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Roger Penrose on Why Consciousness Does Not Compute
- deepnotderp 10y agoI'm honestly not sure why artificial intelligence comes up every time Penrose's hypothesis is mentioned. The point of artificial intelligence is not ( at least in my and several other prominent AI scientist's such as Andrew Ng's opinion) to create a conscious intelligence, but to create intelligence that can do many of the useful tasks that we can do. Whether or not it's conscious along the way is largely irrelevant. That being said, I'm not sure why there's quite so much vitriol towards Penrose and his hypothesis, the leveraging of quantum effects in photosynthesis and enzymes have been demonstrated and recent studies show that the sense of smell may also be based upon quantum phenomena. So it's not all too unreasonable that there might be something quantum going on, even if it's not Penrose and Hameroff's microtubules. Another interesting quantum hypothesis in neuroscience is Fisher's: https://www.quantamagazine.org/20161102-quantum-neuroscience/ https://www.quantamagazine.org/20161102-quantum-neuroscience...
- paulddraper 10y ago"The question 'Do computers think?' is as interesting as the question 'Do submarines swim?'" - Dijkstra
- bitwize 10y ago> The point of artificial intelligence is not ( at least in my and several other prominent AI scientist's such as Andrew Ng's opinion) to create a conscious intelligence, but to create intelligence that can do many of the useful tasks that we can do. That's only one school of AI ("weak AI"). The other school ("strong AI") says that it's certainly worthwhile to create an intelligence that is capable of thought the way humans are -- if only to get a better handle on what "thought" and "intelligence" really are. Currently weak AI is "winning" because the surveillance and online-advertising industries can get more use out of it. But that doesn't put strong AI out of reach, nor render it wholly irrelevant.
- deepnotderp 10y agoCurrently weak AI is winning, but you forget that weak AI has always historically won. The annals of history ( as in the last ~100 years :P ) are littered with field attempts at finding "consciousness" and mixing neuroscience with philosophy with the occasional mathematician and once in a blue moon a CS... My skepticism comes less from a hatred of "Strong AI" and more from the fact that it has been promised over and over again with no results to show for it. In addition, every time "weak AI" makes progress, there's always someone who writes an article bashing the progress of "weak AI" and saying "it isn't REAL AI (tm)". This is kind of similar to the reason I dislike neuromorphic architectures, you can't just assume that you're right and look down upon all others, you need to show results if you want to do that.
- lukas099 10y ago>My skepticism comes less from a hatred of "Strong AI" and more from the fact that it has been promised over and over again with no results to show for it. Could that just be because Strong AI is much, much more difficult to achieve than Weak AI? And not that it is less valuable an end to pursue than Weak AI? In other words, does the value of one vs. the other necessarily correlate to our previous success in one vs. the other?
- psyc 10y agoThat isn't the common distinction made between weak and strong AI. Until we know what causes the internal point of view, it's conceivable that an AI could exhibit superhuman intelligence, as viewed from the outside, without itself having any view from the inside.
- goatlover 10y agoThere is also the other form of AI, which is Augmented Intelligence, which focuses on augmenting human intelligence, not reproducing or replacing it. But weak AI might be included in that.
- zitterbewegung 10y agoI think the reason that Penrose's hypothesis is brought up is that the study consciousness are a part of human philosophy since its very beginning. Consciousness is seen in people to be totally the domain of humans and Strong AI represents either instills a sense that humans aren't special that they have consciousness and that is why there is a divide where people like Penrose things Strong AI is impossible and people like Kurzweil thinks Strong AI is possible.
- goatlover 10y agoChalmers, Nagel & McGinn arguments are that there is a fundamental explanatory gap between objective processes and subjective experience. It's not because humans are special. Many other animals might be conscious. In Chalmers case, any informationally rich stream of data could be conscious, or possibly any physical system, if one wants to go all the way with panpsychism. The issue is the hard problem, not the uniqueness or humanity.
- greenshackle2 10y ago> Whether or not it's conscious along the way is largely irrelevant. Seems morally relevant re: does the suffering of AI entities matter.
- komali2 10y agoWhat is suffering if you don't have nerves to transmit pain?
- lomnakkus 10y agoEh? Many mental illnesses would be classified as causing "suffering", yet the don't require nerves.
- dragonwriter 10y agoName one mental illness, or any other state besides death, in humans that does not require nerves.
- aninhumer 10y agoSuffering is not a signal from a pain receptor, it's the conscious experience that results from that signal, or indeed from the much more complex inputs that can lead us into psychological anguish. The feelings one might experience upon hearing of the death of a close friend are clearly not the result of a "nerve transmitting pain", but most people think they're pretty unpleasant nonetheless. If an AI can experience similar anguish, then that's ethically relevant to how we use them.
