7 ms·

I'm worried about this development. One the one hand, ubiquitous encryption is simply required for security on the internet. Things like lets encrypt and warni

by rocqua 8y ago

I'm worried about this development. One the one hand, ubiquitous encryption is simply required for security on the internet. Things like lets encrypt and warning on http are great improvements. On the other hand, the owner of a network has some right to look into the packets on that network. Especially if the owner of the network also owns the end-points of that traffic. My main use-case here isn't corporate networks, snooping there makes me uncomfortable. Really, my issue is stuff on my own network. I want to see what my TV sends home. Same with an amazon-echo, or really any IoT thing. Yet, if they all use SSL and don't allow me to add a root CA, I can't look at what they run. A user has no control over an amazon echo. You can't modify the software because the bootloader is locked down. You can't inspect the traffic because it is SSL cert-pinned. Amazon can push updates to it at any time. All a user gets to do is decide whether it is turned on, and whether it gets a network connection. Really, what I would want to see is the option to install a CA cert on any device I own. At the same time, that is a terrible idea. Every 14 year old with google is going to find some stack-overflow answer that'll tell them to MitM their TV to do some simple thing.

k__ 8y ago
While I understand your point of view, I think the plausible deniability network owners get frees them from much risk and burocracy.
- rocqua 8y ago
  To be honest, I'm probably happy with the breaking of corporate blanket MitM-ing. It was never very effective because data exfiltration can be made very hard to detect. What worries me is that the full chain (Client-software -- Network -- Server-software) is totally opaque and immutable at the discretion of a vendor. That means we are left at the mercy of the vendors. I'm hoping for laws like 'Right to Repair' to help with this. The alternative would be to go full Richard Stallman, and I still think that is too radical.
hsbaut76 8y ago
I share your worry about not being able to inspect communications for various apps and devices purely from a privacy advocacy perspective. If you own a device, and said device is transmitting data from your environment, you should be able to know what information this device is communicating. It is not enough to trust a company privacy policy.
ryukafalz 8y ago
The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; rather than weakening encryption to enable network owners to analyze traffic on their network (which also harms dissidents who need secure network access), I would prefer a push for more trustworthy devices. The devices we own should be acting in our own best interest; we shouldn't need to treat them as adversaries.
- rocqua 8y ago
  > The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Your point about dissidents needing secure access is a strong one. Any way to MitM a connection for audit purposes can be repurposed into an MitM for surveillance given enough coercion. However, I don't think this applies to a network connection between my TV and Samsung. Once a surveillor coerces me to give them access, I can disconnect my TV from the internet. The same goes for an amazon echo, or a juice press with WiFi. It is different with whatsapp, facebook and internet banking. These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent.
  - ryukafalz 8y ago
    >A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Sure, but you can also look at the device's communication if you have administrative access to it yourself, rather than trying to MITM it. I suppose this could be a vulnerability itself if done poorly, but users have administrative access to their PCs; why should other devices they own be any different? >These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent. If the user gives consent, they should be allowed to inspect the connection. The device's UI can make it _very clear_ that they're about to do something dangerous, but it's their device and should be their choice.
  - 8y ago
jmcqk6 8y ago
>Really, my issue is stuff on my own network. I want to see what my TV sends home. Same with an amazon-echo, or really any IoT thing. I'm with you 100%. The reality is, though, your only choice is to not run those devices with access to the internet. A TV should not require internet access to be usable. I won't use an Echo, and IoT devices are isolated to their own internal network without WAN access.
