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I didn't see anything that makes it unique to recaptcha. Any fingerprint able traffic pattern that can be observed coming and going will work. I could make a w
by tedunangst 10y ago
I didn't see anything that makes it unique to recaptcha. Any fingerprint able traffic pattern that can be observed coming and going will work.
I could make a website that adds random(1, 64) one pixel images to each page. As you browse the site, you'll be broadcasting 6 bits of identifier with every click.
- jerf 10y agoI don't see anything that makes this unique to CloudFlare, either. (You imply this in your point, but given the specificity of the accusation, I think it's worth clearly pointing out.)
- SwellJoe 10y agoI believe the "unique to CloudFlare" element is that CloudFlare effectively sees traffic for significant portions of the web...but is one entity. So, a powerful enough hostile actor (say, a state) would only need to compromise one entity (CloudFlare) to exploit users of thousands of websites, including many major ones. Er, well, two entities, because they also need entrance data. So, if a state were to compromise an ISP and CloudFlare it would give that state a lot of Tor users identities. Very few small-ish entities have such a large reach and can interject themselves into so many connections on the web.
- jerf 10y agoBut if we're talking about The Adversary, then they're already deeper in than CloudFlare will ever be, so... what's different?
- yoo1I 10y agoThe difference is that reCAPTCHA provides a detectable traffic pattern and is already widely deployed. This provides plausible deniability. Other than that, I don't see a difference.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- SwellJoe 10y agoCloudFlare is an endpoint for predictable actions; and serves overseas websites. So, even a state that doesn't necessarily have power to infiltrate a foreign host might still be able to identify users of those foreign hosts. So, say I use Tor to make political comments on a foreign website; one that I have reasonable trust is outside the reach of my government. But, say that website uses CloudFlare and CloudFlare has servers that are within reach of my government. That's the difference. It is a difference of degree, rather than kind, but a difference nonetheless. Powerful actors have always had some ability to compromise Tor by compromising the requesting side (the ISP of the target of an investigation, for example), and then the receiving side (the website where your suspect does the thing you're investigating them for...possibly a honey pot setup specifically to catch people who do this thing, or possibly a website whose owner has already been arrested, prosecuted and made a deal that allowed access to the systems). CloudFlare just adds an additional element of uncertainty for Tor users: Will this CAPTCHA take place in a way and place that allows someone to narrow down my identity? As with a lot of the security concerns about Tor, one has to take it as weights on a scale. Who are my attackers, and what level of attack can they bring against my traffic? If your privacy concerns don't include state level actors, then this is probably a theoretical attack. If your attackers do include state level actors, then it is a concern to be aware of. State level actors have other means of compromising your identity and traffic, of course, but this is one of them, and if I understand it correctly, it is a valid concern.
- onecooldev24 10y agoData between you and tor nodes are encrypted, no way your idea will work.
- tedunangst 10y agoEncryption doesn't obscure the size or frequency of requests.
- onecooldev24 10y agoIt does obscure the size, maybe not the frequency. Best have JS disabled when you come across this.
- garrettr_ 10y ago> It does obscure the size Encryption does not inherently obscure the size of plaintext. Protocols may choose to pad plaintext for various reasons, and both Tor (since Tor always sends fixed-width cells) and TLS (when it uses a block cipher mode) do so. However, the amount of padding is typically small and can hardly be said to "obscure" the size of a request - it is not a defense against traffic analysis.
- onecooldev24 10y ago> since Tor always sends fixed-width cells you send 1px of data or 500px tor always send fixed width cells. There is no question of padding here.
- mynameisvlad 10y agoI believe what he's saying is that it'll pad to fit those cells. If you're sending 500b of data in 16b chunks, you'll need some padding (12b) in there to fit into 32x16 = 512b.
- onecooldev24 10y ago
- sitkack 10y agoThe problem is that traffic is passed all the way through the network. A solution would be to have a transformative proxy on the inside of the tor network running as a hidden service that made requests on your behalf. Then it could possibly respond with .har files or some other transformed asset that doesn't match the same traffic signature. VPN into Tor, terminate at a high level proxy and then exit Tor through this intermediary.