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Russia requesting to review source code of Western companies’ security products
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- dmichulke 9y agoIt's a natural consequence of the US trying to bug / backdoor hardware. A plain 2nd order effect.
- mi100hael 9y agoSeems more like a natural evolution of the digital landscape. The US certainly doesn't have a monopoly on covertly compromising hardware/software. Considering China, Israel, and Russia's posture, the US would be laggards at this point if they weren't doing it.
- pmontra 9y ago> The companies say they only allow Russia to review their source code in secure facilities that prevent code from being copied or altered. So how do the Russians know that the code they see is the one generating the binaries sold in Russia? This is where reproducible builds would help, but without source code it's hopeless. They should at least build the product inthe lab, make sha1 of every file and check if they match with the ones on sale. But then there would be an inspection before every release and patch.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- Lagged2Death 9y agoSo how do the Russians know that the code they see is the one generating the binaries sold in Russia? Maybe this is more about training and retaining Russian tech talent, creating friction for foreign vendors, and spreading a proto-fascist FUD and distrust of governments all over the world. Because yes, I would think inspecting binaries (probably secretly) would be more productive in pursuit of the stated goal.
- mannykannot 9y agoThe stated goal of these inspections may not be the actual goal - from the article's third paragraph: "But those inspections also provide the Russians an opportunity to find vulnerabilities in the products' source code - instructions that control the basic operations of computer equipment - current and former U.S. officials and security experts said."
- JoachimSchipper 9y agoAt least half the point is checking whether the source code is total crap. Detecting intentional, malicious backdoors is a lot more difficult, but the threat of a static analysis tool finding something is probably enough to keep vendors in line.
- smm2000 9y agoYou build binaries and make sure SHA1 matches. Obviously malicious vendor can have custom compiler that inserts backdoor code during compilation and obfuscated stuff like that but it dramatically increases complexity and number of engineers who have to know about backdoor. Realistically most companies are not CIA and are not set up for this kind of ops. Essentially it makes it much more risky for company to insert backdoor and gives more incentives for pushing against NSA/etc.
- DarkKomunalec 9y agoI find it rather revealing how much weight is given to the concerns of the tech firms, while entirely ignoring the concerns of consumers that run closed code, and are at the mercy of Intel and AMD's management engines, and the reported cases of backdoored routers, smart TV's sending your filenames back to HQ, cars and appliances with regulatory defeat devices, etc. The negative spin put on asking to know how our devices work, and what they do, is frankly disgusting. Edit: Is posting identical comments in identical submissions, where one submission is upvoted and the other buried, not allowed? What should one do instead, if one's opinion on the story hasn't changed?
- thresh 9y agoDoes that also happen with, say, German or French governments? Or US government? What about the Chinese? Do they not ask to review source code of the tools they buy and use?
- secfirstmd 9y agoDefo the UK and US does
- jerf 9y agoI've seen "merely" large corporations, let alone governments, insist on root access to boxes customers are not normally given shell access to at all, for auditing purposes. To answer the implicit question, no, I don't think this is really all that abnormal, it's just that even many HN denizens may not be aware that this sort of thing happens more often than they realize. The idea that they're doing it to develop backdoors is at least sort of silly, on the grounds that they are perfectly capable of dumping the firmware of these boxes once they import one and developing exploits against the actual image. In fact, that's not even a "nation-state" level of capability, there are plenty of individuals who can and do accomplish that for merely "bug bounty" money. Given the restrictions they have at looking at the source code it's not clear to me that it's going to be much easier for them than just doing it based on firmware dumps.
- endorphone 9y agoA counter example is the F35 -- it is a fighter that is hugely contingent upon its software, but the US has denied partners (the people who also cofunded development) access to it. Given that software controls everything, that should invalidate it as an option for any other military at the outset.
- AnimalMuppet 9y agoNot everyone else can build something equivalent. That leaves them two options: Trust the hidden software, or fly inferior planes. It's not clear which one is the correct answer.
- rwmj 9y agoI wouldn't consider a security product unless it came with full source.
- AJ007 9y agoI wouldn't consider a security product secure unless it was compiled from the source code by oneself.
- daxorid 9y agoThis is security Inception. There have been many PoCs for compilers and linkers being modified to then insert backdoors into compiled/linked output. At some point you have to trust your toolchain.
- mikegerwitz 9y agoYou're referring to the Thompson hack: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 The system needs to be bootstrapped in such a way that the compiler can be trusted. This may include compiling e.g. gcc through a multi-stage process starting from a simple, easily-audited compiler with a small set of features and working your way up to a full-featured C compiler. It might mean double-compilation---comparing output from multiple compilers. Combining that with reproducible builds, you can (one day) trust your toolchain and your system. Hardware is another story. https://reproducible-builds.org/events/athens2015/bootstrapping/ https://reproducible-builds.org/events/athens2015/bootstrapp... Hopefully this will be all sorted out and standard practice in the near future.
- mikegerwitz 9y agoUnless it's bit-for-bit reproducible.
- rb808 9y ago> But those inspections also provide the Russians an opportunity to find vulnerabilities in the products' source code - this is the biggest part of the article. If the Russians are trying to hack US govt/corps/people its really helpful to have the US security companies show how they check.
- horsawlarway 9y agoDespite the clear slant in this article to associate this with more malicious goals... This is an ENTIRELY reasonable request. The US has shown time and time again that it has absolutely ZERO morals with regards to monitoring/spying/breaking security products at whim, when it suits us, and often even when it's a REALLY bad fucking idea and everybody knows it.
