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We can confirm that there was a successful 51% attack on Ethereum Classic
- aetherspawn 8y agoWhat does this mean? (Not all of us know a whole lot about how crypto works or why this is good or bad and what it means for our investments)
- analyst74 8y ago51% attack means someone (or a group of people) has successfully taken over the said blockchain.
- bonyt 8y agoIn this kind of blockchain network, the longest chain of blocks is considered to be the valid one. However, someone that has 51% of the hashing power (i.e. more hashing power than everyone else combined) can create a chain that grows faster than the chain used by everyone else. This means that they could tamper with their chain, potentially rewriting history on it, and because it is the longest chain, it will be accepted as the valid chain, and their version of events looks like it has been accepted.
- orblivion 8y agoBeing only somewhat familiar, I wonder this: Why don't clients have a simple rule against accepting changes to history that are more than one or two blocks old?
- wmf 8y agoThose rules can cause breakage under normal usage because the probability of an N-deep reorganization is low but nonzero. They also don't help nodes that are syncing the chain from scratch.
- leevlad 8y agoBecause it's an eventually consistent system. If what you proposed was implemented, you could end up with a fork that would never get reconciled.
- makomk 8y agoIn short, because they don't know that the chain they saw first is the chain that other nodes saw first (especially if they weren't online at the time). At least in theory, an attacker can exploit this to permanently fork the chain.
- orblivion 8y agoHmm. The humans at the exchanges seem to be able to tell the difference. I wonder if it could be encoded.
- AgentME 8y agoThe "legitimate" fork can only be identified if you were online when the 51% attack started. Users who have started up their ETC client after the attack started will just see two forks and will pick the one with more blocks (which will be the 51% attacker's fork). No one wants a permanent fork, so the clients that were online the whole time disregard their knowledge of the previous "legitimate" fork and adopt the attacker's fork because it has more work and because that's the one everyone else is using. Also, if you have clients follow the rule "never switch forks" to protect against 51% attacks, then any network partitions will cause a permanent fork.
- leevlad 8y agoI don't think that's feasible, to be honest. I'd imagine that you would want to look for evidence of a double spend as that's the most likely goal of a 51% attack. But then the blockchain must have up-to-date knowledge of likely double spend targets (such as exchanges, OTC desks, etc), and be able to algorithmically and deterministically prove malicious intent with high certainty. Only then will you be able to maintain consensus and prevent unnecessary or accidental forks. But since this is all open-source anyway, it would only be a matter of time before a slightly more sophisticated attacker read through the updated consensus algorithm and figured out how to game it. And so the cycle continues. In truth, the only real strategy for mitigating attacks in PoW blockchains is hash power. It has proven to be very effective if you have enough of it (see BTC), and looking for other 51% resistance measures isn't really that productive unless you start from the ground up and rebuild the consensus mechanism on a different paradigm (e.g. PoS, which is still unproven afaik).
- CydeWeys 8y agoBecause then a simple accidental network partition could cause a permanent fork in the cryptocurrency.
- pryce 8y agoOther people have answered this from a more technical perspective. Philosophically, what the distributed blockchain is, is an agreement for adjudicating whose record (eg list of transactions) should be agreed on as "the valid one". If you already have a different, reliable external way of deciding this question, that is (arguably) conceding that you didn't need a distributed blockchain in the first place. EDIT: I've realised my comment could be misinterpreted as endorsing the blockchain 'movement'. I am among those who are quite skeptical of these many blockchain projects.
- orblivion 8y agoWhat I described would be part of the rules of system (or at least certain players). It just says "no changing history after X point". If anything, relying on an outside source is what we're doing now. Coinbase and others are telling us that they detected something and I haven't heard anybody question them. (And I'm assuming they're not lying). Though that's not to say the blockchain will be changed by this information.
- pryce 8y ago> If anything, relying on an outside source is what we're doing now. You are correct of course. To me, problems like this recent attack highlight an inherent contradiction in the blockchain idea - that the "51%+ of hashing power determines the truth" rule is really either lip-service; techno-marketing vanity that doesn't actually translate to practice (if corrective action ensues), and in which case the adjudicator is clearly not the blockchain tech we were told, but instead a nebulous collection of companies and stakeholders OR - that "51% determines the truth" is indeed a strictly-held principle even though we have already demonstrated that there exist actors with enough resources and motivation to make attacks of this nature on some of the most prominent blockchain projects already - and we haven't even yet witnessed what a 51% attempt by an actor with the resources of a state would look like. This is one of the reasons I have become skeptical of blockchain projects.
