17 ms·
FaceID Security [pdf]
- dippydipdips 9y ago"Face ID confirms attention by detecting the direction of your gaze" So to the argument that police can force you to open your iPhone if secured with TouchID, is this perhaps more secure? If you refrain from looking at your phone?
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- aeontech 9y agoNo, any kind of biometric auth is vulnerable to the adversary forcing your physical compliance. However you can disable TouchID and FaceID both by pressing the power button five times in quick succession, after which it will require your passcode.
- eridius 9y agoFor the iPhone X it's hold both the power button and either volume button for 2 seconds.
- gknoy 9y agoI've had a remarkably difficult time getting this kind of thing to register when I try to take screenshots -- probably an issue with my case? -- so it is probably worthwhile to practice doing this ahead of time.
- Angostura 9y agoActually, I think that’s the hard reset sequence - replacing the Home Power combo
- eridius 9y agoFrom the PDF: > After initiating power off/Emergency SOS by pressing and holding either volume button and the side button simultaneously for 2 seconds.
- 24gttghh 9y ago5-clicks-in-quick-succession primarily activates the "Emergency SOS mode", as well as temporarily disabling TouchID. I think you should edit your post to reflect this.
- aeontech 9y agoIt’s disabled until you enter your passcode again, correct, which is what you want. I am not sure what you thought I was saying? If you want to disable it permanently, you can do that in Settings, but doing that requires you to unlock the phone, at which point the adversary may take it and have free reign.
- 24gttghh 9y agoWhat I'm saying is, if someone wants to simply disable TouchID, without also automatically calling the police by whom they are presently being held then the 5 click method is overkill.
- FilterSweep 9y ago> However you can disable TouchID and FaceID both by pressing the power button five times in quick succession This seems effective "on paper, but not in practice." Even if you're innocent, it is one of the most nerve-racking experiences to go through. In the heat of the moment, what if you used an old 5s method to deactivate TouchID instead of whatever method works for the X?
- aeontech 9y agoIt works fine for me, but if you have a more practical suggestion, can you expand on that? What do you think would work better?
- SomeHacker44 9y agoThis is woefully insufficient for a feature I have been begging for forever... I would prefer it to be a double-tap on the power button, or at the very absolute worse, a triple tap. Two buttons simultaneously five times? Impossible to do under any sort of external pressure/duress.
- mikewhy 9y agoNot sure where you got two buttons from. It's only the power button.
- GeekyBear 9y agoOn this year's hardware, they have added a new option to temporarily disable biometrics. You press either one of the volume buttons on one side of the phone while also pressing the sleep/wake button on the opposite side. http://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-disable-face-id-on-your-iphone-x-just-squeeze-it/ http://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-disable-face-id-o...
- aeontech 9y agoTwo buttons press and hold on iPhone X. Power button 5x on any other phone.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- scarface74 9y agoI doubt police will let a little thing like constitutional arguments keep them from forcing you to unlock your phone. The best decryption algorithm is still rubber hose decryption.
- FilterSweep 9y ago> If you refrain from looking at your phone? Unfortunately, (myself included), we are so conditioned to look at your phone when it is out in our face that you would have to actively train against this "reflex".
- strictnein 9y agoHere's what police do today, and it will defeat this and all types of security: Follow you until you make a phone call, or do something that requires you to unlock your phone. Then multiple people descend on you and grab you and your phone.
- empath75 9y agoThat's if they're interested in looking at your phone for a particular reason, rather than randomly being nosy in a traffic stop.
- dmitriid 9y agoFaceID and TouchID are not passwords, so you have to comply and unlock your phone.
- komali2 9y ago>You can always use your passcode instead of Face ID, and it’s still required under the following circumstances: >The device has received a remote lock command. I haven't had an iPhone since the 3Gs - how are these sent? Via cellular data I assume, but is there some app you have to have on your computer?
- virusduck 9y agoNo, you can send the lock via the iCloud website. Although, to log on, you may have to use a 2FA code that is sent to your device or home Mac....
- 8_hours_ago 9y agoYou can find your iPhone and remotely lock it from the web: https://www.icloud.com/#find https://www.icloud.com/#find
- berberous 9y agoFrom an iOS app (find my iPhone) or iCloud.com
- ibero 9y agocorrect, the 'Find My iPhone' app can lock the phone in what they call "Lost Mode." https://support.apple.com/kb/ph2700?locale=en_US https://support.apple.com/kb/ph2700?locale=en_US
- alacritythief 9y agoVia "Find my iPhone" on a Mac or any iOS device you own, or on the web via iCloud, you can send a remote lock command (or locate/wipe the phone).
