to read. Charging extra for comfier seats, I can understand, but charging extra for features that might be the difference between life and death for 100+ persons, that's just sick and criminal in my mind.
- cja 8y ago
  Road vehicle manufacturers also charge extra for safety features.
  - jsiepkes 8y ago
    Where to begin? 1) That doesn't make it acceptable 2) My car doesn't fit 200 people 3) I can smash a window and jump out of my car if it is on fire.
  - Cyph0n 8y ago
    I also find that extremely strange, but maybe I'm in the minority. I think Toyota has safety features standard in all trims. Regardless, the safety requirements in planes are much more stringent than in road vehicles.
  - RankingMember 8y ago
    The person who will be occupying the vehicle gets to make those decisions. Unless you're buying your own 737, you don't get to make that choice.
  - samueloph 8y ago
    why is it becoming a trend to make idiot analogies that are clearly useless as an argument (because they aren't the same thing) here in hackernews?!
- veryworried 8y ago
  What’s more criminal is not buying the extra safety features. Creating safety features, while important, is not free. Someone has to pay for it, no matter how many lives they save. Hard to fault Boeing there. It’s like side air bags in cars. Some have them, some don’t, but if you want them you will pay an extra 2 grand as each airbag unit is easily a grand each, and must be replaced completely if it ever deploys. If you buy your teenager a car you can decide if you will pay extra for those safety features.
baxtr 8y ago
I am sure that some pricing and bundling consultancy has made a "good" job here.
mnm1 8y ago
I'm sure if Boeing had correctly described the lack of these features as potentially crashing the airplane, these airlines would have bought them. As it is, hundreds of people had to die because Boeing wanted to make a little extra cash selling essential, potentially life saving features as add-ons. If that's not criminal, I don't know what is. Of course, I would bet money that no one is held responsible for this, as usual. We probably won't even get a canned apology. This airplane design should be grounded permanently. If Boeing is willing to let hundreds die by making critical systems optional, who knows what other issues the plane has that will kill even more people? There should also be an investigating into how this plane was certified, as clearly regulators failed to do their job and check Boeing's greed. The CEO and people at Boeing responsible for this plane should face criminal charges as well as anybody in the regulatory bodies who decided to certify this plane buying Boeing's claims that it was just another 737 when that is not the case. Without criminal charges, Boeing and other companies are going to continue to play with people's lives to make a few extra bucks.
ethagknight 8y ago
(Woof, sorry for the long comment) A little thought experiment, and I want to be clear, its apparent Boeing screwed up big time, but I also expect my airline to make every effort to incorporate all safety features. Since it’s a bit of an ethical gray area where cutting edge or expensive safety features are knowingly foregone, I haven’t seen the fact discussed concerning these airlines’ culpability for choosing to acquire aircraft without safety features to save money (aka, to make more money), just like Boeing marks up the cost of these features to make money. I realize that the AoA disagree is a safety feature that would have informed pilot of a bad Boeing design, but are there other sensors and features that could have been offered by Boeing, but aren’t available or aren’t purchased for similar reasons. If it was an option on the order sheet, and they had technical consulting to assist with specificying the plane, then they made an active decision not to beef up on safety. I’m sure there are better examples that have a higher probability of improving safety, but for some fun examples, where are the massive, inflatable, roofmounted airfoils that inflate like big airbag parachutes in the event of an impending crash. What about 5 pt harnesses for all passenger? Where are the uniformed armed security squad on every flight to deter hostage situations? What about full situational awareness mesh network radar comms a la the F-35? What about no carryons allowed in the cabin to reduce flammability and airborne objects during crashes? Each of these things offers a potential, incrementally-increasing level of safety for passengers, that are not taken up by the market. For an analogy, If my cabby didn’t buy curtain airbags from the Ford, and I get my head smashed in a wreck caused by a malfunctioning component elsewhere in the car, doesn’t the cab company still have some culpability for skimping in passenger safety? If not in that scenario, what about a poor level of maintenance (but still technically compliant) of the vehicle? At some point, for contracts of carriage, it’s up to the carrier to establish an expected, acceptable level of safety for its customers. Again, it sounds like Boeing bears the lead blame, and it wasn’t clear the features as sold offered valuable data to the pilot in the event of an emergency, but I also expect my airline/carrier to provide as much safety is commercially reasonable. Just like when reviewing legal contracts or lines of code, if a line item is added with no obvious reason for existing, one must ask “why is this item here?”
foldr 8y ago
https://youtu.be/UAvuZsflglw?t=8382 https://youtu.be/UAvuZsflglw?t=8382
mizchief2 8y ago
Why is the story that Boeing sold them as extras instead of the airlines not buying the option?