- hinkley 8y ago> I am among those who are quite skeptical of these many blockchain projects. There's always dilution when an idea has been around long enough and I'm concerned about the copycats trying to use blockchain for other things. If Raft is democracy, then blockchain is Might Makes Right. The guy with the biggest stick always wins. There is no actual vote. Everybody is an accomplice. That doesn't sound like progress, that sounds like regression. A really big one.
- stale2002 8y agoSome clients do have this rule, actually! It is a pretty interesting solution, that seems to work out OK. For example, most Bitcoin cash clients don't accept reorgs longer than 10 blocks, as such a reorg is 100% an attack. This protects the network against large reorgs.
- eloisant 8y agoBecause crypto-currencies are validating transactions by having them validated by the network as a whole, a group who controls more than 50% of the computing power can do whatever they want: reject valid transaction, create (and validate) fake transactions...
- gus_massa 8y agoYou can't create fake transactions[1]. You can reject some valid transactions or reject all transactions freezing the network for some time, and also try to double spend your money. [1] The idea is that the miner just pick the last block and select a bunch of the current transactions and a random number and makes a hash of all of them. If the hash has enough zeros at the beginning then it is a new block and it is distributed to all the network. The other nodes of the network validate all the transactions and also that this bunch of transactions with this random number produce a hash that has enough zeros at the beginning. Any invalid transaction of a wrong random number make all the other nodes of the network ignore the fake block. Once the last block and the bunch of transactions are picked, the difficult part is selecting a random number that with them produces a has that has enough zeros at the beginning. So the mines must try, try, and retry with different random numbers until they are lucky (or someone else is lucky). They must try millions of millions of millions (gillons?) of times, because it's difficult to pick the correct one. This uses a lot of electricity to power the computer. The other people just validate with the lucky number, so it's much cheaper.
- wmf 8y agoThe attacker rewrote part of the blockchain which was supposed to be immutable. Generally this allows spending the same money twice.
- DyslexicAtheist 8y ago51% attack: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp I can't comment on investment. Note Ethereum has always been over-hyped which (imvho) makes it useless for any serious engineering. see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18780489 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18780489
- pietjepuk88 8y agoThe most typical way to profit from this, is to have quite a bit of ETC, and then sell it on an exchange or buy something expensive. This transaction would then end up on the block chain, and eventually be considered secure / part of history. Privately, you are building a chain where said transaction did _not_ occur. Because your hash rate is high enough, you are generating blocks at at least the pace of the public chain. You keep mining your chain (without your transaction) privately until the bank transfer from the exchange goes through, or you are sure whatever you bought is on its way. Then you broadcast your private chain as soon as it has at least one block more than the public chain and voila, you have your ETC back and the USD/EUR/crypto you sold it for (or the product you bought). You can have your cake and eat it too. This is because the rule of most cryptocurrencies is that the longest chain is the truth, and everyone mines on top of the longest chain. If a longer chain appears out of nowhere, all miners will jump on top of this one. There is no such thing as "finality" in most cryptocurrencies, where something becomes actually (read: much more) irreversible. Of course, doing this only makes sense if what you gain outweighs the costs of performing such an attack. Note that you typically _cannot_ steal coins from specific wallets, as you do not have the keys to those coins. You can however censor transactions that you may not want, but the above is a common way to benefit from a 51% attack.
- naveen99 8y agoso to be safe, an exchange should require more confirmations depending on size of deposit. Basically the number of confirmations you could finance an attack for with the deposit.
- Klathmon 8y agoYes, and most do. Many will semi-routinely increase the number of confirmations during times where it could be necessary (like chain splits or network upgrade events), or adjust the number of confirmations depending on the size of the currency and overall usage. Another mitigation is to shut down trading until the attack is over. Maintaining a 51% attack is expensive (assuming there is at least SOME usage of the coin), and if you just say "we won't be doing business for the next 24 hours", the attacker now has to maintain that attack for the next 24 hours, and if the company wants, they can just extend the time. Eventually (hopefully!) the attacker will run out of money, and the "correct" chain will take it over again.
