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An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

522 points by marksamman 9y ago

beefhash 9y ago
Good times when kernel privilege escalation was the worst you had to fear. I'm not familiar enough with the Intel ME to tell, but could this possibly be exploited with the arbitrary code execution in the ME being used to set the HAP bit without requiring hardware intervention?
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  That'd be pretty sweet, wouldn't it? Maybe I'll hold off on patching for a bit.
  - mysterypie 9y ago
    > Maybe I'll hold off on patching for a bit. I think you're suggesting extremely interesting but I'm not totally clear on it. So someone[1] has come up with some code to either disable (kill switch) or remove the Intel ME. (Setting the HAP bit is the kill switch.) Now Intel and its vendors are going to issue a patch for the Intel ME. Are you saying that as a result of applying this patch we might not be able disable or remove the Intel ME? In other words, we'll end up with a slightly more secure Intel ME, but be worse off since we can't exploit any bugs to get rid of it? If I'm understanding you correctly, this sounds like the iPhone situation: upgrade to a newer iOS and lose the ability to jailbreak. [1] https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/wiki/HAP-AltMeDisable-bit https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/wiki/HAP-AltMeDisable-bi...
    - jlgaddis 9y ago
      Basically, yeah. Hold off on patching this vulnerability so that it can be exploited later in order to disable ME entirely. Their firmware updates could very well close off these existing "known holes", making them impossible to exploit. If we can take advantage of them to kill the ME entirely, that's even better than Intel releasing this fix.
cjsuk 9y ago
This will be trying to close off the holes used to get at the ME OS I reckon.
- sigzero 9y ago
  Technically speaking, that is a security vulnerability. So it wouldn't surprise me.
joe_the_user 9y ago
So, will Intel be patching both the vulnerabilities and the kludges people have found to remove ME? Thus making some customers safer while maintaining systemic risk for everyone? "Asking for a friend"
- discreditable 9y ago
  Intel provides patches to vendors. Vendors provide patches to you eventually or never.
  - Sir_Substance 9y ago
    Who is my vendor if I assembled my computer myself?
    - lwhalen 9y ago
      The company who built your motherboard
      - Sir_Substance 9y ago
        I'll take your word for it I guess, but I don't see the logic. Why would my motherboard manufacturer be involved in this process? edit: maximum downvotes for a legitimate question, thanks all
        nevir 9y ago
        It's a chip that your motherboard manufacturer hardwired in (e.g. part of the chipset). Firmware updates need to go through the efi/bios they set up
        artimaeis 9y ago
        The motherboard manufacturer integrated the chipset into their board. They worked with Intel, or Intel's spec/API directly. They are responsible for your machine's interaction with the CPU. The same is true of all the devices directly integrated into your motherboard. Broadcom/Intel wireless chipset, Ethernet, audio, etc.
revmoo 9y ago
So does this updated firmware remove the backdoor or just re-secure it so it can't be removed?
- berbec 9y ago
  Best I can tell, the are re-locking the door and hoping no one else picks the lock.
aeleos 9y ago
Wow all 6th, 7th and 8th gen are all vulnerable along with a bunch of Xeon processors. Even the laptop I am typing this on is vulnerable, this is going to be messy. Plus all the fun vulnerabilities like arbitrary code execution, unauthorized access to privileged content. These must be related to the blackhat talk coming up in December about hacking a turned-off computer and running unsigned code on ME [0]. Yep and the two researches doing the talk are the two people credited in this announcement, Mark Ermolov and Maxim Goryachy. Great work by them finding these vulnerabilities and disclosing them, these are the kind of vulnerabilities that the NSA would salivate over. I wonder if this will at all dissuade either Intel or AMD into continuing to make these super privileged processors whose functions are completely hidden. The cynic in me thinks that this will change absolutely nothing. There is a great website called The Bad Thing [1] that has compiled the known information about Intel ME. I just ran the detection tool on my laptop and I am running a vulnerable version of Intel ME, but I can't even do anything about it until my system manufacturer provides a patch for it. I feel like this is going to be one of those situations that ends up leaving millions of devices unpatched and vulnerable a few years down the road. [0]: https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/briefings/schedule/#how-to-hack-a-turned-off-computer-or-running-unsigned-code-in-intel-management-engine-8668 https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/briefings/schedule/#how-to-ha... [1]: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~davide/bad_thing.html https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~davide/bad_thing.html
- toyg 9y ago
  > I wonder if this will at all dissuade either Intel or AMD into continuing to make these super privileged processors They clearly invested some serious money into this sort of thing and see it as a differentiator (or AMD wouldn't have followed suit). Chances that they'll throw it all away because of a few vulnerabilities are very, very thin.
  - chocolatebunny 9y ago
    Throwing it away is unlikely but the fact that this affects Xeon processors means that pretty much every single data center across the world could be affected. And that means that a lot of companies with a lot of money will complain.
teolandon 9y ago
This time it's only 6th Generation Core processors and up? I thought even the older ones had pretty much the same version of ME installed, which had the previous vulnerability.
- my123 9y ago
  6th gen and later ME are fully different. They are Minix and x86-based, while earlier ME is ARCCompact with the ThreadX RTOS
eecc 9y ago
Wow, just imagine what this means to cloud, you get to own not one server of an org... but several orgs at the same time!
pwdisswordfish2 9y ago
Original title: "Security vulnerabilities discovered in Intel ME"
- nullc 9y ago
  The original title was more accurate.
polskibus 9y ago
Can this vulnerability be used to take over public cloud?
- my123 9y ago
  MEI is only exposed to the VM host, not to the guests thankfully.
xwvvvvwx 9y ago
Unreal. Kept scrolling and the vulnerabilities kept coming. Most annoying thing is that there isn’t even a real alternative. If I understand it right then AMD chips have pretty much the same thing?
- thg 9y ago
  Well, maybe AMD does at least some security reviewing on their own? /s ARM could be a affordable alternative to x86 if that works for you.
  - tdb7893 9y ago
