5 ms·

Why the Navy Needs Disruption Now

44 points by Luc 10y ago

labrador 10y ago
Former sub-sailor here: An important point is made: For the Navy, a Horizon 3 conversation would not be about better carriers and aircraft. Instead it would focus on the core reasons the Navy deploys a carrier strike group: to show the flag for deterrence, or to control part of the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine amphibious force, or to project offensive power against any adversary in well-defended areas. Carriers are vulnerable and probably cannot be protected enough to survive an all out war. Too often the conversation gets side-tracked by this debate. However, carriers are very useful outside of war for projecting power and influence around the globe, so they are still very useful.
- Alupis 10y ago
  > Carriers are vulnerable and probably cannot be protected enough to survive an all out war Carriers don't travel by themselves, and are heavily defended by anti-missile/plane/sub/etc installations and supporting vessels. They may not last an entire war, but they will probably last as long as needed to tip the scale. It's more likely the carrier's aircraft will be lost before the carrier.
  - arohner 10y ago
    "In a 1982 congressional hearing, legislators asked [US Admiral Hyman Rickover] how long American carriers would survive in an actual war." his response? “Forty-eight hours”. https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-navy-s-big-mistake-building-tons-of-supercarriers-79cb42029b8#.ir5t0zedu https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-navy-s-big-mistake-building-...
    - labrador 10y ago
      Adm Rickover was known mostly for two things besides putting an atomic reactor in a submarine in the 1950's: Being consistently right and being blunt about it.
    - DrJokepu 10y ago
      I mean, Rickover was a through and through submarine guy though. This statement might be true, but he was hardly objective and without agenda when it came to surface naval warfare.
    - Alupis 10y ago
      I'd wager the first 48 hours of a modern all-out war with another major nation will be the deciding factor, or heavily tip the scales. A modern war with another major nation likely won't last months or years like traditional wars. There's too much destructive firepower available to major nations for that to be realistic. It's more likely that it will be destructive, brutal, and very swift. Not to mention Rickover said that nearly 40 years ago - our modern carrier groups have a lot more firepower and technology at their disposal - including new generation stealthy ships.
  - Benjammer 10y ago
    Still seems like such a huge attack surface compared to a dude sitting at a terminal in an NSA office or a drone pilot in Nevada or a cruise missile platform tucked away in a mountain somewhere. Aren't we past the point where giant war machines have much effectiveness when it comes to actual global war between 1st world nation-states?
    - Alupis 10y ago
      Carrier groups aren't just about giant war machines. They carry many troops and their transportation (smaller war machines, like helicopters and boats).
- karma_vaccum123 10y ago
  No surface vessel is defensible against modern anti ship missiles deployed in bulk. The Falklands War demonstrated this. Carriers have already proven themselves as valuable assets over half a century of relative peace. This is what they are to me: peace time projection platforms.
  - Benjammer 10y ago
    I would almost tend to extend that to say that no large-scale modern terrestrial base/war machine can really stand up to modern, anti-whatever missiles. There's this idea where there are two sides in war scenarios, offense and defense, attackers and defenders, like sports or whatever. It seems to me more like modern war wouldn't be two sides playing offense and defense, it would be two parties dishing out incomprehensible destruction and one-upping each other hoping that the other gives up first.
- Benjammer 10y ago
  At what point did the appearance of military power diverge from actual military effectiveness? Guerilla warfare in the 18th century? It seems like the modern militaries are probably already well aware of these two separate things, to the point where there are probably two different conversations about Horizon 1/2/3, one for projecting the appearance of power for diplomatic leverage, and the other for wartime efficacy.
  - foota 10y ago
    Projecting power isn't just about appearance, it's about being able to use your military even in small conflicts to enforce your policy.
    - douche 10y ago
      The biggest problem in recent decades seems to be the reticence to actually pull the gloves off and really fight a war. War is one of those things you have to actually do, and not dick around with, to be successful. All that artificial "Rules of Engagement" provide is a framework for the enemy to hide behind.
      - Teever 10y ago
        > The biggest problem in recent decades seems to be the reticence to actually pull the gloves off and really fight a war. I guess that's probably true if your objective is to wage war and kill. If your objective is to prevent or minimize those things than it's probably not your biggest problem at all and is actually your biggest accomplishment.
        douche 10y ago
        If you aren't willing to actually fight a war, then maybe you shouldn't fuck around and waste people's lives on a half-hearted adventure.
        Teever 10y ago