- diminoten 8y ago
  Your definition of a usable TV is outdated.
  - robohoe 8y ago
    Agreed. It's not even the TV that needs access to Internet. What if you have one of the Roku, Apple TV, Chromecast, etc devices that stream content from the Internet? Without those we might as well go back to storing content locally which let's face it - is mostly retrieved quasi-legally through BitTorrent.
    - jethro_tell 8y ago
      yeah, while that's true, a manufacture like amazon or apple is much more likely to update your device since they are still hoping to sell you content. You think your offbrand Smart TV is going to update past a couple bugs? They already made all the money they are going to make off that TV and they are done. Still have to trust the manufacture for that to work, but at lease you're not just left wide open there. (I mean you still could be, but it seems less likely with this model). And, if it doesn't stay up todate, you can toss the box and plug in a new one.
      - TeMPOraL 8y ago
        > You think your offbrand Smart TV is going to update past a couple bugs? They already made all the money they are going to make off that TV and they are done. Honestly, who cares? I mean, it's a TV. It should not need Internet to work, and it definitely shouldn't need software updates. Displaying video on a screen is a solved problem. The very fact you can use "software update" and "TV" in the same sentence signals a pretty big problem - a problem of companies selling you TV as a service, and customers accepting half-done pseudo-products.
jstanley 8y ago
> Really, my issue is stuff on my own network. I want to see what my TV sends home. Same with an amazon-echo, or really any IoT thing. Yet, if they all use SSL and don't allow me to add a root CA, I can't look at what they run. Which is part of why the more paranoid of us steadfastly refuse to own such devices.
- rocqua 8y ago
  I'm hoping for something like 'Right to Repair' or 'Right to Tinker' that'll let us verify more devices are trustworthy. My smart TV (I am ashamed to admit I have one) is really useful. Very little about the idea of a TV with build-in Plex support requires it be totally locked down. Hence it is a buisness decision that could be competed or regulated away. (I was going to make the same argument about a TV with build-in Netflix support, but I believe the DRM requirements of Netflix require quite a bit of lock-down)
  - logfromblammo 8y ago
    Some of us (for whom Charisma is not their dump stat) need to get elected to national legislative assemblies and form technology and engineering caucuses. Possible items for its agenda: - Right to Repair - Right to Tinker - Right to "Pwn Ur Own" - Hardware sellers required to deliver firmware source to buyers --- including build scripts --- including device-specific signing keys --- even for cars and tractors - Public APIs required for public-facing services - Right to non-backdoored strong encryption - Formal requirements for custodianship of PII - Formal requirements for security in IoT devices - Ban on local monopolies on wired telecoms - Definitions for terms used in advertising (i.e. "5G") - Establish a separate USPTO regime specifically for computer programs The lawyers of the Boomer generation that seem to be running the show now are not very well-suited to understand the near-future problems in the technology field. A lot of these problems are better solved by strongarming companies into behaving more eusocially than by attempting a technical solution or starting disruptive competitor businesses.
    - aaaaaaaaaab 8y ago
fouc 8y ago
What about an enterprise situation? Would a company allow devices that don't accept their root CA on the network? Are there enterprise versions of all these devices that we can buy instead?
- nradov 8y ago
  Most Internet connected consumer devices don't have separate enterprise versions. The usual approach for enterprises that care about security is to ban them (DHCP server won't issue an IP address and switch blocks all traffic), or segregate them onto a very limited virtual network.
rcarmo 8y ago
