7 ms·

Or nuclear tipped cruise missiles on ships or in-air bombers. The nuclear triad is still unbeatable. The article is pretty terrible in general. Hypersonics won

Or nuclear tipped cruise missiles on ships or in-air bombers. The nuclear triad is still unbeatable. The article is pretty terrible in general. Hypersonics won't change the balance of anything, especially considering what a decent sized one can do. If you're delivering nuclear-levels of destruction with hypersonics then your opponent will retaliate with nuclear weapons. There will be no exception for "Oh, you used hypersonics on us, that's cool." If anything, hypersonics make the nuclear option more likely and nation states will be wary on ever using them on another nuclear power. The article does play up a 'Russia/China will soon dominate the US' nonsense that gets ad impressions, but if these weapons ever hit a US carrier or city, then a nuclear response will be the most likely scenario. The development of these weapons has been pretty slow and no one is sabre-rattling with them for a reason. They'll fall under the category of weapons of mass destruction, which is probably what all the major powers want because the alternative is yet another arms race, on top of the low simmering nuclear arms race that exists today.

jessriedel 10y ago
> or in-air bombers. It's no longer the case that the US and Russia maintain nuclear bombers in air continuous.
- mikeash 10y ago
  It hasn't been for a long time, too. The US discontinued continuous air alert in 1968, when it became apparent that it was just too risky (planes kept crashing with live weapons on board) and ICBMs and SLBMs made it unnecessary. I'm sure it could be restarted now if it looked to be necessary, but it doesn't seem to be.
  - ekianjo 10y ago
    > It hasn't been for a long time, too If my memory does not fail me, the book COmmand Control claims that it did continue until well in the 90s.
    - jessriedel 10y ago
      This review of the book just says it was briefly re-activated from time to time, which I don't believe anyone disputes. > Speaking of heartless and barbaric, Schlosser covers Richard Nixon’s “madman theory,” which he and his close adviser Henry Kissinger developed after Nixon took over the presidency in 1969... > How to show the world he was a “madman”? Nixon and Kissinger came up with a plan in 1969. They ordered the Strategic Air Command to go on airborne alert for two weeks. “Ignoring the safety risks,” Schlosser notes, “B-52s loaded with hydrogen bombs took off from bases in the United States and flew circular routes along the coast of the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviets nor the Vietcong was fooled by the bluff.” https://vva.org/arts-of-war/history/command-and-control-by-eric-schlosser/ https://vva.org/arts-of-war/history/command-and-control-by-e... That occurred after the Thule airbase accident that prompted the end of continuous air alert in 1969. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chrome_Dome https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chrome_Dome
    - mikeash 10y ago
      From my copy: "The airborne alert program was terminated the day after the Thule accident. The risks no longer seemed justifiable, and many B-52s were now being used to bomb Vietnam." The Thule accident was, of course, in 1968. I don't recall there being anything else about a continuous alert being resumed afterwards, but I certainly could have forgotten. Edit: since we're talking about this book, if anyone is interested in stuff I highly recommend it. The full title is Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety by Eric Schlosser. Available wherever fine books blah de blah blah.
- drzaiusapelord 10y ago
  Yep, but in wartime there would be. The US can launch nuclear bombers very quickly when any threat is detected or assumed to come anytime soon (watching the Chinese roll out rockets for hypersonics for example via satellite). I suspect we have a lot of classified nuclear flights when the DoD gets worried.
theptip 10y ago
I think the nuclear angle is a red herring, and that the real destabilizing aspect of hypersonic weapons is that they can take out carriers, at much lower cost. The entire foundation of US force projection is built upon the carrier battle group. If putting your $5b carrier in the South China Sea makes it vulnerable to getting taken out by a $5m missile, then the balance of power has changed. Obviously there's nuclear weapons as the ultimate backstop, but if your adversary is China or Russia then that's MAD.
- Kroniker 10y ago
  I wanted to say exactly this- people seem to be overlooking, but this is entirely correct- it is a monetary balance changer.
- drzaiusapelord 10y ago
  I believe the common wisdom here is that no nation has remotely accurate targeting location on US carriers. This hypothetical attack would require intelligence and sensing capabilities that don't currently exist. I'm not saying this isn't possible, but right now you'd have to fly an enemy drone or plane near the carrier group to get any accurate targeting information and that plane would be shot down or jammed well before it could determine the exact locale, especially in wartime where such things would be not even be given a warning and all sorts of electric countermeasures would be on 24/7. Worse, unless the carrier is parked, its moving and hypersonic missile attacks against moving ships is an unsolved problem. You can't do last second course corrections at Mach 5. The obvious solution would be to just have many megatons of kinectic energy hit near the carrier group via a decently sized kinetic, but the US would treat that exactly as a nuclear attack by a foreign power and respond in kind. It would probably look like one to central command as well, mushroom cloud and all. I think the idea that these things will be stealthy, maneuverable, unstoppable, accurate, and undetectable is a little much. These weapons come with quite a bit of liability and might be impractical in any non-total war scenarios. The US is not going to let China and Russia blow up carrier groups with multi-megaton weapons and not respond in kind with its own megaton weapons, either nukes or large kinetics against military bases or capital cities. Once that hotpoint is reached, nuclear war is assumed. A kinetic strike against USS Ronald Reagan will mean a kinetic or nuke strike against Beijing or Moscow. The Chinese and Russians would know our escalation policies and would act accordingly if they don't plan to start WWIII with these weapons. Whether these policies have been officially written yet is the only real question here. Its safe to assume multi-megaton attacks against the US will absolutely not be tolerated and will not be treated with a conventional response.