Animats 10y ago
For a better discussion of the future of aircraft carriers, see this Naval War College paper.[1] Especially the section on the various uses of carriers. They're vulnerable to an opponent with a major anti-ship missile capability, but most of the US's opponents don't have that. [1] https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-05df6e416b3b/The-Future-of-Aircraft-Carriers https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-...
niftich 10y ago
The article was a good analysis of both the down-and-dirty mission of an aircraft carrier, (i.e. actual combat, actual support), and the strategic, big-picture role of an aircraft carrier (e.g. force projection). So far so good. But I was hopelessly lost when it tried to draw an analogue between the 'need for disruption' and the larger, big-picture view of why we have aircraft carriers in the first place. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the point, but I certainly don't want any sort of disruptive, mavericky thinking applied to how, why, when a Navy (any Navy, not just "ours") deploys force projection. This does not sound like an appealing recipe for responsible use of force and for limiting provocation of other parties to just below the level that they're willing to retaliate, and the like. So, in short, I don't understand the point the author's trying to make.
- L_Rahman 10y ago
  I believe you may have misunderstood the point. The author of the post suggests that why and when remain the same - to show the flag for deterrence, or to control part of the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine amphibious force, or to project offensive power against any adversary in well-defended areas. Today, the way we do this carrier strike groups. The author is arguing that the carrier strike model for achieving these goals is now ~50 years old. If you were to start today from a blank slate to achieve those goals, you'd construct something very different from a strike force. This is where he's suggesting mavericky thinking ought to be applied - in coming up with those blank slate solutions.
ChuckMcM 10y ago
After manually magnifying the size by 8x :-) that is a pretty good overview of the defense department strategy for developing the warfighting capabilities. It also demonstrates why you start every war with equipment that would have been great for the last one but sucks for this one. The thing about war is that innovation is tolerated because people are dying. It is sad but ultimately true. When there isn't anyone dying the tolerance for risk of failure is extremely low. Even with that bias though things like rail guns and theater defense with lasers is continuing. If I were in a H-3 think tank I would be seriously thinking about what it means to have computers and sensors to be "free". Consider what it would mean if in addition to a tracer round in CIWS you fired a sensor round. A bullet with a cpu, a network, an a 9dof inertia sensor and one bit optical sensor. All sensor bullets in flight sending back telemetry about position and optical transits on their sensors above the horizon. Now your anti-ship missile has to be stealthy and invisible. That is just off the cuff but such sets of sensors are cheaper to deploy than some of these bullets.
atemerev 10y ago
You want disruption? Here are some ideas. Build drone carriers. Who needs brave pilots in fighter seats when you can get the same results with slightly less brave drone operators? You can pack a lot more than 44 drones in each carrier. Repurpose container ships. If Russians can launch cruise missiles directly from shipping containers (4 missiles per standard 40-feet container), the same can be done with drones. Imagine how much of them can be packed in 1000-container container ship, which looks like any other civilian cargo ship until the need arises. Drone operators can control entire formations of combat drones (no need to actually fly these things — point and click interface should be enough with modern tech). Autonomous refueling, sensor fusion, battlespace mapping — the only need for humans in the loop is giving "go / no go" for kill requests. Use large coordinated battlegroups with numerous uniform modular cheaper vessels instead of a few big expensive carriers surrounded by combat support. Every ship can (and should) be fitted with ECC and offensive electronic warfare options, which prevents attacking electronic support first. Try to jam 200 small ships simultaneously while they are constantly on the move in the large area — nearly impossible. No designated C&C ships — all battlegroup members can take multiple roles as needed, including command and control. Fail-deadly "nuclear options" — if battlegroup communications are jammed beyond repair, drones can be programmed to proceed with their missions fully autonomously, until kill switch signal arrives. Looks harsh, but better than actual nuclear option. Etc etc.
- cgearhart 10y ago
