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Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail
- qrbLPHiKpiux 9y agoMetadata is more important than content. Metadata is surveillance. There is no way to hide metadata with computers. The only way to get around this is through anonymity. You put the info out there, but it can't be correlated to you by someone else except your intended recipient. This is approaching impossible even with the best, security-minded infosec professional. The safeguards you need to employ are very extraordinary. One slip-up, UR-FCK'ed. OPSEC is not retroactive.
- philipwhiuk 9y agoTackling header privacy is harder in an existing platform. Memoryhole ( https://github.com/autocrypt/memoryhole https://github.com/autocrypt/memoryhole ) has some ideas but it's some way off implementation right now.
- upofadown 9y agoTo save some hunting around, here is the description of what is being proposed here: * https://autocrypt.org/examples.html https://autocrypt.org/examples.html Basically you include your public key in a "Autocrypt:" header line added to all messages you send out. Then encryption transparently happens. So we give up some protection against MITM attacks but get protection against passive surveillance for people who are not willing or able to participate in a web of trust. All and all a good idea. Because this works with standard OpenPGP messages it would be good if we could tell what level of protection we were getting when we view a message.
- e12e 9y agoHow is this better than signing outgoing email, and default to encrypt to senders who sign their mail?
- upofadown 9y agoA signature does not give you a public key. You actually need the pub key to verify the signature. I think one could still ask why you couldn't just use a mime section for the public key in the same way that signatures are often attached.
- e12e 9y agoThe implied missing steps are a)publish key to keyserver network, and b) get fingerprint from signature and look up key on keyserver network. Bundling public key with every mail "feels" a bit heavy handed - given the key server infrastructure that already exist. (and special-casing "mail to new receiver" seems cumbersome. At least considering you'd probably want to sign all outgoing mail anyway[1]). [1] Ok, maybe not your bomb threats if they're designed to be anonymous - but that's getting into one of the other issues with pgp - non-repudiation.
- pcunite 9y agoWho is the team or company behind this offering?
- philipwhiuk 9y agoDevelopers from various open-source email clients. It's a protocol, not a product. https://autocrypt.org/contact.html https://autocrypt.org/contact.html
- dbennett455 9y agoSend the link to your boss and ask his opinion
- figgis 9y agoSay your company needs a new vehicle with specific safety features while still being convenient. When you find the vehicle that meets the requirements do you just plop the manual on your managers desk and ask for an opinion?
- doener 9y agoHere is a description how it works: https://posteo.de/en/blog/new-easy-email-encryption-with-autocrypt-and-openpgp-header https://posteo.de/en/blog/new-easy-email-encryption-with-aut...
- gruez 9y ago>>The manual exchange and management of keys – which users often perceive as complicated – is becoming superfluous: Prior to the first encrypted communication, a regular empty email (without content) is sent. With this, the key is transferred in the background. Henceforth, messages can be encrypted automatically. doesn't sound like they solved the key exchange problem. they merely changed it to trust on first use.
- digi_owl 9y agoAnd that still defends against the biggest howler with email, that in raw form it is a post card, not a enveloped letter. The issue if trusting that the sender is who is being claimed is a very different issue, and one that i don't think anyone had solved yet beyond cumbersome exchange procedures (possibly involving locked suitcases).
- FullyFunctional 9y agoWhich is a common compromise and frankly more useful than the web-of-trust model, as long as users understand the limitation and verify once offline. It's still unclear to me how this works if you use more than one email client.
- elahd 9y agoThis seems like a good use case for keybase.io. They've implemented their own proof of concept messaging system, but I have yet to see any third party integrate with the service.
- dane-pgp 9y agokeybase.io is another centralized third party which, like Signal, we should be trying to move away from rather than becoming more dependent on. By relying on the DNS (which is already trusted to make email, keybase.io, and Signal work), every service provider can be in control of the keys they are publishing. Also, keybase.io, being centralized, isn't as auditable as the DNS, but admittedly there is work being done on both DNSSEC transparency: http://blog.huque.com/2014/07/dnssec-key-transparency.html http://blog.huque.com/2014/07/dnssec-key-transparency.html and keybase.io publishing to the bitcoin blockchain: https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitcoin_blockchain https://keybase.io/docs/server_security/merkle_root_in_bitco...
