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How Russia Works on Intercepting Messaging Apps
- finishingmove 11y agoI love reading gray on gray. No, really, the web needs more of this. Let's also make sure the font is readable only on retina displays.
- usaphp 11y agoMaybe it's your monitor's issue, it looks very readable on mine.
- douchescript 11y agoYep, looked super.
- stordoff 11y agoIt's readable fine on mine as well, but the screenshot in the article (black text on white) is much more pleasant to read.
- sarnowski 11y agoYes, http://contrastrebellion.com/ http://contrastrebellion.com/
- marcosdumay 11y agoDoes this site break scrolling for artistic irony?
- switch007 11y agoAlso, I think font-weight: 100 looks a bit...I don't know, heavy? Who wants to help me put forward a spec for font weights 1-99 (in increments of 1)?
- cookiemonsta 11y agoi agree, but if you highlight it, it is much easier on the eyes.
- pigscantfly 11y agoIt's interesting that the Russian state relies on these multi-party procedures (security service contacts telco to cut off service to initiate attack) rather than unilateral interception, which as the author says, might not only be simpler but also less detectable.
- nxzero 11y agoJust because the teleco said something happened doesn't mean that's what happened. Lot of other ways even an average attacker could due this if they had the resources to do it, and unlikely that a service provider would tell a customer what happen; they could be the attacker testing the systems.
- frozenport 11y agoThey wanted the history which might not be available in a intercept of current data.
- chinathrow 11y agoLesson No 1: Don't tie your messaging account to your cell number. E.g. Threema allows that.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- rotw 11y agoWhat about Signal?
- guilhas 11y agoA guy working for NATO thinks that Russia...
- weitzj 11y agoIt would be nice to have a distributed 2 factor authentication using something like bitcoin or ipfs.com
- nxzero 11y agoBitchains would leak a massive amount of metadata.
- nxzero 11y agoEven E2E apps like Signal use a device's number to setup an account; meaning as of a month ago, at least for the app, the device number was required to created an account. Maybe this isn't an issue, but seems odd to me.
- chinathrow 11y agoNot all E2E apps do that, e.g. Threema can be used withouth a cell number showing up in your account. I'm sure there are others doing the same.
- venomsnake 11y agoEasy solution. Create the account with number with some operator in other jurisdiction.
- chinathrow 11y agoSS7 issues are widespread - that wouldn't help in every case.
- retox 11y agoI can confirm, Signal will not go through initial run without access to your IMEI, even for an existing account.
- nxzero 11y agoAwesome, any suggestions on how to reproduce this at runtime and/or find the related code on GitHub? Thanks!
- Amir6 11y agoHow is this a good thing for privacy?
- nxzero 11y agoWhat would be a better solution, why, and what if any trade offs might exists between the options? Do you use the app or code?
- mtamizi 11y agoIt's one thing to rely on phone numbers for authentication, it's yet another to store the messages. The same scenario on WhatsApp would have given the attacker access to the account but not the message history, which is presumably what they were after.
- dendory 11y agoIt's all fine and good to point out how insecure SMS is, and various ways that 2-factor auth may have been improved, but I think the bottom line is that when your adversary is the government, police and telecom provider working together, the means you use to protect yourself are irrelevant, if they really want to bring you down, they will. The solution is in democratization and lobbying for proper laws to be passed.
- snitko 11y agoThe solution is to make it extremely difficult/costly for them. It is never democratization and lobbying, because for a person to see any kind of change in the direction he wishes, it may take years. And even then it's just asking your masters for permission. Technology gives us a quick way to bypass government, make it irrelevant.
- dcposch 11y agoNo, we need both politics and technology. First, we need an organized and determined political movement to defend civil liberties in general and our right to privacy in particular. To an extent the EFF and ACLU fill that role, but I think we can do better. Check out the NRA for example--I happen to oppose its mission, but I am still impressed by its effectiveness. The NRA can literally decide which political campaigns get funded. If a congressperson supports real gun control, suddenly they have a well funded opponent in the primary. We need that level of organization. When our own ancient and tech illiterate congresspeople here in California try to ban encryption, we need to be organized so we can get together and replace them. Second, we need technology that provides privacy by default. For example, WhatsApp for messaging. E2E encryption is not magic, but it does make mass surveillance a lot harder, because there's no central database of everyones conversations. It does a lot to protect ordinary citizens from fishing expeditions. Deprecating plain HTTP, making HTTPS ubiquitous for the web, is also a huge win and is already underway. Both parts go together. We need to work on the politics and on the technology of freedom at the same time.
- snitko 11y ago
- kabouseng 11y agoThere is a couple of points I disagree with this article. First off two factor authentication and resetting your account use sms's for recovery not so much to get access to your social graph and thereby "growth hacking", but because proving someone's identity you don't know personally digitally is a hard unsolved problem (pgp key ceremonies and web of trust certainly didn't solve it). Second, saying you should use end to end encryption doesn't prevent someone from resetting your account and getting access, so it is not some sort of silver bullet. It does however prevent an attacker from reading your past messages, but after getting access they will be able to read all your current messages on multi device services.
- e12e 11y agoIt seems unlikely that the Russian intelligence services would be forced to this in such an obvious manner. But it might have been done in such an obvious way to act as a deterrent: like a van parked outside a dissidents house: We are watching you, and want you to know that we are watching you?
- SXX 11y ago> We are watching you, and want you to know that we are watching you? This. People they watching doesn't represent any real danger to regime as otherwise they would easily put them in prison for no reason. So in that case intelligence only goal is to make activists life as hard as possible and force them to leave the country or stop being activist. They periodically confiscate their personal phones / computers during searches in their property and offices. People smart enough to use crypto and it's not that easy to get control over accounts on services that are not hosted in Russia.
- jacobush 11y agoIt also follows the Soviet tradition - they used that "we want you to know you are watched" tactic a LOT.
- mlvljr 11y agoИз пальца высосано :) Cheers from the place
- Amir6 11y agoThis shows the absurd ignorance of many people (including security experts and even Snowden himself!) on using messaging apps that are based on phone number. As stated many times, there are limited number of phone numbers possible for every country, so even if the database only consists of some sort of hash value instead of the number itself, the system is vulnerable to identity theft and user identification. Practically in any country governments have a database of people's phone number (correlated to their social security numbers, banking info used to pay the bills, street addresses and even IMEI,MAC address of the devices they used or bought for that account). I wish someone could tell me why an app like Telegram or even Signal (which both make many claims on their encryption capabilities and are endorsed by activists) are based on such fundamental security flaw!