- komali2 10y agoPeter Watts' Blindsight is a great read that explores this topic. In short, an alien space-faring species is discovered that seems extraordinarily intelligent, but not conscious. There's a couple more twists exploring consciousness I don't want to give away but it really makes one wonder - what if high intelligence doesn't require self-awareness?
- barrkel 10y agoWhat does self-awareness have to do with consciousness? Self-awareness can be tested for. Consciousness can't; for all I know, I'm the only conscious person in the universe. Some people are evidently self-aware by their actions. The two concepts are unrelated.
- goldenkey 10y agoI dont know why you are being downvoted. Solipsism is a real possibility. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
- aeorgnoieang 10y ago> what if high intelligence doesn't require self-awareness How could that work concretely? I'm struggling to think of how an agent could be intelligent, e.g. able to effectively achieve its goals, without being aware of itself. I suspect that, if you could communicate with one, any sufficiently intelligent being would be aware that it's a thinking being. What else does "self-awareness" encompass that I'm missing?
- snowwrestler 10y ago> be intelligent, e.g. able to effectively achieve its goals Well, a lot of very intelligent people never achieve their goals either. I'd suggest that intelligence is not the achievement of goals but the formulation of goals. And funny enough, people generally have no self-awareness about how they come to have goals. Some kid grows up wanting to be a fighter pilot. Why? Why does some other kid want to be a writer? Why do I like peach ice cream more than chocolate? Achieving the goal of getting some peach ice cream is a lot easier than understanding why I want to. Intelligent beings want things, on their own. Rational consciousness is just the tool we use to get what we want. The importance of articulated self-awareness to intelligence is probably overstated by humans.
- m-i-l 10y agoEven if some quantum effect is required for consciousness, and even if consciousness is required for intelligence, I'd argue that this does not mean we cannot simulate this - the Universal Quantum Computer[0], for example, was proposed by a researcher at the same institution at around the same time as Penrose when he wrote The Emperor's New Mind. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Turing_machine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Turing_machine
- SilasX 10y ago>Whether or not it's conscious along the way is largely irrelevant. It's certainly relevant whether your AI technique involves creating conscious, suffering beings!
- ebcode 10y agoRelevance is relative. So, relevant to whom? It would of course be relevant to the consciousness created, but how would the creator/programmer of the AI even recognize it as being conscious?
- SilasX 10y agoCorrect: not everyone would care whether they're creating a suffering, conscious being, or think about the topic enough to consider it a possibility. I still think the issue merits being called "relevant" in the context where I mentioned it.
- ebcode 10y agoI agree with you, but... until we have some sort of "Test For Consciousness", I think it's safe to assume that we're not going to accidentally create consciousness just by writing computer programs --- even if the programs themselves do happen to make use of damn fine algorithms "inspired by nature". I think the more immediate concern is that we begin to turn over everyday life-and-death decisions (driving, obvs) to machines which are, at the end of the day, unconscious, and programmed by us oh-so-fallible human beings.
- visarga 10y agoI don't think quantum physics is the correct level of abstraction to think about consciousness. Consciousness, if anything, is a process at macro level, not atomic level.
- unabst 10y ago> Whether or not it's conscious along the way is largely irrelevant. Exactly. It's the distinction between programming consciousness and physically reproducing it. The latter is for physicists and biologists. Equating abstractions with what it's abstracting is a mistake, but assuming something cannot be programmed or simulated is also a mistake. Anything observable can be abstracted. But to then think something can be accurately simulated without a good understanding of its nature is another mistake. So programmers should be following physics and biology. And finally, to equate the two when the simulation is accurate is yet another mistake. It's like mistaking the gravity in a video game for real gravity. They are never the same. But they are related: One is a simulation of the other.
- mixedbit 10y ago> But to then think something can be accurately simulated without a good understanding of its nature is another mistake. So programmers should be following physics and biology. Biological systems work and evolved into intelligent self conscious beings without anyone who understands how they work guiding this evolution. Similarly self conscious AI can emerge without people having good understanding of the source of the consciousness.
- unabst 10y ago> Similarly self conscious AI can emerge without people having good understanding of the source of the consciousness. Any evidence? It's fun to think about, but most people who think this are guilty of one of the mistakes I've listed. Or don't consider it a mistake. Or are not programmers. AI, as long as it is software, is programmed with a very specific understanding of what is being programmed. Every line of code is intentional. Nothing exists in between the lines. > guiding this evolution AI is perfectly guided. Every program is completely understood (insert incompetent programmer joke here). Every symbol is typed with purpose on purpose. The point is, Roger Penrose is not talking about programs. He's talking about physics. When a programmer successfully emulates consciousness, every line will be deliberate, and they will know exactly how they did it. Not only that, if their program behaves like real consciousness, the programmer will have had to have knowledge of real consciousness. Otherwise what they've built would be something else. Something exciting I'm sure, but something else. All of our models (and programs) are based on our understanding of the real world. Hence, they are simulations. The deeper our understanding of the real world, the more accurate our simulations.