  These aren't disruptive ideas, they're just bad ideas. > Build drone carriers. You mean like regular carriers will be with N-UCLASS (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47B https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47B) or the optionally-manned F/A-XX (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F/A-XX_Program https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F/A-XX_Program)? > looks like any other civilian cargo ship until the need arises. This is called Perfidy. It's a war crime. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy > Drone operators can control entire formations of combat drones They have a hard enough time controlling one -- bandwidth requirements and ensuring reliable communication are hard. > point and click interface should be enough with modern tech Right up until your adversary degrades your access to all that modern tech. Military tech needs to be literally bullet-proof. > programmed to proceed with their missions fully autonomously The UN disagrees. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/09/un-urged-to-ban-killer-robots-before-they-can-be-developed https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/09/un-urged-to-...
fncndhdhc 10y ago
The author seems to be forgetting that no two first-world, nuclear armed nations can ever engage eachother ever again without total mutual nuclear annihilation occuring. He spends the entire time worrying about highly advanced technologies that are only possessed in sufficient quantities by nuclear armed states. If that equipment were ever used, it would become pointless in a matter of hours once the nuclear weapons start flying. With that in mind we ought to quit pouring all of our money on weapons designed for enemies that we can never realistically fight. It would make far more sense to retool for conflicts against insurgencies and developing nations.
- Benjammer 10y ago
  Or retool for figuring out how to get everyone on Earth to chill the fuck out for a minute.
- nostrademons 10y ago
  That's been the thesis every since the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949. It didn't stop Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, or the two Persian Gulf wars from happening. What seems to occur instead is that major powers fight via proxy wars, where they provide arms, training, covert assistance, and sometimes even open troop commitments on the soil of vassal states. This provides plausible deniability to the superpowers (neither of which actually want to see the world end in nuclear annihilation); offloads the human cost of the war onto foreign, less-developed countries; offloads the political cost onto puppet governments that can be disposed of when no longer needed; and prevents widespread public discontent from threatening the ruling government. Just because the war is likely to happen in the Persian Gulf or Sea of Japan doesn't mean that the weapons & tactics involved won't be developed by first-world nations.
  - fncndhdhc 10y ago
    >It didn't stop Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, or the two Persian Gulf wars from happening. So why do we need lasers, railguns, and stealth fighter jets to fight bands of rice farmers and goat herders?
jorblumesea 10y ago
Carriers are more of a psychological force projection than a physical one for adversaries such as China. No nation dare attack a carrier strike group because of the power behind the response if something were to happen. They are a "I'm not touching you" kind of a game at that level. A way for American to claim physical space for awhile and back up diplomatic rhetoric. I don't think anyone in the pentagon would be foolish enough to pit f/a 18s against modern missile defenses. For less well equipped armies they are used as a blunt instrument as in Syria, Iraq etc. Just so we're clear, only the most advanced countries have ASBM technology, it does not apply to many.
cgearhart 10y ago
Let's talk real disruption: money. DoD wastes money like you can't believe because they're required to. * Contracting takes forever -- actual times measured in months to years. We haven't had proper planning and budgeting from congress for almost a decade, so funds that expire are released late, forcing the services to take a bad deal signed quickly over a good deal that would come too late. * No flexibility. Projects are funded as "Programs of Record" (or not at all) and funded for their life-cycle in the budget. Services fight endlessly to keep PoRs no matter how they turn out because it is so damn hard to start new programs. * The system is designed to allow bad deals. It's legal (and not uncommon) for a prime contractor to subcontract work through a middle-man corporation that contracts back to a subsidiary of the prime to perform the work. DoD acquisition contracts include a negotiated profit fee with the prime, but often have no insight into the structure of their lower-level deals, allowing the primes to take a profit straight off the top, then an additional cut at the working level. * All new acquisitions are driven "top-down" by resource sponsors distilling warfighter needs into "requirements" that are then solved with a materiel solution. * We spend a lot of money on this stuff, and we can't make new programs, so we end up supporting things long after their planned EOL. Check out B-52s, A-10s, F/A-18s, weapons, etc. It costs a lot of money to keep supporting this stuff. * PoRs usually require a competitive tech development phase where you pay two prime contractors to build solutions before doing a competitive down-select. So... Make it easier to contract. Easier to spend small amounts of money to test solutions. PoRs should grow out of successful products, not the BS we do now. Be a bully in contract negotiations, and put some teeth in the regulations on contractors playing shell games. We don't see much innovation because the services can't move quickly, and they can't adapt to changing requirements. How bout we disrupt that?