It's not just the Alexa-like and IoT devices, it's your entire home LAN that might be indirectly exposed. The last carrier I worked for was running trials of a "virtual CPE" that replaced your home gateway with a much dumber and cheaper device that effectively extended your home LAN to the local exchange (at least), where the actual isolation, filtering and NAT were performed. I switched home providers when I left there, and if my current provider ever goes the same route I'll drop my own firewall in front of my LAN. (Theoretically there is already relatively little isolation between your LAN and parts of the carrier network if you have VoIP or IPTV, but in this case I happen to know who tests that equipment and have a very good idea of what it really does, because I used to work in that team a long time ago...)
gnode 8y ago
> On the other hand, the owner of a network has some right to look into the packets on that network. I don't agree. If you let a guest use your WiFi network for instance, there's no inherent moral right for you to intercept their emails. However I generally agree with the principle that if you own a device, you have the right to learn what it's doing, and the trend towards black boxes is concerning.
- duckMuppet 8y ago
  You have no more right to learn what a particular device is doing than you have in intercepting emails of guests on Wi-Fi. You might have purchased a particular device, but you generally don't have the rights to the software or firmware that runs it. If you're truly concerned, you should support manufacturers that leave their system open by design, or support open source devices, and contact manufacturers describing your concerns. But the tradeoff wars of freedom v. security were lost long ago. The idea that one should shoulder any blame for choices is lost on a generation that needs YouTube videos to cut an onion. Likewise, a significant number of individuals can't be bothered to change their router password from 123456, and an even greater number of folks think the govt needs to regulate the internet to keep it fair and safe for everyone.. Forced encryption with no choice by design is a feature, not a bug. Use open source or
  - gnode 8y ago
    > but you generally don't have the rights to the software or firmware that runs it Legally this is correct in certain jurisdictions. But I'd say this is similar to arguing that you have no right to know the ingredients in food you buy.
  - rocqua 8y ago
    > You might have purchased a particular device, but you generally don't have the rights to the software or firmware that runs it. True, I don't have a right to see their source code. But decent laws shouldn't prevent me from reverse-engineering the code (DMCA is not a decent law). Moreover, access to code is orthogonal to control over devices one owns. If I own a device, I should be the one who has ultimate control over it.
diminoten 8y ago
You ostensibly have access to any private key being used to decrypt this traffic, assuming you have access to the device, which I believe is the correct boundary.
- ckocagil 8y ago
  With public key encryption? Very unlikely.
znpy 8y ago
"big companies" and big hardware producers in general would bake crypto in their stuff anyway.
api 8y ago
It is a bit of a double edge sword, but overall I think crypto is better. The best solution to the privacy problem is to do research and exercise consumer choice about what sorts of devices you purchase.
hrez 8y ago
Just wait for devices with 5G modem. They will skip your network control entirely.
amaccuish 8y ago
It's a major bugbear I have with Android. Now most apps don't by default respect CAs you've added, even via MDM. They get marked differently and can only be used by VPN, WiFi, ActiveSync, and apps that opt in to your custom certs.
est 8y ago
So it's perfect time to start a powered-by-community smart device. NLP and voice commands should work offline, without license issues, trained for private use, no constant connection bullshit.
ezoe 8y ago
That can't prevent a malicious device which act like harmless for the most time, but do evil thing on certain conditions are met. You may found the evidence of malicious act after it has happened, but often it's too late. If Amazon is directly responsible for Amazon Echo's malicious act, you can blame Amazon. But if the attacker was government spy agency, you're out of lack. Just don't use these devices which cannot be examined thus cannot be trusted.
romeisendcoming 8y ago
You have a choice. Boycott especially egregious offenders and packet filter and deny service to any suspicious device on _your_ home network. Years ago sticking these types of devices on a trusted home LAN would have been unthinkable.