- empath75 10y agoWhether or not ai programmers and researchers are attempting to create consciousness, the question of whether it's possible for them to do so is relevant to people who are interested in what consciousness is.
- wildermuthn 10y agoConsciousness is vital to AI because there are vast amounts of data that can only be measured through consciousness — data that AI absolutely requires to solve the hardest human problems. This type of data is called "qualia" — the experience of pain, for example. An unconscious AI can process data about what causes pain: brain activity. Only a conscious AI can process data about pain itself, and only because a conscious AI measures pain from its own experience of pain. The same can be said of any conscious experience that follows the spectrum from fear to love, terror to joy. If we want AI to solve human problems, it will need data about what it feels like to experience reality, and that data can only come by being conscious itself.
- marcosdumay 10y ago"Quantum effects" is not the same as "quantum computing". This is the same bullshit as the D-Wave marketing, just in a different domain. Quantum computing happening in the brain is an extremely extraordinary hypothesis, and requires some very good evidence before it's accepted. Quantum effects happening on the brain is a "well, duh, and you'll tell me water is wet later?" hypothesis, and requires some good evidence not to believe in it.
- YeGoblynQueenne 10y ago>> The point of artificial intelligence is not ( at least in my and several other prominent AI scientist's such as Andrew Ng's opinion) to create a conscious intelligence, but to create intelligence that can do many of the useful tasks that we can do. Your syntax is suggesting that you consider yourself to be a prominent AI scientist like Andrew Ng, but I'll assume that's just a mistake! As to what is really the aim of AI as a field, there are two issues here. On the one hand, the original AI project as conceived back in the early '50s by the likes of Turing indeed aimed at getting computers to mimic human intelligence. Everything that has happened since then in the field has followed from that original and grandiose quest. It's true that in more recent years the applications of AI have tended to be aimed at much humbler goals, like performing specific, isolated tasks at a level approaching (and sometimes surpassing) the human- select tasks like image classification or machine translation etc. However, this is by necessity and not by choice. Think of it this way: if we would benefit from a system that can perform select tasks as well as humans, then we would benefit a lot more by a system able to perform _all_ conceivable tasks that well (or better). In that sense, the motivation of the original AI project remains alive and well. Consciousness of course seems to be an integral part of human intelligence- and it's reasonable to expect that it would be a prerequisite for strong AI also. In that sense, yeah, I'm afraid the discussion about consciousness is part of AI and will remain that for a long time to come.
- dilemma 10y ago>The point of artificial intelligence is not to create a conscious intelligence, but to create intelligence that can do many of the useful tasks that we can do. No. If it isn't conscious it isn't intelligent. There is no AI without consciousness because a non-conscious entity cannot make decisions independently -- react intelligently to its environment.
- eosophos 10y agoSo algorithms, thermometers, and neural nets are all conscious?
- stupidcar 10y agoOrch-OR isn't very convincing as a theory, but if you just read it as sci-fi, it's incredibly entertaining. So many weird, quasi-spiritual ideas.
- inputcoffee 10y agoThe Penrose Fallacy: 1. We don't understand Quantum Mechanics 2. We don't understand the mind 3. Therefore QM explains the mind Or as Steve Harnad once said, he takes all the embarrassments and failings of one field and marries them with another.
- kordless 10y agoThe connecting of disparate ideas is irrational in the individual. It's only when a group of people temporarily accept that those concepts may make sense that things get done. Given consciousness is directly responsible for giving us an individual's consciousness, and that consciousness (either by group or individual) must try to understand itself using the effect it is trying to describe, the concepts may NOT make sense when getting things done. This may be why philosophy is frequently taken as quackery, and non-scientific. ;) My HN profile has carried my thoughts on Penrose and Hammeroff's theories for some time now. Good to see it posted here and debated. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reduction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reducti...
- drostie 10y agoDownvoted because Penrose does not actually commit this fallacy, therefore naming it after him is something of a cheap shot, an excuse to not actually engage with his ideas.
- inputcoffee 10y agoI would downvote you if I could because you make a claim without backing it up. I am not the only one who has this interpretation of him. I certainly arrived upon it independently but so did many (more credible) giants in the field. As far as I can tell, he doesn't have an argument that consciousness stems from QM beyond the rather elusive nature of both. So if you think that is wrong, by all means, explain the connection you think he elucidates.