- jonknee 9y ago> To counter both digital and physical spoofs, the TrueDepth camera randomizes the sequence of 2D images and depth map captures, and projects a device-specific random pattern. I await some interesting articles featuring IR imaging after the X ships.
- nsxwolf 9y agoHow does that counter physical spoofs? If I have the 3D printing technology to pull off a Mission:Impossible quality mask of my target, what good does a random IR projection do?
- achamayou 9y agoThere was a bit in the keynote where they mentioned those and said they’d done work to prevent them from logging in successfully. They did not elaborate though. Maybe the IR reflectivity of human skin and usual mask material is sufficiently different?
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- eanzenberg 9y agoThis is great, and I can't wait to see the accuracy and speed of the faceid unlock firsthand.
- MBCook 9y agoGood document, but I was really hoping they’d go deeper into how they tested some of the fraud detection stuff (masks, etc) or give us some statistics on the twin/family member issue.
- netsharc 9y agoIt mentions infrared picture. Masks probably have a different infrared signature. But so does your face if it's been wearing a balaclava in the cold (some parts will be cold and some will be warm...
- MBCook 9y agoI seriously doubt they’re using actual infrared emissions (as in heat measurements), I imagine it’s just used as a simple B&W camera so they don’t need visible light.
- MBCook 9y agoSince I’ve been downvoted and I can no longer edit, let me try to explain my theory: I’m guessing they only use the camera to read the positions of the dots projected onto the face. I don’t think they care about the ‘color’ of the face or how hot it is thermally. They’ve said they’re projecting the infrared dots? Have they said they’re doing any other kind of infrared illumination like the kind that can show blood vessels? I’m curious to see if face paint (assuming it reflects IR to a reasonable degree) interferes with FaceID. If it does they’re using more than just the dots for geometry. On the other hand if it doesn’t then the can’t be paying attention to things like IR emissions from the skin since it would be covered and thus heavily dampened. Right?
- MBCook 9y agoIt was brought to my attention in another comment that they do have an IR light to illuminate the face besides the dots. Now I’m even more curious about the face paint.
- 9y ago
- eridius 9y ago> The probability of a false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you as well as among children under the age of 13, because their Face ID Security September 2017 2 distinct facial features may not have fully developed. If you're concerned about this, we recommend using a passcode to authenticate. I was really hoping they'd provide the probability for identical twins, but maybe they don't have enough data to give a specific number on this (I assume most of their data comes from people without identical twins).
- thefalcon 9y agoI believe the probability for identical twins is 1 in 1; they mentioned in the keynote that some people will have to stick with passcodes, including those with "evil twins". (Presumably if you trust your identical twin to not be evil, you don't care if they're able to unlock your phone.)
- eridius 9y agoIdentical twins aren't identical down to every last detail. What I'm curious about is if Face ID can pick up on any details that are different that humans wouldn't notice. Also regarding the "evil twin" thing, evil twins came from another dimension so, aside from the goatee, they really were literally identical down to every last detail. It's unclear to me if that joke was meant as "your identical twin will be able to unlock your phone, so hopefully they aren't evil", or was just meant as "someone who looks like you might be able to unlock your phone". Probably a bit of both. But this is why I want to know what the actual probability is that an identical twin can unlock the phone. Maybe it really is 1 : 1, but maybe it's not.
- jagger27 9y agoAssuming the hardware isn't being pushed to the accuracy limit for the sake of processing time, perhaps there could be an "enhanced security" mode that requires a more thorough check? I suspect their 1:1,000,000 false-positive number is an extrapolation of the maximum allowable difference in measurement. They probably could have set that "fudge factor" to a value that corresponds to something like 1:1,000,000,000 and increased false negatives to 50%. Maybe it needs to see more "liveliness" and a few degrees head rotation? Overall I think with the alertness test, the 48-hour passcode lockout, the "press the lock button 5 times" panic mode, and a limit on all attempts is enough to discourage most three letter agencies. It seems to have been enough with TouchID.
