11 ms·
This is really excellent. A few thoughts: 1) They seem to have replaced TLS/SSL between client and server with "Noise Pipes". Based on a couple of minutes Goog
by mike_hearn 11y ago
This is really excellent. A few thoughts:
1) They seem to have replaced TLS/SSL between client and server with "Noise Pipes". Based on a couple of minutes Googling this seems to be a brand new one-man protocol from Trevor Perrin (the same guy who did Axoltl on which Signal is based). At least, I'd never heard of it. I wonder if this is the first inkling of a post-TLS future?
http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html
2) It's a shame to see key words be killed off by internationalisation concerns. 12 words seems so much more friendly, at least to English speakers, than a 50 digit number. In practice I doubt any non-trivial numbers of people will ever compare codes by reading out such a number. I hope further research here can develop better replacements for encoding short binary strings in i18n friendly ways (perhaps with icons instead of specific words? if you don't speak a common language with your chat partner then the app is useless anyway).
3) What's the next step? My feeling is that the next step is securing the build and distribution pipeline. WhatsApp could partner with security firms around the world, like Kaspersky Lab in Moscow, perhaps one in Germany and another in Iran, to make it harder for the software to be forcibly backdoored by a single decision of a single government representative. This would require splitting the RSA signing keys used by the app stores. I have some code in my inbox that claims it can do this (it's written by some academics and I obtained it after a bit of a runaround) but I never found the time to play with it.
Of course, getting a bunch of security firms to sign off on every update, no matter how trivial that update is, might prove politically difficult inside Facebook. If mobile platforms supported in-app sandboxing better then the app could slowly be refactored to be more like Chrome, where the base layer doesn't trust the upper layers. Those upper layers wouldn't have access to key material and could then be updated more freely than the higher privileged components.
- envy2 11y ago> 2) It's a shame to see key words be killed off by internationalisation concerns. 12 words seems so much more friendly, at least to English speakers, than a 50 digit number. In practice I doubt any non-trivial numbers of people will ever compare codes by reading out such a number. I hope further research here can develop better replacements for encoding short binary strings in i18n friendly ways (perhaps with icons instead of specific words? if you don't speak a common language with your chat partner then the app is useless anyway). There's a QR code representation as well that can be scanned to verify.
- jszymborski 11y agoI feel like there are a lot of security issues with QR code representations, namely that the information are even less transparent than hexadecimal fingerprints, and therefore are not really a fail-safe to MITM attacks.
- kevincox 11y agoI'm not sure about this. If they can change what QR code you are seeing they can change the words as well.
- drdaeman 11y agoA wild idea: a string of distinctive emojis (distinctive: I mean, not allowing emojis that are too close, like too similar face expressions where only smaller details differ) They're unified, they're mostly language-agnostic, and there is shitload of them so the representation would be much more compact than hexadecimal or base64-encoded string.
- jsmthrowaway 11y agoCryptography software built with emojis would probably the final straw to me burning down my career, destroying every computing device I own, buying a shrimp boat, and living out my days at sea with a Lieutenant Dan stand-in by my side, wistfully remembering the good times when the computing world made sense as Bud Light finds its way down my jaded, cynical throat. Put it on a .io domain for bonus points.
- drdaeman 11y agoHey, hey, if that nonsense would appear in my XMPP client I'd really feel the urge do to the same. But aren't we're talking about modern popular messaging apps here? If those only'd be international, I'd seriously propose key fingerprints based on animated meme-filled "gifs". Because that's what the common audience understands (or at least my impression is so). Not some weird-looking strings of meaningless digits and letters.
- moxie 11y ago> They seem to have replaced TLS/SSL between client and server with "Noise Pipes". WhatsApp was already using a custom protocol instead of TLS. We worked with them to transition over to Noise Pipes, which has some advantages over what they were doing before. Also, we've renamed Axolotl to Signal Protocol: https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal-inside-and-out/ https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal-inside-and-out/
- mike_hearn 11y agoThanks. As an aside, what's with Nietzsche? He seems to crop up in your screenshots quite frequently.