44 points by Luc 10y ago

Former sub-sailor here: An important point is made: For the Navy, a Horizon 3 conversation would not be about better carriers and aircraft. Instead it would focus on the core reasons the Navy deploys a carrier strike group: to show the flag for deterrence, or to control part of the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine amphibious force, or to project offensive power against any adversary in well-defended areas. Carriers are vulnerable and probably cannot be protected enough to survive an all out war. Too often the conversation gets side-tracked by this debate. However, carriers are very useful outside of war for projecting power and influence around the globe, so they are still very useful.

Alupis 10y ago
> Carriers are vulnerable and probably cannot be protected enough to survive an all out war Carriers don't travel by themselves, and are heavily defended by anti-missile/plane/sub/etc installations and supporting vessels. They may not last an entire war, but they will probably last as long as needed to tip the scale. It's more likely the carrier's aircraft will be lost before the carrier.
- arohner 10y ago
  "In a 1982 congressional hearing, legislators asked [US Admiral Hyman Rickover] how long American carriers would survive in an actual war." his response? “Forty-eight hours”. https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-navy-s-big-mistake-building-tons-of-supercarriers-79cb42029b8#.ir5t0zedu https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-navy-s-big-mistake-building-...
  - labrador 10y ago
    Adm Rickover was known mostly for two things besides putting an atomic reactor in a submarine in the 1950's: Being consistently right and being blunt about it.
  - DrJokepu 10y ago
    I mean, Rickover was a through and through submarine guy though. This statement might be true, but he was hardly objective and without agenda when it came to surface naval warfare.
  - Alupis 10y ago
    I'd wager the first 48 hours of a modern all-out war with another major nation will be the deciding factor, or heavily tip the scales. A modern war with another major nation likely won't last months or years like traditional wars. There's too much destructive firepower available to major nations for that to be realistic. It's more likely that it will be destructive, brutal, and very swift. Not to mention Rickover said that nearly 40 years ago - our modern carrier groups have a lot more firepower and technology at their disposal - including new generation stealthy ships.
- Benjammer 10y ago
  Still seems like such a huge attack surface compared to a dude sitting at a terminal in an NSA office or a drone pilot in Nevada or a cruise missile platform tucked away in a mountain somewhere. Aren't we past the point where giant war machines have much effectiveness when it comes to actual global war between 1st world nation-states?
  - Alupis 10y ago
    Carrier groups aren't just about giant war machines. They carry many troops and their transportation (smaller war machines, like helicopters and boats).
karma_vaccum123 10y ago
No surface vessel is defensible against modern anti ship missiles deployed in bulk. The Falklands War demonstrated this. Carriers have already proven themselves as valuable assets over half a century of relative peace. This is what they are to me: peace time projection platforms.
- Benjammer 10y ago
  I would almost tend to extend that to say that no large-scale modern terrestrial base/war machine can really stand up to modern, anti-whatever missiles. There's this idea where there are two sides in war scenarios, offense and defense, attackers and defenders, like sports or whatever. It seems to me more like modern war wouldn't be two sides playing offense and defense, it would be two parties dishing out incomprehensible destruction and one-upping each other hoping that the other gives up first.
Benjammer 10y ago
At what point did the appearance of military power diverge from actual military effectiveness? Guerilla warfare in the 18th century? It seems like the modern militaries are probably already well aware of these two separate things, to the point where there are probably two different conversations about Horizon 1/2/3, one for projecting the appearance of power for diplomatic leverage, and the other for wartime efficacy.
- foota 10y ago
  Projecting power isn't just about appearance, it's about being able to use your military even in small conflicts to enforce your policy.
  - douche 10y ago
    The biggest problem in recent decades seems to be the reticence to actually pull the gloves off and really fight a war. War is one of those things you have to actually do, and not dick around with, to be successful. All that artificial "Rules of Engagement" provide is a framework for the enemy to hide behind.
    - Teever 10y ago
      > The biggest problem in recent decades seems to be the reticence to actually pull the gloves off and really fight a war. I guess that's probably true if your objective is to wage war and kill. If your objective is to prevent or minimize those things than it's probably not your biggest problem at all and is actually your biggest accomplishment.
      - douche 10y ago
        If you aren't willing to actually fight a war, then maybe you shouldn't fuck around and waste people's lives on a half-hearted adventure.
        Teever 10y ago