- drostie 10y agoYour frustration in your first sentence I would equate to a general human frustration that we all feel when we see our own sins reflected in others -- you don't back up your claim so you get mad at me for not backing up my claim. I could in turn make a really good case that the burden of proof is not on the person who says "he doesn't make that argument" to prove that he doesn't, but on the person who says "he makes that argument" to prove that he does. And then we can go back and forth in negativity, I suppose. In an attempt to avert that spiral of world-suck, let me attempt to instead meet your request head-on. Penrose is not saying what you say he's saying, and would not be able to fill up two books with your argument. Let's talk hacker for a second. What you're saying is that Penrose is basically saying "well I don't understand this bug in my computer program, and I don't understand the kernel in my computer, so therefore a kernel bug is causing this bug in my computer program." You are going to be predisposed to see any reduction of a bug towards the kernel as being evidence that yes, your characterization of the argument is correct and the argument is indeed laughable. This is understandable if someone just told you that hypothesis off-the-cuff, which I surmise is how you've probably encountered Penrose. (That is, I take the fact that you're laughing as evidence that you've not read both The Emperor's New Mind and Shadows of the Mind.) The alternative however, is that someone has (a) a high-level statement of "this shouldn't be happening", and (b) knows that the only way that such things can happen, barring things like the MMU misbehaving, is a kernel bug, and (c) has been attempting to trace down the code to the fundamental syscalls, and found that the thing-that-shouldn't-be-happening is indeed bracketed around one syscall in particular which does not seem to be doing what the docs say it should do. And if a hacker has attempted all of this, I mean, they might still be wrong: but their argument is no longer something of the form "I don't understand the kernel and I don't understand this bug, therefore the kernel caused this bug." It is something more sophisticated than that, and you're doing a disservice by laughing at them. One and a half of Penrose's books are ultimately about why the computationalist/algorithmist thesis of brain function seems deeply incomplete -- that a hallmark of some certain examples of reasoning appears to be deeply nonalgorithmic. (For example The Emperor's New Mind supplements his usual Godel argument with arguments that if brain plasticity comes from local neural plasticity then it is unlikely to have a great generality, but by a clever analogy if it does have a great generality then not only does that mesh with an idea of global plasticity, but it is very unlikely to be algorithmic. The one and a half books are basically full of little digs that, seen together, do seriously undermine faith in the thesis.) This is essentially the "bug" above. His favorite example is that we are capable of proving to our own mathematical understanding that our mathematical-understanding-algorithm contains true sentences which we will never be able to prove; if this algorithm exists then it is able to prove something that it will never be able to prove, which seems like a straightforward contradiction. But there are one and a half pop-sci books that he's written building up some other problems with this thesis in a way that even if you don't start off with knowledge of the relevant physics/comp-sci/whatever, you can hopefully understand it enough to appreciate the problem. He follows these up with a principled dive into what's actually underlying these "bugs". That is, he discards ideas about souls and takes it seriously that our reasoning is realized in our brain, and takes seriously that this is a biochemical system, and evaluates whether the noncomputable phenomena that he is "debugging" can come from chaos or randomness or the like. He is able to rule most of these out with auxiliary considerations, and so tries to get one level closer to the hardware: the biochemsitry is well-modeled, we know, by physical chemistry; there are likely no new fundamental interactions or whatever to be found in biochemistry. Looking into the physical chemistry level he finds that it can be somewhat cleanly divided into two parts: quantum and classical. Technically, it's all quantum: but you can handle a lot more with various classical rules of thumb, and this has basically all been done before him so he can just steal those results:the classical part of physical chemistry and probably even the vast majority of the quantum part of physical chemistry are algorithmic, it is known that quantum computers don't do other things than what computers do; they just might do many things more quickly. There exists only one part of the quantum part of physical chemistry which is not. Unfortunately, he doesn't have access to the source code, nor docs for what nature does--so he actually constructs physical-chemistry models that could hypothetically do the sort of buggy things that he's seeing at the top-level that he has carefully ruled out at the other levels of explanation. And this is all to say: as you can hopefully now see, these books contain a lot more than simply "we don't understand X, we don't understand Y, therefore Y causes X." Namely there is an actual understanding for example that X is realized in a system which has to be modeled with Y, and which has some features that can only come from certain corresponding features in Y, which we actually do understand very well. There has been a solid amount of good effort to push down that causal chain until one is left at these syscalls and then saying "something is fishy about those." And his argument might indeed be wrong, there are many little parts where maybe he's wrong about how chaos works and how it could cause a similar bug, just as our programmer above might be wrong about whether two processes are properly synchronized via locks or whatever -- but it's no longer this laughable thing of "ha, he doesn't understand X and Y so he thinks Y causes X!" that you're trying to say.
- dzdt 10y agoFor an intelligent response to Penrose see Scott Aaronson : http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=2756 http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=2756. Aaronson recognizes Penrose's genius while still disagreeing vigorously with his out-of-the-mainstream ideas. One of the many reasons I admire Roger is that, out of all the AI skeptics on earth, he’s virtually the only one who’s actually tried to meet this burden, as I understand it! He, nearly alone, did what I think all AI skeptics should do, which is: suggest some actual physical property of the brain that, if present, would make it qualitatively different from all existing computers, in the sense of violating the Church-Turing Thesis. Indeed, he’s one of the few AI skeptics who even understands what meeting this burden would entail: that you can’t do it with the physics we already know, that some new ingredient is necessary.