jessriedel 10y ago

> or in-air bombers. It's no longer the case that the US and Russia maintain nuclear bombers in air continuous.

mikeash 10y ago
It hasn't been for a long time, too. The US discontinued continuous air alert in 1968, when it became apparent that it was just too risky (planes kept crashing with live weapons on board) and ICBMs and SLBMs made it unnecessary. I'm sure it could be restarted now if it looked to be necessary, but it doesn't seem to be.
- ekianjo 10y ago
  > It hasn't been for a long time, too If my memory does not fail me, the book COmmand Control claims that it did continue until well in the 90s.
  - jessriedel 10y ago
    This review of the book just says it was briefly re-activated from time to time, which I don't believe anyone disputes. > Speaking of heartless and barbaric, Schlosser covers Richard Nixon’s “madman theory,” which he and his close adviser Henry Kissinger developed after Nixon took over the presidency in 1969... > How to show the world he was a “madman”? Nixon and Kissinger came up with a plan in 1969. They ordered the Strategic Air Command to go on airborne alert for two weeks. “Ignoring the safety risks,” Schlosser notes, “B-52s loaded with hydrogen bombs took off from bases in the United States and flew circular routes along the coast of the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviets nor the Vietcong was fooled by the bluff.” https://vva.org/arts-of-war/history/command-and-control-by-eric-schlosser/ https://vva.org/arts-of-war/history/command-and-control-by-e... That occurred after the Thule airbase accident that prompted the end of continuous air alert in 1969. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chrome_Dome https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chrome_Dome
  - mikeash 10y ago
    From my copy: "The airborne alert program was terminated the day after the Thule accident. The risks no longer seemed justifiable, and many B-52s were now being used to bomb Vietnam." The Thule accident was, of course, in 1968. I don't recall there being anything else about a continuous alert being resumed afterwards, but I certainly could have forgotten. Edit: since we're talking about this book, if anyone is interested in stuff I highly recommend it. The full title is Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety by Eric Schlosser. Available wherever fine books blah de blah blah.
drzaiusapelord 10y ago
Yep, but in wartime there would be. The US can launch nuclear bombers very quickly when any threat is detected or assumed to come anytime soon (watching the Chinese roll out rockets for hypersonics for example via satellite). I suspect we have a lot of classified nuclear flights when the DoD gets worried.

theptip 10y ago

I think the nuclear angle is a red herring, and that the real destabilizing aspect of hypersonic weapons is that they can take out carriers, at much lower cost. The entire foundation of US force projection is built upon the carrier battle group. If putting your $5b carrier in the South China Sea makes it vulnerable to getting taken out by a $5m missile, then the balance of power has changed. Obviously there's nuclear weapons as the ultimate backstop, but if your adversary is China or Russia then that's MAD.

Kroniker 10y ago
I wanted to say exactly this- people seem to be overlooking, but this is entirely correct- it is a monetary balance changer.
drzaiusapelord 10y ago
I believe the common wisdom here is that no nation has remotely accurate targeting location on US carriers. This hypothetical attack would require intelligence and sensing capabilities that don't currently exist. I'm not saying this isn't possible, but right now you'd have to fly an enemy drone or plane near the carrier group to get any accurate targeting information and that plane would be shot down or jammed well before it could determine the exact locale, especially in wartime where such things would be not even be given a warning and all sorts of electric countermeasures would be on 24/7. Worse, unless the carrier is parked, its moving and hypersonic missile attacks against moving ships is an unsolved problem. You can't do last second course corrections at Mach 5. The obvious solution would be to just have many megatons of kinectic energy hit near the carrier group via a decently sized kinetic, but the US would treat that exactly as a nuclear attack by a foreign power and respond in kind. It would probably look like one to central command as well, mushroom cloud and all. I think the idea that these things will be stealthy, maneuverable, unstoppable, accurate, and undetectable is a little much. These weapons come with quite a bit of liability and might be impractical in any non-total war scenarios. The US is not going to let China and Russia blow up carrier groups with multi-megaton weapons and not respond in kind with its own megaton weapons, either nukes or large kinetics against military bases or capital cities. Once that hotpoint is reached, nuclear war is assumed. A kinetic strike against USS Ronald Reagan will mean a kinetic or nuke strike against Beijing or Moscow. The Chinese and Russians would know our escalation policies and would act accordingly if they don't plan to start WWIII with these weapons. Whether these policies have been officially written yet is the only real question here. Its safe to assume multi-megaton attacks against the US will absolutely not be tolerated and will not be treated with a conventional response.