- coldcode 9y agoAnd the Russians clearly don't have a desire to hack US systems, which of course is much easier if you can see the source code. The alternative of course is build your own products and don't buy anything from the US.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- justinclift 9y agoFor a lot of software, Open Source solutions might be a workable alternative. There's not fantastic "go so" solutions in every product category though. :/ Though, if enough US companies do decide not to do business with Russian, it might kickstart the filling-in of some the holes.
- origami777 9y agoIt may be reasonable, but it's not a good idea. We shouldn't trust Russsians, and they shouldn't trust us. I'd rather the US companies be forced not to sell if those are the terms. It exposes US companies even more than they are. The Russians should find another product if they aren't happy with it.
- EugeneOZ 9y agoSome specialists, if you have time, please explain me in few words, why they can't just disassemble products they need to check?
- supremesaboteur 9y agoIt would be substantially more expensive to audit the assembly and verify its security
- johngalt 9y agoAfter code is written it goes through a compilation step that makes it easier for machines to read and harder for humans to understand. Think of the index of a reference book. Where every pertinent word is listed along with a page number. Imagine you wanted to read a complicated and meaniful book like Tolstoy or Kafka and really understand it. Walk away with a sense of exactly what it meant. To gain that understanding you only have an index and you had to reconstruct the book's meaning from there. Technically you can, but it is massively more difficult. Edit: A more accurate analogy would be that you aren't even given an index of words, but an index of phonetic sounds that you have to piece together to create words.
- holtalanm 9y agoIs this really surprising? Most big/old corporations already require the same level of scrutiny when auditing a new piece of security software, so it really isn't that shocking to hear of a _government_ requesting the same thing. Hell, most corporations require high scrutiny for _any_ software, let alone security software.
- dsfyu404ed 9y agoIt's surprising to the people here. If this were a forum for tech workers for banks and defense contractors it would be a different story.
- holtalanm 9y agoI worked with an international shipping insurance company for a little while as a QA tester (contracted). They required almost this level of scrutiny for just testing software.
- e12e 9y agoI'm reminded of Microsoft giving access to source code to certain clients for code review: "Microsoft lets EU governments inspect source code for security issues" [2015]: http://www.pcworld.com/article/2931212/microsoft-lets-eu-governments-inspect-source-code-for-security-issues.html http://www.pcworld.com/article/2931212/microsoft-lets-eu-gov... https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sharedsource/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sharedsource/ I wonder how people think you get military clients without allowing deep inspection of the product? Oh, yeah, sure just hook your "super secure, rushed-to-market black box" on the same network as our cruise missile targeting systems. We trust you.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- codedokode 9y agoIt would be good if anyone could review the source code of any program they are using.
- sqeaky 9y agoI am curious what it would take to make a law prohibiting the sale of software without source code and build scripts. Some would fight it tooth and nail, but it would be better for society. It would be end the idea of selling prepackaged software, but it would end whole categories of viruses and malware.
- emilfihlman 9y agoI find it funny that they are afraid to show the code because it might lead to hacks, as if there were intentional bugs in the code that can be abused. If your product contains bugs it is up to you to fix them. If some "Russian hackers" can find them by looking at the code in a clean lab but you can't, well, you aren't supposed to be in this business.
- jb613 9y agoThe more slow-moving government will get involved, the more industry will be pulled towards open source where there is no need to get government approval. Sure - it won't be easy and will come with other pitfalls, but in some circumstances these may be easier hurdle than waiting months/years for some government to approve your product sale.
- schemathings 9y agoHow many people here use Kaspersky privately or at work?
- mikegerwitz 9y agoWith regards to opinions on whether or not specific entities like Russia should be permitted to examine source code: we can also consider the Apple v. FBI case. For those who don't recall, one of the concerns was the government trying to compel Apple to make changes to iOS to permit brute forcing the San Bernardino attacker's PIN. This is a violation of First Amendment rights (compelled speech), so this drew a lot of opposition, including from people that are part of free software and open source communities. The alternative was to have the FBI make changes to the software instead of compelling Apple to do so. For those who agree with the free software philosophy, it's important to remove consideration of _who_ is trying to exercise the four freedoms. In the case of the FBI, from a free software perspective, of course they should be able to modify the software---we believe that all software should be free. (But that doesn't mean they should be able to install it on _someone else's_ device.) In this case, Russia doesn't have to ask to examine free software. And if they did, it shouldn't be a concern. Restricting who can use and examine software is a slippery slope: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/programs-must-not-limit-freedom-to-run.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/programs-must-not-limit-freed... But not all software is free/libre. But by extending that philosophy---there would be no _ethical_ concerns with a foreign power wanting to inspect proprietary source code. But proprietary software might have something of concern to hide: it might be something malicious like a backdoor, or it might be something like a lack of security or poor development practices.
- BrandoElFollito 9y agoI wonder how much the author was involved with actual tests. My guess is that it was exactly zero. I was heading the team overseeing these tests for a large western European company. The reviews are done on the customer's company computers, with no access to network. After that the Russians only get a hash of the binary compiled with the reviewed code, that's all. They then compare this hash to the sw they get (on firmware for instance) to make sure that it comes from the code they reviewed. I am paranoid but this is a very reasonable requirement we do not, unfortunately, normally have in Europe for "friendly" software coming from "friend" US companies (and probably vice versa but I do not care that way). Snowden proved that the BFF approach does not work.