- ithkuil 10y agorelated read: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permutation_City https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permutation_City
- HONEST_ANNIE 10y agoPenrose is unique genius. His deep geometric intuition is extremely rare even among mathematicians. He uses his superior geometric intuition to teach physics in the book "Road to Reality" in a level that surpasses even Feynman. There is common underlying assumption that the hard problem of consciousness is tied to high level cognitive or computational capabilities. I don't see the connection. The crux of being conscious is having the cognitive ability of being aware-consiouns-attentative-reflective at least tiny amount of time. If we could scientifically determine/agree what consciousness is, we should be able to make nice hyper-aware-of-blue-and-knowing-it robot and it would be relatively simple one.
- Koshkin 10y agoWell, you can learn physics from Feynman. In order to read (and understand) Penrose, you need to already know physics (and math).
- ABCLAW 10y ago
- d--b 10y ago> And for all the recent advances in neurobiology, we seem no closer to solving the mind-brain problem than we were a century ago Er... Maybe not consciousness-brain (although I'm no expert on this at all), but it's hard to dispute that we have a MUCH deeper understanding of movement-brain, perception-brain, memory-brain, problem-solving-brain relationships that we had 100 years ago. Consciousness is a touchy subject. We've been studying cancer for a long time and haven't found a cure for it either. Yet, no one thinks that cancer originates in quantum effects. "we're no closer to solving it" is not a good argument in favor of one theory over another.
- inputcoffee 10y agoIt depends on what you mean by "relationship" Consider that we know "where" things happen, but it doesn't follow we know "how" things happen. It is a bit like opening up a computer and taking a thermometer and measuring the heat kicked off by various parts. Now I can tell you that when I run MatLab, the part called "CPU" gets hot. And when I run games the part called "GPU" gets hot. So clearly the CPU is the Matlab part of the computer and the GPU is the games part of the computer. What we need is a theory of software before we can make progress, and that is what we lack.
- SubiculumCode 10y agoThat is a much more obtuse view of the state of neuroscience than is deserved. Sure, it started out as, oh this part of the brain needs more oxygen when remembering something, and oh, if that part of the brain is removed then people cant remember much . But it progresses to, ah this part of the brain is important to memory that binds multiple features, not within objects,but between objects. oh, computational models suggest pattern separation and completion operations that allow orthoganalization of activity during encoding of similar memories and retrieval of all the pattern of activity from reactivation of part of the activity. So lets make an experiement that modulates similarity between memories and modulates the completeness of retrieval cues for bound percept pairs, and/or in animal models directly modulate activity in the sub parts of that brain region thought to be reponsible for separation or completion operations to see if we can impair or enhance separation or completion operations. Anyway, thats just my field. Edit: Adding some references. Not sure how to format it into a list. Pattern Separation and Completion in Dentate Gyrus and CA3 in the Hippocampus: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/315/5814/961 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/315/5814/961 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149763412001674 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149763412... http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627313010854 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627313... http://science.sciencemag.org/content/319/5870/1640 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/319/5870/1640 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26190832 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26190832 https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=pattern+separation+completion&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiQ36iK4tbTAhUC6GMKHXVuAXYQgQMIJDAA https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=pattern+separation+comp... Relational Binding: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166432813003094 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166432813... http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/neu/29/1/126/ http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/neu/29/1/126/ http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963721410368805 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963721410368805
- mcguire 10y ago"[Penrose] explained that his interest in consciousness goes back to his discovery of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem while he was a graduate student at Cambridge. Gödel’s theorem, you may recall, shows that certain claims in mathematics are true but cannot be proven. “This, to me, was an absolutely stunning revelation,” he said. “It told me that whatever is going on in our understanding is not computational.”" Penrose starts from a specific conclusion, that formal systems are limited in ways that he clearly is not, and then searched for some way to explain the difference.
- drostie 10y agoThat's kind of the modus operandi of physics, I suppose. Max Planck started from a specific conclusion, that the spectrum of the Sun is limited at high frequencies in ways that Maxwell's theory clearly is not, and then searched for some way to explain the difference.
- Sean1708 10y agoThe difference being that Planck knew what the reality was (we knew what the spectrum of the sun looked like), but with consciousness we don't really know what the reality is (there is no "spectrum" of the mind for us to match).
- lodi 10y agoOkay how about Einstein then? My understanding is that he also worked backwards in order to develop his theory of Special Relativity; he was trying to "fit" a theory to a universe that presupposed that the laws of physics are the same throughout the universe, including a constant speed of light for all observers. Relativistic effects weren't known to be reality at the time this theory was proposed. Much later, scientists developed experiments to confirm relativity. Maybe we're still searching for the right theory of consciousness to know what exactly we're trying to measure?