- defen 11y ago"The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. If you try it, you will be lonely often, and sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself." (just a guess)
- tptacek 11y agoIt is killing me that you didn't rename Signal to Axolotl.
- aw3c2 11y agoWhy? "Axolotl" at least has seriously pronunciation issues so I am glad it is not used "user-side".
- ge0rg 11y agoBut it had a significantly better signal-to-noise (SCNR) ratio when looking for specifications, code and docs. The original "axolotl" term comes from a completely different domain, so it was easy to distinguish and filter for. "Signal" in IT usually means UNIX inter-process communication.
- tptacek 11y ago
- erkkie 11y agoReproducible builds help with 3) as well. There was just an announcement re that a few days ago: https://whispersystems.org/blog/reproducible-android/ https://whispersystems.org/blog/reproducible-android/
- humanrebar 11y ago> What's the next step? Is there any work on encrypting group chat sessions?
- mike_hearn 11y agoPlease read the articles. It already says that those are encrypted, as well as voice calls. Apparently once everyone is upgraded, nothing will be unencrypted. Their white paper also describes the protocols used in quite a lot of detail.
- jamesdwilson 11y agono proof without open source
- kmch 11y agoYou could inspect the packets yourself to see that they are encrypted.
- jamesdwilson 11y agohow do i know they aren't sending the chat log in a side channel, encrypted?
- koide 11y agoIt's worse to use an encrypted but potentially compromised channel than a plain text one only when you assume the encryption is not in fact compromised, which you shouldn't do. So I fail to see the problem. It still likely protects you from nosy neighbors or nasty non tech savvy competitors, even if it doesn't protect you from state level actors or from Facebook itself. The above, in addition to the fact that open source is neither required for auditing, nor guarantees proper auditing occurring (see OpenSSL having vulnerabilities for years before anybody released them to the public)
- jamesdwilson 11y ago
- martindevans 11y ago> It's a shame to see key words be killed off by internationalisation concerns [....] I hope further research here can develop better replacements for encoding short binary strings in i18n friendly ways I rather like the urbit way of encoding numbers. I can't remember the exact details but it's something like: There are 256 unique three letter words (all nonsense, but deliberately picked to be possible to pronounce). Each word is mapped to a byte and then a blob of binary data becomes a nonsense word. So for example "tasfyn-partyv" instead of "1242B24A".
- kuschku 11y ago> deliberately picked to be possible to pronounce That only works in English, again.
- stormbrew 11y agoIt seems like there could be a lowest-common-denominator set of phonemes that such a system could be built on, with translations into symbol groups for different languages. As long as those symbol groups are relatable by two people who speak the same language, that might be sufficient?
- avn2109 11y ago>> "lowest-common-denominator set of phonemes" They already spent a bunch of time and effort finding these phonemes to build Esperanto, right?
- stormbrew 11y agoThat would probably still be a very eurocentric set of phonemes, so probably would not really be suitable for the modern multilingual world, I would think.
- pgeorgi 11y agoEsperanto was designed to be partially understandable by people across Europe by lifting words from various languages liberally. Lojban is designed to be well-defined on phonemes, but that still only works when knowing its (rather simple) pronunciation rules.
- zeveb 11y agoNoise is really interesting. I'd hoped from the name that it might incorporate some of the ideas behind Dust[1], which attempts to hide even that there is a Dust session going on, and what the public and private keys of the recipients are. No such luck — still, it looks very interesting. [1] http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/wileydust.pdf http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/wileydust.pdf
- skybrian 11y agoWhat's interesting about Noise?
- tptacek 11y agoIt's an expert-authored modern framework for designing fast cryptographic transport protocols that have (depending on the options you select) forward secrecy, peer authentication, and resistance to key compromise. The notion of a cryptographic protocol framework, rather than a complicated negotiation scheme for a kitchen-sink protocol, is also somewhat novel.
- StavrosK 11y ago> 12 words seems so much more friendly, at least to English speakers I have a feeling that English speakers are the minority of WhatsApp users. > if you don't speak a common language with your chat partner then the app is useless anyway They do speak a common language, it's usually just not English.
