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The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention
- examancer 10y agoWe need to get better at following the current Geneva Convention before we can hope to enforce a digital version.
- lorenzhs 10y agoThe two are not mutually exclusive, and the set of people who could work on either of these is probably mostly disjoint. "Don't fix problem X because problem Y is more important" isn't a helpful stance if we can work on both.
- JumpCrisscross 10y agoSort of. We can learn from why the the Geneva Conventions aren't respected while WTO rulings are.
- Semaphor 10y agoUnless they negatively affect the US? https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e...
- examancer 10y agoMy comment was meant to point out how frequently the Geneva Convention is ignored by nations today. Clearly we need a similar convention to protect our increasingly critical digital infrastructure. However, our inability to enforce the current convention does not bode well for enforcing this one. It's tough to see how we can compel nations to comply until international law as a whole is better respected by all nations.
- walshemj 10y agoand presumably like the Geneva conventions "police" actions will be outwith that - its ironic that if a solder in wartime used ammo that police regularly use they would be committing a war crime
- vonmoltke 10y agoThe Hague Conventions restrict that, not the Geneva Conventions.
- yourself92 10y ago"Following highly visible and even challenging negotiations, in September 2015 the U.S. and China agreed to important commitments pledging that neither country’s government would conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property." LOL. Does anyone actually believe that?
- jeron 10y agono
- Eridrus 10y agoSort of http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/china-still-successfully-hacking-us-but-less/d/d-id/1325980 http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/china-still-succ... There are certainly challenges, but the threat/intelligence communities have made a lot of strides in attribution. If you can attribute attacks, you can retaliate with sanctions, etc. So if you are credible in your threat of retaliation and the retaliation is meaningful and proportional, reducing cyber conflict may be possible. This is certainly a challenging topic, but to draw a parallel; many people were sceptical of the Iranian nuclear deal, but even the Israelis admit that the Iranians look to have stopped developing nuclear weapons capabilities.
- vinay427 10y ago> many people were sceptical of the Iranian nuclear deal, but even the Israelis admit that the Iranians look to have stopped developing nuclear weapons capabilities. It's incredible that people thought Iran would risk devastating sanctions just to pursue a risky nuclear program that would remain open to foreign intervention and espionage indefinitely. If Israelis really want peace, they might consider electing a government that actually promotes that.
- JumpCrisscross 10y agoThe full text is: "The United States and China agree that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors" [1] (emphasis mine). Not a meaningful commitment since the U.S. does not (officially) do this and the concept of a purely-commercial Chinese company defies delineation. [1] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/0...
- nof 10y agoYo Microsoft, have you looked at the work done by e.g. EFF?
- dzolvd 10y agoEFF is what I immediately thought of as well.
- d--b 10y agoThis is wrong on so many levels. The worst is that it undermines the actual Geneva Convention by borrowing its name to advocate something totally different. The Geneva Convention doesn't ask for "no fighting", but rather gives boundaries to keep fighting within "human-ish" levels. I think everyone agrees that hacking is not inhumane...
- Teever 10y agoAnd when that hacking results in a power plant in a region being taken offline and after several days of emergency power several babies in incubators die is that still humane?
- steverb 10y agoAnd when a power plant in a region is taken offline via conventional means? That isn't covered by the Current Laws of Land Warfare, why should a digital version be any different?
- zeveb 10y agoI think that it is covered by the laws of war: as long as the military benefit of attacking the power plant is sufficient to outweigh the collateral damage, it's legal. If you're wrong, and you lose, then you hang after the war is over.
- steverb 10y agoYou are correct. I should have said that it's not prohibited.
- dragonwriter 10y ago> And when a power plant in a region is taken offline via conventional means? That isn't covered by the Current Laws of Land Warfare While details of the context will matter, an attack on such a plant would potentially implicate any or all of Arts. 51-56 (exc. 53) of Protocol I to the 1949 Conventions (the US is not a party to Protocol I but had traditionally viewed it's terms as declarative of and redundant with pre-existing customary international law.)
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- jjawssd 10y agoIf Microsoft actually cared they would donate to or support the EFF
- tptacek 10y agoThe Geneva Conventions have whatever teeth they have precisely because they don't prohibit war. But these recommendations would more or less prohibit signals-based spycraft. It's reasonable to want governments not to spy on each other. It's not reasonable to expect it, especially since --- probably unlike most violations of the Geneva Convention --- there's a Prisoners Dilemma problem with adhering to these conventions.
