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Can Boeing Trust Pilots?
- everdev 8y ago> What’s critical to the current, mostly uninformed discussion is that the 737 MAX system is not triply redundant. In other words, it can be expected to fail more frequently than one in a billion flights, which is the certification standard for flight critical systems and structures. How was the plane delivered if it didn't pass certification?
- _eht 8y agoDolla dolla bills y’all
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- ams6110 8y agoIt's grandfathered under the original 737 type certificate from the 1960s. The aircraft would not meet today's certification requirements as a new type
- JauntyHatAngle 8y agoAs someone with limited knowledge into airplane engineering/certifications, on the surface that seems wrong. I understand (I think) that they made changes to make it essentially handle and act like the 737 therefore it can apply to the same certificate, but surely there should be some kind of time restriction on a certificate applying to new models - even ones that are "similar". Can someone illuminate me as to why this does or does not make sense?
- tyingq 8y agoBoils down to money. A brand new type certificate for a big passenger jet is in the hundreds of millions of dollars in time and money. Therefore you can justify spending quite a lot on lobbying (actual and metaphorical) to get away with reusing one. Edit: And the airlines will lobby on your behalf too. They don't want to have to certify pilots on a new type, or have yet another split of who can fly what.
- snowwrestler 8y agoThe FAA reviewed the 737 Max 8 following the Lion Air crash and decided to allow it to keep flying. Now obviously they could have made the wrong decision there, but the idea that this plane is somehow skating by with no oversight via a technicality just does not pass the smell test. Edit to add: The 737 Max Wikipedia page details the testing that the Max variant underwent, and links to the 737 type certificate—which devotes 38 pages to the 737-8. Also: > Boeing announced on February 16, 2018 that the 737 MAX 9 has received an amended type certificate (ATC) from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), officially certifying the airplane for commercial service. > This certification marks the culmination of a successful flight test program that began in March 2017 with two Boeing flight test airplanes. The FAA certification affirms that the airplane’s handling, systems and overall performance all comply with required aviation regulations. https://worldairlinenews.com/2018/02/16/boeing-737-max-9-awarded-faa-certification/ https://worldairlinenews.com/2018/02/16/boeing-737-max-9-awa...
- sn41 8y agoThis has been mentioned in the discussions - the "Red Flag" comment : "The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag'.[1] " What happened, I think, is deceptive naming - a fairly different model was given the name of a safe plane. I think this would have simplified and lessened the certification requirements for the new model. The other models of 737 are among the safest in the world. [1] https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/boeing-737-max-banned-pilots-concerns-a8820496.html https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/boeing-...
- skybrian 8y agoI think this is a misunderstanding. He's not saying the plane didn't pass certification. The standard he's referencing is for "flight critical" things that the pilot can't compensate for or do without.
- lisper 8y agoSomething about this piece doesn't smell right. The author claims to be a pilot with 45 years of experience, writing in a publication that bills itself as "by pilots, for pilots", but I'm a pilot (with 23 years of experience) and I've never before heard a pilot refer to the yoke as "the wheel". ("If you don’t believe me, sit in a Bonanza A36 or Cessna 210, or just about any other high-performance piston airplane, and pull the wheel back while sitting still on the ramp.") I'm also very skeptical of his thesis that these accidents were pilot error, that there is nothing different about the Max 8 than any previous generation of the 737. The 737 in general has an excellent safety record. The Max 8 has had two crashes within two years of its introduction. The odds of that just being a coincidence are pretty damn low. So I can't help but wonder if this guy is a shill. Maybe the question we should be asking is: can pilots trust Boeing?
- Shank 8y agoFrom [this source], "McClellan has logged more than 10,000 hours as pilot-in-command, flying everything from a 1946 Cessna 140, his first airplane, to the Cessna 162 SkyCatcher and virtually all general aviation airplanes that have been in production over the past 30 years. He holds an ATP certificate for multi engine airplanes with type ratings in several business jets, has a commercial certificate for helicopters, and is a CFI-I." [this source]: https://www.aviationpros.com/home/press-release/10393553/mac-mcclellan-joins-eaa https://www.aviationpros.com/home/press-release/10393553/mac...
- tyingq 8y agoAnd the Cessna 140 has a yoke that looks like a (oblong) wheel. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a9/1946_Cessna_140_Interior.JPG/220px-1946_Cessna_140_Interior.JPG https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a9/19...
- frutiger 8y ago> The odds of that just being a coincidence are pretty damn low. To the statisticians of HN: I am genuinely curious. What are the odds of that? Do we model it as Poisson?
- larkinrichards 8y agoI don’t believe this author understands the issue here. His description of the force feedback on the wheel is not correct. The automatic trim adjustment from the MCAS would not be detected if the pilot is trimmed in and at neutral stick. They may detect the pitch change and pull up/retrim for level flight, which disables the MCAS temporarily and gives the impression that trim is under control.
- mannykannot 8y agoThe author does not say say that MCAS works as a stick pusher, and does not describe it as if it did. He writes "When the AOA reaches a point without enough stall margin, the system adds some nose-down pitch trim. That pitches the nose down and gives the pilot the stick force to know that he is pulling too close to the stall margin" [my emphasis.] Given that the trim operates by changing the angle of incidence of the stabilizer, and apparently only provides feedback at the yoke through the aerodynamic consequences of the trim change, is that inaccurate is some way? Maybe the threshold is as much one of stability margin as stall margin, but that's not significant with respect to the issue here.
