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> one has to trust Mozilla not to do that. Exactly. One has to trust Mozilla every time one visits the page. They could easily configure it to be malicious o

by zeveb 9y ago

> one has to trust Mozilla not to do that. Exactly. One has to trust Mozilla every time one visits the page. They could easily configure it to be malicious one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that they would be caught? Web-page-based crypto is fundamentally insecure, and Mozilla is committing an extremely grave error in encouraging users to trust it (as they also do with their Firefox Accounts). Security is important, and snake-oil solutions are worse than worthless.

edanm 9y ago
The way this gets solved in the real world is through contracts - they have a certain contract with you, and if they break it, they can get sued and lose a lot of money. This is one of the goals of the legal system - make it so we usually trust each other. There are no real long-term technical solutions to this problem. So if you want to make sure you're safe, read their EULA or equivalent.
- cyphar 9y ago
  Or you can design a system (like any number of crypto systems) that aren't vulnerable to these sorts of attacks. A compromised CDN could cause this problem, which now means that Mozilla would be liable for things that they don't administer. And resolving technical problems through the legal system never works well. If you can design something so users don't have to constantly trust you, then that's a much better solution. Not to mention that Send likely doesn't have a warranty (like most software under a free software license).
Yoric 9y ago
Send is meant to be an improvement on Dropbox & co for a specific use case. Is it perfect? No, it isn't. But it is still a considerable improvement. If you have a better solution in mind for the average user crowd, feel free to suggest it, of course.
- jhasse 9y ago
  Sending the file over an end to end encrypted chat app.
  - codebolt 9y ago
    Even then, you are trusting the app to do what it says it's going to do. The only way I feel 100% safe is encrypting the file manually before sending (through whatever platform), and sharing the key through some other medium (preferably word of mouth). As a Windows user I mostly use 7-zip for this purpose, or the encryption plugin in Notepad++ for text.
    - cyphar 9y ago
      If the app is free software it can be audited. The problem with web-based crypto is that you're downloading a new program every page refresh and executing it immediately. If you're worried about a free software app not encrypting things properly, I'd be worried about the tools you use manually doing the right thing as well. While I agree that doing it manually is the only reliable way if you're going to send it over an insecure channel, if the channel is secure then it's much easier for an end-user to just send it in the app.
    - pleasecalllater 9y ago
      And that's still just a feeling. You just feel you can trust the encryption application. Which can be changed any time in the future in a way it is not secure any more. You just need to trust. So what's wrong in trusting Mozilla, if you can easily trust your encryption/decryption software?
    - galaxyLogic 9y ago
      Why would you trust 7-zip or NotePad++ more than FireFox?
      - jhasse 9y ago
        Because I don't trust Mozilla, see https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/6mw1ld/firefox_tracks_users_with_google_analytics_in_the/ https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/6mw1ld/firefox_track... or http://www.zdnet.com/article/firefox-tests-cliqz-engine-which-slurps-user-browsing-data/ http://www.zdnet.com/article/firefox-tests-cliqz-engine-whic...
giaour 9y ago
I don’t think the second paragraph is a logical extrapolation of the first. If this is using the WebCrypto API (which it appears to be doing), then trusting this browser-based solution isn’t fundamentally different from trusting an installed application that can update itself.
- CaptSpify 9y ago
  > trusting this browser-based solution isn’t fundamentally different from trusting an installed application that can update itself. Which is still a bad idea to trust, so I'd say that it is a logical extrapolation.
  - giaour 9y ago
    We trust applications like that all the time. Browsers update themselves, and we trust them to secure our communication with banks, governments, health providers, etc. Most browsers now also store passwords in an encrypted secret repository. If you're on Windows or OSX, your OS is also constantly updating itself with closed-source binary blobs. I mean, sure, you can never use an auto-updating application again and always manually review system updates before installing them. But realistically, I don't see anyone besides Richard Stellman adopting that lifestyle.
    - CaptSpify 9y ago
      > We trust applications like that all the time Sure, nobody ever said otherwise. But that doesn't mean it's a good idea. The software I use is open-source, so I can see what I'm running, and what updates I get. I also don't use any auto-updates. The web is inherently different in that I can't really guarantee that the code I get is going to be the same code that you are getting.
      - damnyou 9y ago
        I hope you've thought very carefully about your threat model when you say you don't autoupdate. For most people your advice is quite plainly wrong. Most people should have everything on autoupdate.
TuringTest 9y ago
> They could easily configure it to be malicious one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that they would be caught? How could they do that easily? Their source code is public, and many third parties work on it and produce their own compiled versions - plus every security people tracking unexpected connections would catch it.
- icebraining 9y ago
  Compiled versions of the JavaScript served by the site?
rmc 9y ago
> Exactly. One has to trust Mozilla every time one visits the page This is where IPFS could be useful. It's content addressed, so the address guarantees that you're getting the same, unmodified, content
intherdfield 9y ago
>> one has to trust Mozilla not to do that. > > Exactly. One has to trust Mozilla every time one visits > the page. They could easily configure it to be malicious > one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that > they would be caught? Bear in mind they also make the web browser.
- hypervis0r 9y ago
  Sure, but that's open source and you can disable automatic updates, meaning they can't change the code whenever they feel like doing so. And if they do, the code will be kept in the source code control history, and will eventually be caught. It's wildly different from a JS file that's loaded every time you visit the website.
  - intherdfield 9y ago
    It's pretty close to being the same thing. You're downloading Firefox at some point and not verifying the binaries you get match the source. Unless Firefox provides fully reproducible builds on your platform from an open source compiler, you have no guarantee that the binary you have is built from the public source code. You have to trust Mozilla. Without reproducible builds, compiling the source yourself would be the way to go. Anyway, I agree that it should be clear that this file sharing service, while convenient, essentially requires you to trust Mozilla with your data. The claim "Mozilla does not have the ability to access the content of your encrypted file..." is fragile.
    - cyphar 9y ago
      If you are running on Linux, then Firefox is built by your distribution. So attacks like that are much harder to accomplish, because the distribution of software like Firefox is (for lack of a better word) distributed. I'm not going to get into all of the techniques that distributions use to make these things safer, the crux of the point is that you should always use distribution packages because we generally have much better release engineering than upstream (as we've been doing it for longer).
daveFNbuck 9y ago
If you're using Firefox, you're already trusting Mozilla every time you visit any page.