    What's the state of x86 emulation on ARM? Using ARM before that might be a dealbreaker. If I remember correctly Microsoft was working on it
    - my123 9y ago
      Release is on track for December 2017, but Qualcomm chips have ME-like firmware too (from SCM to the modem)
  - agumonkey 9y ago
    it's less painful if you only pay half for being pwnd
  - bryanbuckley 9y ago
    AMD PSP is an ARM core. Running some derivative of Trustonic OS (based on L4), if I'm not mistaken.
    - em3rgent0rdr 9y ago
      Somewhat numerous that the most secure OS kernel (the L4) is utilized in a bad way to result in a less secure system overall.
  - disconnected 9y ago
hoodoof 9y ago
I'd have preferred to hear something along the lines of "We'll be stopping implementing this technology in future CPUs"
- vellipylly 9y ago
  +1
- CodeWriter23 9y ago
  Or at least a jumper-select to disable it.
k2enemy 9y ago
It looks like they specifically label CVEs that require local access as such. Does anyone know if "via unspecified vector" means network access?
- dboreham 9y ago
  Surely in that case it would say something like "attacker with access to the lan connected to the machine's NIC" ?
En_gr_Student 9y ago
So after it is exposed, after 3 generations of products, do they admit it is not a "feature". I can't imagine why they thought this kind of escalation couldn't be cracked by a 3rd party, or how it would bring brand value. This is "clipper" and yes, the hacker can control it. Dangit. Sell-outs. I'm just waiting for the ransomware that lives on AME, and is burned to the various dies instead of on hard-drives. Isn't that what this open door means?
dboreham 9y ago
I don't see any remote exploits here (other than "attacker with remote admin access..."). Is that correct? Presumably an attacker with remote admin access is already all powerful? Or is the concern that they can backdoor the hardware in an undetectable way, remotely?
- reificator 9y ago
  A vulnerability where someone can remote control your machine is bad. A vulnerability where someone can remote control your machine even after you swap out all local storage and install a new OS is another thing entirely.
  - dboreham 9y ago
    True but I'd still like the nature of access required to exercise these vulnerabilities clearly defined. e.g. if I have a box that I've maintained strict physical control over, and not allowed admin access to an attacker, does that mean said box can't have been subverted via these vulnerabilities?
jlgaddis 9y ago
I prefer the wording in Lenovo's security advisory [0]: > "Potential Impact: An attacker could load and execute arbitrary code outside the visibility of the user, operating system, and hypervisor/virtualization platform; resulting in exfiltration of secrets, subtle manipulation of system operation, or denial of service." [0]: https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297 https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297
- loop0 9y ago
  It is nice to know lenovo already has the updates, but sadly I'm gonna have to install windows for that :(
  - criddell 9y ago
    Send me your IP and I'll patch it for you.
    - kome 9y ago
      first "ahahaha" then "sigh..."
    - throwaway613834 9y ago
      Wouldn't really work behind a NAT...
      - abainbridge 9y ago
        Unless the NAT is running on an affected processor... (Which is unlikely if its a COTS dedicated router).
  - deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    Go for the "bootable CD" option, if it's available. You don't need Windows for that. My ThinkPads all run Linux and I have no problems updating them.
dboreham 9y ago
Does "attacker with local access to the system" mean "physical access to the system"?? Initially I thought it meant "attacker able to run an unprivileged process on the system" but then I see other wording that seems to imply that case, so does "local access" mean physical access? (e.g. connect a USB drive, boot the box off their own media?)
- berbec 9y ago
  The examples I've heard about are plugging a usb drive in and that's the ballgame. The big one, that I have not heard of, would be accessing the ME and privilege elevation over network.
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    It would be a little more interesting if a "virtual USB drive" (similar to a virtual floppy/CD-ROM drive) in remote consoles (BMC/iDRAC/ILO/IPMI/etc.) could be used to exploit it.
  - jackhack 9y ago
    Network is a problem. As I understand it, the ME subsystem is an overseer, and is running even if your main PC is powered off. It has control over the network, unobservable from the downstream CPU/OS. It could therefore receive commands/input from the network and update itself while "off", or transmit data outbound. So unless the system is unplugged from the wall, the ME subsystem could be doing God-knows-what.
jlgaddis 9y ago
In my case, their Linux detection tool is less than useless: $ sudo ./intel_sa00086.py ... *** Risk Assessment *** Detection Error: This system may be vulnerable, please install the Intel(R) MEI/TXEI driver (available from your system manufacturer). ... Thanks, Intel! If you have a Lenovo machine, check Lenovo's security advisory [0] to see if it is affected. Intel has the wrong URL in their link. Edit: FWIW, the (Linux) tool creates a .log (and .xml) file in the current directory that was slightly more helpful: $ tail -n 4 SA-00086-cluefire-2017-11-20-21-09-36.log HECI error: No device with MKHI found[2] Can't find SPS version in the tool output Status: HECI_NOT_INSTALLED Tool Stopped This workstation doesn't have an "HECI" [1], apparently. It does have SPS, but "spsInfoLinux64" throws an error too: Error 9460: Unknown or unsupported hardware platform This box has 2 x E5-2620 v4 CPUs so it is reportedly "not affected" but I thought I'd double-check anyways. Oh well, I won't miss out on all the excitement -- I'll still get to have some fun updating my other machines and all of $work's servers in the datacenters. :/ [0]: https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297 https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297 [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host_Embedded_Controller_Interface https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host_Embedded_Controller_Inter...
- aeleos 9y ago
  I get the exact same thing, I might be wrong but I don't think that the windows version does anything different. According to the website it seems that the vendor needs to provide software to patch the firmware.
fencepost 9y ago
The question then becomes which of any of these can be exploited by a non administrator local user or remotely via LAN (which might include the local machine depending on handling of loop back). Personally I can already see a bunch of on site upgrades I'm probably going to have to do for small clients. I almost wish it covered 3rd-5th generation, just to help me push some folks to upgrade.
Sephr 9y ago
They still haven't publicly documented and supported the HAP bit. If Intel actually cared about your security they would document that. It says so right in the security advisory that the external researchers are the reason for the security review, and not due to customer concerns.