Animats 10y ago

For a better discussion of the future of aircraft carriers, see this Naval War College paper.[1] Especially the section on the various uses of carriers. They're vulnerable to an opponent with a major anti-ship missile capability, but most of the US's opponents don't have that. [1] https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-05df6e416b3b/The-Future-of-Aircraft-Carriers https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-...

niftich 10y ago

The article was a good analysis of both the down-and-dirty mission of an aircraft carrier, (i.e. actual combat, actual support), and the strategic, big-picture role of an aircraft carrier (e.g. force projection). So far so good. But I was hopelessly lost when it tried to draw an analogue between the 'need for disruption' and the larger, big-picture view of why we have aircraft carriers in the first place. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the point, but I certainly don't want any sort of disruptive, mavericky thinking applied to how, why, when a Navy (any Navy, not just "ours") deploys force projection. This does not sound like an appealing recipe for responsible use of force and for limiting provocation of other parties to just below the level that they're willing to retaliate, and the like. So, in short, I don't understand the point the author's trying to make.

L_Rahman 10y ago
I believe you may have misunderstood the point. The author of the post suggests that why and when remain the same - to show the flag for deterrence, or to control part of the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine amphibious force, or to project offensive power against any adversary in well-defended areas. Today, the way we do this carrier strike groups. The author is arguing that the carrier strike model for achieving these goals is now ~50 years old. If you were to start today from a blank slate to achieve those goals, you'd construct something very different from a strike force. This is where he's suggesting mavericky thinking ought to be applied - in coming up with those blank slate solutions.

ChuckMcM 10y ago

After manually magnifying the size by 8x :-) that is a pretty good overview of the defense department strategy for developing the warfighting capabilities. It also demonstrates why you start every war with equipment that would have been great for the last one but sucks for this one. The thing about war is that innovation is tolerated because people are dying. It is sad but ultimately true. When there isn't anyone dying the tolerance for risk of failure is extremely low. Even with that bias though things like rail guns and theater defense with lasers is continuing. If I were in a H-3 think tank I would be seriously thinking about what it means to have computers and sensors to be "free". Consider what it would mean if in addition to a tracer round in CIWS you fired a sensor round. A bullet with a cpu, a network, an a 9dof inertia sensor and one bit optical sensor. All sensor bullets in flight sending back telemetry about position and optical transits on their sensors above the horizon. Now your anti-ship missile has to be stealthy and invisible. That is just off the cuff but such sets of sensors are cheaper to deploy than some of these bullets.

atemerev 10y ago

You want disruption? Here are some ideas. Build drone carriers. Who needs brave pilots in fighter seats when you can get the same results with slightly less brave drone operators? You can pack a lot more than 44 drones in each carrier. Repurpose container ships. If Russians can launch cruise missiles directly from shipping containers (4 missiles per standard 40-feet container), the same can be done with drones. Imagine how much of them can be packed in 1000-container container ship, which looks like any other civilian cargo ship until the need arises. Drone operators can control entire formations of combat drones (no need to actually fly these things — point and click interface should be enough with modern tech). Autonomous refueling, sensor fusion, battlespace mapping — the only need for humans in the loop is giving "go / no go" for kill requests. Use large coordinated battlegroups with numerous uniform modular cheaper vessels instead of a few big expensive carriers surrounded by combat support. Every ship can (and should) be fitted with ECC and offensive electronic warfare options, which prevents attacking electronic support first. Try to jam 200 small ships simultaneously while they are constantly on the move in the large area — nearly impossible. No designated C&C ships — all battlegroup members can take multiple roles as needed, including command and control. Fail-deadly "nuclear options" — if battlegroup communications are jammed beyond repair, drones can be programmed to proceed with their missions fully autonomously, until kill switch signal arrives. Looks harsh, but better than actual nuclear option. Etc etc.