by zeveb 9y ago

edanm 9y ago

The way this gets solved in the real world is through contracts - they have a certain contract with you, and if they break it, they can get sued and lose a lot of money. This is one of the goals of the legal system - make it so we usually trust each other. There are no real long-term technical solutions to this problem. So if you want to make sure you're safe, read their EULA or equivalent.

cyphar 9y ago
Or you can design a system (like any number of crypto systems) that aren't vulnerable to these sorts of attacks. A compromised CDN could cause this problem, which now means that Mozilla would be liable for things that they don't administer. And resolving technical problems through the legal system never works well. If you can design something so users don't have to constantly trust you, then that's a much better solution. Not to mention that Send likely doesn't have a warranty (like most software under a free software license).

Yoric 9y ago

Send is meant to be an improvement on Dropbox & co for a specific use case. Is it perfect? No, it isn't. But it is still a considerable improvement. If you have a better solution in mind for the average user crowd, feel free to suggest it, of course.

jhasse 9y ago
Sending the file over an end to end encrypted chat app.
- codebolt 9y ago
  Even then, you are trusting the app to do what it says it's going to do. The only way I feel 100% safe is encrypting the file manually before sending (through whatever platform), and sharing the key through some other medium (preferably word of mouth). As a Windows user I mostly use 7-zip for this purpose, or the encryption plugin in Notepad++ for text.
  - cyphar 9y ago
    If the app is free software it can be audited. The problem with web-based crypto is that you're downloading a new program every page refresh and executing it immediately. If you're worried about a free software app not encrypting things properly, I'd be worried about the tools you use manually doing the right thing as well. While I agree that doing it manually is the only reliable way if you're going to send it over an insecure channel, if the channel is secure then it's much easier for an end-user to just send it in the app.
  - pleasecalllater 9y ago
    And that's still just a feeling. You just feel you can trust the encryption application. Which can be changed any time in the future in a way it is not secure any more. You just need to trust. So what's wrong in trusting Mozilla, if you can easily trust your encryption/decryption software?
  - galaxyLogic 9y ago
    Why would you trust 7-zip or NotePad++ more than FireFox?
    - jhasse 9y ago
      Because I don't trust Mozilla, see https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/6mw1ld/firefox_tracks_users_with_google_analytics_in_the/ https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/6mw1ld/firefox_track... or http://www.zdnet.com/article/firefox-tests-cliqz-engine-which-slurps-user-browsing-data/ http://www.zdnet.com/article/firefox-tests-cliqz-engine-whic...