- twiss 9y agoPretty off topic, but: I've been working on signed web applications: http://blog.airbornos.com/post/2017/08/03/Transparent-Web-Apps-using-Service-Worker http://blog.airbornos.com/post/2017/08/03/Transparent-Web-Ap.... If anyone working on a web-based email client wants to take a shot at making it completely secure (against the web app's server), shoot me an email :) in profile.
- FullyFunctional 9y agoThe site could benefit from a to-the-point explanation that doesn't assume prior experience with PGP based mail. I can't point less technical users to this. Does this work if one uses multiple mail clients (fx. notebook, desktop, and smartphone)? Since it requires client support, it doesn't seem an option currently on, say, an iPhone.
- Valodim 9y agoIndeed, we are not at a stage yet where pointing "less technical users" to our website is very useful, since the main take away for those people is "stay tuned". We hope to be able to change this as implementations progress.
- tptacek 9y agoUnpopular but very probably true fact: email can't practicably be made secure, and people should stop trying. Email is itself archaic, and there aren't good reasons people should use it for routine peer-to-peer communications that need secrecy. Why? Because: * It's default-plaintext. We don't generally love the way websites ensure they're viewed securely, but email doesn't even have the basic mechanisms HTTP has to prevent secrets from accidentally being sent in the clear. * Email encryption is never forward-secure. The most popular standard, OpenPGP, involves a long-term key that is the root of secrecy for all messages from a particular person. Lose that key, ever, and not only is every message you send in the future unsafe, but every message you've ever sent in the past is too. That's a terrible property for a secure messaging system. * Email leaks metadata. In fact, some of what we call email "metadata" isn't even metadata --- stuff like subject lines are simply content. They're sent in plaintext. We would never accept a new secure messaging system that behaved like that. * Most email users get their email from a website. Unless you make them install something on all their computers --- and at that point, just get them to install Signal, WhatsApp, or Wire --- "encrypting" their email involves schemes in which those websites can get their plaintext mail. * Most email clients are searchable-archive-by-default. Again, if you're using a secure messaging system to keep secrets from a state-level adversary, that's exactly what you don't want. And again, what matters here is the behavior of the overwhelming majority of clients. If you can stipulate a special mail client that is extra-careful, why not stipulate a forward-secure advanced messaging system and stop bothering with email? Everything that makes email effective in the real world makes it inhospitable to secure messaging. We should stop trying to push this particular boulder up this particular mountain and instead just get people to adopt serious secure messengers.
- zaro 9y ago> Email is itself archaic, Very true and yet its the only messaging with wide adoption that is federated. There are so many better ways to communicate now days all of them locking you to a specific vendor. So whether it's archaic or not there isn't really any alternative :)
- snvzz 9y agoSMTP belongs in the trash, sure. Whatever happened to the Dark Mail Alliance working on replacing it? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_Mail_Alliance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_Mail_Alliance
- r3bl 9y agoGah, the thing I truly hate about this website is that it doesn't offer me an answer to the most important question: But what does it do? I have to scroll down to see the content in the "What is Autocrypt" section. The content was two sentences long and I still didn't understand what does it do (I wondered what's an "email program" in this context). Since there was no additional text to help me out on the homepage, I had to look further. FAQ page was too technical for such an explanation, implementation status page gave me some genuine idea that this is something related to other OpenPGP products instead of a new OpenPGP product. The third page I tried opening was the "test it" page, which led me to basically nothing out of any use. And this is not an isolated case, this is more of a rule for project websites. Seriously, figure out a layman term to explain whatever you're representing and slap it on top of your homepage. Nobody cares if you're decentralized or an open standard until we know what is it. "Convenient End-to-End Encryption for E-Mail" made me believe it was a separate OpenPGP implementation, not a set of guidelines. Just one sentence like "a set of guidelines that make email encryption easier" would make me want to find out more. This way, by the time I found that out, I have already decided to write this out of rage instead of finding out more. So, here's a plea to the authors of this website and every other project website: Please, tell me what your project does right at the top of your homepage and do not make me chase an answer to that question.
- Valodim 9y agoNote taken. Making a website for a tech spec is surprisingly hard after looking at it for so long :( https://github.com/autocrypt/autocrypt/pull/328 https://github.com/autocrypt/autocrypt/pull/328