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- gjhan 8y agoThe author understands the issue fine and their description is correct. MCAS is a trim-and-feel system that exists to satisfy the stick force gradient requirements of 14 CFR 25.143 [1] within a relatively normal flight envelope. A stick pusher is a stall warning/prevention device that exists to satisfy 14 CFR 25.207 and 25.103, and which doesn't activate in a normal flight envelope. [1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.143 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.143
- anoncoward111 8y agoDoes it have any choice? The official FAA incidents log has US pilots stating that the MAX is different to fly from normal 737s... ...and using their own words, is "unsafe!" to fly without additional training. It is unsafe to fly a plane with different layout and handling.
- cryptonector 8y agoDid you read TFA?
- tuna-piano 8y agoAssuming the author is correct, and the reaction to the MCAS issues is a simple reaction that every pilot should know by memory: Is it really acceptable that once every 3 months a 737-Max will attempt a nose dive and require a vigilant pilot who can identify and correct the issue before the plane crashes into the ground? And this likely happened at least twice, while there were 300 MAXs in service. If there were 3,000 MAXs in service, MCAS misfires would presumably be happening 3x a month worldwide - each misfire requiring a proper pilot reaction. How can you defend Boeing in that case?
- anoncoward111 8y agoYou can't morally, but Boeing will pay shill pilots top dollar to attempt a defense. You can leave your ethics and pride at the door, like it seems this "pilot" has. I always reiterate-- this isn't about red team vs blue team, this is about preventing people from dying. I don't see any GM buses trying to ram full throttle into oncoming traffic against all driver input
- tyingq 8y agoCurious if you're really suggesting Boeing paid this guy to write the post, or just frustrated with people saying there's not an aircraft issue. I don't agree with the article either, fwiw, but I suspect it's just his unpaid opinion.
- projektfu 8y agoI’ve learned you don’t need to pay people tit for tat. People natively reward kindness with kindness. Five years back Boeing May have given this writer a number of unnoticeable freebies every other pilot has access to and this pilot feels like part of the tribe.
- lagolinguini 8y agoI feel like this is a strong argument for the airbus alpha protection. And I think Boeing agrees with that given the way the 777 fly by wire system is designed. There are plenty of people (on this site and on reddit) who jump on to criticize airbus for the way it puts the aircraft's computer systems ahead of the pilots and claim that the 737's flight controls are preferable to pilots because the pilots have full control. I don't want to spark any airbus vs boeing debate, but I want to point out these accidents seem to discredit that line of thinking.
- ilaksh 8y agoIt seems like FBW is the way to go and that this particular subsystem was tacked on and not adequately tested and the overall subsystem missing redundancy. Main problem is greedy executives trying to pass it off as a normal 737 when it was completely different. So some executives at Boeing and the FAA should go to prison. MCAS needs another layer of redundancy and whole thing needs to be entirely retested and certified under a new type.
- ryantgtg 8y agoAm I the only one who immediately stops reading when a writer says, "let me explain"? I was totally going to let you explain. After all, I'm reading your article and I intended to read more than just the first paragraph. But your sudden insistence that I just give you a few more minutes to explain your provocative argument presumes too much about what I'm thinking. And it's over-used. And it's an annoying tone.
- amluto 8y agoHere’s what I don’t get about this whole situation: AIUI 737 MAX has an instability such that, in near stall conditions, some attempts to recover can make the stall worse. To mitigate this, Boeing added MCAS, and MCAS can malfunction with a single sensor failure. Imagine that this failure occurs and the pilot successfully turns off MCAS but ends up in a dive, too close to the ground, or otherwise in a bad situation. Now the pilot has to recover, but they are facing a faulty AoA indicator (if they have one at all) as well as a plane that, because MCAS is off, is unstable in near-stall conditions. And the pilot has never been trained in the handling of type 737 MAX under these conditions. Am I wrong for some reason, or is this a potentially rather dangerous situation that could be caused by a single instrument failure?
- neom 8y agoYou're not wrong by my estimation. If a function provided to recover from a stall activated at low altitude, regardless of flight control at < 5k ft, I'm not a pilot but depending on how aggressive the MCAS was, I can't imagine recovery would be easy.
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- theobeers 8y agoI found this article informative on several points, and the conclusion is correct ("I am sure the future belongs to FBW"), but it sets up a test that has already been failed. Can Boeing trust pilots? Well, if that's how he wants to put it, then no, evidently they cannot. We're talking about two crashes in a short period, in which hundreds of people died. There's a kind of tautology here.
- snowwrestler 8y agoOf course we can’t trust pilots, that why airliners have at least two of them, and check lists for everything, and all sorts of warnings, etc. We just had a truly historic near-miss where a crew lined up to land on a crowded taxiway at SFO instead the runway. If they had not gone around at the last second we would be talking about it as the most deadly accident in aviation history. Fly by wire was not going to prevent that; the descending aircraft was an Airbus A320. Whether fly by wire makes pilots more trustworthy—that’s a good question. But I think the author is addressing a subtly different question, which is: what seems more trustworthy to people? People like: the public and politicians. Is it still acceptable to say “the human, despite its flaws, still belongs in the critical path of safety.” Or, is the reputation of computers so strong now that all planes will have to work that way to satisfy modern notions of what is safe?
- salawat 8y agoThe sad thing is that more than anything else, this is starting to veer into the realm of a philosophical question: Who is more eeliable, the instrument, or the instrument user? A machine can only be guaranteed to function on information it has. Same with the human being behind the yoke. The human by far has the greatest capacity as the only General Intelligence in the room, but technically, that GI's performance is limited by it's access to accurate information regarding the functionality of the tool he is using.
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