- xbkingx 8y ago(This is a very basic run down of what I understand to occur. There are places where I omit steps and oversimplify, but I THINK it's pretty accurate. Someone please correct me if I'm wrong.) Mining is basically the way that everyone agrees a transaction is valid - you have a bunch of unrelated entities saying, "Yes, according to my copy of the ledger, the sending party has X dollars and wants to send Y dollars, and the two parties agreed." (It's much more nuanced, but this is the easiest way to summarize it.) If someone said, "I'm going to send AccountB 100ETC from AccountA," but AccountA only had 50ETC then a miner would see that and deny the transaction (wouldn't add it as a valid block to the blockchain). In reality, there are several places that the transaction should be thrown out, but there are obvious ways around those, and every transaction incurs a fee, so trying to just flood the network is costly. More importantly, several miners have to agree that the transaction is valid. When sending bitcoin, you'll see a number of "confirmations," which is the number of miners that marked the transaction as valid. You can see this when sending coins between two exchanges, you'll see that the receiving exchange won't allow you to use the coins for trading until you hit, say, 30 confirmations. The problem with this model for smaller projects is that those "confirmations" by unrelated miners can't be trusted if one person/group owns more than half the miners. I left out the idea of wallets/nodes to bring this up here. Every "full" wallet (or node) has a copy of the blockchain and does some cursory checks on transactions before broadcasting them to the network. Miners then package a bunch of transactions in a block and send this to the network - "Here is my version of block X. It should be added to the blockchain as block X for everyone." The miners then have to expend some effort to verify that the block is actually the block they think it is and contains valid transactions. When the miners confirm a block, it eventually propagates to all the miners and nodes, and competing blocks by other miners, which might have contained some of the same transactions are discarded. It doesn't mean the other blocks were fake, just that the chosen block reached "consensus" of the miners and can be trusted to be valid. (I realize this leaves lots of open questions, but I'm limiting the scope to OP's question.) Consensus is the big problem in 51% attacks. If someone controls more than half the mining power, they can reach consensus on blocks faster than legit miners and add whatever they want to the blockchain that is distributed to all the other miners and nodes. That means they can add/delete transactions or manipulate existing ones to, say, change the receiving address to their own, and everyone that receives those blocks will accept the outcome. This is why decentralization is so important to cryptocurrency. There's a level of necessary chaos that keeps the network honest. It is possible to roll back the blockchain to a previous version, but that also means that transactions in all blocks that followed must be rolled back as well. If the rogue party simply accumulated currency, that's not a big deal, since all other transactions would still be valid. But, if they immediately turned around and traded them for other coins, you start to see the problem. On top of that, if ETC was more "robust", the news would (and currently is) send the price into a nosedive, which creates an opportunity to legitimately buy it very low and profit from the recovery. That's not going to be the case here. All this being said, Ethereum Classic was kinda declared dead a month ago when the development group halted operations, so anyone with any significant amount of ETC should have sold off by now. This attack will probably be the final nail in the coffin. TL;DR - In the end, the state of the blockchain comes down to a simple majority of miners agreeing that a block (a group of transactions) is valid. At 51%, you can force everyone to see invalid transactions as valid. ETC development ceased around a month ago, so no one that follows it should be holding any now, but people blindly trading for profit will get a nasty surprise.
- hacker_9 8y agoAmazing, this blockchain technology really just keeps on giving. I have to say, it's quite entertaining to watch. It's pretty much a car crash happening in slow motion at this point. At least it provides something else to nerd joke about by the watercooler that isn't brexit for once.
- Klathmon 8y agoThat's like saying "this whole programming thing just keeps on giving" every time a bug is discovered in any program. Those involved have been warning of the insecurity of smaller chains for a long time now, and they aren't representative of the entire ecosystem.
- brokensegue 8y agowell programming is providing lots of value to humanity at the moment so it gets a pass
- kryogen1c 8y ago> That's like saying "this whole programming thing just keeps on giving" every time a bug is discovered in any program. No it's not. Programming is a tool to create programs with. Block chain is a technological buzzword being used (and implemented) wildly inappropriately. 51% attacks are a fundamental vulnerability in decentralization. It would be like inventing programming when everyone pretends bugs don't exist at all. Bugs are inherent to the task, just like blockchains have a very narrow set of use cases, but everyone's too busy flying too close to the sun.
- albertgoeswoof 8y agoThere are some cool things you can do with blockchains, they’re just a little over hyped. It’s pretty neat to send funds to someone without going via a 3rd party, it’s cool to run code on a global computer, it’s awesome to have digital assets that can’t be doled out on a whim by a central authority.