by rocqua 8y ago

k__ 8y ago

While I understand your point of view, I think the plausible deniability network owners get frees them from much risk and burocracy.

rocqua 8y ago
To be honest, I'm probably happy with the breaking of corporate blanket MitM-ing. It was never very effective because data exfiltration can be made very hard to detect. What worries me is that the full chain (Client-software -- Network -- Server-software) is totally opaque and immutable at the discretion of a vendor. That means we are left at the mercy of the vendors. I'm hoping for laws like 'Right to Repair' to help with this. The alternative would be to go full Richard Stallman, and I still think that is too radical.

hsbaut76 8y ago

I share your worry about not being able to inspect communications for various apps and devices purely from a privacy advocacy perspective. If you own a device, and said device is transmitting data from your environment, you should be able to know what information this device is communicating. It is not enough to trust a company privacy policy.

ryukafalz 8y ago

The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; rather than weakening encryption to enable network owners to analyze traffic on their network (which also harms dissidents who need secure network access), I would prefer a push for more trustworthy devices. The devices we own should be acting in our own best interest; we shouldn't need to treat them as adversaries.

rocqua 8y ago
> The implication here is that you can't trust the devices on your network. IMO that's itself a problem; A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Your point about dissidents needing secure access is a strong one. Any way to MitM a connection for audit purposes can be repurposed into an MitM for surveillance given enough coercion. However, I don't think this applies to a network connection between my TV and Samsung. Once a surveillor coerces me to give them access, I can disconnect my TV from the internet. The same goes for an amazon echo, or a juice press with WiFi. It is different with whatsapp, facebook and internet banking. These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent.
- ryukafalz 8y ago
  >A large part of trust is auditability. And a large part of auditing a device is looking at its communication. What we are kind of running into is the security implications of a debug-interface. Sure, but you can also look at the device's communication if you have administrative access to it yourself, rather than trying to MITM it. I suppose this could be a vulnerability itself if done poorly, but users have administrative access to their PCs; why should other devices they own be any different? >These are much more essential, so it is more important that it is hard to MitM them even if the user gives consent. If the user gives consent, they should be allowed to inspect the connection. The device's UI can make it _very clear_ that they're about to do something dangerous, but it's their device and should be their choice.
- 8y ago

jmcqk6 8y ago

>Really, my issue is stuff on my own network. I want to see what my TV sends home. Same with an amazon-echo, or really any IoT thing. I'm with you 100%. The reality is, though, your only choice is to not run those devices with access to the internet. A TV should not require internet access to be usable. I won't use an Echo, and IoT devices are isolated to their own internal network without WAN access.

diminoten 8y ago
Your definition of a usable TV is outdated.
- robohoe 8y ago
  Agreed. It's not even the TV that needs access to Internet. What if you have one of the Roku, Apple TV, Chromecast, etc devices that stream content from the Internet? Without those we might as well go back to storing content locally which let's face it - is mostly retrieved quasi-legally through BitTorrent.
  - jethro_tell 8y ago
    yeah, while that's true, a manufacture like amazon or apple is much more likely to update your device since they are still hoping to sell you content. You think your offbrand Smart TV is going to update past a couple bugs? They already made all the money they are going to make off that TV and they are done. Still have to trust the manufacture for that to work, but at lease you're not just left wide open there. (I mean you still could be, but it seems less likely with this model). And, if it doesn't stay up todate, you can toss the box and plug in a new one.
    - TeMPOraL 8y ago
      > You think your offbrand Smart TV is going to update past a couple bugs? They already made all the money they are going to make off that TV and they are done. Honestly, who cares? I mean, it's a TV. It should not need Internet to work, and it definitely shouldn't need software updates. Displaying video on a screen is a solved problem. The very fact you can use "software update" and "TV" in the same sentence signals a pretty big problem - a problem of companies selling you TV as a service, and customers accepting half-done pseudo-products.

jstanley 8y ago

> Really, my issue is stuff on my own network. I want to see what my TV sends home. Same with an amazon-echo, or really any IoT thing. Yet, if they all use SSL and don't allow me to add a root CA, I can't look at what they run. Which is part of why the more paranoid of us steadfastly refuse to own such devices.

rocqua 8y ago
I'm hoping for something like 'Right to Repair' or 'Right to Tinker' that'll let us verify more devices are trustworthy. My smart TV (I am ashamed to admit I have one) is really useful. Very little about the idea of a TV with build-in Plex support requires it be totally locked down. Hence it is a buisness decision that could be competed or regulated away. (I was going to make the same argument about a TV with build-in Netflix support, but I believe the DRM requirements of Netflix require quite a bit of lock-down)
- logfromblammo 8y ago
  Some of us (for whom Charisma is not their dump stat) need to get elected to national legislative assemblies and form technology and engineering caucuses. Possible items for its agenda: - Right to Repair - Right to Tinker - Right to "Pwn Ur Own" - Hardware sellers required to deliver firmware source to buyers --- including build scripts --- including device-specific signing keys --- even for cars and tractors - Public APIs required for public-facing services - Right to non-backdoored strong encryption - Formal requirements for custodianship of PII - Formal requirements for security in IoT devices - Ban on local monopolies on wired telecoms - Definitions for terms used in advertising (i.e. "5G") - Establish a separate USPTO regime specifically for computer programs The lawyers of the Boomer generation that seem to be running the show now are not very well-suited to understand the near-future problems in the technology field. A lot of these problems are better solved by strongarming companies into behaving more eusocially than by attempting a technical solution or starting disruptive competitor businesses.
  - aaaaaaaaaab 8y ago

fouc 8y ago

What about an enterprise situation? Would a company allow devices that don't accept their root CA on the network? Are there enterprise versions of all these devices that we can buy instead?