- secfirstmd 10y agoAlso Geneva Conventions were developed following widespread experience of the horrors of traditional warefare. "Cyber" warefare does not yet have that same affect on policy-makers and the general public.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- frozenport 10y agoWorst case senarios such as damage to critical structures such as dams might have high fatalities. The key is to avoid a war before it happens.
- ocdtrekkie 10y agoWould existing protections in the Geneva Conventions against targeting noncombatants apply to damaging infrastructure that leads to civilian fatalities?
- mmirate 10y agoProbably the better question is whether everyone who might want to damage such infrastructure is in fact (a) a state actor who (b) was one of the signatories to the Geneva Conventions.
- wbl 10y agoDams and nuclear reactors are specifically covered under dangerous forces. But you can target highway bridges, ports, locks which can fail safe, etc.
- sqeaky 10y agoDoes anyone else see irony in microsoft advocating good behavior? Just yesterday I was saying that some industries self regulate well, I even used video games as an example. Even with their cleaner behavior the past few year I don't think I won't companies like microsoft anywhere near actual regulation of anything vaguely connected to human rights. I see too many ways for them to abuse even an advisory role in such regulation. Maybe they really have turned over a new leaf and microsoft is nothing but angels, but it is too soon to tell in my opinion.
- JumpCrisscross 10y agoPolitics is about building coalitions. A good way to ensure nobody joins your coalition is to pre-sort parties based on some arbitrary measure of "goodness".
- marcosdumay 10y agoPolitics is also about knowing when to trust that previous serial killer that wants your house keys for no good reason, and when not to trust.
- sqeaky 10y agoThis was exactly my point. How do we know microsoft won't do something shady to strongly favor themselves or hurt others? They have done it in the past with standardizations groups.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- zeveb 10y ago> 1. No targeting of tech companies, private sector or critical infrastructure. In peacetime, the last item is okay — clearly in wartime it's appropriate to degrade a foe's infrastructure, consistent with the accepted laws of war and humane concerns. I think the private sector ought to be generally off-limits — but surely there are times when that might not be the case. Do spies never duck through a dry cleaners'? I'm negative about privileging tech companies vs. the private sector in general. > 2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to & recover from events. Sure, that sounds reasonable. > 3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors rather than to stockpile, sell or exploit them. I can't possibly imagine that will or should ever happen. Nation-states have a duty to their citizens to be able to conduct offensive & defensive cyber operations; a necessary condition of doing so is the ability to stockpile & exploit vulnerabilities. There's a gain-loss calculation to be made for report any vulnerability: does the gain to national defense of closing that vulnerability outweigh the loss to national defense of being able to exploit it against an adversary? I see absolutely no reason to believe that the answer is automatically 'yes,' or even mostly 'yes.' > 4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and ensure that any developed are limited, precise and not reusable. Restraint of course is laudable. Limited & precise capabilities are obviously a good thing. Trying to limit reuse, though, seems impossible to ensure in the general case, and not really desirable anyway. Why restrain makers of software munitions from using one of the most powerful tools in a software developer's toolkit: reuse? > 5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to[sic] cyberweapons. Meh, I always thought nonproliferation in general is either a case of pulling up the ladder behind oneself (on the part of states which have already achieved a capability) or a exercise of wishful thinking (on the part of those who think that the genie can be crammed back in the bottle). As applied to cyberweapons, I have difficulty understanding what this is even supposed to mean. > 6. Limit offensive operations to avoid a mass event. This is already addressed by the existing laws of war, particularly the principle of proportionality. Overall, I imagine this is really meant to be a starting point, not a draft: there is absolutely no way that a serious person can expect point 3 in particular to universally hold.
- alexandercrohde 10y ago>>> Nation-states have a duty to their citizens to be able to conduct offensive & defensive cyber operations; a necessary condition of doing so is the ability to stockpile & exploit vulnerabilities. You speak of war as those it's some necessary and good force, as opposed to a 0-sum-game that has lost all use in modern society. Am I the only one who thinks that we as a race need to look to an era 200 years out where the very concept of "war" and "nation" is obsolete?
- Kunix 10y agoI am surprised by the number of naysayers here. Question: Do you have something better to suggest? (something that could realistically get implemented) Conventions like the one suggested here are the baseline on agreeing on common rules. It allows accountability, boundaries, and once accepted open the way to discuss possible sanctions. I would much rather see positive steps like this one than no progress at all.
- mi100hael 10y agoThis particular suggestion is a pie-in-the-sky joke. > Such a convention should commit governments to avoiding cyber-attacks that target the private sector or critical infrastructure or the use of hacking to steal intellectual property. That basically translates to "plz don't hack things." It's as though cyber attackers would stop if only someone would think to ask nicely.