- msh 11y agoAnd the language of the clients might not be the same. I might write in English to a German friend, but my whatsapp is localized to Danish and his to Germany. How would whatsapp know what language to present the words in?
- yorwba 11y agoIt could be a selectable option.
- eridius 11y agoIt could have a language picker. It's not like you're stuck with just one language; the underlying fingerprint could be converted into any language that has an appropriate dictionary constructed for it, so all you would have to do is ensure both parties have picked the same language and you can then compare the fingerprint easily.
- jandrese 11y agoThat could get confusing. "Ok, your pattern is Bread Cloud Tiller..." "Scheiße! We're being MITMed! My pattern is Brot Wolke Pinne..."
- eridius 11y agoIf I were to design this system, I'd make the language picker very prominent and have a very clear explanation saying to make sure both parties have the same language selected before comparing the words. Alternatively, the party whose code is being confirmed would just select the language, and the other party's UI could automatically update to show the code in the chosen language. The first party would still have to pick a language both people understand but (as long as both parties have a working internet connection) there wouldn't be a sync issue.
- pfg 11y agoI keep wondering if package managers (be it Google Play, apt or dnf) are in need of a solution like Certificate Transparency. Like Certificate Transparency, it would not necessarily prevent a backdoor(/certificate) from being pushed to selected users, but it would guarantee detectability, at least after the fact. If the package as a whole is included in the log, it would also allow BinDiff-style reverse engineering of any backdoor. Application developers could scan the log for unauthorized builds of their software (i.e. key compromises), and I imagine there are some things you can do with gossip protocols for end-users as well (i.e.: how popular is this build? Am I the only one running it?). This would solve part of the trust issue both for proprietary and open source software (I mean, who's actually using or verifying reproducible builds?). It would also be a huge problem for intelligence agencies or other adversaries who want to do this undetected.
- zmanian 11y agoYes binary transparency for package managers is extremely needed esp because we've been widely publicizing this vulnerability a lot now with no real fix.
- mike_hearn 11y agoIt would be interesting but I suspect ultimately futile. Certificate transparency works because detected problems are actionable: the bad certificates can be revoked and, if necessary, so can the entire CA that was compromised. There is no way to revoke an app store, as there's only two of them that matter. So if the transparency system revealed subversion .... then what? There'd be a big uproar for a few days, but nobody would know who the target was, or what the bad app was doing, and there'd be no action that could be taken.
- pfg 11y agoI think the actual implications wouldn't be too different in production. Those are the main scenarios where Binary Transparency might be of use: 1. An application developer's private key gets compromised (either through a breach or an inside job). Binary Transparency would allow the developer to monitor the log server for any unauthorized binaries and, once detected, investigate the source of the attack, rotate keys and possibly blacklist the affected binary (not sure if a mechanism like that exists at the moment, but it would make sense with Binary Transparency). 2. The application developer is coerced into signing a binary including a backdoor. Binary Transparency would guarantee that there's a public record of a modified binary being released. This alone would probably make any adversary think twice about doing this, especially if they want to stay unnoticed. In addition to that, gossip protocols and dedicated auditors could allow users to detect odd releases even if the developers were gagged. This might very well result in the app being effectively revoked because users stop trusting it. Both scenarios would at the very least allow the backdoor to be reverse-engineered. Ultimately, I'm afraid you're probably right and the limitations and complexity of this approach probably won't make it viable for a long time. Maybe the thinking will change if we see some high-profile cases where apps are backdoored - that's what got the ball rolling for Certificate Transparency, after all.
- davorb 11y ago> What's the next step? Imho one thing that the Signal project suffers from -- and that a lot of open-source projects suffer from -- is poor documentation. They need document their protocol better, to make it easier for third parties to integrate with their system. Signal still lacks a working desktop client (no, the one that you can use if you're running Chrome doesn't count), and I'm sure tons of people would be eager to do stuff like provide integration for Pidgin if only there was better documentation.
