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Smartphones can be fooled by fake, digitally composed fingerprints
- mmastrac 10y agoThis is the IEEE paper referenced in the article: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7893784/?reload=true http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7893784/?reload=true PDF version: http://www.cse.msu.edu/~rossarun/pubs/RoyMemonRossMasterPrint_TIFS2017.pdf http://www.cse.msu.edu/~rossarun/pubs/RoyMemonRossMasterPrin... Abstract: This paper investigates the security of partial fingerprint-based authentication systems, especially when mul- tiple fingerprints of a user are enrolled. A number of con- sumer electronic devices, such as smartphones, are beginning to incorporate fingerprint sensors for user authentication. The sensors embedded in these devices are generally small and the resulting images are, therefore, limited in size. To compensate for the limited size, these devices often acquire multiple partial impressions of a single finger during enrollment to ensure that at least one of them will successfully match
- mediocrejoker 10y agoI skimmed the paper but I don't see which iPhone they were able to unlock with this method. Do you know if the resolution of the fingerprint scanner differs between iPhone models?
- nneonneo 10y agoThere's no reason to cite a Google-translated version of this article when a suitable, well-explained English article exists in the New York Times: https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/technology/fingerprint-security-smartphones-apple-google-samsung.html https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/technology/fingerprint... As the article notes, you really need more than one imprint in order to get into a phone - the authors suggest that five distinct imprints could get into about 40-50% of phones, which fits within the 5 try limit imposed by many systems.
- dang 10y agoRight. Url changed from https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&u=https%3A//www.mobilegeeks.de/news/fingerabdrucksensor-sicherheit-generalschluessel/ https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&u=https.... Submitters: Please don't post Google translate links.
- arielweisberg 10y agoFrom the NYT article. > The researchers did not test their approach with real phones, and other security experts said the match rate would be significantly lower in real-life conditions. Still, the findings raise troubling questions about the effectiveness of fingerprint security on smartphones. I wonder what the actual impact/severity is.
- 2bitencryption 10y agoTotally not relevant, but holy cow Google Translate is getting good. I swear I've read articles in plain English that were less comprehensible than this translated on, by a mile.
- dhosek 10y agoI didn't look closely at the link or url and didn't realize that I was reading Google Translate until I saw your comment. That's scary good translation.
- mediocrejoker 10y agoI didn't realize either but I had a very hard time following what was being explained and assumed it was just poorly written.
- hollander 10y agoDoes this have to do with German being such a structured language? Just a guess here, but it may explain things a bit.
- nyolfen 10y agobasically, there's just a larger body of translated work to develop from for western european languages because the EU has to translate all official documents between the major languages > One explanation could have to do with the text the algorithm uses to generate its translations. Google Translate works by drawing from vast banks of text, searching for patterns in language use to match future translation requests. Some of those texts include documents from the United Nations and the European Union that have to be translated into multiple languages. (from first result i found for this bit of trivia but probably not the best: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/a-secret-code-in-google-translate/378864/ https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/a-sec... )
- hangonhn 10y agoTrue but isn't the job a lot easier because it's going from German to English, which are closely related? I don't want to take away from Google's achievement but wanted to point that out to set expectations.
- gwbas1c 10y agoHonestly, I've never cared about the fingerprint reader for security. I just see it as a better way to prevent my phone from turning on in my pocket and butt-dialing someone. I never put a password on my phone before the fingerprint reader. The apps that I care about protecting have password functionality built-in.
- sgarman 10y agoWhat about 2-factor auth or sms two factor auth or access to your gmail client?
- Doctor_Fegg 10y agoYou know, not everyone uses gmail.
- chimeracoder 10y ago> I never put a password on my phone before the fingerprint reader. The apps that I care about protecting have password functionality built-in. What email client and web browser do you use that protect access via a password?
- et-al 10y ago> The apps that I care about protecting have password functionality built-in. 1Password on iOS has this issue. You can either unlock by Touch ID or master password. I wish there was fingerprint + PIN option.