- sneg55 8y agoMining pools reported it at least 15hours ago https://twitter.com/pool2miners/status/1082157492875022337 https://twitter.com/pool2miners/status/1082157492875022337
- johndunne 8y agoThis is inevitable. Ethereum Classic (ETC) isn't the only currency such attacks have been successful on. The site https://www.crypto51.app/ https://www.crypto51.app/ puts the cost of running a 51% attack on ETC at ~$5k per hour. The incentive for running these attacks for profit becomes higher as the market cap of these coins increases, making long-term 'investment' in these coins nonsensical.
- NathanCH 8y agoSome of these numbers are very low. $30/h for Bitcoin Private? Seems inexpensive, what am I missing?
- brianwawok 8y agoNo one uses it. So you attack it. Cool. You can't turn it into USD or anything else, so you just spend $30 for nothing.
- IncRnd 8y agoAnd, that's exactly why it only costs $30.
- matte_black 8y agoBut you still get the prestige of having taken down a coin.
- baddox 8y agoWhat makes you think there would be any such prestige earned?
- matte_black 8y agoIt’s not very often you get a chance to take down a currency. In 30 years from now you’ll be able to brag about how back in your day you took down entire cryptocurrencies with 51% attacks.
- FrankDixon 8y agoHm, doesn't even seem to be that expensive (ETC $4,996, ETH $107,536) to run a 51% attack: https://www.crypto51.app/ https://www.crypto51.app/
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- viraptor 8y agoAn update from eth classic amount linked in that thread: (not sure what they mean by selfish mining...) Regarding the recent mining events. We may have an idea of where the hashrate came from. ASIC manufacturer Linzhi confirmed testing of new 1,400/Mh ethash machines #projectLavaSnow - Most likely selfish mining (Not 51% attack) - Double spends not detected (Miner dumped bocks)
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- aaron_m04 8y agoSo this is a publicity stunt intended to show off their mining rigs.
- pietjepuk88 8y agoCoinbase mentions a few reorgs without double spends, and a quite a few more with: https://blog.coinbase.com/ethereum-classic-etc-is-currently-being-51-attacked-33be13ce32de?gi=cb294c058a6d https://blog.coinbase.com/ethereum-classic-etc-is-currently-...
- trophycase 8y agoIIRC selfish mining is mining without broadcasting the blocks. Some pools do it for only a short time to get a headstart on mining the next block, the obvious risk being someone else broadcasts a block before you do and your block becomes orphaned. In the case of a 51% attack, I believe you can simply selfish mine then reorg the chain every now and then because your chain is longer. This way, you mine every single block.
- lexs 8y agoEyal, Ittay, and Emin Gün Sirer. "Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable." Communications of the ACM 61.7 (2018): 95-102. https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~ie53/publications/btcProcFC.pdf https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~ie53/publications/btcProcFC.pdf
- soared 8y agoAccording to [1], running a 51% attack for an hour is incredibly cheap for most currencies. Why doesn't this happen more often, or is running the attack for an hour not a long enough time frame to double spend? [1] https://www.crypto51.app/ https://www.crypto51.app/
- leevlad 8y agoI think it's just not worth the time. What do you do when you've successfully run a 51% attack? You go on an exchange and double spend the money, which means you have to maintain the 51% attack for longer than min # of confirmations for this currency on said exchange. And even after that, most exchanges (in NA at least, can't say much about intl) require KYC.
- johndunne 8y agoExactly, it's not worth the time. And once the attack is underway, it'll be detected and everyone can simply increase the number of confirmations needed before finalising.
- Cilvic 8y agoHow is the 51% attack detected?
- CydeWeys 8y agoIt's really obvious once the new chain is broadcasted. "Honest" miners switch over to mine on the deepest chain as soon as they become aware of it. It's very rare to even see a 2-block conflict. When you see a large N-block conflict then it's obvious there's a 51% attack going on.
- Semaphor 8y agoBut isn't the point of the whole thing that you do not broadcast it until after you are done? So yes, it's obvious in hindsight, but the damage will be done.
- ajkjk 8y agoI'm not sure I think the word 'attack' is right here. Crypto by design says that if anyone controls over half the network, they get to say what happens. Sounds like democracy, specifically the 'tyranny of the majority': over half the network votes that they get more of your money, so they do! Of course if you're in the other 49% you might feel attacked, but ultimately this is working as intended.
- pslam 8y agoThe intent is a currency which can be reliably used for exchange of goods and services. This would seem to cause a failure of the basic reason for its existence.
- tim333 8y agoThe intent of democracy was a sensible way of running countries but it seems to show similar failures. This is leading presently to quite a lot of odd debate in the UK on how having another democratic vote would be a betrayal of democracy and similar.
