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Some context: 1. There have been 865 737 related ASRS reports since 1/1/2018 2. I don't know how to quickly separate out 737-MAX reports from the non 737-MAX

• dpwm 8y ago
  regex? I just grepped "B737 max" and found 11 entries. "737.{0,20}max" (case insensitive) yields 20. [0] [0] CSV output: https://pastebin.com/87N023cx https://pastebin.com/87N023cx
  • dajohnson89 8y ago
    So 20 MAX-related issues out of ~850. How is that significant?
    • siwatanejo 8y ago
      we're talking about a plane model that is only 2 years old?
      • ams6110 8y ago
        Yes and no. The basic 737 design dates to the 1950s. The first ones flew in the 1960s. The 737 Max is an augmented version of the original.
        • siwatanejo 8y ago
          Right, I'm (we're) obviously talking about 737MAX
          • privong 8y ago
            > Right, I'm (we're) obviously talking about 737MAX I think @ams6110 is saying that it may not be fair to identify the 737MAX as a completely new plane, since the 737MAX can be identified as more of an evolution of the 737 rather than a new, from-scratch plane design.
            • siwatanejo 8y ago
              And that is bullshit. As long as you're not just changing the resolution of the seat's screens, it's a completely different model, for all intents and purposes.
    • ggm 8y ago
      We'd need some meta analysis of the rate of issues for other plane types by release date to track the declining exponential curve of bugs to legacy. "all new systems have bugs. this may not be unusual"
      • inferiorhuman 8y ago
        I don't think anything else has been pushed as far as the 737. The closest are probably the De Havilland DHC-8 and the Douglas DC-9/MD-80/MD-90/717, and maybe the DC-10/MD-11. The The Q400 had some pretty serious landing gear issues, the MD-11 was notoriously tricky to land, the MD-80 had that undocumented auto throttle issue, and the MD-90 had those extra flaps next to the engines.
    • privong 8y ago
      > So 20 MAX-related issues out of ~850. How is that significant? To build on what @ggm and @siwatanejo noted. The 737 debuted in 1967, so it is 52 years old now. The 737 MAX is 2 years old. In terms of number of issues per year since the aircraft was introduced the 737 is at ~15 incidents per year and the 737 MAX is at ~10/year. But as @ggm notes, it's important to look at when in the life cycle many of the non-MAX 737 incidents occurred. Another way to look at this is by number of aircraft produced. The Boeing website[0] gives production numbers for various classes of the 737. In terms of incidence per number of aircraft delivered the non-max 737s have 0.082 incidents per delivered aircraft while the 737 MAX has 0.05 incidents per delivered aircraft. Both of those suggest that the 737 MAX may not be any worse than the non-max 737s, but a more careful statistical analysis is probably necessary to draw strong conclusions. [0] http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/displaystandardreport.cfm?cboCurrentModel=737&optReportType=AllModels&cboAllModel=737&ViewReportF=View+Report http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/displaystandardre...
      • ansy 8y ago
        I’d look at incidents per flight hour. Some of those 737s have been in the air for decades. I suspect the numbers for the 737 MAX will stand out more on this analysis.
        • close04 8y ago
          It’s also worth noting that the MAX should benefit from 5 decades of accumulated experience and regulation. So you’d expect far lower incidents. The problem might not be with the plane per se but rather with Boeing rushing a bit and relying on the fact that “it basically the same plane but better so why would there be issues”.
      • dajohnson89 8y ago
        So then why did I get downvoted so hard?
        • ezconnect 8y ago
          You don't seem to know how to do math
  • tarabanga 8y ago
    searching for mcas and its long form might do as well.
• tuna-piano 8y ago
  Some other MAX reports: 1583028: B737 MAX-8 Captain reported the engine fuel burn was higher than expected. Maintenance confirms that several 737-MAXs are burning fuel faster than expected. 1593699: ATIS sheet fell through the slot forward of the center pedestal and the blank off plate. We had Maintenance come out to remove it. We discovered 20 other ATIS sheets mixed into the wiring. The aircraft is only six months old. Severe potential fire hazard! 1538699: B737 MAX pilots reported flying through the final approach course and descending below published altitudes due to confusion with the new style instrument displays.
  • jrockway 8y ago
    1593699 is amazing.
    • selectodude 8y ago
      Probably southwest pilots. If it’s not analog it’s too much for them.
      • iforgotpassword 8y ago
        Well this shit doesn't sound any better: 1565207 At cruise flight, our Wi-Fi stopped working. I then saw that I was unable to access the Pilot Mobile app. Since I do not routinely copy the flight plan to iBook or acrobat (we are not required to do this), I was unable to access the flight plan. I've lost Wi-Fi before but not had this problem. Maybe it's a 737max thing. My First Officer had a copy on iBook and airdropped it to me. Later we were able to restore the Wi-Fi and I could login to pilot mobile but the [flight plan] was not there anymore. It's time we make radio with the ATC VoIP. Just run an asterisk on the plane.