- ge0rg 11y ago+1 for documentation. The XMPP community is trying to get "OMEMO"[0,1] rolled out, which is an XMPP adaptation of Axolotl, but fails due to missing specs[2]. [0] https://conversations.im/omemo/ https://conversations.im/omemo/ [1] https://conversations.im/xeps/multi-end.html https://conversations.im/xeps/multi-end.html [2] http://mail.jabber.org/pipermail/standards/2015-November/030622.html http://mail.jabber.org/pipermail/standards/2015-November/030...
- Spakman 11y agoI agree about the documentation and a number of other things, but why doesn't the Chromium extension count as a desktop client? You don't need to use Chromium for anything else if you don't want.
- ge0rg 11y agoI suppose the main reason is that it links to your existing Signal installation on iOS/Android, and does not work standalone.
- ianmiers 11y agoI'm hoping they deploy some from of key transparency. E.g. CONIKS or CONAME, the version Yahoo and Google are working on for e2e that already has a productionish grade sever and client[0]. Either that or give the community a practical reason why it can't be used as is, and then we can start working on alternatives. [0] https://github.com/yahoo/conam https://github.com/yahoo/conam
- pa7ch 11y agoI think he already made a strong point why CONIKS style transparency isn't all that great for end-users. See this mailing list thread that includes the author of CONIKS talking about it with moxie before CONIKS was published: https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000226.html https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000226.... https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000234.html https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000234.... Basically, users change their identity key in practice so often that a 3rd-party can't be the source of truth on whether a MITM has happened. Only the user can audit that and most users are not equipped to do so. So, towards the goal of universal e2e messaging its not clear that key transparency is a real win over the simplicity of trust-on-first-use.
- ianmiers 11y agoSo I think CONAME solves 90% of this. It's set up in such a way that third party verifiers only have to check that the update counter for each key is monotonic. Users can check just that, for the current epoch, the write counter is correct and their key is there. So only a user themselves should see a warning. (and warning cans be disabled by default ... as long as the attacker doesn't know if the user has them on or not, it's an issue) In contrast, in CONIKS, a user had to check every single epoch. Which was impractical and meant you relied on third party auditors. This doesn't deal with the restore from backup issue. I think given the FBI apple phone issue though, maybe it's worth reevaluating the risk vs. reword here. Especially if user visible warnings are opt in.
- pa7ch 11y ago
- Mafana0 11y ago> It's a shame to see key words be killed off by internationalisation concerns. I think it's actually a solid decision from WhatsApp since the majority of their users are from non English speaking countries[0]. [0]: http://www.statista.com/statistics/291540/mobile-internet-user-whatsapp/ http://www.statista.com/statistics/291540/mobile-internet-us...
- lmm 11y agoThe question isn't really what country they're from though. How many of those users can't speak English?
- tommorris 11y agoQuite a lot. One example: WhatsApp is one of the primary messaging services used in Brazil, with something like half the population using it. The vast majority of which don't speak any languages other than Portuguese. When the courts in Brazil shut down WhatsApp for 48 hours, there was a huge outcry because it is THE primary means of communication for people, especially to talk to family who have gone abroad.
- Xeoncross 11y agoCould someone explain the benefit of the noise protocol? Some of us are not well-versed in the problems or attack vectors of modern crypto.
- cmdrfred 11y agoI'd be interested as well I'm building a chat system myself and I'm currently using AES (its web based and zero knowledge so I need a javascript implementation)
- taejo 11y agoIf you don't understand the difference between a block cipher and a secure transport you probably shouldn't be writing cryptographic software.
- patcon 11y agoMy hope is that the next step for WhatsApp is to add editing of arbitrary received messages in the client app. While the protocol provides plausible deniability of messages in the cryptographic sense, it's hard for someone who sent an incrimination message to argue that their layperson recipient someone modified the message when the app doesn't allow this to happen easily
- kobayashi 11y agoWhy on Earth would someone from a liberal democracy want to partner with a security firm based in Iran?
- stelonix 11y agoPerhaps because said liberal democracies are known to spy on that someone more than Iran, North Korea and China combined.
- dvdplm 11y agoTo keep said liberal democracy honest?
- kobayashi 11y agoIran, a brutal theocratic dictatorship is going to keep a liberal democracy honest? You've got to be kidding me...