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So what's the argument from the other side? Going through all this effort to allow PFS to be disabled seems like a ton of work? What's their use-case?
by Spivak 8y ago
So what's the argument from the other side? Going through all this effort to allow PFS to be disabled seems like a ton of work? What's their use-case?
- bryanlarsen 8y agoBanks are required by regulation to monitor & audit pretty much everything. Previously they did this for internet usage by using MITM proxies. TLS 1.3 makes that approach hard/impossible.
- snek 8y agoWhy can't they just install their own self signed root ca on all their computers and continue MITM it?
- yfiapo 8y agoCertificate pinning is used by some very common applications and can break a MITM that relies on a self-signed certificate.
- goda90 8y agoAre those common applications necessary for their business operations though? They could just blacklist them entirely.
- vetrom 8y agobesides, many of those applications depin when you install custom CAs, don't they?
- Legogris 8y agoDo you have any example of such applications that would be used by a bank?
- yfiapo 8y agoI don't work for a bank so I can't speak definitively to their applications. A few sample applications I see listed as certificate pinned in Netskope (a CASB) though include: Adobe Creative Cloud Amazon Work Spaces Docusign GitHub Google Drive GoToMeeting iCloud Microsoft Office 365 Outlook.com Microsoft Skype for Business Salesforce.com Note this typically refers to native applications and plugins which also connect over TLS and not web applications.
- Legogris 8y agoMy suspicion was that any such applications have a web version. I'm a bit surprised by Skype for Business (horrible product BTW, it's a gamble to even be able to sign in on a fresh install) though, the rest I would expect people to use web versions of. I would think that (perhaps coincidentally), the organizations that require these kinds of insights are not the ones that are relying on services that do cert pinning. And if they do, they can but the marketing department/the server running THAT wonky old software from the 90s in a separate subnet.
- Dylan16807 8y agoIsn't that exactly the same between TLS 1.2 and 1.3? They won't have the private keys for google drive. How are those handled today?
- JoshTriplett 8y agoThen those applications are correctly getting the behavior they desire: either they get a secure connection or they don't connect at all.
- hsk0823 8y agoThere's a whole IT market segment around TLS decryption for corporate LAN. Basically corporate MITM that will decrypt TLS at the gateway / firewall, and with currently used TLS standards, will then re encrypt the traffic back to the client so the browser thinks it has a legit connection. It's used to scan packets for intrusion detection, for malware, to track for data loss like the article talks about.
- throwaway2016a 8y agoAll of those require your computer to trust a new Certificate Authority or you will get warnings all over the place. If there is a company that claims to be able to do it without trusting the CA or producing warnings I would love to see it. (seriously, I actually would love to see that). And if you are in a corporate environment using a company computer you forfeit your privacy anyway. You can always go somewhere else or do your banking and Facebook on a different machine / not on company time.
- tonyarkles 8y agoCorrect re: the root cert in my experience at least. They usually get pushed out as part of a Group Policy in Active Directory.
- KingMachiavelli 8y agoWhy? If you have the private key you can decrypt TLS traffic if forward secrecy is off. Which is why forward secrecy exists, to prevent captured encrypted sessions form being decrypted out-of-band with, presumably, comprimised private keys. The issue is that TLS 1.3 deprecates the key exchange that makes this possible, essentially making (perfect) forward secrecy a requirement since the only inlcuded ciphers do so. The only way to monitor/inspect TLS traffic in this situation is to MITM the traffic rather than simply record encrypted sessions.
- dcbadacd 8y agoIt's deceptive to call out-of-band MITM not MITM, it's still MITM just covert. TLSv1.3 forcing it to become glaringly obvious is exactly what should be happening.
- kevin_b_er 8y agoBreaking the security of HTTPS for surveillance and monitoring purposes. The BITS group is formally opposed to secure communications because they want to make it easier to MITM attack the secure communication. They want to make it easier to decrypt communication.
- cbsmith 8y ago...and they want that for transparency, not for nefarious reasons.
- JoshTriplett 8y agoMITMing TLS outside the endpoints is inherently nefarious, whether they think it is or not. If you want to compromise the endpoint, compromise the endpoint. Install your own MITM certificates and terminate the connection in the middle, or install client-side malware. Either way, there should always be a giant warning sign on the client that end-to-end security is compromised.
- cbsmith 8y agoThey don't want to compromise the endpoint. They want to ensure they have a record of all communications to and from the endpoint.
