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I should absolutely be able to intercept TLS traffic on my computers on my network. That's the distinction. Third party interception capability needs to be ille
by Spooky23 9y ago
I should absolutely be able to intercept TLS traffic on my computers on my network. That's the distinction. Third party interception capability needs to be illegal and connections should be tamper evident.
Frankly, I have a higher duty than user privacy. My users have access to data that's critically sensitive in various ways, in some cases they face criminal sanction. I need to both control and detect unauthorized software on the network and ensure that users are following the rules.
More extreme privacy activists will make noises about things using endpoint based solutions or something similar. It's a bullshit position that will ultimately weaken security.
- marcosdumay 9y agoOn your computers, yes. On your network, not so much. You have no right to intercept data just because you are moving it from one side to the other. And that's the thing. There is nothing stopping those companies from analyzing the data once it reached a managed computer. It is just that they want the capacity to do that on computers they don't manage.
- closeparen 9y agoTLS interception is predicated on whitelisting your own CA on the endpoint. Can't really do that if you don't manage it. And in any case, you need to be resilient to a rogue or compromised device.
- Spooky23 9y agoYeah, no. The network is my property and the contract our employees or partners sign establishes terms for using the network. You cannot get out of the network unless the traffic is proxied. There are a few exceptions for identify based reverse proxies that companies like Google talk about. But most places aren't there yet for sensitive applications outside of collaboration. There's also the matter of trust. Some business partners are explicitly trusted, either by a private CA signed certificate or by a specific third party key that is independently validated. Public networks are completely different. I am not talking about an ISP here.
- jake_the_third 9y agoWhat your saying doesn't really address the issue marcosdumay raised: That is, the issue with allowing this kind of introspection is its susceptibility for abuse. That said, your use-case of intercepting secure connections in your private network is a solved one: set up a private CA. Wanting to weaken the security of TLS for everyone else for what amounts to your own convenience is very selfish.
- hueving 9y agoIs setting up a private CA even enough with certificate pinning?
- aaronmdjones 9y agoThe HTTP Public Key Pinning specification says that browsers should/may (I forget which) ignore the pin if the chain ends up at a private locally-installed CA, for this very reason.
- aaronmdjones 9y agoIt's also worth mentioning that an MITM proxy with a private CA root certificate could just strip HPKP headers out of any webpage it sends you. If your computer is tied to its network (e.g. corporate PC) it will never see it, so there's no issue.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- throwaway613834 9y agoI'm confused, isn't this the normal criterion for a certificate being valid? If your certificate chain doesn't end in a locally-installed trusted CA then how is that any different from a random cert signed by a nobody off the street?
- crypto_graphy 9y agoTLS 1.3 doesn't change that, you can still MITM connections using your own root CA certificate installed on users' devices. Not quite sure what you're arguing against here.
- m-p-3 9y agoLet's say a user has to access something confidential over your network to an outside resource that has to follow HIPAA guidelines. Intercepting that data would be an HIPAA violation, how do you avoid that?
- dsacco 9y agoDo you have a citation for this? I do security reviews for companies with strong HIPAA requirements and I’m nearly certain this is incorrect.
- kodablah 9y ago> I should absolutely be able to intercept TLS traffic on my computers on my network. Just ask the users of your network to install your CA cert (or click past your cert warnings). That should work with TLS 1.3 right? Or in your statement are you really meaning, "I should absolutely be able to intercept TLS traffic on my computers on my network without them knowing about it"? If so, that's a completely different thing altogether and if that's what you and the GCHQ mean when talking about proxying, it needs to be explicitly stated. There is a huge difference.
- paralelogram 9y agoThe largest ISP in Kazakhstan believes that it should be able to intercept all TLS traffic on their network: https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/kazakhstan-moves-to-tighten-control-of-internet-traffic/ https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/kazakhstan-moves-t.... Because there are no technical differences between your TLS interception and what Kazakhtelecom is doing and no legal differences in most non-Western countries, I believe that all software should be changed to make TLS interception as hard as possible.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- Spooky23 9y agoThat isn't a technical problem, it's a Kazakstan problem.
- emmelaich 9y agoThere is absolutely a significant legal and moral difference between national interceptions like Kazakhstan does and the ones we do protecting children you are guardians of or protecting company secrets and integrity. In the latter case ideally (and possibly legally required) you'd have acceptance of potential interception a condition of employment.
- forapurpose 9y ago> I should absolutely be able to intercept TLS traffic on my computers on my network. ... / Frankly, I have a higher duty than user privacy. My users have access to data that's critically sensitive in various ways, in some cases they face criminal sanction. I need to both control and detect unauthorized software on the network and ensure that users are following the rules. Perhaps the security agencies view their country as "my network", and then if you read the rest of the quote, everything follows from there. There are big differences: The compulsive power of government, and the necessity of civil rights and peacefully organizing against the government; compared with the 'at will' relationship with a company and its interest, generally considered legitimate, in ultimate authority and stopping insubordination. On the other hand, large companies are not really 'at will'; people can't just walk away from jobs 'at will', especially when they have children, mortgages, other debts, or (in the U.S.) health problems. Also, some insubordination is legitimate: Labor organizing, legal and regulatory complaints (EEOC, safety, etc.), and probably other things I'm not thinking of. The distinction isn't so clear cut. I'm not sure the objection of the corporate sysadmin is that much more valid than the government security agency. Also, the security agency often has far more at stake.
- chopin 9y agoYou're saying with a straight face that you want to have encryption containing a backdoor. How is your demand different from the FBI's and its ilk? Intercept the traffic on your machines, if that's a legal requirement.
- kevin_b_er 9y agoWe properly presume your network to be hostile and malicious to security. You've declared it so. Therefor everything is encrypted and secured. Your hostile network is no different than a hostile network of a small country bent on attacking the security of the communication. So feel free to have insecure communication provided you control all devices on the network. It will still be insecure.