        • NikolaNovak 8y ago
          Boggles the mind on several levels: 1. That airlines would use consumer tablets without hard-copy backup as matter of procedure. I remember Air Canada announcing it and how it would save so much weight for both pilots and the airplane, and thinking... I print my Google Maps as a backup for roadtrips, I sure as heck would do it on a flight! 2. Perhaps I'm misjudging, but the tone and perspective of pilot makes me worry for their approach and technical skills. Does not routinely copy to local device before takeoff? "Maybe it's a 737max thing"? Airdropping as a solution? This does not smell off setting up for success... :<
• jashkenas 8y ago
  Great links! Here are the three 737-related ASRS reports that mention MCAS: ACN: 1597286 "Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure, we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing, however, no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively." ACN: 1597380 "It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested, great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg, normal Ops Brief, plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues, bulletin, MCAS, stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat. Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle, temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft, no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+. Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!" I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now, I would generally assume it was my automation error, i.e., aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles, crossing restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one). With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on "descending" was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue." ACN: 1593017 "The recently released 737 MAX8 Emergency Airworthiness Directive directs pilots how to deal with a known issue, but it does nothing to address the systems issues with the AOA system. MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems. The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation. This description is not currently in the 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor the Boeing FCOM, though it will be added to them soon. This communication highlights that an entire system is not described in our Flight Manual. This system is now the subject of an AD. I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models. The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag. Now we know the systems employed are error prone--even if the pilots aren't sure what those systems are, what redundancies are in place, and failure modes. I am left to wonder: what else don't I know? The Flight Manual is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient. All airlines that operate the MAX must insist that Boeing incorporate ALL systems in their manuals."
• mannykannot 8y ago
  Thanks for the documents! I searched through item 1 for 'trim', and while I found some trim failure reports, and the complaint about Boeing's nondisclosure of MCAS in its documentation, I did not notice any concerns over disabling a runaway trim situation.
  • tuna-piano 8y ago
    Not sure what that means though. As far as I am aware (totally a layperson), there have been potentially only 3 potential 737-MAX MCAS trim issue occurrences: 1. The Lion Air flight prior to the fatal lion air flight 2. The Lion air flight which crashed 3. The Ethiopian flight which crashed Of course I don't think any of those 3 are absolutely confirmed, but I do think it seems likely the three had MCAS trim related issues. If the success rate for pilots dealing with this issue just 1 in 3, does that say anything regarding the MCAS issue difficulty/complexity or the skill/training of pilots?
    • mannykannot 8y ago
      From the article's title, one might get the impression that pilots have been saying that MCAS is dangerous. What I was trying to do was distinguish between possible MCAS incidents and safety concerns, complaints about Boeing's nondisclosure of MCAS, and pitch-down incidents that had other causes (incidents of the last case seem to be related to the autopilot, rather than MCAS.) The latest crash certainly looks suspicious, but we don't really know yet, and the Lion Air crash occurred before the details about how MCAS could behave on sensor failure had been revealed. One would certainly hope that after this was revealed, all Max-8 pilots would be well prepared to recognize the situation and handle it, which might suggest that there is something more (or different) about this case (which could be worse news for Boeing).
      • acqq 8y ago
        > One would certainly hope that after this was revealed, all Max-8 pilots would be well prepared to recognize the situation and handle it Far from certain, becaus Boeing is selling and the companies indeed treat it as "the same plane like old" even if it obviously isn't: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19374386 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19374386
• ehsankia 8y ago
  It would be ironic if the lack of 737-MAX category for reports is why these reports never made it to the people who needed to see them, which caused the issue to go unnoticed.
  • azernik 8y ago
    Yet another way in which Boeing's marketing/regulatory insistence that the MAX was the same type as the 737 caused safety problems.
  • dpwm 8y ago
    1555013 is pretty damning in telling how the airlines treated the MAX as the same type as the 737-800: "I had my first flight on the Max [to] ZZZ1. We found out we were scheduled to fly the aircraft on the way to the airport in the limo. We had a little time [to] review the essentials in the car. Otherwise we would have walked onto the plane cold.My post flight evaluation is that we lacked the knowledge to operate the aircraft in all weather and aircraft states safely. The instrumentation is completely different - My scan was degraded, slow and labored having had no experience w/ the new ND (Navigation Display) and ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) presentations/format or functions (manipulation between the screens and systems pages were not provided in training materials. If they were, I had no recollection of that material). We were unable to navigate to systems pages and lacked the knowledge of what systems information was available to us in the different phases of flight. Our weather radar competency was inadequate to safely navigate significant weather on that dark and stormy night. These are just a few issues that were not addressed in our training. I recommend the following to help crews w/ their introductory flight on the Max:Email notification the day before the flight (the email should include: Links - Training Video, PSOB and QRG and all relevant updates/FAQ's)SME (Subject Matter Expert) Observer - the role of the SME is to introduce systems navigation, display management, answer general questions and provide standardized best practices to the next generation aircraft.Additionally, the SME will collect de-identified data to provide to the training department for analysis and dissemination to the line pilots regarding FAQs and know systems differences as well best practices in fly the new model aircraft." [EDIT] Fixed ACN Number
    • 8y ago