- funkymike 8y agoIn order to implement ETS they already have to compromise the endpoint to make the TLS 1.3 implementation use static keys, right?
- cbsmith 8y agoYeah, but it's a means to an end, not the end. The assumptions that TLS 1.3 is based around are in direct conflict with the requirements of the secure environment they operate in. This isn't some evil thing... a cryptographic protocol is a part of a trusted system, and whether it is appropriate for a particular context has to do with the design of the trusted system.
- yfiapo 8y agoThe other side of the argument is frequently discounted and as an IT security person myself I understand that. However, there is a real challenge for companies who deal with large amounts of very sensitive data. To be able to effectively monitor for data loss it makes a lot of sense to be able to monitor the connection points between your protected network and outside networks. The move to all traffic being encrypted and uninspectable breaks this paradigm. You can cover some of the same concern by implementing an agent on every connected computing device but this brings much greater complexity as you are monitoring potentially hundreds to thousands more places and still have to worry if you have complete coverage. Consider an analogy of going through international customs. Do you employ customs officials at the border who are allowed to sample and inspect private belongings to verify laws are being followed? Or do you employ an official to help pack the belongings of each individual who you think may eventually cross the border? The second example is a bit stretched but hopefully illustrates the scale problem.
- Spivak 8y agoBut since every device needs to trust your CA aren't you forced to pack their belongings in either case?
- yfiapo 8y agoHmm, I'm straining my own analogy already so I won't try to beat that horse any deader. :-) I am mostly trying to argue the positives of centralized inspection at network chokepoints in simplicity and guarantee of coverage.
- dcbadacd 8y ago> Or do you employ an official to help pack the belongings of each individual who you think may eventually cross the border? Without telling the person who's things were packed that they were packed by the official.
- Legogris 8y agoI assume that organizations deploying this make it clear to employees that the network and computer equipment is intended for professional use.
- rocqua 8y agoIf your stance is: No opaque data leaves my network Then this is the only way you can have outbound HTTPS connections. And for e.g. a bank, certain legal firms, or any company that has a lot of sensitive data they either don't want to be leaked, or at least want the option of detecting when it is leaked, that is a somewhat reasonable stance. In the case of banks, this is needed for regulatory compliance regarding insider trading. For legal companies, I imagine this is about ensuring certain confidentiality. I could see the same thing for companies dealing with trade-secrets. The statement 'Just log it on the end-points' presumes complete access to those end-points and all software running on them. This method is considered better than terminating TLS early at a proxy and setting up a separate tunnel to the clients because breaking PFS is passive, rather than active. Thus it is a lot less resource intensive, a lot less vulnerable (no internet facing box that, if broken, has all communication in plaintext), and introduces no extra latency. It is essentially a 'better' way to do an authorized MitM on everything on your network, and some companies want this authorized MitM. Like any authorized MitM, it introduces a third party who can compromise security, which is not generally desirable, but some companies don't mind being that third party to their own employees.
- tinus_hn 8y agoIt’s a pipe dream. The webpage or application can easily include its own encryption that can’t be broken by these proxies. If your stance is ‘no opaque data leaves my network’ your only option is an air gap.
- acdha 8y agoEngineering is all about making trade-offs (“perfect is the enemy of the good and all”) and security engineering is no different. The same logic could be used to say that you don't need an edge firewall because each client should have one but it's much easier to simplify the baseline. If nothing else, it would make the remaining traffic stand out more since you wouldn't be spending time auditing normal apps which decode cleanly and it's highly likely that someone trying to circumvent such a system would be required to do things which stand out more than routine usage. As a simple example, an organization which does that kind of monitoring is unlikely to allow users to install arbitrary applications or visit any site on the web. With a standard setup, someone trying to exfiltrate data could just hit a popular site like Github, Gmail, Dropbox, etc. but if they need to use some custom encryption or steganography code they're either forced to install it somewhere far less common (i.e. more likely to stand out) or installing something locally where client monitoring can report an unusual browser extension or application.
- marios 8y agoCorporate environments where "endpoint solutions" snoop through all traffic to detect malware activity. While I understand the use case, I would not support it. What I find unacceptable is, assuming the article is correct, that ETSI is asking NIST to recommend their crippled TLS in their new guidelines rather than TLS1.3. Disabling PFS and thus enabling the decryption of all TLS sessions should be a conscious decision rather than something that was there 'by default' (and could easily be abused).