86 points by edward 8y ago

If it is a 737, the airline isn't buying any extras for comfort, even though they might give it a fancy paint job. (e.g. it's like putting a padded seat on a torture rack)

lm28469 8y ago
s/comfort/safety
- Kuraj 8y ago
  Please write your comments in a manner understood by everyone
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]
  - stordoff 8y ago
    s/x/y is common syntax: > A related habit uses editor commands to signify corrections to previous text. This custom faded in email as more mailers got good editing capabilities, only to take on new life on IRCs and other line-based chat systems. [...] The s/Erik/Eric/ says “change Erik to Eric in the preceding”. This syntax is borrowed from the Unix editing tools ed and sed, but is widely recognized by non-Unix hackers as well. http://catb.org/jargon/html/writing-style.html http://catb.org/jargon/html/writing-style.html
  - cdelsolar 8y ago
    Everyone on this forum understands sed, otherwise they wouldn't be on "Hacker News".
tyingq 8y ago
Not sure what you mean here. There are airlines with business class in a 737, and there's also the BBJ. Aircraft owners are free to choose how crowded the seats are on any aircraft.
- PaulHoule 8y ago
  You aren't going to be all that comfortable in business class if the airplane has a circular fuselage that squeezes you in the vertical direction. The 737 is a classic story of undercompetition and underinvestment. The design goes back to the 1958 era 707, and it feels tiny on the outside even though it is big on the inside. The Embraer 195 is much smaller than the 737 but it feels more like the 767 inside because it is designed with the human physique in mind. Boeing was shocked by what it cost to develop the 787, but had it given the same treatment to the 737 it would have been able to recoup the costs more quickly because so many 737s get made. Also since the 737 is so common in the sky anyone who is concerned about climate change, noise, or any other environmental effects of air travel would see the 737 as a priority. Ten years ago you could take a widebody from NYC to LAX. Today if you fly, you wind up on a 737 or an A320 which is basically the same thing. For me it is a reason to stay home, drive, or take the bus.
  - tyingq 8y ago
    I think that's a reasonable point for the 737/A320 coach window seat. That egg shape of the Embraer hull does afford more room. It seems negligible for 737 business class though, since the seat is quite wide.

cube00 8y ago

Scary parallels with the way Tesla is selling software updates to enable features. Let's hope consumers don't have to choose which safety features they can afford in the future.

Yver 8y ago
For a long time, ABS and airbags were as extras as well. The difference is that a consumer shopping for a car can decide how much safety they want to pay for, while air travelers have no idea how safe the plane they are going to board is.
- heavenlyblue 8y ago
  Look: ABS and airbags cost a considerable percentage of the car's total price. An AOA difference indicator price is negligible compared to the total cost of an aircraft.
  - blakesterz 8y ago
    I don't disagree with you on the point here, but how much do the breaks and bags cost? I did a quick search and it seems like the total for all the parts that make up a car is about just over 1/2 of the cost of buying a car. I know replacing an airbag is super expensive. Do the manufacturers pay that much for a new one when they're building the vehicles? I'm more curious than anything.
    - VLM 8y ago
      Air bags are extremely cheap, like the cost of a (typical, not extreme) car stereo. The designers generally don't care what happens to the rest of the car after deployment, so expect a broken windshield, various broken dashboard components, destroyed steering wheel components, HVAC system cracked (ducts, freon lines, vacuum lines, and water lines), broken wires of various kinds... Even if the air conditioner evaporator coil wasn't cracked, for example, the sheer labor cost of having to disassemble and inspect the entire interior of the car is very expensive for labor. Technically yes you can replace an airbag in about an hour, then you discover there's no turn signals and at next inspection/registration you discover there's no working horn, etc etc it adds up.