wonderous 9y ago
Anyone able to explain why Intel’s severity rating for this is “important” and not “critical”; meaning of the terms per Intel’s own words: “Critical: A vulnerability, which if exploited, would allow remote execution of malicious code without user action.” “Important: A vulnerability, which if exploited, would directly impact the confidentiality, integrity or availability of user’s data or processing resources.“
- openasocket 9y ago
  This doesn't allow remote access, just privilege escalation. So you'd already have to have some degree of access to the system to be able to use this vulnerability.
lifty 9y ago
Does anyone have an idea to what extent macbooks are affected? Intel ME is baked in every CPU but according to The Register [0] the AMT part is not running on Apple hardware. [0]: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/01/intel_amt_me_vulnerability/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/01/intel_amt_me_vulner...
- giobox 9y ago
  Most reports I've read, including the one you have just linked, state Apple hardware as unaffected by this.
  - tmsldd 9y ago
    Is there a official position/statement from Apple on this?
    - robertcw_3rd 9y ago
      No, not yet. I went into my local Apple store and brought it up to one of the genius's and they haven't heard anything at all about the exploit from HQ. But, I can confirm that Intel's ME is present in all Apple macs. The physical hardware is completely unchanged according to the Apple genius bar employee. It's unclear to me whether or not Apple uses Intel firmware for the non AMT portions of ME. I will report back to you when I find out. However, the evidence I've seen so far isn't looking too good, and it definitely looks like the vast majority of macs made in the last 5 years are all vulnerable, many appearing to run outdated Intel firmware to boot -- not good for Apple. The evidence can be seen here, https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/306959/intel-management-engine-is-macos-vulnerable https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/306959/intel-manag... where some people run a python program to check the version of their ME firmware (which works and returns numbers completely consistent with Intel firmware numbering). I wonder if Apple just isn't aware of the hack yet?
- TD-Linux 9y ago
  These most recent vulnerabilities don't require AMT. I don't see any reports of me_cleaner being used on a Mac yet, but I'd assume they are running the same ME firmware as everything else unless there is evidence otherwise.
partycoder 9y ago
The ME should not even exist. Best way to secure it is to remove it. Problem solved. They will of course not let go because it's a backdoor. It's an overprivileged computer within your computer.
- vellipylly 9y ago
  true that
- arca_vorago 9y ago
  The NSA has an NSL and threats of jail to anyone at Intel who pushes back against this. Inslaw and Promis was always leading to this, and that's why they killed Danny Casalero.
revelation 9y ago
It's bad enough Intel have created the ultimate trojan, but their detection tool can't even fix the problem! The tool rightly points out that my desktop consumer system is vulnerable (from the list, no Intel CPU manufactured in the last 5 years isn't), then suggests I contact the manufacturer for an update. Here is what the tool says my system manufacturer is: Manufacturer: To Be Filled By O.E.M. Model: To Be Filled By O.E.M. I will get right on that and bug "To Be Filled By O.E.M." for an update! It's an ASRock motherboard, by the way. But with this approach they are not going to patch even 5% of personal computers out there..
- kw71 9y ago
  This isn't uncommon. You're not wrong to expect that, if they did not do their job when configuring these data, they will not do anything to support you postsale. Their lifecycles are so short maybe your product is several generations old now. Some of the board vendors do a better job, but usually still not as good as "namebrand computers." There is a lot of engineering work that goes into integration. It's not readily visible to endusers/consumers and therefore difficult for us to appreciate it or evaluate it for completeness or accuracy. I hope that someone does a survey of computer and board vendors' support for this problem. I would like to see who abandons products last.
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
mysterypie 9y ago
When I run the detection tool, I get: Based on the analysis performed by this tool: Detection Error: This system may be vulnerable, please install the Intel(R) MEI/TXEI driver (available from your system manufacturer). Does that mean that the Intel ME is disabled, so I don't have to worry about it? I certainly don't want to install anything that might enable the Intel ME if it's already disabled! What a quandary. This reminds me of all the information I was asked to give to get a detailed credit report. If I didn't give it, they weren't going to give me the report. If I gave it, they would add to my credit file even if they never had it before.
- rst 9y ago
  That's what you get if the tool can't identify the ME version. (I get "not vulnerable" if I run the script with sudo -- ME version too old for these vulns, though likely has other, undisclosed vulns -- but without sudo, I get "may be vulnerable", since it can't talk to the kernel driver.)
xwvvvvwx 9y ago
Could someone explain what Management Engine is actually used for? It’s still not really clear to me why it needs to exist at all. Serious question.
- ficklepickle 9y ago
  Remote administration. Installing a new OS remotely, for example. There is legit demand for that. Imagine manually re-imaging 1000 workstations or servers.
  - vellipylly 9y ago
    yes, very useful for an enterprise and completely useless/potentially dangerous for consumers.
  - akvadrako 9y ago
    That is AMT, which is just one application on the ME. More in general it aims to handle things the system should do independently of the OS, even when powered down. That _can_ include advanced power management, secure computing stuff, watchdog functions and stuff like that.
stablemap 9y ago
Helpful thread from Matthew Garrett at Google: https://twitter.com/mjg59/status/932730696614813696 https://twitter.com/mjg59/status/932730696614813696
trisimix 9y ago
Hackings back baby, whose ready for Hackers 2?
0culus 9y ago
How does this affect Apple products? I've looked around for discussion of Intel ME with regards to Apple and the silence out there is deafening. [edit] I guess I also want to know is, does Apple provide Intel firmware patches bundled with their own software update?
- mrsteveman1 9y ago