- crazygringo 10y ago> "Dr. Memon said their findings indicated that if you could somehow create a magic glove with a MasterPrint on each finger, you could get into 40 to 50 percent of iPhones within the five tries allowed before the phone demands the numeric password, known as a personal identification number." I don't understand how this is possible at all. I've always assumed that each fingerprint is essentially turned into a hash, and that there must be something like at least 10,000+ possible hashes. I mean, I used to belong to a gym that used a fingerprint reader for entry, and it correctly identified me (flashing my name) from the other 1,000+ members each time. So as long as the hash space is reasonably large, it doesn't matter what these 5 magic imprints are, they still each convert to just 1 hash, no different from any other fingerprints. Am I missing some critical aspect here to explain how "master prints" are even plausible -- how they could possibly act as "wildcards" for large swathes of hashes?
- artpar 10y agoThey covered it in the article. > Full human fingerprints are difficult to falsify, but the finger scanners on phones are so small that they read only partial fingerprints. When a user sets up fingerprint security on an Apple iPhone or a phone that runs Google’s Android software, the phone typically takes eight to 10 images of a finger to make it easier to make a match. And many users record more than one finger — say, the thumb and forefinger of each hand. > Since a finger swipe has to match only one stored image to unlock the phone, the system is vulnerable to false matches. > “It’s as if you have 30 passwords and the attacker only has to match one,” said Nasir Memon
- majke 10y agoThat's not how it works. The process of reading your retina / fingerprint is error prone. You can't take hash out of error-prone data blob! My understanding is that matching the pre-saved template against a fresh scan is a process similar to measuring Levenshtein distance. There is some threshold, and sample with smaller error are accepted. This does imply that the iphone has somewhere stored your _unencrypted_, _unhashed_ template of your fingerprint. But this is not my area of expertise. Perhaps a subject matter expert can comment.
- djrogers 10y agoI shouldn't be surprised, but the reporting on this makes it sound way different than the actual research. Specifically, none of the research appears to have been performed on, or tested against ACTUAL SMARTPHONE implementations - for example: "Experiments on a capacitive fingerprint dataset, similar to the one used by Apple TouchID, showed that it is possible to break 6.88% of users’ account in 5 attempts if the FMR setting of the matching algorithm (Verifinger 6.1 SDK) was set to 0.01% and each subject was enrolled with one finger and 12 partial impressions per finger." It seems that using commercial fingerprint software and captive systems 'similar to the one used by Apple TouchID' is very different from actually testing your theories against, you know, Apple TouchID. The way you believe TouchID works may be significantly better or worse than it actually does, so don't you need to test iPhones if you're going to be giving scary quotes to reporters about them being insecure?
- pinum 10y agoI understand it's difficult to test against the actual Touch ID, since it has aggressive hardware-enforced cooldowns and other defensive tech.
- ballenf 10y agoSo it's a lock that's too hard to pick to prove how easy it is to pick?
- mikeash 10y agoIt should be easy on a phone you control. You can try five times quickly, then it stops accepting fingerprints until you put in the password. This is a major problem for an attacker, but if you're just researching it then you can put in the password to reenable fingerprint authentication and then get five more tries. You should be able to try 20-30 fingerprints per minute.
- fauigerzigerk 10y ago>I shouldn't be surprised, but the reporting on this makes it sound way different than the actual research. Specifically, none of the research appears to have been performed on, or tested against ACTUAL SMARTPHONE implementations That is exactly what the article says. Specifically: The researchers did not test their approach with real phones, and other security experts said the match rate would be significantly lower in real-life conditions. and “To really know what the impact would be on a cellphone, you’d have to try it on the cellphone,” she said. and Dr. Ross acknowledged the limitations of the work. Half of the article is about the limitations of the approach the paper used, so I fail to understand your criticism of the reporting.
- umurkontaci 10y agoI have the feeling that the researched tried to unlock real phones and failed. It sounds weird when you say you have made a research about security of fingerprint scanners on phones without actually trying the attacks on those phones.
- cantrevealname 10y ago> I have the feeling that the researched tried to unlock real phones and failed. That sounds plausible. Think about how much more impressive their results would be if they demonstrated the attack on real phones. But they have a paper to publish, so why detract from the paper by mentioning that tests on real phones didn't pan out.