- PeterisP 10y agoThe baseline for common rules is something that would be desirable by all major players. Gas attacks and torturing POWs is something where the disadvantage of being on the receiving side is much greater than the practical advantage of being allowed to use such techniques, all major combatants would generally prefer to fight in a war without poison gas or tortured POWs, so they're prohibited. For at least some "serious players", the practical advantage of being able to use or threaten cyberwarfare (or nuclear attacks) is greater than the disadvantage of potentially being on the receiving side, at least some major combatants would really prefer to fight a war where cyberattacks against civilian networks are used, so they can't and won't be prohibited or meaningfully restricted; the suggestions are simply futile unless they somehow manage to show that all the countries who currently seem to benefit from unrestricted cyberwarfare actually somehow suffer from the status quo.
- tendre 10y agoI share your feelings but it's not surprising since a good idea was given a poor analogy with the Geneva convention. It is the nature of the HN hive mind to take titles literally, as if they break all the code that follows.
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- DanielBMarkham 10y agoIt should be noted that the Geneva Conventions were signed immediately after a war, the signatories were all nation-states (no independent non-state groups), they were an ongoing process, and not every nation-state signed them. They have also been violated quite frequently. In fact, if it weren't for the constant peacetime indoctrination of military officers in signatory nations, they would be violated a lot more in time of war. It also should be noted that for a long time there has been a solution for non-state actors inciting violence upon another state: military trial. Pirates, no matter what Disney may have you believe, were not the most friendly folks. The Royal Navy and others hung quite a few in an effort to establish open seas. We already are at war, it's just nobody wants to come out and say it. So now is a terrible time to bring this up. Belligerents are going to stall and hem and haw while they seek tactical advantage. That's not conducive to a frank discussion. I can't see any of the major nations or third parties participating in any kind of honest way, sadly. If we want to start hanging hackers (the bad kind), and I'm not so sure we aren't just a few decades away from doing that, we need to start having an honest discussion about just what constitutes an "open internet". And I imagine there are several nations right now, including the U.S., that do not have one. That's a great discussion to get started, but this idea is way, way premature and is based on a ton of assumptions which are not true. Loosely the analogy might work, but I doubt the authors have thought through exactly what they're leading us into.
- MaggieL 10y agoJust what we need: more asymmetric warfare.
- berry_sortoro 10y agoI would actually bother to read the article and upvote it if this would not come from M$. How hypocritical can it me?
- rrggrr 10y agoInverse = better. Enact products liability legislation that holds software and hardware makers financially liable to damages due to defects in their products and watch the attack surface available to state and non-state actors shrink demonstrably. Not only will more secure solutions be engineered, but greater resources will be expended by companies like Microsoft, Apple, Cisco, etc. on UI's, educational efforts, and features that enhance security. There is no stopping a state actor through treaty. Its unrealistic and will cause compliant countries to unilaterally disarm at the expense of non-compliant actors (eg. Assad chemical weapons use in Syria).
- mempko 10y agoWhen our own government (USA) has violated the Geneva conventions many times we must keep in mind what the real purpose of the conventions seem to be. To be a tool to be used against 'the other guys'. The strong against the weak.
- hackuser 10y ago> a tool to be used against 'the other guys'. The strong against the weak. Recently some African countries have withdrawn from the International Criminal Court on that basis; only the weak are prosecuted. It's inconceivable that a U.S. leader would be prosecuted, for example. However, the GC are used by everyone against everyone, including the strong against the strong, so the strong don't escape scrutiny. I believe U.S. law requires the government to obey them. For example, the Bush administration crafted careful (and sometimes convoluted) legal arguments that their actions complied with the GC - they respected the GC enough to feel they couldn't just ignore the rules. On the other hand: The Geneva Conventions are not followed or implemented perfectly, but neither is any law or rule. International governance is anarchy; there is no real authority; in that realm, nothing will get nearly 100% compliance. Do the GC have a positive impact? Now militaries and governments are legally bound and their people trained to follow these rules, and accusing someone of 'violation of the Geneva Conventions' carries weight. Imagine the world without them.