  I suspect they'll be patching this one, but I don't know if they have updated the ME firmware in the past. However, Intel's own platform tools (MEInfo and MEManuf running in a UEFI shell) can't even communicate with the ME on my 2015 Macbook Pro, so I would be quite interested to know what exactly they have done differently with regard to configuring the platform. People have been archiving every version of the ME firmware for each chipset, and it would appear there are some versions that may be specific to Apple hardware. I'm not sure what is different, if anything, but you can see (and download) the particular firmware versions here: https://www.win-raid.com/t596f39-Intel-Management-Engine-Drivers-Firmware-amp-System-Tools.html https://www.win-raid.com/t596f39-Intel-Management-Engine-Dri...
  - 0culus 9y ago
    Very interesting! Thanks for the link. I'm curious if Apple has done something to disable it either themselves or via a special deal with Intel. It's also interestingly timed with the announcement of the new iMac apparently having an A10 coprocessor.[0] [0]: https://www.macrumors.com/2017/11/19/imac-pro-a10-chip-hey-siri/ https://www.macrumors.com/2017/11/19/imac-pro-a10-chip-hey-s...
locusm 9y ago
What was wrong with IPMI for out of band management? What problem was ME actually solving?
- cjpb 9y ago
  The question I think people should be asking is not "what problem was it solving?", but rather "why was it implemented directly into the processors hardware/firmware?"
computator 9y ago
Don't rush to apply the Intel ME patch! Several HN users here (beefhash, jlgaddis, joe_the_user) have raised the possibility that applying the patch might make it impossible to get rid of the Intel ME entirely. If you don't apply the patch, someone may come up with a nice new exploit (using the security bugs) to completely remove the Intel ME. If you do apply the patch, it might close off possible exploits and you'll be left with an Intel ME that's impossible to remove.
- nullc 9y ago
  Right now to remove ME you need to connect an external flash programmer. It seems really unlikely that anything they do with a firmware update will be able to block that at least if someone can get a pre-change image. Maybe there is a way to reprogram to disable ME without the flash programmer which these fixes may block. If my laptop weren't already ME disabled, I'd probably apply the fixes.
  - pas 9y ago
    > .. can get a pre-change image. Isn't there an "eFUSE-like" counter that prevents firmware rollback?
- beefhash 9y ago
  While we're on the topic -- is there some IRC channel or something dedicated to Intel ME research?
  - exikyut 9y ago
    Good question. I'm not aware of any; I say make one. The question is what the best IRC server would be to use; considerations include reputation and "unpopularity", ie certain overly busy networks may scare some people away. There's also the possibility of using Discord. The main issue is encryption; most won't have any opinions on the subject, but more vocal types who may be useful to have on board may insist on specific forms of security in order to participate. Just my 2c
  - 9y ago
unixhero 9y ago
Would you upgrade the firmware or leave it in? Who knows what benefits this defect can give you down the line. Maybe it will be possible to take over the entire Management Engine. That would be neat.
arca_vorago 9y ago
So when do I start hearing all the BSD/MIT promoters apologize for allowing this normalization of tivoization and admitting RMS was right all along? Oops, that potentially might interfere with profits, never mind, as you were, keep trying the same ol shit.
- citrin_ru 9y ago
  Cost of licensing closed source or developing own OS for ME is not prohibitive for Intel. No way GPL could prevented creating of Intel ME.
  - arca_vorago 9y ago
    Its the attitude that closed source is OK that is the problem.
fernly 9y ago
The detection tool for Linux is a Python 2 script. It contains ~15 print statements. If you change them to print functions, the script works fine on Python 3. The Intel dudes could have added "from future import print_function" and made it version-independent.
blinkingled 9y ago
So does this mean 5th gen and below ones are not vulnerable or Intel just couldn't be bothered to review the ME version on those? Unclear from the article.
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
tpearson-raptor 9y ago
Yet another reason owner-controlled machines like the Talos™ II [0] are so important. Yes, it may cost a bit more up front, but what's the cost again of having your data stolen and then, especially with the older machines here, having to replace all of your hardware to boot? Plus, purchasing machines like that one not only sends a clear signal that we want backdoor-free computing, but also allows the further development of more libre computing options. Wouldn't you rather have Linux and BSD as first-class citizens on new hardware, instead of always needing to play catch-up from behind? [0] https://raptorcs.com/TALOSII/ https://raptorcs.com/TALOSII/
- reirob 9y ago
  From their FAQ: Q: Why preorders? Why can't I evaluate a production machine right now? A: Although we have Talos™ II hardware in our labs, IBM has not yet released the POWER9 CPU to the general public. The POWER9 launch is scheduled for Q4 this year; we intend to make Talos™ II available to everyone shortly after POWER9 launch via our pre-order model. This model allows us to manage supply of the Talos™ II systems for Q4 shipment, and we intend to transition to a more standard ordering model once the POWER9 processor has reached general availablility (GA). Orders placed after our pre-order cutoff will not ship until 2018, and you would be missing out on the benefits of early market access to the POWER9 processor, so we strongly recommend that you place your pre-order as quickly as possible!
vellipylly 9y ago
what i don't get is how would the consumer benefit of having these features? it all looks like a nonsense to me and I'd rather live without it. i think it's time to say goodbye to Intel and opt for another vendor.
- kowdermeister 9y ago
  That's the problem. There are no REAL alternatives.
  - vellipylly 9y ago
    I'd be glad to switch to raspberry pie or AMD, but I don't know whether or not those chips have similar crap in them. is the Intel alone with this? do others do it too?
_pmf_ 9y ago
Ah, the smell of a billion dollar class action lawsuit in the morning!
nly 9y ago
So while us technonerds wait and see whether our OEMs will bother to push out firmware updates sometime in the next 6 months, remember that 99% of users will go unpatched anyway because grandma never upgrades her BIOS.
jacquesm 9y ago
So, what's the best ARM based laptop that runs without binary blobs?
avocad 9y ago
This reminded me of the famous lecture by Ken Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust: https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thomp... Basically you have to trust the compiler because it compiles all code on your system, including itself. Not entirely the same, and I think the Intel trick is more nefarious.
geth 9y ago
I would be curious to know what the attack scenario is exactly? I assume this is local, not remote, but the article is not very specific. Furthermore, has any kind of PoC been published?