cgearhart 10y ago
These aren't disruptive ideas, they're just bad ideas. > Build drone carriers. You mean like regular carriers will be with N-UCLASS (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47B https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47B) or the optionally-manned F/A-XX (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F/A-XX_Program https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F/A-XX_Program)? > looks like any other civilian cargo ship until the need arises. This is called Perfidy. It's a war crime. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy > Drone operators can control entire formations of combat drones They have a hard enough time controlling one -- bandwidth requirements and ensuring reliable communication are hard. > point and click interface should be enough with modern tech Right up until your adversary degrades your access to all that modern tech. Military tech needs to be literally bullet-proof. > programmed to proceed with their missions fully autonomously The UN disagrees. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/09/un-urged-to-ban-killer-robots-before-they-can-be-developed https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/09/un-urged-to-...

fncndhdhc 10y ago

The author seems to be forgetting that no two first-world, nuclear armed nations can ever engage eachother ever again without total mutual nuclear annihilation occuring. He spends the entire time worrying about highly advanced technologies that are only possessed in sufficient quantities by nuclear armed states. If that equipment were ever used, it would become pointless in a matter of hours once the nuclear weapons start flying. With that in mind we ought to quit pouring all of our money on weapons designed for enemies that we can never realistically fight. It would make far more sense to retool for conflicts against insurgencies and developing nations.

Benjammer 10y ago
Or retool for figuring out how to get everyone on Earth to chill the fuck out for a minute.
nostrademons 10y ago
That's been the thesis every since the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949. It didn't stop Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, or the two Persian Gulf wars from happening. What seems to occur instead is that major powers fight via proxy wars, where they provide arms, training, covert assistance, and sometimes even open troop commitments on the soil of vassal states. This provides plausible deniability to the superpowers (neither of which actually want to see the world end in nuclear annihilation); offloads the human cost of the war onto foreign, less-developed countries; offloads the political cost onto puppet governments that can be disposed of when no longer needed; and prevents widespread public discontent from threatening the ruling government. Just because the war is likely to happen in the Persian Gulf or Sea of Japan doesn't mean that the weapons & tactics involved won't be developed by first-world nations.
- fncndhdhc 10y ago
  >It didn't stop Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, or the two Persian Gulf wars from happening. So why do we need lasers, railguns, and stealth fighter jets to fight bands of rice farmers and goat herders?

jorblumesea 10y ago

Carriers are more of a psychological force projection than a physical one for adversaries such as China. No nation dare attack a carrier strike group because of the power behind the response if something were to happen. They are a "I'm not touching you" kind of a game at that level. A way for American to claim physical space for awhile and back up diplomatic rhetoric. I don't think anyone in the pentagon would be foolish enough to pit f/a 18s against modern missile defenses. For less well equipped armies they are used as a blunt instrument as in Syria, Iraq etc. Just so we're clear, only the most advanced countries have ASBM technology, it does not apply to many.

cgearhart 10y ago

Let's talk real disruption: money. DoD wastes money like you can't believe because they're required to. * Contracting takes forever -- actual times measured in months to years. We haven't had proper planning and budgeting from congress for almost a decade, so funds that expire are released late, forcing the services to take a bad deal signed quickly over a good deal that would come too late. * No flexibility. Projects are funded as "Programs of Record" (or not at all) and funded for their life-cycle in the budget. Services fight endlessly to keep PoRs no matter how they turn out because it is so damn hard to start new programs. * The system is designed to allow bad deals. It's legal (and not uncommon) for a prime contractor to subcontract work through a middle-man corporation that contracts back to a subsidiary of the prime to perform the work. DoD acquisition contracts include a negotiated profit fee with the prime, but often have no insight into the structure of their lower-level deals, allowing the primes to take a profit straight off the top, then an additional cut at the working level. * All new acquisitions are driven "top-down" by resource sponsors distilling warfighter needs into "requirements" that are then solved with a materiel solution. * We spend a lot of money on this stuff, and we can't make new programs, so we end up supporting things long after their planned EOL. Check out B-52s, A-10s, F/A-18s, weapons, etc. It costs a lot of money to keep supporting this stuff. * PoRs usually require a competitive tech development phase where you pay two prime contractors to build solutions before doing a competitive down-select. So... Make it easier to contract. Easier to spend small amounts of money to test solutions. PoRs should grow out of successful products, not the BS we do now. Be a bully in contract negotiations, and put some teeth in the regulations on contractors playing shell games. We don't see much innovation because the services can't move quickly, and they can't adapt to changing requirements. How bout we disrupt that?