stanski 8y ago

To be fair, I don't think the "disagree" light would've helped those pilots any. Knowing that the AoA sensors disagreed isn't going to help them troubleshoot a system they are not aware exists. It's just one more warning to troubleshoot while fighting the aircraft. If anything, it's MCAS that needs to be heeding the AoA readings disagreement. Instead it's more than happy to only rely on the reading of one of the sensors.

lallysingh 8y ago
Or, you know, train the pilots. Boeing is trying to get the blame off their backs. It can go to the airlines now.
- Someone1234 8y ago
  MCAS wasn't in the training materials provided to airlines. Even some US pilots have complained that they had no knowledge of it before the Lion Air crash.
  - lallysingh 8y ago
    I didn't know that the materials weren't provided. How do they add a new system and not provide training materials?!?!
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
    - danso 8y ago
      Because part of the advertised appeal of the MAX was that it would not require new training, despite a different aerodynamic profile: > Since MCAS was supposed to activate only in extreme circumstances far outside the normal flight envelope, Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system — and indeed that they didn’t even need to know about it. It was not mentioned in their flight manuals. > That stance allowed the new jet to earn a common “type rating” with existing 737 models, allowing airlines to minimize training of pilots moving to the MAX. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...

VBprogrammer 8y ago

An angle of attack sensor is loosely equivalent to a G-meter in a car. Calling it a safety device is a bit of tabloid reporting. That said, given the sensors are used directly as input having a disagree light is a reasonable thing to expect.

tyingq 8y ago
It's standard equipment on new Cessna 172's and marketed as "Safe Flight", specifically called out as a way to avoid a stall, etc. When the industry says it's a safety thing, it's hard to blame a reporter.
- VBprogrammer 8y ago
  Yeah, marketers aren't any better. If I was buying a new 172 I'd probably be more interested in a BRS (whole airframe parachute) than an AoA sensor. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/general-aviation/2016-12-30/cessna-adds-safe-flight-aoa-new-skyhawks%3Famp&ved=2ahUKEwil3Pvvo5PhAhUr2OAKHT7rDygQFjAAegQIAhAB&usg=AOvVaw2KnayYMbyI7efq78lKx9EK&ampcf=1 https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/general-aviation/201... Since these are twin engine aircraft, you could make many arguments about blue line speeds and balanced runway lengths but I'll take your point.
Someone1234 8y ago
> Calling it a safety device is a bit of tabloid reporting. It become a safety critical sensor as soon as flight inputs are directed as a result of its data. For example, bad data has now resulted in 346 deaths, if that isn't safety critical I don't know what the criterion would be.
- VBprogrammer 8y ago
  To be blunt, hitting the ground at 300kts is what caused 346 deaths. There hasn't even been a preliminary report on the Ethiopian crash so we can't say with any certainty that the failure was the same. It is quite likely that the pilots were overwhelmed with warnings (e.g. stick shaker activation) and conflicting data. It's not clear that presenting yet more conflicting data would have averted the disasters. Limiting the authority of the MCAS system is likely to be the real fix.

deleted 8y ago

[deleted]

OliverJones 8y ago

Well, they tried to fix an airframe stability problem (caused by fitting larger/heavier engines to an existing airframe platform) with a fly-by-wire solution. Kinda like if you or I could rent an 18-wheeler truck with a promise that it "drives just like a car." One wonders: Did outside air temperature or weight-and-balance issues figure in to these crashes? Hotter=less lift. Weight too far aft=nose up tendency.