522 points by marksamman 9y ago

Good times when kernel privilege escalation was the worst you had to fear. I'm not familiar enough with the Intel ME to tell, but could this possibly be exploited with the arbitrary code execution in the ME being used to set the HAP bit without requiring hardware intervention?

jlgaddis 9y ago
That'd be pretty sweet, wouldn't it? Maybe I'll hold off on patching for a bit.
- mysterypie 9y ago
  > Maybe I'll hold off on patching for a bit. I think you're suggesting extremely interesting but I'm not totally clear on it. So someone[1] has come up with some code to either disable (kill switch) or remove the Intel ME. (Setting the HAP bit is the kill switch.) Now Intel and its vendors are going to issue a patch for the Intel ME. Are you saying that as a result of applying this patch we might not be able disable or remove the Intel ME? In other words, we'll end up with a slightly more secure Intel ME, but be worse off since we can't exploit any bugs to get rid of it? If I'm understanding you correctly, this sounds like the iPhone situation: upgrade to a newer iOS and lose the ability to jailbreak. [1] https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/wiki/HAP-AltMeDisable-bit https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/wiki/HAP-AltMeDisable-bi...
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    Basically, yeah. Hold off on patching this vulnerability so that it can be exploited later in order to disable ME entirely. Their firmware updates could very well close off these existing "known holes", making them impossible to exploit. If we can take advantage of them to kill the ME entirely, that's even better than Intel releasing this fix.

cjsuk 9y ago

This will be trying to close off the holes used to get at the ME OS I reckon.

sigzero 9y ago
Technically speaking, that is a security vulnerability. So it wouldn't surprise me.

joe_the_user 9y ago

So, will Intel be patching both the vulnerabilities and the kludges people have found to remove ME? Thus making some customers safer while maintaining systemic risk for everyone? "Asking for a friend"

discreditable 9y ago
Intel provides patches to vendors. Vendors provide patches to you eventually or never.
- Sir_Substance 9y ago
  Who is my vendor if I assembled my computer myself?
  - lwhalen 9y ago
    The company who built your motherboard
    - Sir_Substance 9y ago
      I'll take your word for it I guess, but I don't see the logic. Why would my motherboard manufacturer be involved in this process? edit: maximum downvotes for a legitimate question, thanks all
      - nevir 9y ago
        It's a chip that your motherboard manufacturer hardwired in (e.g. part of the chipset). Firmware updates need to go through the efi/bios they set up
      - artimaeis 9y ago
        The motherboard manufacturer integrated the chipset into their board. They worked with Intel, or Intel's spec/API directly. They are responsible for your machine's interaction with the CPU. The same is true of all the devices directly integrated into your motherboard. Broadcom/Intel wireless chipset, Ethernet, audio, etc.

revmoo 9y ago

So does this updated firmware remove the backdoor or just re-secure it so it can't be removed?

berbec 9y ago
Best I can tell, the are re-locking the door and hoping no one else picks the lock.

aeleos 9y ago

Wow all 6th, 7th and 8th gen are all vulnerable along with a bunch of Xeon processors. Even the laptop I am typing this on is vulnerable, this is going to be messy. Plus all the fun vulnerabilities like arbitrary code execution, unauthorized access to privileged content. These must be related to the blackhat talk coming up in December about hacking a turned-off computer and running unsigned code on ME [0]. Yep and the two researches doing the talk are the two people credited in this announcement, Mark Ermolov and Maxim Goryachy. Great work by them finding these vulnerabilities and disclosing them, these are the kind of vulnerabilities that the NSA would salivate over. I wonder if this will at all dissuade either Intel or AMD into continuing to make these super privileged processors whose functions are completely hidden. The cynic in me thinks that this will change absolutely nothing. There is a great website called The Bad Thing [1] that has compiled the known information about Intel ME. I just ran the detection tool on my laptop and I am running a vulnerable version of Intel ME, but I can't even do anything about it until my system manufacturer provides a patch for it. I feel like this is going to be one of those situations that ends up leaving millions of devices unpatched and vulnerable a few years down the road. [0]: https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/briefings/schedule/#how-to-hack-a-turned-off-computer-or-running-unsigned-code-in-intel-management-engine-8668 https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/briefings/schedule/#how-to-ha... [1]: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~davide/bad_thing.html https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~davide/bad_thing.html

toyg 9y ago
> I wonder if this will at all dissuade either Intel or AMD into continuing to make these super privileged processors They clearly invested some serious money into this sort of thing and see it as a differentiator (or AMD wouldn't have followed suit). Chances that they'll throw it all away because of a few vulnerabilities are very, very thin.
- chocolatebunny 9y ago
  Throwing it away is unlikely but the fact that this affects Xeon processors means that pretty much every single data center across the world could be affected. And that means that a lot of companies with a lot of money will complain.

teolandon 9y ago

This time it's only 6th Generation Core processors and up? I thought even the older ones had pretty much the same version of ME installed, which had the previous vulnerability.

my123 9y ago
6th gen and later ME are fully different. They are Minix and x86-based, while earlier ME is ARCCompact with the ThreadX RTOS

eecc 9y ago

Wow, just imagine what this means to cloud, you get to own not one server of an org... but several orgs at the same time!

pwdisswordfish2 9y ago

Original title: "Security vulnerabilities discovered in Intel ME"

nullc 9y ago
The original title was more accurate.

polskibus 9y ago

Can this vulnerability be used to take over public cloud?

my123 9y ago
MEI is only exposed to the VM host, not to the guests thankfully.

xwvvvvwx 9y ago

Unreal. Kept scrolling and the vulnerabilities kept coming. Most annoying thing is that there isn’t even a real alternative. If I understand it right then AMD chips have pretty much the same thing?