- some_guy_there 10y ago
- deepnet 10y agoFor the completely opposite view, listen to Daniel Dennet on The Life Scientific [1]. Dennet argues that combining Darwin's strange inversion of reason (complexity from bottom up iterative refinement) with Turing's Universal Machine provides a way of understanding how we are machines, built of mahcines, built of machines, etc. and it is the heirarchy that allows the complexity of minds to emerge. That heirarchical iterative schemes are unexpectedly powerful is well mirrored by the recent successes of deep neural nets, and Dennet cites Hinton. It's worth a listen and summarises his new book From Bacteria to Bach. [1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08kv3y4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08kv3y4
- sgt101 10y agoYeah, but we are made of The Universe, and yet The Universe is and we can't say why. So I don't get where Dennet's argument goes. I don't think he does either. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/daniel-dennetts-science-of-the-soul http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/daniel-dennetts...
- deepnet 10y agoDennet is concerned with the origin of minds on Earth and how this is explicable within our current evolutionary framework. He does not seek to explain the origins of the universe but argues that this is not necessary to understand how minds could come about.
- abiox 10y ago> yet The Universe is and we can't say why is there a 'why'? some people say it was 'created', but then the creator 'is and we can't say why'.
- deepnet 10y ago"Perhaps the best way of seeing the reality, indeed the ubiquity in Nature, of reasons is to reflect on the different meanings of “why.” The English word is equivocal, and the main ambiguity is marked by a familiar pair of substitute phrases: what for? and how come?” “Why are you handing me your camera?” asks what are you doing this for? “Why does ice float?” asks how come: what it is about the way ice forms that makes it lower density than liquid water?" P48, From Bacteria to Bach, The Evolution of Minds by Dan Dennet
- bra-ket 10y agoRelated: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cognition https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cognition https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holonomic_brain_theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holonomic_brain_theory
- Animats 10y agoAll the mammals have roughly the same brain architecture and the same DNA. Whatever makes brains work is present at the mouse level in some form. We really ought to be able to build a mouse brain by now. A mouse brain has about 75 million neurons. That's not a big number for modern hardware. If we knew what to build, it would probably fit in a 1U rack. Some years ago I met Rodney Brooks, back when he was doing insect robots. He was talking about a jump to human-level AI as his next project. I asked him, "Why not go for a mouse next? That might be within reach." He said "I don't want to go down in history as the man who created the world's greatest robot mouse." He went off to do Cog [1], a humanlike robot head that didn't do much. Then he backed off from human-level AI, did vacuum cleaners with insect-level smarts, and made some real money. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cog_(project) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cog_(project)
- sgt101 10y agoYes, but one mammal has created a technological civilization. There are no mice on HackerNews. I think.
- abvdasker 10y agoYes, but one mammal has created a technological civilization. We did, but is that really categorically different than groups of primates using primitive tools [1]? I think the idea that humans are categorically different from other species is misguided. Instead consciousness and intelligence seem to be more continuous than discreet, particularly when looking at semi-intelligent animals like monkeys, dolphins and octopi. Animals in that class can all learn pretty complicated tasks and are able to make use of tools. Self-awareness and consciousness isn't something we understand fully enough to even exclude all animals from possessing. The only thing that seems particularly unique about humans is our ability to use complex language and record it. Passing down knowledge from one generation to the next is the _only_ reason we have "technological civilization". [1] http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150818-chimps-living-in-the-stone-age http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150818-chimps-living-in-the...
- orbifold 10y agoIt is really not that simple unfortunately, CMOS the only submicron technology that can be produced with sufficient repeatability and noone has come up with a proposal yet how to produce a CMOS chip with that integration density, what you have to realize is that each neuron has typically up to 1000 connections to other neurons so you need to fit in 75*1000 synapse circuits in your design as well. That is already 2 orders more transistors than any currently produced chip.
- dvt 10y ago> This past March, when I called Penrose in Oxford, he explained that his interest in consciousness goes back to his discovery of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem while he was a graduate student at Cambridge. Gödel’s theorem, you may recall, shows that certain claims in mathematics are true but cannot be proven. “This, to me, was an absolutely stunning revelation,” he said. “It told me that whatever is going on in our understanding is not computational.” This is a very strange conclusion to make. Maybe someone can elucidate. Godel's theorems apply to tightly-controlled formal systems. And they do not, in fact, apply to particularly weak systems (e.g. sentential logic). Why would Penrose think that Godel has anything to do with consciousness? All it seems to have done is prove that, in some systems, there are known unknowables (specifically, that the consistency of sufficiently-complex systems cannot be proved). If anything, it should lead us to take a train of thought similar to Chalmers': consciousness is unknowable (maybe kind of like God), but even that's a stretch. Because, like I mentioned above, Godel's theorems are about formal systems. Not only is the real world not a formal system, but (at least on the quantum level), it's also non-deterministic. Now, there are probabilistic logics out there that follow Godel's findings, but there's a lot of work that needs to be done to bring that in the real world.