- FilterSweep 9y agoQuestions: * Does one explicitly set up their FaceID with the option to skip, like how TouchID works currently? I see (when...enabled) verbiage, which is a good sign. * "The probability that a random person in the population could look at your iPhone X and unlock it using Face ID is approximately 1 in 1,000,000 (versus 1 in 50,000 for Touch ID)" If you have a face that causes most people you meet to say "oh, you look like X, Y, or Z", is this probability reduced? Other comments noted Twins. This isn't meant to be humorous or tongue-and-cheek, there could be a precedent that people of certain appearances are easily spoofed. * "To avoid a user having to reenroll to Face ID when these neural network changes are made, iPhone X will be able to automatically run stored enrollment images through the updated neural network." I guess a layperson would see the words "automatically" and relax, but this leaves more to be desired in explaining the "Secure Enclave" to me. The Name "Secure Enclave" almost sounded like remote storage until I read that the data never leaves the device. Thanks for the downvotes for questions! [0] http://www.pnas.org/content/102/35/12629.full http://www.pnas.org/content/102/35/12629.full
- rb808 9y agoWould be cool/weird if you could find out who they were and have a meetup.
- FilterSweep 9y agoI've met a few. Paths have moved on but it would have been cool to see if they could try unlocking my phone if this came out during my tenure in college.
- dmitriid 9y agoSecure Enclave isn't somehthing new to FaceID. It was developed for Touch ID. Some details here: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
- madeofpalk 9y ago> I see (when...enabled) verbiage, which is a good sign. Of course. See "Face ID requires a facial match — or optionally the passcode — at every wake." and "If you're concerned about [matching with a twin], we recommend using a passcode to authenticate."
- qrbLPHiKpiux 9y agoBiometrics are UID's - not passcodes.
- aroman 9y agoI agree with you, but features like this are often the difference have some (decent) security and none at all. Consider the iPhone prior to TouchID. A lot of people used trivial passcodes, or no passcodes at all.
- MBCook 9y agoApple had numbers a few years ago (2015?). It was something like 95% without passwords before TouchID and only 50% after TouchID. I know people who consider TouchID too much of a hassle. This doesn’t need to be a perfect solution, it just needs to be more secure than TouchID (claimed) and more secure than nothing (obviously) while being easy enough people won’t turn it off (we’ll see).
- mikeash 9y agoBiometrics are neither user IDs nor passcodes, they are biometrics and they have their own features, strengths, and weaknesses.
- madeofpalk 9y agoLiterally the second paragraph > Face ID doesn’t replace your passcode, but provides easy access to iPhone X within thoughtful boundaries and time constraints. This is important because a strong passcode forms the foundation of your iOS device’s cryptographic protection.
- JumpCrisscross 9y agoAlso, “ID” is literally in the name.
- matthewmacleod 9y agoYes, we all know that. The difference is that they are a user ID which is somewhat difficult to lose, forget, or have stolen. No, it’s not impossible to clone a fingerprint that will fool Touch ID, but it’s not easy either. If we assume that Face ID will be roughly as difficult to fool, then we’ve actually got pretty good security here. It’s possinle that in some cases a secure passcode would be safer, and it’s great that you still have that option too. But security can only effective in the consumer market if it’s fairly frictionless; I’m unlikely to tolerate entering a long, complex passcode every time I want to use my phone, so I’d probably compromise on something shorter. If Touch/Face ID offers a more secure option, we all win!
- athenot 9y agoI still wish it had an "unlock under duress" mode, where you could authenticate with a subtle difference (different gaze, alternate passcode, etc). The phone would unlock itself but then signal back to the mothership, cloud services and even apps that it's in "duress mode". Display in that mode should look totally normal, just some of the information missing (e.g. emails/messages/contacts from certain groups of contacts flagged as "withhold from duress mode"). This could help mitigate physical danger while preseving some of our critical information. It's akin to having multiple wallets when visiting high-theft areas. Get held up by an armed thief and give them the cash in the visible wallet, while holding back what's hidden in another location.
- giarc 9y agoThat sounds like a cool feature, but probably applicable to 0.0001% of the population. Think of all the work app developers would need to do to make their app "duress compatible" in the very rare chance someone is being held at gunpoint and the person is asking to see their emails.
- surfmike 9y agoIf the phone allowed multiple users that might be one way to do it. Just log in to another user.
- mLuby 9y agoOr use all that machine learning to fake a normal user profile…
- r1ch 9y agoXiaomi's MIUI has this feature, you can use different fingerprints to directly enter a "2nd Home" or something where all apps / data is segregated. It's not really designed to be too stealthy though as there's ways to switch back to the regular homescreen.