VLM 8y ago
An accurate analogy, although a better HN automobile analogy in the sense of more accessible to the general public would be trying to drive SUVs like cars results in rollover accidents. Its an error of regulation to permit a ridiculously safety critical real world physical system to digitally emulate a historical virtual system to save training money. Its a perfectly good aircraft on its own; it just has intentionally hacked and modified controllers to fake being another plane, and those hacked and modified controls unfortunately kill hundreds of people. Given the merger of government and aerospace its going to be a huge dysfunctional fight where neither side can back down and admit they need to change things. My guess is for purely political reasons both sides will admit guilt, although its obviously completely a government failure. On the other hand, as per the recent VW Diesel situation, if the government implements stupid regulations that are followed to the letter resulting in predictably dumb outcomes, the government accepted no blame and the company was attacked. There are strong indications going both directions which will make this interesting to watch.
- treis 8y ago
  >An accurate analogy, although a better HN automobile analogy in the sense of more accessible to the general public would be trying to drive SUVs like cars results in rollover accidents. That analogy implies that the pilots were trying to fly the plane in a way that it couldn't handle. A better analogy would be a safety mechanism on the SUV that prevents drivers from turning too sharply and rolling over. The crashes are caused by that system incorrectly measuring the turn rate, forcing the car to drive straight, and have it run off the road. Really, there's nothing wrong with the MCAS system in theory. Plenty of planes require computer controlled inputs to fly safely. The problem is in the execution. The base model lacks redundancy and pilots weren't trained well enough to handle the system malfunctioning. And in the case of the Lion Air crash a poor safety culture. Honestly, the problem is probably already solved at this point. Correcting the issue that caused the crashes is simply flipping a switch. The issue is identifying what's causing the control issues to know which switch to flip. Every pilot should be hyper aware of the potential issue and they'll be able to easily diagnose and fix in flight issues.

ocdtrekkie 8y ago

It's comforting knowing the airline I usually fly on bought both options. I wonder if we could mandate these options being public and who ordered what, so that airlines are more hesitant to leave them out? Reminds me so much of the car market though. Adding a $3 thermistor is "automatic temperature control" and requires a trim level that costs $1,400 more.

nyeormex 8y ago

In the software update that Boeing says is coming soon, MCAS will be modified to take readings from both sensors. If there is a meaningful disagreement between the readings, MCAS will be disabled. How was MCAS rolled out and certified flight-ready when it did not rely on readings from both sensors? This breaks a cardinal law of airplane safety -- always have redundancy.

Someone1234 8y ago
Because MCAS wasn't originally proposed as having enough authority to make dangerous flight inputs. It was allowed by that standard. Then Boeing increased how much authority the system had to pass a different part of certification without telling the FAA. > “The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.” [...] > The discrepancy over this number is magnified by another element in the System Safety Analysis: The limit of the system’s authority to move the tail applies each time MCAS is triggered. And it can be triggered multiple times, as it was on the Lion Air flight. I'd suggest reading the full article/context: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
- nyeormex 8y ago
  Interesting, thanks for this.
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]

DailyHN 8y ago

> A United spokesman said the airline does not include the features because its pilots use other data to fly the plane.

ajnin 8y ago

> Boeing charges extra, for example, for a backup fire extinguisher in the cargo hold. Past incidents have shown that a single extinguishing system may not be enough to put out flames that spread rapidly through the plane. Well that's something that is not comforting to read. Charging extra for comfier seats, I can understand, but charging extra for features that might be the difference between life and death for 100+ persons, that's just sick and criminal in my mind.