- HONEST_ANNIE 10y agoIndeed. There is nothing to indicate that human brains have done anything that can't be achieved with polynomial time heuristic search algorithm. Most people who have read the "Emperors New Mind" have been surprised that Penrose don't' seem to realize that. He has very strong intuition about consciousness and cognition but he can't explain it to others.
- goatlover 10y agoThere are at least two things correlated with brains that we have no algorithm for: 1. Consciousness (subjective experience, qualia) 2. Intentionality (the aboutness of mental content) What would a conscious algorithm even look like?
- mannykannot 10y ago
- RichardHeart 10y agoThings that think they're special and important outperform things that don't. The side effect of that is that they justify their specialness with things that are hard to understand, an appeal to complexity. In this case, the complexity is invented. There is no hard problem of consciousness. What we do isn't so magical, or special, from what animals, or machines, or other actors with agencies do. Consciousness is rare and beautiful, however, not magic.
- lordnacho 10y agoI don't get how Gödel leads to quantum consciousness. Even if you need quantum to make consciousness, doesn't that just mean we're all quantum computers instead of classical chemical computers? If we're all made of Lego, but we need Technics sticks and joints to become conscious, how is that any less materialistic? Even the fact that quantum is a source of randomness doesn't seem essential.
- sgt101 10y agoThere may be different classes of quantum computers in the sense that some algorithms - including algorithms we do not yet have yet - may not execute on all the quantum computing surfaces we have. Additionally current quantum computers are heroic devices, it may be beyond our civilization to build ones that are equivalent to a human brain - or that elucidate how any brain works.
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- csomar 10y agoDoes that mean that animals don't feel pain? Or that they are conscious? I don't mean to tarnish his research with a simple fact but I guess it's something worth exploring. Do animals feel pain the same way humans do? Is there a measure of consciousness?
- sgt101 10y agoThere's a measure of consciousness - if you accept that other adult humans are conscious then at some point babies move from not capable of conscious to capable of conscious (maybe 20 weeks?). If you accept that then go and play with a dog and reflect on awareness/awakeness/agency and compare with a baby.
- Chronos 10y agoA while ago I wrote up my objections to the Penrose-Lucas argument: https://chronos-tachyon.net/essays/penrose-objections/ https://chronos-tachyon.net/essays/penrose-objections/ . I'm not super proud of how it turned out (way too meandering), but it boils down to: 1. Let's suppose for sake of argument that humans really can see the inherent truth of "Peano Arithmetic is consistent". That doesn't mean humans violate Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem: it could just mean that humans use axioms stronger than PA. 2. Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem only applies to systems that are perfectly logically consistent. Not sure how Penrose didn't notice, but humans... aren't. 3. When scientists proposed Quantum Mechanics as a replacement for Classical Mechanics, it was on them to explain how Quantum Mechanics simplified to Classical Mechanics in the common case. "Penrose Mechanics" is an even more radical departure — especially from a physics of computation standpoint, as Penrose Mechanics by definition would allow solving at least some of the problems in (ALL - R) in ~polynomial time. Penrose needs to explain how Penrose Mechanics reduces to Quantum Mechanics in the common case. 4. Penrose proposes that (a) there exist new physics, (b) that evolution has learned to computationally exploit the new physics via microtubules, and yet (c) that humans are the only lineage to make use of this feature of microtubules, even though microtubules are found in all eukaryotic cells (from mushrooms to amoebae). From a predator-prey standpoint alone, it would seemingly be a huge evolutionary advantage to be able to compute NP or R functions in polynomial time. (That ability is not _strictly_ implied by Penrose Mechanics, but it's a very likely consequence.) Penrose needs to explain why only humans are taking advantage of the computational power of microtubules, when microtubules have existed for billions of years and across millions of species.
- dilemma 10y ago>2. Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem only applies to systems that are perfectly logically consistent. Not sure how Penrose didn't notice, but humans... aren't. Why are humans not logically consistent then, if they are as materialists claim, something that can be abstracted with a computer program if we have full information of their workings?
- Chronos 10y agoUm, you seem to be operating on a confusion of ideas. Materialism does not imply that humans are logically consistent. The universe in which we exist is (probably?) a logically consistent system, but that's true for both materialism and non-materialism. The difference between the two is which set of rules the universe runs on, not whether those rule sets are internally consistent. When I say "systems that are perfectly logically consistent" and "humans... aren't", I'm saying that the ideas humans have in their heads are not logically consistent. It's possible to write down "2+2=5" on a piece of paper, even if 2 plus 2 doesn't actually equal 5, and it's likewise possible for humans to believe "2+2=5" even if 2 plus 2 doesn't equal 5.
