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It's not like regulating devices is unprecedented. New devices already have to be approved by the FCC before being sold in the U.S. Suppose that the FCC also ch
by skybrian 10y ago
It's not like regulating devices is unprecedented. New devices already have to be approved by the FCC before being sold in the U.S. Suppose that the FCC also checked that Internet-capable devices are safe to be connected to the Internet? This would have global impact because most companies want to sell their devices in the U.S. (And even more so if other countries with big markets cooperated with similar standards.)
Another possible model would be something like having Underwriters Laboratories and other independent organizations check the devices.
This is never going to be perfect, but it doesn't need to be. The goal is to make sure that devices people buy at the store are reasonably secure. In previous eras, the goal of new regulation was to make sure that you can still listen to the radio and watch TV, and that people don't often get electrocuted by their appliances. By and large it seems to have worked.
For more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationally_Recognized_Testing_Laboratories https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationally_Recognized_Testing_...
- imglorp 10y agoThe FCC worked because the devices they regulate are mostly local in range, but this stuff is global. Even if you do get some regulation in the First World internet devices, there are still going to be millions of legacy devices, millions more unregulated in the Third World, plus how many illegal ones and even more with latent flaws. All of them are going to be targets in the next DDOS botnet wakeup. So what do you do there, put up national firewalls? How? There's around 9,000 CVE's this year so far. Should devices be checked against all of them? How about next week, does the vendor have to go back and check your fridge? Do they have to patch it? For how long? Who pays for all that? A $20 webcam suddenly needs $500/year just in ongoing maintenance and updates. I don't have any answers, only questions.
- wwwigham 10y agoAnd, not to be prudish, but the lack of regulation is part of what has allowed the industry to explode. It's more unlikely I can succeed at a kickstarter for a neat computer dongle if it needs an extra few thousand dollars for regulatory approval before I can ship it. While I have no personal experience with the FDA approval process, my father worked for a company in the healthcare industry - I'd hear stories of multi-month long FDA audits of their hardware after a 'statistically significant' number of failures in the field. That kind of pressure is not amenable to single-man operations, as is frequent in our field - nor should a dev be on the hook for lifetime tech support for a silly lightbulb or other trinket. Yea, the infrastructure as it currently stands has issues, but while regulatory pressure will whip the big players into line, it could also easily choke out smaller players and startups. On the subject of answers, rather than questions... I have a funny story. So the XBox one has this neat feature where you can control your console via an app on your local area network PC or phone. The default setting was that any device on the network the Xbox was connected to could control it. Imagine this, in a college dorm. I saw a lot of xboxes available to control. So, after testing with a friend (yep, I could easily interfere with whatever), I developed a key combo that I could rapidly input from any console state which would open the settings menu and disable the remote control feature, locking out my own access (And I'd know it had worked because I'd be disconnected). That's right, I effectively developed a virus which patched the vulnerability. If attackers have the advantage in this field, then maybe we should put more effort into thinking about friendly counter-attackers. If the silly IoT device can be pwned, then it can be pwned for good, as it were. Does anyone know of any groups working in this area, or any research done towards it? Pen-testing and other white hat hacking activities I know about, but does anyone officially do this kind of guerilla-patching?
- CaptainZapp 10y agomy father worked for a company in the healthcare industry - I'd hear stories of multi-month long FDA audits of their hardware after a 'statistically significant' number of failures in the field. Healthcare industry? Statistically significant (which I note you put in scare quotes) failures? I damn well hope so that such incidents are taken very seriously by the FDA.
- toyg 10y agoYeah, I think his point was that it's not sustainable for a company selling $20 webcams to get that sort of scrutiny. The counterpoint is that, if the webcam is used in failure-critical situations, then it absolutely should be under that level of scrutiny. The problem is finding how you can define that operational scenario in law.
- majewsky 10y agoIn a world where random webcams can mount DDoS attacks on basically any internet service, is there any non-failure-critical situation for an internet-connected device? (Honest question.)
- csydas 10y agoI'm having difficulty finding any authoritative or historical resources on this, but I recall that "good" viruses were for some time planned that would do just that: Run around, see if they could infect via the method, then patch and self-destruct. Ultimately the idea was considered not good because of difficulties with getting it to work as expected, pressure and fear that the fix would introduce more issues, liability issues, and so on, and probably some ethics debates on computer intrusion even for the purpose of securing the device. I'm not really sure what stance to take on such an issue, since the idea behind it is good intentions, but I feel like it can lead to unintended consequences that ultimately would have no one liable. For my personal machines I have fairly vanilla setups, but many of my friends and colleagues have rahter intentionally complex set ups and most definitely would object to someone accessing their set up and making changes without their permission.
- micaksica 10y ago> A $20 webcam suddenly needs $500/year just in ongoing maintenance and updates. Yes, but what is the negative externality the market is not currently capturing when these devices are assumed into botnets and used against others? Simple economics states that the $20 device is $20 because somebody else is paying for the security mistakes of the shitty device's developers.
- ska 10y agoThis point is key and a lot of people seem to be missing it. We're collectively paying for a lot of this already, it's just hard to measure.
- tzmudzin 10y agoIt's not unreasonable to expect that a device connected to the Internet should be patchable over the same connection. As for the influence on other countries -- blocking their traffic is an effective way to convince them of the need to take action. For sure this still means temporary disruptions and maintenance cost for every operator, but it's part of the "cost of living" on the Net as long as the others don't catch up. Take it or leave it. (yes, I am aware of the security risks of hijacking the updates, but it's still still a better control than no control at all)
- woliveirajr 10y agoDon't limit that to Third World. Everywhere it's possible to open a company, sell some products, close the company and go away with the money. And I'm not saying that it must be malicious. It's not hard to find bugs and problems that were hidden in unexpected places or triggered by weird combinations of inputs. Simple mistakes (or well thought backdoors) like goto_fail and heartbleed can explode a good time after they were created. And then we will sue, get money, send to jail, but the damage will be already done.
- belorn 10y agoA third possibility, one that I find more likely and advocated by Schneier before, is that government regulates the device manufacturers rather than the devices. For example, if a company sold more than X amount of Internet-capable devices, the threat to society will have to be addressed in form of liability and insurance. Insurance companies will then enforce standards and best practices, and economics will ensure that security teams get funded. All the regulation need to do is to limit the scope of limited liability disclaimers.
- thatcat 10y agoLetting insurance companies enforce best practices seems pretty inefficient, considering how that strategy has played out in the medical markets.
- rtpg 10y agoMedical markets are a bit different. No matter who you are, you're likely to participate in the medical market. If iPhones cost $7000 instead of $700, there would be a lot less iPhones. Same for IoT lightbulbs (though they're pretty expensive already)
- thatcat 10y agoAre you suggesting that some people should be priced out of using the internet? This is exactly what I was talking about, insurance companies will use the fact that you need access to something to erect a giant money gate in front of it, justifying it with advanced tech that helps in some ways but is almost always used out of context based on the insurance companies control policies that they force practitioners to follow.
- _delirium 10y agoNot out of using the internet full stop, but out of putting internet in every random device, perhaps. If the increased liability of putting internet in your refrigerator gets reflected in the purchase price, so that an IoT fridge has, say, an extra $200 in liability tacked on vs. a non-IoT fridge, many people might choose to buy the non-IoT fridge, which is probably not really a huge loss to society overall.
- BurningFrog 10y agoA lot of horrible things are precedented. That something similar already exists is an awful argument for doing it.