cja 8y ago
Road vehicle manufacturers also charge extra for safety features.
- jsiepkes 8y ago
  Where to begin? 1) That doesn't make it acceptable 2) My car doesn't fit 200 people 3) I can smash a window and jump out of my car if it is on fire.
- Cyph0n 8y ago
  I also find that extremely strange, but maybe I'm in the minority. I think Toyota has safety features standard in all trims. Regardless, the safety requirements in planes are much more stringent than in road vehicles.
- RankingMember 8y ago
  The person who will be occupying the vehicle gets to make those decisions. Unless you're buying your own 737, you don't get to make that choice.
- samueloph 8y ago
  why is it becoming a trend to make idiot analogies that are clearly useless as an argument (because they aren't the same thing) here in hackernews?!
veryworried 8y ago
What’s more criminal is not buying the extra safety features. Creating safety features, while important, is not free. Someone has to pay for it, no matter how many lives they save. Hard to fault Boeing there. It’s like side air bags in cars. Some have them, some don’t, but if you want them you will pay an extra 2 grand as each airbag unit is easily a grand each, and must be replaced completely if it ever deploys. If you buy your teenager a car you can decide if you will pay extra for those safety features.

baxtr 8y ago

I am sure that some pricing and bundling consultancy has made a "good" job here.

mnm1 8y ago

I'm sure if Boeing had correctly described the lack of these features as potentially crashing the airplane, these airlines would have bought them. As it is, hundreds of people had to die because Boeing wanted to make a little extra cash selling essential, potentially life saving features as add-ons. If that's not criminal, I don't know what is. Of course, I would bet money that no one is held responsible for this, as usual. We probably won't even get a canned apology. This airplane design should be grounded permanently. If Boeing is willing to let hundreds die by making critical systems optional, who knows what other issues the plane has that will kill even more people? There should also be an investigating into how this plane was certified, as clearly regulators failed to do their job and check Boeing's greed. The CEO and people at Boeing responsible for this plane should face criminal charges as well as anybody in the regulatory bodies who decided to certify this plane buying Boeing's claims that it was just another 737 when that is not the case. Without criminal charges, Boeing and other companies are going to continue to play with people's lives to make a few extra bucks.

ethagknight 8y ago

(Woof, sorry for the long comment) A little thought experiment, and I want to be clear, its apparent Boeing screwed up big time, but I also expect my airline to make every effort to incorporate all safety features. Since it’s a bit of an ethical gray area where cutting edge or expensive safety features are knowingly foregone, I haven’t seen the fact discussed concerning these airlines’ culpability for choosing to acquire aircraft without safety features to save money (aka, to make more money), just like Boeing marks up the cost of these features to make money. I realize that the AoA disagree is a safety feature that would have informed pilot of a bad Boeing design, but are there other sensors and features that could have been offered by Boeing, but aren’t available or aren’t purchased for similar reasons. If it was an option on the order sheet, and they had technical consulting to assist with specificying the plane, then they made an active decision not to beef up on safety. I’m sure there are better examples that have a higher probability of improving safety, but for some fun examples, where are the massive, inflatable, roofmounted airfoils that inflate like big airbag parachutes in the event of an impending crash. What about 5 pt harnesses for all passenger? Where are the uniformed armed security squad on every flight to deter hostage situations? What about full situational awareness mesh network radar comms a la the F-35? What about no carryons allowed in the cabin to reduce flammability and airborne objects during crashes? Each of these things offers a potential, incrementally-increasing level of safety for passengers, that are not taken up by the market. For an analogy, If my cabby didn’t buy curtain airbags from the Ford, and I get my head smashed in a wreck caused by a malfunctioning component elsewhere in the car, doesn’t the cab company still have some culpability for skimping in passenger safety? If not in that scenario, what about a poor level of maintenance (but still technically compliant) of the vehicle? At some point, for contracts of carriage, it’s up to the carrier to establish an expected, acceptable level of safety for its customers. Again, it sounds like Boeing bears the lead blame, and it wasn’t clear the features as sold offered valuable data to the pilot in the event of an emergency, but I also expect my airline/carrier to provide as much safety is commercially reasonable. Just like when reviewing legal contracts or lines of code, if a line item is added with no obvious reason for existing, one must ask “why is this item here?”

foldr 8y ago

https://youtu.be/UAvuZsflglw?t=8382 https://youtu.be/UAvuZsflglw?t=8382

mizchief2 8y ago

Why is the story that Boeing sold them as extras instead of the airlines not buying the option?