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I've seen some of the papers where people look at big chunks of unused address space and watch the probes etc. It is really quite amazing. Once I screwed myself
by ChuckMcM 9y ago
I've seen some of the papers where people look at big chunks of unused address space and watch the probes etc. It is really quite amazing. Once I screwed myself royally by accidentally turning RIP on for the upstream side of my router (connected to the cable modem) and it advertised 192.168/16 which Comcast accepted and started routing random stuff from the local exchange to my router. It was pretty funny talking to their NOC staff who was mad at me for advertising the route but I pointed out it was pretty stupid of them to accept routes like that from their edge nodes. What if I had sent them a BGP route for China, then what would they have done? (Don't try that at home kids unless you don't want to use your network for a while)
- dannyw 9y agoWow I’m surprised. That is such a low barrier to doing your own BGP hijackig.
- Steeeve 9y agoYou have no idea
- godzillabrennus 9y agoIt's even easier to steal a phone number. Lots of phone companies still just approve a port if you send them the required paperwork to initiate a port. That means with zero verification from the account holder a number can vanish from your account.
- IntelMiner 9y agoPacketCable (VoIP over Cable internet) is even worse When it came out. If you wanted to "borrow" someone's phone number. All you had to do was clone the MAC address of the VoIP (EMTA) port If someone called the number. Both you and the victims phones would ring
- rootsudo 9y agoSame with CDMA. Just had to copy the phone number and ESN. Boom whichever phone was closest to the tower would ring, if both phones wear pinging with near freq then both could receive the same SMS and call, but only one could be on a call at a time. No actual interception. Things got a bit different with MDN and MIN were different to ESN pair. Calls still came but you couldn't auth or call out for data services. It's all a bit old now, but look up QPST, QXDM for the past decade and 20 years ago look up Oki900.
- kevin_nisbet 9y agoFor some reason I think CDMA could suffer from crosstalk in certain circumstances, but it was something relatively obscure, like one device had to be above another (like an apartment building), but otherwise in the same/similar coordinates, and then certain code assignments would allow crosstalk to happen. It was weird, because it could be one direction only. Unfortunately I don't really remember the details, since I worked on the core data network at the time.
- aviv 9y agoWorse. Some very large carriers don't even look at the supporting documentation (bill, LOA) submitted with port orders unless there's a rejection from the losing carrier and they want to double check the address entered or something. Hijacking numbers is crazy simple. Same for hijacking the SMS functionality of any number in the US (voice traffic remains untouched). In about 10 minutes you can start receiving SMS directed towards any number you want, and also be able to send out texts originating from that number. Anyone who relies on SMS for any type of authentication should stop.
- walrus01 9y agoSS7 was designed in an era of huge Monopoly telecoms that all trusted each other. Worked fine. Needs to be burnt to the ground, the ashes stomped around on a bit, and rebuilt with the same level of thought that has gone into the development of TLS1.3 for modern use. Won't happen though due to the sheerly massive installed base of telecom gear worldwide.
- rusk 9y agoYes, sunk costs mean that while those costs are amortized these technologies will remain in place. Upside is there's plenty of business in the area of plugging the holes in the meantime!
- threeseed 9y ago> Anyone who relies on SMS for any type of authentication should stop Err. That's pretty much every implementation of 2FA around the world. Why isn't this more well known ?
- burnte 9y agoAs someone who has tried to port about 1,100 phone numbers last year, this couldn't be further from the truth. Getting numbers ported is a GIGANTIC pain in the ass with ANY small detail being wrong will reject the entire batch. Since the slamming problem in the 90s it's been increasingly hard to port phone numbers without every T crossed and every I dotted exactly right.
- walrus01 9y agoAny sane bgp neighbor has prefix limit ACLs and prefix filters in place on their edge connections to another peer. As an ISP that announces a lot of space and customer space to 2 upstream transits, every time we take on a new downstream customer that brings their own /24 or bigger, we need to have our upstream transit providers update their prefix-list filters. If our upstreams were clueless or negligent, it would be possible to get into a situation such as when a Pakistani telecom announced a huge chunk of V4 space that is YouTube, effectively DDoSing their international submarine links and also taking down YouTube for some users worldwide.
- devicenull 9y agoExcept many of the big upstream providers don't actually filter anything. HE.net for example, doesn't. We forgot to create some IRR entries and GTT just accepted our prefixes. There is essentially no security, it's fairly trivial to hijack whatever space you want. (Doing it undetected is more difficult though!)
- Hikikomori 9y agoWell, not really. It doesn't mean that Comcast was re-advertising it into BGP and also advertising it to their peers. Usually you use a combination of prefix-list filtering and route tagging so you don't advertise garbage to your peers. RIP and other IGP protocols do not need to have their neighbors explicitly configured, they will find neighbors automatically on enabled interfaces. On some platforms they are enabled on all interfaces by default so it will form neighbor relationships with anything connected. A sane network design would be to only enable it on interfaces connected to your own routers (or customer interface, but on a different process ID) and also use a password.
- IntelMiner 9y agoAs an ex-Comcast employee. Seeing stuff like that happen really doesn't surprise me When Comcast first rolled out that data cap nation wide, I started prodding at it one night out of morbid curiosity Turned out that it would silently slurp all HTTP traffic! Once you hit some arbitrary measurement (EG: 50%) it'll immediately start hijacking all HTTP websites you visit and inject a ton of Javascript to put a message over the web page forcing you to acknowledge your cap Nmapping the server they used caused the messages to immediately disappear. As well as the server to seemingly vanish. Turned out the firewall was just blanket banning the entire IP range when it saw a portscan! The upside being that Comcast would stop MITM'ing HTTP traffic for about 72 hours
- walrus01 9y agoAnd people wonder why https everywhere is such a necessity now. It should not be necessary to treat your last mile ISP as a hostile entity , but sadly, it often is.
- jakeogh 9y agoI canceled my decade old COX account last time that happened. Even asked nicely not to "help" by editing traffic, the runaround was fun. At the end they offered to take my ~$90/mo to ~$70; re-confirming they had no idea what I was unhappy about.
- walrus01 9y agoA $12/hour call center customer retention worker in rural TN has no idea what you're complaining about, their job is simply to meet some retention metrics on a weekly basis. Even if you can actually reach the people who run the ASN of your ISPs, if it something big like Cox, charter, Shaw, etc, they'll be politically unable to confirm or deny anything, and won't want to talk to you. You might get a straight answer if you are in a similarly senior position at an equivalent sized ISP that has mutual settlement free peering, such as between RCN and Charter.
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- api 9y agoEven for regular IPv4s you often get upwards of 20-40k SSH probes per day trying common passwords against root. IPv6 largely makes this go away since it's too big to brute force scan.
- walrus01 9y agoYes, but the volume in kbps is tiny.
- tzs 9y ago> Even for regular IPv4s you often get upwards of 20-40k SSH probes per day trying common passwords against root So...anyone here ever set up a throwaway machine with root ssh enabled with one of those common passwords, so that some of those could get in, so you could see what they actually try to do once they are in? If so, what did you see?
- adrianpike 9y agoYes, this is a pretty common practice. Take a look at the Honeypot wikipedia page and enjoy the rabbit hole. :)
- ChuckMcM 9y agoYes. And a lot of script kiddies (people who were just using easily acquired scripts to attempt to break into hosts). Looking at the sequence of password hashes you could tell some of these scripts were just fed the 'most popular password' list and were working their way down the list.
- ericfrederich 9y agoThis is called a Honeypot. https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=ssh+honeypot https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=ssh+honeypot