- ars 10y agoThe phone is covered with fingerprints from the owner anyway. If you have the phone, you already have the "password". The fingerprint scan is just to make it a little bit annoying for attacker, so they'll factory reset instead of bothering to crack it. It's not intended for any kind of real security. Like many others here I never used to lock my phone at all until the fingerprint scan, and I don't consider the scan as a form of security, but rather as a quick way to turn on the phone.
- gpawl 10y agoHow do you know that the finger data the scanner uses is present in oil prints? If this true, someone would have created a working demonstration in the past 5 years.
- kalleboo 10y agohttps://www.heise.de/video/artikel/iPhone-5s-Touch-ID-hack-in-detail-1966044.html https://www.heise.de/video/artikel/iPhone-5s-Touch-ID-hack-i...
- r00fus 10y ago> The phone is covered with fingerprints from the owner anyway. If you have the phone, you already have the "password". This is a ridiculous assertion. On the front, I have an oleophobic screen and constantly wipe the phone (i.e., put in pocket). On the back I have a leather case that would be impossible to get prints from. Do you know of any demonstration that isn't "lab conditions" where touchID is broken?
- artursapek 10y ago"Your fingerprint is your username, not your password"
- kefka 10y agoNo. Not even that. A fingerprint just directly implies presence. And it doesn't even have to be intentional presence either. A handscan I could see being a login. Because your not going to easily lift that as a fingerprint partial.
- dragonwriter 10y agoA fingerprint is not suitable as a username (as it can be physically damaged unrecoverably) or as a password (because it cannot be freely changed if potentially compromised.)
- Animats 10y agoThat is really clever. The Ur-fingerprint, developed using simple machine learning. Well, that's the end of using "minutiae" for recognition. Recognition has to use something that requires the features have the proper positional relationship to each other, such as a whole fingerprint.
- dustinkirkland 10y agoFingerprints are usernames, not passwords. http://blog.dustinkirkland.com/2013/10/fingerprints-are-user-names-not.html http://blog.dustinkirkland.com/2013/10/fingerprints-are-user...
- snarf21 10y agoExactly this. I've made the same comment other places on here. Fingerprint for username, 8 character alphanumeric for password and mandatory hardware 2FA fobs/keys.
- hawski 10y agoI use fingerprint screen unlock, because it's the most convenient screen unlock mechanism. The phone will not be unlocked by a mistake and it is very fast when you really want it. I like especially the placement of the sensor on the back cover. When the phone is in front of my face it is already unlocked if I want it.
- ouid 10y agoA fingerprint isn't secure in any robust sense of the word. you leave your fingerprints on everything you touch.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- jamiesonbecker 10y agoNearly all biometrics, except for physically invasive ones, are easily stolen. All are forgeable. Biometrics can never be revoked once compromised. They're like the social security number of logins. Completely useless. Using biometrics for security or identity violates practically every rule for secure credentials. They exchange convenience for extremely minimal security. Perhaps the oft-cited username, not a password? No, not even useful for that: for a mobile phone, a username isn't even needed in most cases because there's usually only one user on the device. It lends no additional security -- merely an extra step. For a phone, a fingerprint is probably less secure than a swipe pattern. It's security theater. Why do we keep equating biometrics with security?
- WatchDog 10y agoFor most people biometrics offer a better security posture than some of the alternatives. The average user is at much greater risk of someone watching them enter a PIN/Password than having them capture and forge their biometrics.
- kalleboo 10y ago> Why do we keep equating biometrics with security? Because we don't have any other practical alternatives? With how often people unlock their phones in public, PIN codes are absolutely useless.
- crystaln 10y agoThere are all sorts of reasons fingerprints are not a highly secure authentication mechanism. Just as there are all sorts of reasons passwords and other techniques are imperfect. Password entry can be observed. Chosen passwords are frequently insecure, particularly on smartphones where brevity is so important. Fingerprints are an excellent mechanism for almost all threat vectors for your average consumer smartphone. Your friends, enemies, and criminals would have to go through enormous, expensive, and clearly unethical efforts to access your phone. Given the convenience and security of this, I'm entirely happy with the security of my thumbprint-encrypted iPhone. It's important for people who are dissidents or engaging in criminal activity to be aware that their brain is more secure than their fingerprint, although that seems entirely obvious to anyone capable of maintaining a high security lifestyle.