giaour 9y ago

I don’t think the second paragraph is a logical extrapolation of the first. If this is using the WebCrypto API (which it appears to be doing), then trusting this browser-based solution isn’t fundamentally different from trusting an installed application that can update itself.

CaptSpify 9y ago
> trusting this browser-based solution isn’t fundamentally different from trusting an installed application that can update itself. Which is still a bad idea to trust, so I'd say that it is a logical extrapolation.
- giaour 9y ago
  We trust applications like that all the time. Browsers update themselves, and we trust them to secure our communication with banks, governments, health providers, etc. Most browsers now also store passwords in an encrypted secret repository. If you're on Windows or OSX, your OS is also constantly updating itself with closed-source binary blobs. I mean, sure, you can never use an auto-updating application again and always manually review system updates before installing them. But realistically, I don't see anyone besides Richard Stellman adopting that lifestyle.
  - CaptSpify 9y ago
    > We trust applications like that all the time Sure, nobody ever said otherwise. But that doesn't mean it's a good idea. The software I use is open-source, so I can see what I'm running, and what updates I get. I also don't use any auto-updates. The web is inherently different in that I can't really guarantee that the code I get is going to be the same code that you are getting.
    - damnyou 9y ago
      I hope you've thought very carefully about your threat model when you say you don't autoupdate. For most people your advice is quite plainly wrong. Most people should have everything on autoupdate.

TuringTest 9y ago

> They could easily configure it to be malicious one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that they would be caught? How could they do that easily? Their source code is public, and many third parties work on it and produce their own compiled versions - plus every security people tracking unexpected connections would catch it.

icebraining 9y ago
Compiled versions of the JavaScript served by the site?

rmc 9y ago

> Exactly. One has to trust Mozilla every time one visits the page This is where IPFS could be useful. It's content addressed, so the address guarantees that you're getting the same, unmodified, content

intherdfield 9y ago

>> one has to trust Mozilla not to do that. > > Exactly. One has to trust Mozilla every time one visits > the page. They could easily configure it to be malicious > one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that > they would be caught? Bear in mind they also make the web browser.

hypervis0r 9y ago
Sure, but that's open source and you can disable automatic updates, meaning they can't change the code whenever they feel like doing so. And if they do, the code will be kept in the source code control history, and will eventually be caught. It's wildly different from a JS file that's loaded every time you visit the website.
- intherdfield 9y ago
  It's pretty close to being the same thing. You're downloading Firefox at some point and not verifying the binaries you get match the source. Unless Firefox provides fully reproducible builds on your platform from an open source compiler, you have no guarantee that the binary you have is built from the public source code. You have to trust Mozilla. Without reproducible builds, compiling the source yourself would be the way to go. Anyway, I agree that it should be clear that this file sharing service, while convenient, essentially requires you to trust Mozilla with your data. The claim "Mozilla does not have the ability to access the content of your encrypted file..." is fragile.
  - cyphar 9y ago
    If you are running on Linux, then Firefox is built by your distribution. So attacks like that are much harder to accomplish, because the distribution of software like Firefox is (for lack of a better word) distributed. I'm not going to get into all of the techniques that distributions use to make these things safer, the crux of the point is that you should always use distribution packages because we generally have much better release engineering than upstream (as we've been doing it for longer).

daveFNbuck 9y ago

If you're using Firefox, you're already trusting Mozilla every time you visit any page.