thg 9y ago
Well, maybe AMD does at least some security reviewing on their own? /s ARM could be a affordable alternative to x86 if that works for you.
- tdb7893 9y ago
  What's the state of x86 emulation on ARM? Using ARM before that might be a dealbreaker. If I remember correctly Microsoft was working on it
  - my123 9y ago
    Release is on track for December 2017, but Qualcomm chips have ME-like firmware too (from SCM to the modem)
- agumonkey 9y ago
  it's less painful if you only pay half for being pwnd
- bryanbuckley 9y ago
  AMD PSP is an ARM core. Running some derivative of Trustonic OS (based on L4), if I'm not mistaken.
  - em3rgent0rdr 9y ago
    Somewhat numerous that the most secure OS kernel (the L4) is utilized in a bad way to result in a less secure system overall.
- disconnected 9y ago

hoodoof 9y ago

I'd have preferred to hear something along the lines of "We'll be stopping implementing this technology in future CPUs"

vellipylly 9y ago
+1
CodeWriter23 9y ago
Or at least a jumper-select to disable it.

k2enemy 9y ago

It looks like they specifically label CVEs that require local access as such. Does anyone know if "via unspecified vector" means network access?

dboreham 9y ago
Surely in that case it would say something like "attacker with access to the lan connected to the machine's NIC" ?

En_gr_Student 9y ago

So after it is exposed, after 3 generations of products, do they admit it is not a "feature". I can't imagine why they thought this kind of escalation couldn't be cracked by a 3rd party, or how it would bring brand value. This is "clipper" and yes, the hacker can control it. Dangit. Sell-outs. I'm just waiting for the ransomware that lives on AME, and is burned to the various dies instead of on hard-drives. Isn't that what this open door means?

dboreham 9y ago

I don't see any remote exploits here (other than "attacker with remote admin access..."). Is that correct? Presumably an attacker with remote admin access is already all powerful? Or is the concern that they can backdoor the hardware in an undetectable way, remotely?

reificator 9y ago
A vulnerability where someone can remote control your machine is bad. A vulnerability where someone can remote control your machine even after you swap out all local storage and install a new OS is another thing entirely.
- dboreham 9y ago
  True but I'd still like the nature of access required to exercise these vulnerabilities clearly defined. e.g. if I have a box that I've maintained strict physical control over, and not allowed admin access to an attacker, does that mean said box can't have been subverted via these vulnerabilities?

jlgaddis 9y ago

I prefer the wording in Lenovo's security advisory [0]: > "Potential Impact: An attacker could load and execute arbitrary code outside the visibility of the user, operating system, and hypervisor/virtualization platform; resulting in exfiltration of secrets, subtle manipulation of system operation, or denial of service." [0]: https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297 https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297

loop0 9y ago
It is nice to know lenovo already has the updates, but sadly I'm gonna have to install windows for that :(
- criddell 9y ago
  Send me your IP and I'll patch it for you.
  - kome 9y ago
    first "ahahaha" then "sigh..."
  - throwaway613834 9y ago
    Wouldn't really work behind a NAT...
    - abainbridge 9y ago
      Unless the NAT is running on an affected processor... (Which is unlikely if its a COTS dedicated router).
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  Go for the "bootable CD" option, if it's available. You don't need Windows for that. My ThinkPads all run Linux and I have no problems updating them.

dboreham 9y ago

Does "attacker with local access to the system" mean "physical access to the system"?? Initially I thought it meant "attacker able to run an unprivileged process on the system" but then I see other wording that seems to imply that case, so does "local access" mean physical access? (e.g. connect a USB drive, boot the box off their own media?)

berbec 9y ago
The examples I've heard about are plugging a usb drive in and that's the ballgame. The big one, that I have not heard of, would be accessing the ME and privilege elevation over network.
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  It would be a little more interesting if a "virtual USB drive" (similar to a virtual floppy/CD-ROM drive) in remote consoles (BMC/iDRAC/ILO/IPMI/etc.) could be used to exploit it.
- jackhack 9y ago
  Network is a problem. As I understand it, the ME subsystem is an overseer, and is running even if your main PC is powered off. It has control over the network, unobservable from the downstream CPU/OS. It could therefore receive commands/input from the network and update itself while "off", or transmit data outbound. So unless the system is unplugged from the wall, the ME subsystem could be doing God-knows-what.

jlgaddis 9y ago

In my case, their Linux detection tool is less than useless: $ sudo ./intel_sa00086.py ... *** Risk Assessment *** Detection Error: This system may be vulnerable, please install the Intel(R) MEI/TXEI driver (available from your system manufacturer). ... Thanks, Intel! If you have a Lenovo machine, check Lenovo's security advisory [0] to see if it is affected. Intel has the wrong URL in their link. Edit: FWIW, the (Linux) tool creates a .log (and .xml) file in the current directory that was slightly more helpful: $ tail -n 4 SA-00086-cluefire-2017-11-20-21-09-36.log HECI error: No device with MKHI found[2] Can't find SPS version in the tool output Status: HECI_NOT_INSTALLED Tool Stopped This workstation doesn't have an "HECI" [1], apparently. It does have SPS, but "spsInfoLinux64" throws an error too: Error 9460: Unknown or unsupported hardware platform This box has 2 x E5-2620 v4 CPUs so it is reportedly "not affected" but I thought I'd double-check anyways. Oh well, I won't miss out on all the excitement -- I'll still get to have some fun updating my other machines and all of $work's servers in the datacenters. :/ [0]: https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297 https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len-17297 [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host_Embedded_Controller_Interface https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host_Embedded_Controller_Inter...

aeleos 9y ago
I get the exact same thing, I might be wrong but I don't think that the windows version does anything different. According to the website it seems that the vendor needs to provide software to patch the firmware.

fencepost 9y ago

The question then becomes which of any of these can be exploited by a non administrator local user or remotely via LAN (which might include the local machine depending on handling of loop back). Personally I can already see a bunch of on site upgrades I'm probably going to have to do for small clients. I almost wish it covered 3rd-5th generation, just to help me push some folks to upgrade.