- mtgx 9y agoYes, allow the users to create multiple accounts and also allow them to encrypt and hide those other accounts. This should also be available to fingerprint readers, as the suggest "gesture" would be even easier: just use a different fingerprint (you can set the fingerprint that everyone expects you to use as the "other fingerprint", and use some other fingerprint as your default one). It should also work with passwords, etc.
- theluketaylor 9y ago> The probability of a false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you Apple mentioned this on stage, which to me was quite significant since they don't waste a single word during their keynotes. They still haven't given approximate collision chances and to me this must mean they think it's below the 1/50,000 touch id had. My understanding is fingerprint collisions are highly random. That is very different from Face ID collisions since they are highly predictable.
- gre 9y agoThey said in the keynote the chance a random person could unlock your phone with FaceID is 1 in a million.
- algaexe 9y agoTwins and siblings that look like you are not random people.
- roywiggins 9y agoNow I'm imagining the FBI using its facial-recognition databases and tracking down people who look like the phone owner to wave an iPhone in front of their face.
- epicide 9y agoI'd watch that TV show. "Dylan and Luke are bounty-hunters of a new breed. They have to find the long-lost twins of suspects on FBI's Most Wanted list. On this episode of Face Hunters..."
- MBCook 9y agoBut you’d have to do it without it seeing people you don’t intend to test with. You only get 5 tries. You can’t wait too long or it will hit the timeout. Sounds like a movie plot to me (I made a guess at one if you dig through my comment history).
- 9y ago
- peterwwillis 9y ago"Once it confirms the presence of an attentive face, the TrueDepth camera projects and reads over 30,000 infrared dots to form a depth map of the face, along with a 2D infrared image. [..] To counter both digital and physical spoofs, the TrueDepth camera randomizes the sequence of 2D images and depth map captures, and projects a device-specific random pattern. [..] the A11 Bionic chip [..] transforms this data into a mathematical representation and compares that representation to the enrolled facial data." So it matches on a math model created using face data and 'a device-specific random pattern'. So unless someone cracks the algorithms used here, you need the device data to spoof the model, assuming the pattern is used in a way that you can't simply ignore it and generate matching models using just a spoofed face. "We worked with participants from around the world to include a representative group of people accounting for gender, age, ethnicity, and other factors." If the model is really hugely inclusive, it could be too general. But also it would be very difficult to get the same number of scans from some minority populations, and that could affect the functionality of the result. "An additional neural network that’s trained to spot and resist spoofing defends against attempts to unlock your phone with photos or masks." Gruesome thought: what if somebody obtained your face? Additional thought: could we train the neural network to detect faces under duress and immediately lock the device?
- tptacek 9y agoI was really unhappy about FaceID last week, but if the attention sensing tech works reliably, I think it's probably better --- including under duress --- than TouchID.
- madeofpalk 9y agoThe diagnostics section is super interesting.
- oflannabhra 9y agoYes, this section hasn't previously been reported or commented on. I wonder if this is essentially an opt-in to add your face to the FaceID master dataset[0], or if it is to just allow the developers to see what issues users are having (and how frequently). [0] - It's previously been reported (https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/15/interview-apples-craig-federighi-answers-some-burning-questions-about-face-id/amp/ https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/15/interview-apples-craig-fed...) that Apple collected this dataset at great expense. The ATP podcast has an account of someone who took part of that data collection here: https://overcast.fm/+CdQoBnmk/1:15:23 https://overcast.fm/+CdQoBnmk/1:15:23
- Manozco 9y agoI'm genuinely interested in knowing how apple can tell that FaceID is better than TouchID - TouchID is already very fast - I can give access to someone else with TouchID without giving my password - It's unlikely that someone will be able to unlock my phone without me knowing it when using TouchID - In case of coercion, I still have the possibility to give the wrong fingerprint 9 times before the good one - I have to voluntary give my agreement with TouchID for an action (think apple pay) All of that makes me think that they are trying to sell a feature that is only due to their engineering team unable to put TouchID on the Iphone X. By every real world metrics, TouchID is better in my opinion...
- epicide 9y agoI think FaceID won't be as good, either, but Apple has surprised me before (with TouchID, no less). The iPhone X definitely seems to be the experimental phone, which I'm glad to see. I hope they continue the product lines they currently have for the phone: the experimental expensive one, the "normal" and Plus iterative ones, and the not-as-fancy-but-fits-in-my-small-hands one.