- prmph 10y agoBasically, "solving" consciousness means being able to answer this question: (it is stated in simple terms, but interesting to grapple with nonetheless) Say a loved one died. Let assume technology has progressed to the point that before he died, his brain and body was recorded in exact detail and replicated. Would you accept an simulation or instantiation of this brain/body as a "resurrection" of your loved one? If not, then consciousness is not simply a matter computation
- hdhzy 10y ago> his brain and body was recorded in exact detail and replicated. I'm not a physicist but as far as I remember it's not a matter of a advanced technology but rather a quantum limitation or the world (you cannot copy an object with all derails). > Would you accept an simulation or instantiation of this brain/body as a "resurrection" of your loved one? Of course not, it's just a simulation although a very convincing one :)
- drvdevd 10y agoI like to pose the question subjectively: what would it be like to have my own consciousness suddenly operating within a computer instead of my body, right now? Would the machine have to simulate my bodily experience to give my mind a frame of reference? I would say once I can go back and forth and know what it's like, then and possibly only then, I could accept such a resurrection. I'm curious about what Penrose would say on this perspective.
- sgt101 10y agoOk - imagine you are completely paralysed, or blind, or deaf, or all of the above. Are you dead? People do, and have experienced a there and back from this.. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kill_Bill https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kill_Bill (also sleepin' dreamin')
- aninhumer 10y agoIt's an interesting philosophical question, but identity is only one aspect of the nature of consciousness. (And asking whether one would "accept" the clone isn't a particularly good framing of the problem.) Far more interesting to me is how consciousness even occurs. It is seemingly impossible to study, because consciousness is fundamentally not externally observable. Even in humans, we have essentially no way of knowing for sure that anyone but oneself is conscious.
- EddieSpeaks 10y agoI'm sorry Penrose is a bit out there in this topic at least, he's been influenced way too much by the likes of Deepak Chopra and goes on endlessly about consciousness made up of micro-tubules and other such pseudoscientific nonsense. He's been proven wrong but he likes the mystical aspects of it. I think it's safe to disregard his opinions on this topic.
- goatlover 10y agoA simple argument or why consciousness doesn't compute which doesn't rely on QM, is that computation is a form of abstraction from subjective experience, as are all explanations and models. To achieve objectivity, we divorce our creature specific and individual experiences to arrive at patterns common across experiences, and we call those real. To go beyond that is to make a metaphysical argument that computation, information, or math makes up reality (as opposed to just things in the case of materialism, or ideas in the case of idealism, or the unknowable noumena in the case of Kant).
- eosophos 10y agoGlad to see Ayahuasca get at least a passing mention here. Let anyone who thinks they understand consciousness inhale >18mg of N,N DMT and return humbled.
- strainer 10y agoThere is something so special about being concious - something precious and undefinable, that I would be surprised if an intractable connection to reality where not intrinsic to it. I would be surprised if the programmed representations of things which I have long played and worked with, the symbols, numbers, vectors and virtual objects; could actually have some conciousness of their own - as though the only likely difference between simulation and reality is just a matter of scale and/or perspective.
- darawk 10y agoCan anyone here defend this theory? I'm genuinely curious. It may well be the case that human consciousness relies on quantum effects. But we know that we can simulate a quantum computer using a regular computer. Which means that in principle, you don't need QM to have consciousness, even if human consciousness makes use of QM. So, while it may or may not be true that the brain uses QM, it doesn't seem to really explain anything of interest. It doesn't make consciousness any less mysterious, or give any real insight into how we might create or understand our own consciousness. Given that (or refute the premises, if you please), why is this theory interesting, relevant, or correct?
- ankostis 10y agoPenrsoe explicitly excludes Quantum Computing from the basis of consciousness. Unfortunately I didn't find the exact interview where we was stating this, but he was clear on this: Quantum Computers are computers after all and he is talking about non-computable physics. The reasons he looks at Quantum it's because it seems to be missing something fro our understanding(the "Reduction of the Unitary evolution"), and he "hopes" that this is non-computable. Does that make sense?
- darawk 10y agoSort of. But fundamentally, if there is a quantum phenomenon that our brains are harnessing, then so too can a quantum computer. So I don't see how he can draw such a distinction, even in theory.
- Tloewald 10y agoI think we're so far from understanding consciousness that having a theory of what makes it work (or even that "if it works, it relies on thing X") is dodgy. E.g. let's suppose I make the claim that some people are conscious and others just seem like they're conscious. Can we test this? Quite respectable people have theorized -- or should I say bloviated? -- that consciousness is merely an emergent property of complex systems. Again, we can't really define what consciousness is, so it's an interesting dinner party conversation starter, but it's not falsifiable.