Sephr 9y ago

They still haven't publicly documented and supported the HAP bit. If Intel actually cared about your security they would document that. It says so right in the security advisory that the external researchers are the reason for the security review, and not due to customer concerns.

wonderous 9y ago

Anyone able to explain why Intel’s severity rating for this is “important” and not “critical”; meaning of the terms per Intel’s own words: “Critical: A vulnerability, which if exploited, would allow remote execution of malicious code without user action.” “Important: A vulnerability, which if exploited, would directly impact the confidentiality, integrity or availability of user’s data or processing resources.“

openasocket 9y ago
This doesn't allow remote access, just privilege escalation. So you'd already have to have some degree of access to the system to be able to use this vulnerability.

lifty 9y ago

Does anyone have an idea to what extent macbooks are affected? Intel ME is baked in every CPU but according to The Register [0] the AMT part is not running on Apple hardware. [0]: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/01/intel_amt_me_vulnerability/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/01/intel_amt_me_vulner...

giobox 9y ago
Most reports I've read, including the one you have just linked, state Apple hardware as unaffected by this.
- tmsldd 9y ago
  Is there a official position/statement from Apple on this?
  - robertcw_3rd 9y ago
    No, not yet. I went into my local Apple store and brought it up to one of the genius's and they haven't heard anything at all about the exploit from HQ. But, I can confirm that Intel's ME is present in all Apple macs. The physical hardware is completely unchanged according to the Apple genius bar employee. It's unclear to me whether or not Apple uses Intel firmware for the non AMT portions of ME. I will report back to you when I find out. However, the evidence I've seen so far isn't looking too good, and it definitely looks like the vast majority of macs made in the last 5 years are all vulnerable, many appearing to run outdated Intel firmware to boot -- not good for Apple. The evidence can be seen here, https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/306959/intel-management-engine-is-macos-vulnerable https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/306959/intel-manag... where some people run a python program to check the version of their ME firmware (which works and returns numbers completely consistent with Intel firmware numbering). I wonder if Apple just isn't aware of the hack yet?
TD-Linux 9y ago
These most recent vulnerabilities don't require AMT. I don't see any reports of me_cleaner being used on a Mac yet, but I'd assume they are running the same ME firmware as everything else unless there is evidence otherwise.

partycoder 9y ago

The ME should not even exist. Best way to secure it is to remove it. Problem solved. They will of course not let go because it's a backdoor. It's an overprivileged computer within your computer.

vellipylly 9y ago
true that
arca_vorago 9y ago
The NSA has an NSL and threats of jail to anyone at Intel who pushes back against this. Inslaw and Promis was always leading to this, and that's why they killed Danny Casalero.

revelation 9y ago

It's bad enough Intel have created the ultimate trojan, but their detection tool can't even fix the problem! The tool rightly points out that my desktop consumer system is vulnerable (from the list, no Intel CPU manufactured in the last 5 years isn't), then suggests I contact the manufacturer for an update. Here is what the tool says my system manufacturer is: Manufacturer: To Be Filled By O.E.M. Model: To Be Filled By O.E.M. I will get right on that and bug "To Be Filled By O.E.M." for an update! It's an ASRock motherboard, by the way. But with this approach they are not going to patch even 5% of personal computers out there..

kw71 9y ago
This isn't uncommon. You're not wrong to expect that, if they did not do their job when configuring these data, they will not do anything to support you postsale. Their lifecycles are so short maybe your product is several generations old now. Some of the board vendors do a better job, but usually still not as good as "namebrand computers." There is a lot of engineering work that goes into integration. It's not readily visible to endusers/consumers and therefore difficult for us to appreciate it or evaluate it for completeness or accuracy. I hope that someone does a survey of computer and board vendors' support for this problem. I would like to see who abandons products last.

deleted 9y ago

[deleted]

mysterypie 9y ago

When I run the detection tool, I get: Based on the analysis performed by this tool: Detection Error: This system may be vulnerable, please install the Intel(R) MEI/TXEI driver (available from your system manufacturer). Does that mean that the Intel ME is disabled, so I don't have to worry about it? I certainly don't want to install anything that might enable the Intel ME if it's already disabled! What a quandary. This reminds me of all the information I was asked to give to get a detailed credit report. If I didn't give it, they weren't going to give me the report. If I gave it, they would add to my credit file even if they never had it before.

rst 9y ago
That's what you get if the tool can't identify the ME version. (I get "not vulnerable" if I run the script with sudo -- ME version too old for these vulns, though likely has other, undisclosed vulns -- but without sudo, I get "may be vulnerable", since it can't talk to the kernel driver.)

xwvvvvwx 9y ago

Could someone explain what Management Engine is actually used for? It’s still not really clear to me why it needs to exist at all. Serious question.

ficklepickle 9y ago
Remote administration. Installing a new OS remotely, for example. There is legit demand for that. Imagine manually re-imaging 1000 workstations or servers.
- vellipylly 9y ago
  yes, very useful for an enterprise and completely useless/potentially dangerous for consumers.
- akvadrako 9y ago
  That is AMT, which is just one application on the ME. More in general it aims to handle things the system should do independently of the OS, even when powered down. That _can_ include advanced power management, secure computing stuff, watchdog functions and stuff like that.

stablemap 9y ago

Helpful thread from Matthew Garrett at Google: https://twitter.com/mjg59/status/932730696614813696 https://twitter.com/mjg59/status/932730696614813696

trisimix 9y ago

Hackings back baby, whose ready for Hackers 2?