- jonknee 9y ago> It's unlikely that someone will be able to unlock my phone without me knowing it when using TouchID Do you really think it's likely that someone will steal your phone and then trick you into looking at your own phone without you realizing it? At that point you might as well be tricked into putting your finger on a TouchID sensor.
- randyrand 9y agoRecently I posted this theoretical spoofing attack in a comment. I'm glad to know they've put in the appropriate measure to detect it - randomly blinking the IR dot pattern, requiring any spoofed videos to react to the blinking with very near zero lag (likely sub-microsecond). Specifically, the last step in this process could be detected because the generated IR video would have a static dot pattern. How to (not) hack FaceID: You'd need: 1. 2 phones (at least 1 with an IR camera, such as another Iphone X) 2. a helper app 3. access to 10+ photos of the victim (Facebook typically) 4. a small mirror With the helper app: 1. capture the suspect's phone's unique IR dot pattern by shining their phone at white piece of paper, recording it with the helper app (the helper phone needs an IR camera of course, such as another Iphone X) 2. the app makes 3d model of persons face from the FB pictures 3. the app generates two animated videos of their face, 1 just a normal color video and another simulated "IR video" with the unique dot pattern applied 4. now you need to show the 2 videos to FaceID, using the mirror to show the color video to the color camera and the IR video the IR camera. Note: It's still TBD which wavelengths the IR camera are sensitive to and which wavelengths smartphone screens can put out, so the IR video device may need to be specially made...
- jagger27 9y agoTheoretical countermeasure: I get an IR visible tattoo that you can't see in my Facebook pictures but FaceID can. I think the level of equipment needed to pull your attack off couldn't be done off-the-shelf. It seems reasonable that IR camera would scan in detail greater than that of a typical display (say, 500ppi) and it needs 100,000dpi resolution. Then you need bigger displays, advanced optics to reduce it to the expected size without distortion, and so on...
- suyash 9y agoI can't wait to disprove Apple with FaceID False Security promise. Waiting for my iPhone X.
- m_ke 9y agoThey should add some sort of integration for lost/stolen iphones that would allow them record face information of anyone who uses it after the phone has been reported stolen.
- hk__2 9y agoNo, because they (and we) don’t want to be able to store face information server-side.
- m_ke 9y agoThey wouldn't have to until the phone is reported stolen and the user enables it.
- MBCook 9y agoI think Apple would argue skipper slope there. We’ve seen what the FBI tried a year or two ago. I have a hard time theybeouldnt try to turn it into a dragnet or ask for ‘special’ phones that could scan people but retain the data in a form the FBI could use.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- shishy 9y agoHow would this work if you wear a burka for example (without having to "downgrade" to using a passcode, when the real alternative would have just been TouchID)? Or am I missing something... genuinely curious.
- oflannabhra 9y agoFaceID will be incompatible with burqas, just like TouchID is incompatible with gloves.
- jagger27 9y agoWhat about an IR transparent burqa?
- MBCook 9y agoDo those exist?
- Shank 9y agoAhoy, a new market!
- oflannabhra 9y agoFaceID uses a combination of IR and visible light. So, theoretically, if you had a perfectly EMR-transparent burqa, it would not interfere with FaceID. Although an EMR-transparent burqa might not even qualify as a burqa anymore.
- MBCook 9y agoDoes it use visible light? If it’s supposed to work in total darkness that seems like a problem.
- fpgaminer 9y agoI'll bet most people who dismiss TouchID and FaceID as useless because they're "usernames" and not "passwords", have a bog standard lock and key on their house. Funny thing about those house keys. They can be stolen, lost, or duplicated from pictures. But TouchID and FaceID have liveness tests to prevent forgeries, your biometrics can't be easily stolen, and you can't lose them. A house key is called a "key" though, so it must be a password, and thus must be secure! And biometrics are just usernames, so they're useless and insecure! Sarcasm aside, my point is this. Even with the worst biometrics, your phone would be more secure than 99% of houses. And I don't see people complaining about the state of home security... Ultimately, these username vs. password analogies are shallow understandings of security, and at best flawed. Biometrics, passwords, house keys, secure dongles, etc. Those are _all_ keys. What they differ in is how reproducible they are, how easily they're lost, and how easily they're bypassed. For example: Biometrics, when measured by devices with sufficient liveness tests, are robust against forgeries. That means they can't be stolen. This is in contrast to passwords and pincodes, which can be stolen by eyeballs, cameras, audio recording devices, etc. You can use FaceID or TouchID to unlock your phone in front of all the recording devices in the world, and yet still your biometric key won't be stolen. See how that example comparison is far more interesting and enlightening than "biometrics are usernames, so they're pointless"? * Of course, when I refer to household locks and keys, I mean your average household lock. There are, of course, premium locks with keys that can't be reproduced. But most houses have locks that you can sneeze on and open.