nradov 8y ago
Most Internet connected consumer devices don't have separate enterprise versions. The usual approach for enterprises that care about security is to ban them (DHCP server won't issue an IP address and switch blocks all traffic), or segregate them onto a very limited virtual network.

rcarmo 8y ago

It's not just the Alexa-like and IoT devices, it's your entire home LAN that might be indirectly exposed. The last carrier I worked for was running trials of a "virtual CPE" that replaced your home gateway with a much dumber and cheaper device that effectively extended your home LAN to the local exchange (at least), where the actual isolation, filtering and NAT were performed. I switched home providers when I left there, and if my current provider ever goes the same route I'll drop my own firewall in front of my LAN. (Theoretically there is already relatively little isolation between your LAN and parts of the carrier network if you have VoIP or IPTV, but in this case I happen to know who tests that equipment and have a very good idea of what it really does, because I used to work in that team a long time ago...)

gnode 8y ago

> On the other hand, the owner of a network has some right to look into the packets on that network. I don't agree. If you let a guest use your WiFi network for instance, there's no inherent moral right for you to intercept their emails. However I generally agree with the principle that if you own a device, you have the right to learn what it's doing, and the trend towards black boxes is concerning.

duckMuppet 8y ago
You have no more right to learn what a particular device is doing than you have in intercepting emails of guests on Wi-Fi. You might have purchased a particular device, but you generally don't have the rights to the software or firmware that runs it. If you're truly concerned, you should support manufacturers that leave their system open by design, or support open source devices, and contact manufacturers describing your concerns. But the tradeoff wars of freedom v. security were lost long ago. The idea that one should shoulder any blame for choices is lost on a generation that needs YouTube videos to cut an onion. Likewise, a significant number of individuals can't be bothered to change their router password from 123456, and an even greater number of folks think the govt needs to regulate the internet to keep it fair and safe for everyone.. Forced encryption with no choice by design is a feature, not a bug. Use open source or
- gnode 8y ago
  > but you generally don't have the rights to the software or firmware that runs it Legally this is correct in certain jurisdictions. But I'd say this is similar to arguing that you have no right to know the ingredients in food you buy.
- rocqua 8y ago
  > You might have purchased a particular device, but you generally don't have the rights to the software or firmware that runs it. True, I don't have a right to see their source code. But decent laws shouldn't prevent me from reverse-engineering the code (DMCA is not a decent law). Moreover, access to code is orthogonal to control over devices one owns. If I own a device, I should be the one who has ultimate control over it.

diminoten 8y ago

You ostensibly have access to any private key being used to decrypt this traffic, assuming you have access to the device, which I believe is the correct boundary.

ckocagil 8y ago
With public key encryption? Very unlikely.

znpy 8y ago

"big companies" and big hardware producers in general would bake crypto in their stuff anyway.

api 8y ago

It is a bit of a double edge sword, but overall I think crypto is better. The best solution to the privacy problem is to do research and exercise consumer choice about what sorts of devices you purchase.

hrez 8y ago

Just wait for devices with 5G modem. They will skip your network control entirely.

amaccuish 8y ago

It's a major bugbear I have with Android. Now most apps don't by default respect CAs you've added, even via MDM. They get marked differently and can only be used by VPN, WiFi, ActiveSync, and apps that opt in to your custom certs.

est 8y ago

So it's perfect time to start a powered-by-community smart device. NLP and voice commands should work offline, without license issues, trained for private use, no constant connection bullshit.

ezoe 8y ago

That can't prevent a malicious device which act like harmless for the most time, but do evil thing on certain conditions are met. You may found the evidence of malicious act after it has happened, but often it's too late. If Amazon is directly responsible for Amazon Echo's malicious act, you can blame Amazon. But if the attacker was government spy agency, you're out of lack. Just don't use these devices which cannot be examined thus cannot be trusted.

romeisendcoming 8y ago

You have a choice. Boycott especially egregious offenders and packet filter and deny service to any suspicious device on _your_ home network. Years ago sticking these types of devices on a trusted home LAN would have been unthinkable.