0culus 9y ago

How does this affect Apple products? I've looked around for discussion of Intel ME with regards to Apple and the silence out there is deafening. [edit] I guess I also want to know is, does Apple provide Intel firmware patches bundled with their own software update?

mrsteveman1 9y ago
I suspect they'll be patching this one, but I don't know if they have updated the ME firmware in the past. However, Intel's own platform tools (MEInfo and MEManuf running in a UEFI shell) can't even communicate with the ME on my 2015 Macbook Pro, so I would be quite interested to know what exactly they have done differently with regard to configuring the platform. People have been archiving every version of the ME firmware for each chipset, and it would appear there are some versions that may be specific to Apple hardware. I'm not sure what is different, if anything, but you can see (and download) the particular firmware versions here: https://www.win-raid.com/t596f39-Intel-Management-Engine-Drivers-Firmware-amp-System-Tools.html https://www.win-raid.com/t596f39-Intel-Management-Engine-Dri...
- 0culus 9y ago
  Very interesting! Thanks for the link. I'm curious if Apple has done something to disable it either themselves or via a special deal with Intel. It's also interestingly timed with the announcement of the new iMac apparently having an A10 coprocessor.[0] [0]: https://www.macrumors.com/2017/11/19/imac-pro-a10-chip-hey-siri/ https://www.macrumors.com/2017/11/19/imac-pro-a10-chip-hey-s...

locusm 9y ago

What was wrong with IPMI for out of band management? What problem was ME actually solving?

cjpb 9y ago
The question I think people should be asking is not "what problem was it solving?", but rather "why was it implemented directly into the processors hardware/firmware?"

computator 9y ago

Don't rush to apply the Intel ME patch! Several HN users here (beefhash, jlgaddis, joe_the_user) have raised the possibility that applying the patch might make it impossible to get rid of the Intel ME entirely. If you don't apply the patch, someone may come up with a nice new exploit (using the security bugs) to completely remove the Intel ME. If you do apply the patch, it might close off possible exploits and you'll be left with an Intel ME that's impossible to remove.

nullc 9y ago
Right now to remove ME you need to connect an external flash programmer. It seems really unlikely that anything they do with a firmware update will be able to block that at least if someone can get a pre-change image. Maybe there is a way to reprogram to disable ME without the flash programmer which these fixes may block. If my laptop weren't already ME disabled, I'd probably apply the fixes.
- pas 9y ago
  > .. can get a pre-change image. Isn't there an "eFUSE-like" counter that prevents firmware rollback?
beefhash 9y ago
While we're on the topic -- is there some IRC channel or something dedicated to Intel ME research?
- exikyut 9y ago
  Good question. I'm not aware of any; I say make one. The question is what the best IRC server would be to use; considerations include reputation and "unpopularity", ie certain overly busy networks may scare some people away. There's also the possibility of using Discord. The main issue is encryption; most won't have any opinions on the subject, but more vocal types who may be useful to have on board may insist on specific forms of security in order to participate. Just my 2c
- 9y ago

unixhero 9y ago

Would you upgrade the firmware or leave it in? Who knows what benefits this defect can give you down the line. Maybe it will be possible to take over the entire Management Engine. That would be neat.

arca_vorago 9y ago

So when do I start hearing all the BSD/MIT promoters apologize for allowing this normalization of tivoization and admitting RMS was right all along? Oops, that potentially might interfere with profits, never mind, as you were, keep trying the same ol shit.

citrin_ru 9y ago
Cost of licensing closed source or developing own OS for ME is not prohibitive for Intel. No way GPL could prevented creating of Intel ME.
- arca_vorago 9y ago
  Its the attitude that closed source is OK that is the problem.

fernly 9y ago

The detection tool for Linux is a Python 2 script. It contains ~15 print statements. If you change them to print functions, the script works fine on Python 3. The Intel dudes could have added "from future import print_function" and made it version-independent.

blinkingled 9y ago

So does this mean 5th gen and below ones are not vulnerable or Intel just couldn't be bothered to review the ME version on those? Unclear from the article.

deleted 9y ago

[deleted]

tpearson-raptor 9y ago

Yet another reason owner-controlled machines like the Talos™ II [0] are so important. Yes, it may cost a bit more up front, but what's the cost again of having your data stolen and then, especially with the older machines here, having to replace all of your hardware to boot? Plus, purchasing machines like that one not only sends a clear signal that we want backdoor-free computing, but also allows the further development of more libre computing options. Wouldn't you rather have Linux and BSD as first-class citizens on new hardware, instead of always needing to play catch-up from behind? [0] https://raptorcs.com/TALOSII/ https://raptorcs.com/TALOSII/

reirob 9y ago
From their FAQ: Q: Why preorders? Why can't I evaluate a production machine right now? A: Although we have Talos™ II hardware in our labs, IBM has not yet released the POWER9 CPU to the general public. The POWER9 launch is scheduled for Q4 this year; we intend to make Talos™ II available to everyone shortly after POWER9 launch via our pre-order model. This model allows us to manage supply of the Talos™ II systems for Q4 shipment, and we intend to transition to a more standard ordering model once the POWER9 processor has reached general availablility (GA). Orders placed after our pre-order cutoff will not ship until 2018, and you would be missing out on the benefits of early market access to the POWER9 processor, so we strongly recommend that you place your pre-order as quickly as possible!

vellipylly 9y ago

what i don't get is how would the consumer benefit of having these features? it all looks like a nonsense to me and I'd rather live without it. i think it's time to say goodbye to Intel and opt for another vendor.

kowdermeister 9y ago
That's the problem. There are no REAL alternatives.
- vellipylly 9y ago
  I'd be glad to switch to raspberry pie or AMD, but I don't know whether or not those chips have similar crap in them. is the Intel alone with this? do others do it too?

_pmf_ 9y ago

Ah, the smell of a billion dollar class action lawsuit in the morning!

nly 9y ago

So while us technonerds wait and see whether our OEMs will bother to push out firmware updates sometime in the next 6 months, remember that 99% of users will go unpatched anyway because grandma never upgrades her BIOS.

jacquesm 9y ago

So, what's the best ARM based laptop that runs without binary blobs?

avocad 9y ago

This reminded me of the famous lecture by Ken Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust: https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thomp... Basically you have to trust the compiler because it compiles all code on your system, including itself. Not entirely the same, and I think the Intel trick is more nefarious.

geth 9y ago

I would be curious to know what the attack scenario is exactly? I assume this is local, not remote, but the article is not very specific. Furthermore, has any kind of PoC been published?