- rcdmd 8y agoIt's okay, just fork it. Ethereum Classic Classic.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- knocte 8y agoEthereum Classic is not a fork. It's precisely called classic because it's ETH the one that forked out of it.
- hinkley 8y agoI think I would be satisfied with the distributed consensus model in these blockchain systems if someone could solve the non-repudiation problem. In many of these blockchain systems, the 51% attacks only applies to money in motion. I can't move all of your funds out of 'your account' unless I have stolen your wallet, and if I have stolen your wallet I don't need to change anything else about the network. I can just spend on your behalf. Lacking that, I can convince you you got paid for services and then claw them back by making the network change their mind after the fact. I can repudiate all payments to you with a 51% attack, by voting again on what transactions just finished. Congress has rules about votes. If you have a quorum, everybody sticks with the outcome. If you don't show up, you don't get a vote. To make that work, you have rules. A quorum is defined and static. Obstruction is not allowed - no secret votes, no locking the doors. It may be as simple as this: When my transaction is settled I need to know the health of the system. If some definition of quorum is met I know my transaction can't be hijacked. If the network was degraded a revote is possible. I need to wait for more confirmation before rendering services.
- nomadiccoder 8y agoBut with a large enough hashrate you can potentially go back many blocks..
- sciyoshi 8y agoThat idea of having quorums voting to establish consistency is essentially what Stellar does in their consensus protocol: https://www.stellar.org/developers/guides/concepts/scp.html https://www.stellar.org/developers/guides/concepts/scp.html
- path411 8y ago> If the network was degraded a revote is possible. That's kinda the essential problem. If you can trigger a revote, then the attacker will stuff the ballot to make their's the winner.
- paradoxparalax 8y agoAn unbrokechain less on the world.
- martindale 8y agoGiven enough time, chains behind the lead position will always succumb to this attack vector. Ethereum's design was flawed in other ways, but at least now it's clearly best used as the sandbox that it is.
- humbledrone 8y agoYou are aware that Ethereum Classic is not the same as the much, much higher-hashpower Ethereum chain, right?
- martindale 8y agoThe mining on that chain is largely pointless, as it's directly controlled by Vitalik. If I held assets on either, it'd be on the chain that didn't hard-fork to reverse a single user's transaction.
- profalseidol 8y agoMining without knowing that miners collectively have the control is largely pointless. > If I held assets on either, it'd be on the chain that didn't hard-fork to reverse a single user's transaction. Enjoy using Ethereum Classic then.
- chr1xzy 8y agoThis could have been prevented with Komodo’s delayed Proof of Work (dPoW) Security for about $250. dPoW explained here. https://blog.komodoplatform.com/delayed-proof-of-work-explained-9a74250dbb86 https://blog.komodoplatform.com/delayed-proof-of-work-explai...
- jMyles 8y agoI think one's opinion on this depends on what you believe Ethereum Classic to be. I think of it as a testnet variant. So $5,000 per hour to mess with a test framework... that actually seems pretty robust to me.
- Proven 8y agoThe way things are going soon Top 10 PoW will become targets and ultimately BTC. BTC is hard to attack and not because it's got a ton of hashpower but because it's hard to get paid in any other crypto (if/when payout for asking a successful attack on BTC might be more than USD 10 mil).
- davesque 8y agoI feel like this is getting so many upvotes because people are confusing Ethereum Classic with Ethereum.
- GrumpyNl 8y agoDoesnt this mean that the coin is worthless when people are able to manipulate the value of coins like this? Why would you still invest in these coins when you know this is possible.
- tim333 8y agoThey stole $1.1m out of a cap of $542m approx and will hopefully be more careful next time?
- _Codemonkeyism 8y ago"A vote occurred and in July 2016 it was decided to implement a hard fork in the Ethereum code [...]. Ethereum Classic came into existence when some members of the Ethereum community rejected the hard fork on the grounds of "immutability", the principle that the blockchain cannot be changed, and decided to keep using the unforked version of Ethereum." -- Wikipedia
- tim333 8y agoSome updates. Money stolen about $1.1m: >exchange has since uncovered another 12 attacks that “included double spends, [now] totaling 219,500 ETC ($1.1 million) https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2019/01/08/ehtereum-classic-51-percent-attack/ https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2019/01/08/ehtereum-classic-... Cost of attack according to https://www.crypto51.app/ https://www.crypto51.app/ about $5k
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- brucefey 8y agoI have created a website https://cryptoattack.io https://cryptoattack.io to show the 51% attack probability on major coins, You guys can check the full list and see.