- sorenjan 9y agoIf I lose my house key I can change the locks and make the old key worthless. How do you change biometric keys once they're compromised?
- namelost 9y agoYou can turn it off. Or you can apply a threat model and determine whether the people for whom TouchID/FaceID is keeping your phone secure against would have the resources to mount such an attack.
- mgleason_3 9y agoThe problem I have is with the lack of TouchID. FaceID is fine. But, I don't always want to have to stop what I'm doing, loooook at the phone and then proceed. Sometimes I even unlock my phone in my pocket to sneak a look. How do you do that with FaceID when the sensor's been removed?
- huxley 9y agoWhat do you sneak a look at? It's usually notifications for me and that's what I've been using my Apple Watch for a bit over a year now. If it's not notifications, then it gets more complicated though looking at anything but notifications is pretty hard to sneak.
- ovao 9y agoBy “removed” do you mean “occluded”? If you have access to the screen but not to the sensor array, you can use a passcode. This is obviously very difficult to do when the phone’s in your pocket, so that’s a very small regression in usability there, but that seems like an extreme edge case.
- mgleason_3 9y agoPretty sure I mean removed - at least on the iPhone X. "The full edge-to-edge screen means no more home button. No more home button means no more Touch ID" >> extreme edge case OK, maybe. Though I think TouchID has become so quick and natural that we forget it's even happening. For me it's almost automatic as I pull it from my pocket. Maybe FaceID will get to that point also. But I think I'm safe in predicting, at least in the beginning, memes of people looking with zombie like stares at their phones trying to get them to unlock.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- swang 9y agoI'm pretty late to this and I'm sure this will get buried... > Face ID data doesn’t leave your device, and is never backed up to iCloud or anywhere else. Only in the case that you wish to provide Face ID diagnostic data to AppleCare for support will this information be transferred from your device. Enabling Face ID Diagnostics requires a digitally signed authorization from Apple that’s similar to the one used in the software update personalization process. After authorization, you'll be able to activate Face ID Diagnostics and begin the setup process from within the Settings app of your iPhone X. What is preventing the government from compelling Apple to give up this key, and intercept your diagnostic data?
- dkonofalski 9y agoDiagnostic data still wouldn't provide anything of value as both sides need to give up the key for it to be useful.
- sitharus 9y agoYou have to authenticate this and it wipes your faceid data. It doesn’t allow upload of the current data.
- royal_ts 9y agoI'd like to know how iPhone X users control (play pause) apps directly from their lockscreens. That no longer works right? Isn't that a major disadvantage?
- dkonofalski 9y agoYou have access to control center from anywhere in the OS. There's a "Now Playing" piece that comes up with a single swipe from the bottom of the screen. If you're not looking at the screen, Now Playing still displays on the lock screen.
- 4ad 9y agoYou have to swipe to log-in. The system authenticates you automatically, but doesn't show the home screen unless you swipe.
- mstolpm 9y agoCould someone help me understand? I‘ve read multiple times in this discussion: > Many (most?) people have more private information on their phones than they do in their house But I can‘t think of any in my situation. Regarding data, almost all is available on my PC and tablet as well, both staying at home most of the time and with security features that can be bypassed with enough time/effort. Moreover, photos, handwritten notes, purchase receipts, bills, love letters and so on are all at my home or accessible through my home, but not necessarily stored on my phone. Digital traces about my communications and travel are available through numerous service providers (mail, cell, isp) ... no need to break into my phone, either. So, what is the private data only available on everyone’s phones but not in their homes? Unsynced, not backuped private notes and photos never shared with anyone else? Am I missing something (honest question)?
- andrei_says_ 9y agoJust wondering, at what point will the face camera data be used to send feedback to advertisers? Being able to tell if phone users watched (for example) a youtube ad and with what facial expression dynamics would be worth something to someone.
- throwawaymanbot 9y agoI dont see apple as an issue, Apple just utilizes data in clever ways, I see the Govt Agencies feeling entitled to this information and want to slurp it up as the problem.