- AnAfrican 10y agoNot that I disagree with your overall point but : >Recently some African countries have withdrawn from the International Criminal Court on that basis; only the weak are prosecuted Actually only two (Gambia and Burundi) has withdrawn arguing this. And in both cases, everyone knows the withdrawal is related to their own human rights abuses. South Africa has announced its intention to withdraw (don't know if it's effective) because they believe it hinders its mediation efforts in conflict zones. (ie. we cannot help Uganda settle with the LRA because we're bound to arrest LRA leaders as soon as they set foot in South Africa)
- hackuser 10y ago
- greenyouse 10y agoOne particular issue that makes this difficult to enforce is the nature of nation-state cyber weapons. Unlike physical weapons, which can be regulated by tracking their location or use, cyber weapons are undetectable by design. Less advanced cyber weapons from weaker programs like North Korea's or Iran's teams can be found but the capabilities of major players like the USA, China, or European countries likely extends far beyond what a company would be able to detect. The technology that advanced nation-states are using to do attacks is highly classified and most likely farther reaching than most people realize. The documentary Zero Days gives a pretty good overview of how nation-state cyber attacks have transferred into physical attacks (e.g. taking large power grids offline, derailing trains, subverting anything that has a PLC, etc.). This technology has been around for almost a decade. Without knowledge of what kind of weapons they have, we won't be able to detect them. If these capabilities fell into the hands of non-nation state actors (terrorists) the damage they could do could be analogous to a nuclear weapon. Even if we do discover an attack, it's even harder to attribute a piece of software to a country. Do you think an advanced nation would leave marks saying "foobar virus copyright X team 2017"? There's plausible deniability as well because one country could frame the other to make it look credible and we'd have no way to know what the truth was. This program may work well for normal hacking attacks by people or lesser nation-states but it will not affect the missions for more advanced countries. Maybe it's worthwhile for stopping some attacks and setting a precedent but it won't be a silver bullet. I agree with the sentiment though, innocent civilians and companies should be left out of the crosshairs. It would be good if major software companies could work together to mitigate damage from attacks.
- sturmisch77 10y agoNation states have gravitated to cyber because it carries less risk than espionage in the field, and because of the difficulty of attribution. Despite a mountain of evidence, Russia denies the DNC hack. The US pretends Stuxnet didn't happen. And N. Korea obviously is not owning up to Sony. This puts tech companies in a bind. They want to innovate on society changing ideas like autonomous vehicles, but with nation to nation cyber attacks, they are potentially putting civilian lives at risk by doing so. Will nation states play nice? No one expected direct attacks on private companies -- then Sony happened. No one expected attacks on a US election. And no one expected an attack on the grid without declaration of war -- but then Ukraine. Without defined international norms, anything is on the table -- even in peacetime.
- anigbrowl 10y agoCivil or international warfare are bad for business, but trying to handshake them away with some sort of business compact is about as realistic as 'peace in our time.' It's going to happen and the time has come to place bets. Trying to postpone this reality by having a lightbulb moment and asking for the rulebook isn't going to work. Sorry.
- coldtea 10y agoBecause the analog one worked wonderfully?
- kakwa_ 10y agoAm I the only one who see this call as deeply misplaced? The Geneva conventions were written and accepted by governments. Those governments where acting on the behalf of their people and had (some kind of) legitimacy. Further more, they were acting with a goal of universal humanity and common interest. This call is Microsoft asking for global legislation for protecting itself and other tech companies, which have no legitimacy whatsoever to represent the common interest.
- rchaud 10y agoThat is how I read it as well. Something written with absurdly transparent levels of self-interest.
- vog 10y agoSuch a Digital Geneva Convention will be utterly useless, and perhaps even counter-productive, until we have solved the attribution problem.[1] Until that is solved, we risk misuse of a Digital Geneva Convention to impose sanctions against innocent players. Like with the real Geneva Convention, prevention is harder and not that sexy, but leads to much better long-term results: Invest in improving software security, run bug bounties, enforce accountability at least for non-free software. And, of course, resolve the conflict of interests within the state, e.g. by making clear that police and intelligence are going too far when they buy zerodays[2] and spread malware[3]. [1] Right now, attributing attacks to their origin is idle speculation. Every larger attack is initially attributed to the currently popular scapegoats, with "evidence" that is essentially based on coffee grounds reading. [2] Buying zerodays creates an incentive for people to keep the volunerabilities they found secret, instead of publishing and fixing them. Moreover, these create an incentive to insert such "bugs" (backdoors) in the first place. [3] ... or force other to build backdoors into their software, which is in effect almost the same as spreading malware.
- a_imho 10y agoCommit to nonproliferation of cyberweapons A cyberweapon performs an action which would normally require a soldier or spy, and which would be considered either illegal or an act of war if performed directly by a human agent of the sponsor during peacetime. Legal issues include violating the privacy of the target and the sovereignty of its host nation. Such actions include (but are not limited to): Surveillance of the system or its operators, including sensitive information, such as passwords and private keys[0] [0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberweapon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberweapon
- dbg31415 10y agoCan we start smaller? Say with a digital bill of rights?
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