- eriknstr 10y ago>It's important for people who are dissidents or engaging in criminal activity to be aware that their brain is more secure than their fingerprint, although that seems entirely obvious to anyone capable of maintaining a high security lifestyle. The problem with the brain is that it forgets. For example if you have an important piece of information that you encrypt with a long passphrase, you will likely have no problem decrypting it if you do so every day but if you don't use the passphrase for a few months, you probably won't remember it. However you probably will remember where you have the passphrase if you write it down and put it somewhere secret where nobody will be able to both find it and to know what it's for. IOW, don't hide the paper in your house.
- consp 10y agoConsidering there is no 'active' part (e.g. no known secret) it cannot be used for authorization, only for identification. The 'kids unlock phone with sleeping parent and buy stuff' techniques are a clear proof of this. Fine for identification, do not use for authorization (e.g. using secrets like when you buy stuff).
- crystaln 10y agoI'm still fine with this threat vector. The idea is to prevent casual intrusion, not premeditated intrusion. If I put my phone on the dinner table, no one is going to send text messages.
- libeclipse 10y ago> But I’d rather see Apple make me enter the PIN if it’s idle for one hour. Does this ever really happen though? It's rare for my phone to sit there for more than 15 minutes without me messing with it.
- fosk 10y agoYou are missing the point. It's not for you to re-enter the PIN every once in a while, it's to prevent a potential attacker with physical access to your phone to unlock it, exactly when the phone itself it's not phisically with you (and so you have nothing to mess with). Anyways it would only mitigate the risk without fixing the root problem.
- dkrich 10y agoI'm not a security expert by any means, but I have to ask- if it's acceptable and most people use a four digit pin to unlock a phone, is the idea of somebody going to the trouble of lifting and replicating fingerprints that worrisome?
- patmike830 10y agoDo you think your partner is cheating om you and you need to spy on their phone or hack their whatsapp, texts, facebook, Viber etc or you want to prevent your phone from being hacked. I strongly recommend SpyhackGod@gmail.com for all hacking problems you might have. He's reliable and efficient. You're welcome
- draugadrotten 10y agoModern fingerprint scanners use various methods to detect if it's a living finger or if it's a static image. This "research" could not beat any phone using a modern fingerprint scanner with liveness detection. Using fingerprints may not be a perfect solution but it beats 4-digit pincodes and passw0rds. Next level in a few years, we'll have retina scanners in our phones, cars and IoT including peppes pizza ads in Oslo. Then 1984 will look like a bedtime story for kids.
- summer69 10y agoBiometrics are in general a bad way to implement security. Finger prints and iris scans can easily be stolen many times by just browsing a person's Facebook profile photos. We have already started depending on these to allow access to bank accounts. I live in India, and there are already companies with phones that have iris and fingerprint scanners to link with each individual's Aadhar ID and grant access to all government and financial services including bank accounts, and even online shopping [1]. Unlike regular credit card transactions, these are supposed to be authenticated, so you cannot ask for a chargeback. Data for 130 million Indian people including their Aadhaar numbers and bank details was recently leaked accidentally. [2] There is a big disaster here just waiting to happen. [1]: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/shop-online-soon-with-fool-proof-iris-scan-aadhaar-phone-1692398 http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/shop-online-soon-with-fool-pr... [2]: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/technology/story/aadhaar-data-of-130-millions-bank-account-details-leaked-from-govt-websites-report/1/943632.html http://indiatoday.intoday.in/technology/story/aadhaar-data-o...
- enig_matic7 10y ago"The researchers did not test their approach with real phones, and other security experts said the match rate would be significantly lower in real-life conditions. Still, the findings raise troubling questions about the effectiveness of fingerprint security on smartphones." Wat.
- skocznymroczny 10y agoMy friend claims that her boyfriend managed to unlock her iPhone using his finger, although I can't 100% verify that claim.
- jlebrech 10y agoIs there a way a phone could know which finger was used by using the camera too?